Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Avoid California DUI Checkpoints this weekend, including Redlands

California DUI checkpoint attorney news

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/tips

The Redlands Police Department will conduct a California DUI sobriety and driver’s license checkpoint beginning at 6 p.m. Friday, May 2, until 2 a.m. Saturday, May 3, at Redlands Boulevard and Seventh Street, California DUI lawyers learned today.

Grant funding for the California DUI sobriety checkpoint was provided by the California Office of Traffic Safety (OTS) which is asking for the public’s help in reporting drunken drivers by calling 911, according to California DUI attorney sources.

“Whether you’re meeting with a friend after work or attending a Cinco de Mayo party, if you plan on using alcohol, never drink and drive,” said Redlands Police Traffic Unit Supervisor Cpl. Les Jolly. “If you notice a friend showing signs of impairment, take their keys. Don’t let them get behind the wheel.”

According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTS), from 2002 to 2006, an average of 43 percent of all highway fatalities on May 5 and overnight into the early morning of May 6 were caused by impaired drivers with a blood alcohol content (BAC) level of .08 percent and above, California DUI attorneys are told.

Friday’s California DUI checkpoint is funded under an October 2007 OTS grant awarded to Redlands. The California DUI grant provides funding in excess of $350,000 to be used for California DUI Checkpoints, California DUI Saturation Patrols, Selective California DUI Traffic Enforcement and California DUI equipment, California DUI criminal defense attorneys understand.

www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com

Thousands of folks celebrate Pot Smoking Day & No California DUI cases!

California DUI attorney news

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/penalties

If Marijuana is Dangerous, How Come No One Gets Hurt at These Huge 4/20 Parties?

This year's 4/20 holiday was bigger and bolder than ever before, generating big headlines, big web traffic, and really really big pot parties. Even the Drug Czar participated by suggesting the holiday is dangerous and warning parents to keep a close eye on their children. But for all the fanfare, no one got hurt on 4/20.

I don't think one could possibly overstate how revealing that simple fact really is. Scanning the 4/20 news coverage, one fails utterly to find examples of the sort of negative outcomes we've been told to expect when people use this drug. Last week, more people got more stoned more publicly than any other day of the year. If pot is dangerous, this would be the time to learn that lesson in stark terms. So where are the hospitalizations? The fights? The car accidents?

In Boulder, CO a turnout of 10,000 produced no arrests or mishaps. This means not only that police were ignoring open marijuana use, but that the users were remarkably well behaved under the influence of the drug. They didn't fight, steal, damage property, or do anything else that would have forced the police to take action. Out of 10,000 people at a completely disorganized marijuana-themed event, nothing went wrong at all.

Similarly, at UC Santa Cruz a crowd of 6,000 led police to express embarrassment at their failure to suppress marijuana culture. And again, there were no arrests made for any offenses of any kind. Arrests and injuries are typical at sporting events, but not these giant impromptu 4/20 pot parties.

This quote from the Santa Cruz Sentinel illustrates that point nicely:


Monday, some readers and callers to the Sentinel expressed shock that police knew what was going on and yet nobody was arrested as they drove away from the gathering, apparently under the influence of marijuana.

Grant Boles, a spokesman for the California Highway Patrol in Aptos, said the CHP made no arrests Sunday…

Amazingly, the California Highway Patrol had an uneventful afternoon on the biggest pot-smoking day of the year. I guess no hippies crashed their cars that day. No one swerved over the yellow line and got pinched for DUI. You can bet we'd know about it if they had. I'm not saying people should get stoned and drive. I'm asking where to find the carnage we've been told to expect from stoned drivers.

So often, we're told that if we change our marijuana laws, everyone will get stoned and it will be horrible. Yet, when marijuana is used gratuitously by massive crowds at unsanctioned events, negative outcomes are extraordinarily rare. The drug is simply not effective at hurting people.

The whole "marijuana is harmless" argument for reforming marijuana laws certainly has its limitations, but damn, look how amazingly safe marijuana is! Wow!


California DUI lawyers have been saying that there is no connection between smoking marijuana and driving under the influence - California DUI.

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/articles

Discretion not abused for sending to prison for revocation of California DUI probation & failure to perform

California DUI criminal defense lawyer news

Filed 4/29/08 P. v.Skuljan CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, A118872

v. (Sonoma County

Super. Ct. No. SCR-476973)

DAVID ZVONKO SKULJAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

______________________________________/

David Zvonko Skuljan appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court revoked his probation. He contends the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and sentenced him to prison. We disagree and affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 8, 2005, shortly after 1:30 p.m., Windsor police officers were dispatched to investigate a suspicious vehicle that was parked in front of a house. When the officers arrived, they found appellant slumped over in the driver’s seat of a car. The officers tried to roust appellant by talking loudly and poking him with a baton. After many attempts they were successful. Appellant smelled strongly of alcohol, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. As appellant exited the car, he staggered and had to support himself on the door. Determining that appellant was severely intoxicated, the officers arrested him. While searching appellant’s car, the officers found a nearly empty bottle of brandy on the floorboard.

Based on these facts, in February 2006, appellant pleaded no contest to felony driving under the influence. (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.) The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation on the condition that he complete a residential treatment program.

In January 2007, a petition was filed alleging appellant had violated his probation by failing to complete his treatment program and by absconding from probation. Appellant admitted the violations at a hearing in May 2007.

On August 21, 2007, the court declined to reinstate probation and sentenced appellant to three years in prison for his underlying offense. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled he had violated his probation.

The trial court is granted broad authority to determine whether a probationer has violated his probation, and its ruling will be reversed on appeal only where the court abused its discretion. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 445.) We find no abuse here. Appellant admitted that he violated probation by failing to complete his treatment program and by absconding from probation. Based on appellant’s admission, the court obviously could conclude appellant violated his probation.

Appellant also argues the court abused its discretion when it declined to reinstate probation and sentenced him to prison.

Again, the standard of review we apply is highly deferential. The trial court is granted the discretion to decide whether to reinstate probation or to sentence a defendant to prison, and its decision will only be reversed on appeal if the court abused its discretion. (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909.) We find no abuse here. The probation report prepared for the sentencing hearing noted that appellant had a long history of alcohol abuse. The report also noted appellant committed the underlying offense “while he was participating on two grants of conditional sentence for DUI convictions.” The report opined that appellant’s failure to complete his residential treatment program was “not indicative of somebody who is ready to address [his] substance abuse issue[s].” The report also forecast that if appellant were released back into the community “there is a strong likelihood that he would continue to drink and endanger the public.” The trial court could, based on this record, reasonably conclude appellant was not a good candidate for probation and that he should be sentenced to prison.

Appellant contends the court abused its discretion because the only reason he left his treatment program was that a person there had asked him to act dishonestly. While that was appellant’s explanation for his conduct, the treatment program described appellant’s departure differently. On appeal, we must assume the court accepted the program’s explanation. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 528.)

Appellant also suggests the court erred because he tried to contact his probation officer shortly after he left his treatment program. While that is true, appellant then simply dropped the issue and he did not try to contact his probation officer again at any time in the following months. Indeed, appellant admitted that he “should have done more than just called . . . .” The court could reasonably conclude appellant’s minimal efforts were inadequate.

Finally, appellant contends the trial court was improperly influenced by the prosecutor’s argument that his probation violation was more serious because he was an attorney who had practiced criminal law in the past. Appellant notes that he practiced civil not criminal law. While that is true, appellant and his counsel pointed out the prosecutor’s error at the sentencing hearing. Again, on appeal we must assume the trial court properly evaluated this conflicting evidence. (People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 528.)

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to reinstate probation and sentenced appellant to prison.




III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Jones, P.J.

We concur:

________________________

Needham, J.

________________________

Stevens, J.*

*Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Mentally ill guy - shot in court - had California DUI

California DUI lawyer

To law enforcement officials, Robert Gerald Eaton was a small-time vandal with an arrest record stretching back 17 years, but to his family, he was a loving father who liked to play guitar and go fishing with his two teenage children at Lake Yosemite.

As to why Eaton drove to the Merced County Superior Courthouse and charged into Judge Brian McCabe's courtroom with two large kitchen knives Monday, that's a mystery to his family.

He had mental health problems, they say, but if Eaton battled demons, that war didn't intrude too much on a normal family life.

"We knew how he was, but we weren't going to let that stop us from being a family," Eaton's 18-year-old daughter, Lisa, said outside her family's house in a new Atwater subdivision Tuesday. Her brother, 17-year-old Robert Eaton III, remembered that his father liked to watch him play football at Buhach Colony High School. "He loved us and we loved him," Robert said.

They say there was no warning that Eaton's life would end in a burst of public violence, when a Merced County sheriff's deputy shot him to death in front of a packed courtroom.

The details of Eaton's mental health treatment aren't public record. The picture that emerges from arrest reports and court files doesn't shed much light on exactly why Eaton, 40, terrorized the courthouse Monday -- but records confirm that he struggled with his mental health and was under court-supervised psychiatric care. They also show a pattern of erratic behavior.

According to a mental health worker's statement to law enforcement, Eaton was a diagnosed schizophrenic. His encounters with law enforcement started in his early 20s with incidents such as drunken driving and public fighting.

In April 2006, he was arrested after he threw a rock through his neighbor's living room window. On his birthday -- Nov. 8 -- Eaton pleaded no contest to misdemeanor vandalism charges, reduced from a felony. McCabe sentenced him to probation and ordered Eaton to maintain his mental health treatment.

A year after the rock-throwing incident, Eaton made what his family called a desperate cry for help. He crashed his 2005 Ford Mustang into the old courthouse. He told officers that he drove into the building because he was upset that he had been denied care at Marie Green Psychiatric Center earlier that day.

At his court hearings, Eaton faced various judges, many times McCabe.

For crashing his car into the old courthouse, Eaton was sentenced to probation, ordered to pay for the damage and told to seek and maintain counseling.

Three and a half weeks ago, Judge McCabe sentenced Eaton to three years of probation, ordered him to pay fines and attend a California DUI class in a drunken driving and car theft case.

10 year California DUI look-back period in California DMV case

California DUI attorney news

Filed 4/29/08 Hoek v. Cal. Dept. Motor Vehicles CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

CYNTHIA LOUISE HOEK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

Defendant and Respondent.
B201244
(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BS104492)


APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Dzintra I. Janavs, Judge. Affirmed.

Scott Gailen, Inc., Scott Gailen and Theodore Cox for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Jacob A. Appelsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Celine Cooper and Dana T. Cartozian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

* * * * * *

Appellant Cynthia Louise Hoek (Hoek) was convicted in California of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) offense. Hoek was subsequently convicted of a DUI offense in Minnesota. Because these two convictions occurred within 10 years of one another, respondent California Department of Motor Vehicles (the DMV) suspended Hoek’s California driving privilege pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13352, subdivision (a)(3)1 for two years. Hoek challenged the suspension by filing a petition for administrative mandamus, which the trial court denied. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 8, 1997 Hoek was convicted in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County of violating section 23152, subdivision (b), driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or higher. The violation date was August 19, 1997. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Hoek was ordered to enroll and complete an alcohol program, pay a fine and remain on probation for 36 months. The standard plea waiver form that Hoek signed included a chart listing the minimum and maximum penalties for a second offense occurring within seven years.2

Nine years later, on March 16, 2006, Hoek was convicted in the State of Minnesota of violating Minnesota statute 169A.20, subdivision 1(5), driving “[w]hen the person’s alcohol concentration at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, of driving, operating, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.08 or more.” The violation date was December 28, 2005.

On May 4, 2006 the DMV, having been advised by the State of Minnesota of Hoek’s Minnesota DUI conviction, served Hoek with an order of suspension, notifying her that her California driving privilege was suspended for a period of two years effective March 16, 2006. The DMV notified Hoek that the suspension was pursuant to section 13352, subdivision (a)(3). On July 3, 2006, the State of Minnesota Department of Public Safety notified Hoek that she was entitled to reinstatement of her Minnesota driving privilege upon the payment of a fine and the passing of a written test.

Hoek filed a petition for administrative mandamus challenging the DMV’s suspension of her driving privilege. Ten months later she filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of her petition, which the DMV opposed. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Hoek’s petition. Judgment was entered against Hoek and she was ordered to pay the DMV’s costs of $320. This appeal followed.3

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review4

In ruling on an application for a writ of mandate following an order of suspension or revocation by the DMV, a trial court is required to determine, based on its independent judgment, whether the weight of the evidence supported the administrative decision. (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 456–457.) On appeal, we determine whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and independently review its legal determinations. (Ibid.)

The DMV Properly Suspended Hoek’s Driving Privilege Based on Her Out-of-State DUI Conviction

A. Section 13352 Mandates Suspension

Section 13352, subdivision (a) provides that the DMV “shall immediately suspend or revoke the privilege of a person to operate a motor vehicle upon the receipt of an abstract of the record of a court showing that the person has been convicted of a [DUI] violation of Section 23152 . . . .” Under section 23540, subdivision (a), if a person suffers a second DUI conviction under section 23152 within ten years of a separate DUI violation, that person’s driving privilege shall be suspended as set forth in section 13352, subdivision (a)(3), which specifies a suspension period of two years.

Hoek argues that because her second DUI offense involved the violation of a Minnesota statute, as opposed to the violation of section 23152, the DMV’s suspension of her California driving privilege was improper. The DMV counters that its suspension action was properly taken where, as here, the licensee violated a Minnesota statute that is found to be substantially the same as section 23152. To that end, the DMV points out that the State of California, through the DMV, is a party to the “Driver License Compact” (§§ 15000–15028), under which party states are required to report to a licensee’s home state convictions of a licensee in a party state. The home state must treat the out-of-state conviction as having been committed in the home state, so long as the convictions are of a “substantially similar nature.” (§ 15023, subd. (c).) The DMV also cites to section 13363, which gives the DMV discretion to suspend licenses based on out-of-state convictions, provided that the law of the other state pertaining to the conviction is “substantially the same” as the law of this state. (§ 13363, subds. (a) & (b).)

But we think the answer to the question of whether the DMV could properly suspend Hoek’s driving privilege for two years based on her out-of-state DUI conviction is more readily answered by a statutory provision not cited by either party or the trial court.5 Section 13352, subdivision (d) states: “A conviction of an offense in a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or Canada that, if committed in this state, would be a violation of Section 23152, is a conviction of Section 23152 for the purposes of this section, . . . . The department shall suspend or revoke the privilege to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to this section upon receiving notice of that conviction.”

Hoek does not argue that her Minnesota offense would not be a violation of section 23152 if committed in this state. To the contrary, she acknowledges that had both offenses taken place in California, the DMV would have been justified in suspending her California driver’s license. Accordingly, pursuant to section 13352, subdivisions (a)(3) and (d), the DMV was required to suspend Hoek’s California driving privilege upon receiving notice of her Minnesota DUI conviction. We therefore find Hoek’s remaining arguments challenging the suspension action to be without merit, as discussed below.

B. No Violation of Plea Bargain

Hoek argues that the suspension of her California driving privilege was improper because it violated the terms of her plea bargain. She points out that the standard plea waiver form she signed specified the maximum penalties for a second DUI offense occurring within seven years. Because her second DUI conviction in Minnesota occurred more than seven years after her California DUI conviction, she reasons that she should have been “home free.” But this argument was expressly rejected in People v. Sweet (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 78 (Sweet) and later in People v. Forrester (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1021 (Forrester), which we find to be controlling.

In Sweet, at the time of the defendants’ prior DUI convictions, five years was the maximum period in which prior convictions could be used to enhance the punishment on a new DUI offense. The law was later amended to extend the time frame to seven years. The defendants reoffended more than five years but less than seven years after their prior convictions, which were used to enhance the penalty on their current convictions. (Sweet, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 81.) The defendant in Forrester found himself in the same predicament, except that the statute had been amended to extend the seven years to 10 years. (Forrester, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 1021.)

Like Hoek, the defendants in those cases argued that the use of their prior convictions to enhance the punishment for their current convictions violated their plea agreements. These arguments were rejected. Neither the Sweet nor Forrester courts found anything in the records to support the arguments that the defendants had contracts or implied promises in exchange for their pleas to the prior convictions that those convictions were usable only for the time frame set forth in the plea waiver forms. As the Forrester court noted, the chart on the waiver form listing the penalties for a second DUI offense simply provided information concerning the relevant law at the time. (Forrester, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025.) The courts found there was no language in the plea agreements nor evidence presented that the defendants entered their pleas in reliance on the information in the chart. Furthermore, the courts concluded that any such reliance would have been unreasonable. (Sweet, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 85; Forrester, supra, at p. 1025.) The same is true here.

C. No Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause

Without citation to any authority, Hoek argues that she was subjected “to ex post facto punishment” because the law extending the time frame from seven years to 10 years in which to use a prior DUI conviction to increase the penalty for a new DUI conviction became effective more than seven years after her first conviction. Even assuming Hoek has not waived this argument by her failure to cite applicable authority or present reasoned analysis, this argument was also expressly rejected in Sweet and Forrester.

As the Sweet court stated, “Statutes enacting punishment for a defendant convicted of violating section 23152 with prior convictions do not have the effect of being ex post facto laws. [Citation.] It is the law in effect at the time of commission of the offense which controls. [Citations.]” (Sweet, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 82–83.) In 2006, when Hoek committed the current DUI offense, the law provided that an individual with a prior section 23152 conviction within the last 10 years would be subject to enhanced punishment if convicted of another violation of section 23152. (§ 23540.) As the Sweet court further noted, the offense for which Hoek was being punished is not the earlier conviction, but the subsequent offense. “The sentence imposed upon a habitual offender is not an additional punishment for the earlier crime, but ‘a stiffened penalty for the latest crime,’ which is aggravated because of its repetitive nature.” (Sweet, supra, at p. 83; accord, Forrester, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024.)

D. Equal Protection Challenge

Hoek also appears to argue that because the State of Minnesota offered to reinstate her Minnesota driving privilege within months of her Minnesota conviction, the DMV’s two-year suspension of her California driving privilege violated her right to equal protection, as guaranteed under the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of California. But Hoek’s argument in this regard is presented in a conclusory manner without reasoned analysis or citation to applicable authority. We therefore deem the equal protection issue as having been waived. (See, e.g., Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 366, fn. 2.) The finding of such waiver is particularly appropriate in light of the well established principle that courts not decide constitutional questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of the issue. (See Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230–231.)




DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The DMV is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_______________________, Acting P. J.

DOI TODD

We concur:

_______________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

_______________________, J.

CHAVEZ



1 All statutory references shall be to the Vehicle Code, unless otherwise noted.



2 At the time of Hoek’s conviction, sections 23540, subdivision (a) and 13352, subdivision (a)(3) required the DMV to suspend a person’s driving privilege for two years when convicted of a second violation of section 23152 within seven years of a separate violation of section 23152. Effective September 20, 2005, the time frame for a second violation was extended to ten years. (§ 23540, subd. (c).)



3 Neither party has addressed the issue of whether this appeal has become moot in light of the fact that as of March 16, 2008, Hoek became eligible to seek reinstatement of her California driving privilege, and, indeed, may have obtained reinstatement by the time this opinion is issued. But because a license suspension on her DMV record could have negative consequences for Hoek’s future driving privileges, we will address the merits of this appeal.



4 The DMV claims Hoek erred in seeking administrative (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) rather than ordinary (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) mandamus. We need not address the distinctions between those sections or resolve the issue given the DMV’s concession that Hoek justifiably could seek ordinary mandamus and there is no suggestion that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review. (See Moomjian v. Zolin (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1611, fn. 6.)



5 Accordingly, we invited the parties to submit briefing on this issue, which they have done.

California DUI consequences

California DUI lawyer news

May 1, 2008

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/blog

When driving any type of motorized vehicle, it is vital to consider the safety of any and all passengers in the vehicle. Many accidents that happen along the United States roadways are caused by drivers who neglect simple safety measures and disobey laws that were put into place for safety purposes.

California Driving Drunk or California DUI is one such occurrence that has numerous laws backing its enforcement.

California DUI drivers who drink and drive are not only putting themselves and their passengers into immediate danger, but also endangering anyone else on the road with them. According to the United States Department of Transportation, DUI / drunk driving incidents cause fatalities roughly every 31 minutes and injuries every two minutes.

If you think those numbers are a bit too high, take a look at another cold hard fact. In 2005 alone over 254,000 people were injured from car accidents with alcohol involved. Nearly 17,000 more individuals were killed by these same types of accidents.

In today’s California DUI legislature, even more California DUI laws are being written to help take California DUI - drunk drivers off of the road with hefty California DUI penalties.

One of the most recent of these laws was the California DUI Administrative License Revocation Law that allowed for license suspension immediately following a refusal to take a breathalyzer test by a suspect drunk driver on the side of the road. In the event of this situation, the individual would be temporarily taken to the California DUI police station and given another chance to submit a California DUI breathalyzer test to see if he/she is in fact legally California DUI - under the influence. If the individual does not comply, other means of extracting this information is possible such as a California DUI blood test.

In a more aggressive fashion, laws have been passed in the state of California that place businesses partially responsible for damages that any of their customers may have part in from purchasing or consuming alcohol beverages at the establishment. Nonetheless, these laws are having a relatively low impact on the majority of offenders. In the past fifteen years, there have been more repeated violators than ever before, California DUI lawyers are told.

If anything, these California DUI laws and legislative actions are helping to spread the word about the extensive California DUI consequences that an individual will go through if they are caught drinking and driving. Not only could your license be suspended, but you could serve California DUI jail time, serve hundreds of hours of California DUI community service, pay thousands of dollars in California DUI court fees, and even begin an unwanted California DUI criminal history that future employers can look up at any time, California DUI attorneys warn.

California DUI drivers are being urged not to drink and drive. Statistically it is the leading cause of deaths along the road ways in the United States. Calling a cab, having someone you know pick you up, or sleeping wherever you were drinking are all not only smart decisions, but could prove extremely less costly in the end, according to California DUI criminal defense attorneys.

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

First of many Cinco De Mayo California DUI checkpoints

California DUI attorneys warn of inevitable California DUI checkpoints.

April 30, 2008

REDLANDS - The Police Department will hold a California DUI checkpoint on Cinco De Mayo weekend in an effort to keep California DUI / drunk drivers off the road.

The California DUI checkpoint will be held from 6 p.m. Friday to 3 a.m. Saturday at Redlands Boulevard and Seventh Street.

About 43 percent of freeway fatalities on Cinco de Mayos from 2002 to 2006 were caused by California DUI - drunk drivers, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

The California DUI checkpoint was paid for by an Office of Traffic Safety grant, California DUI lawyers say.

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/articles

Cal Trans Driver Busted for California DUI - medication

California DUI defense attorney needed for Cal Trans Worker

www.sandiegoduilawyer.com

April 29, 2008

A Caltrans worker driving an orange state-owned Caltrans vehicle was arrested on suspicion of California DUI this morning, California DUI defense attorneys report.

California Highway Patrol Officer Max Hartley said the CHP received a 911 call at about 10:30 a.m. Tuesday from two unconfirmed witnesses who reported seeing an orange Caltrans truck allegedly swerving on eastbound Interstate 80 near the Madison Avenue exit, California DUI defense lawyers are told.

"I caught up to the witnesses and the Caltrans truck," the CHP officer reports. "The truck was using more than one lane of traffic, drifting back and forth."

Denise Adean Anderson, 48, allegedly admitted to being on medication and failed a California DUI field sobriety test. She's been taken into custody and she's been arrested for driving under the influence, said California DUI defense attorneys.

Was Max Mad? Was Denise just doin' her prescription meds? Tune in and California DUI defense lawyers may post updates here or at www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/articles or at http://www.sandiegoduilawyer.com/blog.html .

1 in 10 California Drivers have driven DUI


California Drunk Driving Criminal Defense Attorney story

www.sandiegoduilawyer.com/

One in 10 people have driven drunk

Nearly one out of 10 people admit they have recently driven while drunk, while most believe they are more careful drivers than others, according to a study released April 29, 2008 by AAA.

The AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety report found that while nearly 10 percent of motorists surveyed admitted to driving drunk during the previous month, they cited drinking and driving as the most serious safety issue on the road, and most also rated running red lights and driving while using a cell phone as serious problems.

The study raises questions about whether drivers are being honest with themselves, according to AAA of Northern California spokesman Michael Geeser. "The 'do as I say but not as I do' mentality needs to end," Geeser said.

Three out of four motorists surveyed said they were more careful than others behind the wheel, the study reported.

And while more than 80 percent also rated distracted drivers as a serious problem, more than half said they had used a cell phone while driving and 14 percent admitted to text messaging while driving, according to the study.

More than half of the motorists surveyed said they have sped up to get past yellow lights, and 5 percent admitted running red lights, despite more than 70 percent rating red light running as a serious problem, the study reported.

Geeser advised drivers to "take more responsibility for their own driving instead of blaming the other guy."

According to AAA, traffic crashes are the leading cause of death for people ages 2 to 34. AAA reports there are more than 40,000 fatalities on U.S. roads nearly every year.


San Diego DUI Lawyer


San Diego DUI


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San Diego DUI Help


1-800-The-Law-DUI


http://www.google.com

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Chiropractor with Drunk Driving Convictions keeps License to Practice

California DUI attorney news

California's board that polices chiropractors knew that one of its licensees had a drinking problem that had led to three convictions for drinking and driving. But it took no action – until it learned he had been accused of something much more serious.

Jason Phillip Goettsch of Antioch now stands accused of drugging two women in a bar in February and sexually assaulting one of them after taking them to his chiropractic office. He turned himself in Thursday.

Well before the alleged assault, the California Board of Chiropractic Examiners had heard that Goettsch's drinking was running afoul of the law. It got official notice in 2006, and again in 2007, that he had been convicted of drunken driving.

Drunken driving is grounds for disciplining chiropractors and other health care professionals, including taking away their licenses.

But the board took no action after getting notice of the 2006 offense, reasoning that it was Goettsch's first, executive director Brian Stiger said. Goettsch had been convicted in 1998 of alcohol- related reckless driving, but that was not technically a drunken driving conviction and occurred before he became a chiropractor.

After the 2007 conviction, the board normally would have moved to discipline Goettsch, Stiger said. But by that time, its budget had been cut in half by lawmakers unhappy with a series of legally questionable actions last year.

With a depleted staff, Stiger said, the board could only go after chiropractors accused of harming patients – and so put the Goettsch case on hold.

"I would say, based on what I have seen in the files, that the board acted reasonably," Stiger said.

The case is another example of spotty discipline at the chiropractic board, said Julianne D'Angelo Fellmeth, administrative director of the Center for Public Interest Law, part of the University of San Diego School of Law. The center monitors state licensing boards.

"This is a pretty egregious case," Fellmeth said. "They should have gone after this guy before this."

The Bee reported earlier this year that the board allowed a Los Angeles chiropractor to keep practicing for two years after it got notice that he had been accused of rape. It acted only after four more victims – three patients and one job applicant – reported that they had been sexually abused.

State Auditor Elaine Howle issued a report last month finding that the board had failed to aggressively pursue wayward practitioners and that delays could have allowed chiropractors accused of fraud or sexual abuse to continue to endanger the public.

Goettsch's most recent run-in with the law began when the chiropractor ran into a patient and her cousin at a bar in February, Antioch police Sgt. Diane Aguinaga said.

He is accused of drugging the two women with the "date rape" drug known as GHB and taking them to his chiropractic office, where police say he sexually assaulted one of them.

At some point, according to police, Goettsch was dragging the victim to his car after the assault when an Antioch police officer happened to see him and intervened. The woman was taken to the hospital, and Goettsch was jailed for an outstanding warrant related to one of the drunken driving cases, Aguinaga said.

The woman's blood was tested for the date rape drug, but before the results came in, Goettsch had been released from jail. Police believed he he had fled, but the chiropractor turned himself in on Thursday.

He pleaded not guilty to charges of oral copulation, digital penetration, administering a drug with the intent to commit a sexual act and possession of a controlled substance, said his attorney, Dirk Manoukian.

California law considers abuse of alcohol or drugs by health care licensees to be unprofessional conduct, subject to discipline up to revocation.

In a 2002 case, an appeals court in Los Angeles reaffirmed the validity of a state law that calls for medical doctors to be disciplined for drunken driving and other substance abuse convictions. The court found that such convictions reflect a lack of personal and professional judgment, jeopardize personal and public safety, show a lack of medical knowledge and undermine public confidence in medical professionals.

In nearly 30 cases since 2002, the chiropractic board has disciplined practitioners for drunken driving – sometimes in combination with other misconduct – including at least four cases in which the chiropractors lost their licenses.

Goettsch admitted his alcohol-involved reckless driving conviction when he applied for a chiropractic license in 1999. The board looked into the case, and issued the license anyway, Stiger said.

It investigated the 2006 conviction and closed the case "with merit," meaning that while the misconduct occurred, it didn't warrant discipline. The conviction was put in a file to be kept for five years.

When Goettsch got his second drunken driving conviction in September, the board was in the throes of a budget crisis. Legislators had slashed its funding in half after the board took several legally questionable actions, including firing its executive director without due notice and failing to adhere to the Bagley-Keene Open Meetings Act.

Lawmakers passed a bill that would have asked voters to approve a measure to strip the board of some of its historic autonomy, in addition to restoring the full budget. But when Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill, the board failed to get back the money the Legislature had withheld.

Stiger said the board now has pulled out all the stops to make sure that Goettsch no longer practices. The attorney general's office has filed a formal accusation and petitioned for an immediate suspension of his license.

California DUI warrant announcement by CHP

California DUI lawyer - CHP warrant announcement

April 29, 2008

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net

California Highway Patrol announced that the agency has received a federal grant to arrest California DUI drivers with outstanding warrants for failure to appear in court on California DUI charges, or failure to pay fines or show proof of completion of other requirements imposed by the court after a California DUI conviction, California DUI / drunk driving lawyers learned.

The CHP press release described how every year individuals are arrested for California DUI and enter the legal process and that some individuals either fail to appear in court or fail to pay fines associated with California DUI offenses. As a result, arrest warrants are issued for these individuals. However, sometimes these warrants are not served in a timely manner allowing the violators to avoid justice until they’re apprehended, California DUI / Drunk Driving attorneys are told.

The CHP has indicated that, in order to assure that proper attention is given to outstanding DUI felony and misdemeanor warrants, the CHP has launched a major anti-California DUI crackdown through a new federal grant entitled “Stop DUI II.” This grant will allow the CHP to take an aggressive approach to reduce the number of outstanding California DUI / Drunk Driving warrants by establishing teams of officers for the specific purpose of serving outstanding California DUI / Drunk Driving warrants, California DUI lawyers suspect.

California Highway Patrol officers will serve these California DUI / Drunk Driving warrants and arrest the individuals who have been evading the California DUI / Drunk Driving law. The grant’s focus is on CHP’s Valley, Golden Gate and Southern Divisions and extends through December 31, 2008, according to California DUI criminal defense attorneys.

Funding for this program was provided by a $250,000 grant through the state Office of Traffic Safety, from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, per California DUI criminal defense lawyers.

If you have failed to appear in court relating to a California DUI offense, the Court has likely issued a warrant for your arrest, and, with this grant to the CHP, it is only a matter of time before you will be accosted at your home or place of work by uniformed officers looking to arrest you on the California DUI warrant and take you to county jail.

If you want to save yourself the shock, expense and embarrassment of being arrested for California DUI in front of your family, neighbors, or co-workers, contact California DUI attorney Rick Mueller right away for assistance.

California DUI attorney Rick Mueller has 24 years of experience in helping people to get arrest warrants lifted so that they no longer have to live in fear wondering each day whether this will be “the day” when their luck will run out and they will be arrested by the California DUI police.

In some cases, California DUI attorney Rick Mueller has even been able to get the warrant recalled without the client ever having to appear in court or at a police station so call us to see if he can make similar arrangements in your California DUI case. The sooner you contact California DUI attorney Rick Mueller, the sooner he can start putting our 24 years of experience to work for you.

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/ttips.html

Supermodel Angie Everhart arrested for California DUI

California DUI lawyers watch this super model activity closely.

Former supermodel Angie Everhart was arrested for California DUI - driving under the influence (DUI) last Thursday, California DUI attorneys report.

Everhart, 38, was arrested for a California DUI / Drunk Driving charge around 2 a.m. Thursday on Wilshire Boulevard. She was released after several hours on $15,000 bail, California DUI lawyers are told.

Why was the bail so high?

It was recently reported that the redhead actress and actor Joe Pesci had ended their nine-month-old engagement.

However, a rep for Everhart denied the two were ever engaged and that they remain "good friends" despite the breakup.

Everhart was also briefly engaged to Sylvester Stallone in 1995.

Which California DUI attorney will she hire? www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com

Monday, April 28, 2008

Rocker Scott Weiland Gets Jail Sentence for California DUI

Monday, April 28, 2008

Rocker Scott Weiland Gets Jail Sentence for California DUI

Singer arrested last November for drunk driving in Los Angeles.

Scott Weiland entered a plea of no contest to California DUI and received a sentence of 192 hours in county jail for his arrest for California DUI driving under the influence in Los Angeles, California DUI attorneys hear.

The singer must complete the California DUI sentence before May 28. He was also ordered to enroll in an 18-month California DUI alcohol awareness program and pay a $2000 fine. Weiland will be on California DUIprobation for four years.

Weiland’s November 21 arrest for California DUIdriving under the influence of alcohol in California was his second California DUI offense. He was involved in a non-injury, single car accident and reportedly had a blood alcohol content just above the legal limit of .08% for intoxication, California DUI lawyer are told.

Weiland was singer for the rock group ‘Velvet Revolver’ until he was released from the band April 1. He rejoined his former band-mates ‘Stone Temple Pilots’ and is scheduled to participate in their upcoming US tour. California DUI lawyer like this rock n roll.

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

DUI stories & articles for California

California DUI attorney articles & California DUI lawyer stories

April 28, 2008

San Diego DUI Articles


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Success story of Santa Clarita California DUI Checkpoint

California DUI attorney / California Drunk Driving lawyer checkpoint update

April 28, 2008

California

The California DUI sobriety checkpoint over the weekend resulted in two DUI arrests, California DUI attorneys / California Drunk Driving lawyers reported on Monday.

Both arrests were made at the California DUI checkpoint on Lyons and Peachland in Newhall. Information about both arrests were not made available to the public, California DUI attorney / California Drunk Driving lawyers are told. No additional drivers were reportedly pulled over, and the number of vehicles that passed through the California DUI checkpoint was not yet determined, California DUI attorney / California Drunk Driving lawyers understand.

The California DUI sobriety checkpoint, which started shortly after 8 p.m. Friday and ended before 3 a.m. Saturday, was performed by the Santa Clarita Valley Sheriff's Station and the California Highway Patrol, California Drunk Driving lawyers believe.

Both California DUI law enforcement agencies routinely set up California DUI sobriety checkpoints in areas where California DUI activity is considered to be active. According to both the Sheriff's Station and the Highway Patrol, the California DUI checkpoints are aimed at educating the community about the hazards of drunk driving while enforcing California DUI drunk driving laws. The California DUI checkpoints also help detect drunk and unlicensed drivers who are on the road, California DUI attorneys are informed.

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California's Marijuana Laws & driving with marijuana

California DUI / criminal defense lawyer news

Possession of marijuana is a misdemeanor under California Health and Safety Code Section 11357.

Possession of one ounce (28.5 gms) or less is punishable by a maximum $100 fine. Jail time is possible for larger amounts or for hashish, which is an optional felony ("wobbler"). However, under Prop 36, effective July 1, 2001, first- and second- time possession-only offenders may demand a treatment program instead of jail. Upon successful completion of the program, their conviction is erased. Possession (and personal use cultivation) offenders can also avoid conviction by making a preguilty plea under Penal Code 1000, in which case their charges are dismissed upon successful completion of a diversion program. Possession offenses are expunged from the record after two years under Health and Safety Code Sections 11361.5 and 11361.7.

Possession of one ounce or less in a vehicle while driving may also be charged under Vehicle Code 23222, which is treated identically to HSC 11357 B.
No arrest or imprisonment is allowed for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana. However, police often get around this provision by charging minor offenders with intent to sell (see below).

Marijuana defined. "Marijuana means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or its resin. It does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the steilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination" (H&SC 11018).

Possession with intent to sell any amount of marijuana is a felony under Health and Safety Code 11359. Police often charge intent to sell if they see such indicia as: scales, cash, multiple packages, "commercial" packaging materials, "excessive" quantity, pay-owe seets, address books, pagers, etc.

Cultivation of any amount of marijuana is a felony under Health and Safety Code 11358. People who grow for personal use are eligible for diversion under Penal Code 1000 so long as there is no evidence of intent to sell. There are no fixed plant number limits to personal use cultivation.

Medical marijuana: Medical patients and their designated primary caregivers may legally possess and cultivate, but not distribute or sell, marijuana under Health and Safety Code 11362.5 (Prop 215) if they have a physician's recommendation or approval.

Sale, transportation or distribution of marijuana is a felony under Health and Safety Code Sections 11360. Transporting or giving away one ounce or less is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum $100 fine.

Sale or distribution to minors is a felony under Health and Safety Code 11361.

Marijuana paraphernalia are illegal to sell or manufacture, but not possess, under Health and Safety Code 11364. All marijuana paraphernalia are subject to seizure by the police.

Driving suspension for minors: Any minor (age under 21) convicted of any marijuana, alcohol, or other drug offense faces a 12-month drivers license suspension, regardless of whether the offense was driving-related. The court may allow restricted license privileges if the minor demonstrates a "critical need to drive." Vehicle Code 13202.5 . (Note: This penalty can be avoided by entering a diversion program).

Driving under the influence: It is unlawful to drive while under the influence of marijuana (or alcohol or any other drug) by Vehicle Code 23152. "Under the influence" is not specifically defined in the statute, but is interpreted to imply some degree of impairment. Therefore the mere fact of having taken a toke of marijuana does not necessarily mean one is DUI. For evidence of impairment, officers may administer a field sobriety test. Arrestees may also be required to submit to their choice of a urine or blood test under Vehicle Code 23612. Since marijuana is detectable for much longer periods in urine than in blood (several days vs. several hours), a positive urine test constitutes much weaker proof of recent use and impairment than a positive blood test. If you haven't smoked marijuana recently and are not under the influence, you are better off to choose a blood test, since you will probably pass it. However, if you are a chronic smoker or have smoked recently, you are better off to choose a urine test; even though you can expect to test positive, the question will at least remain open as to whether you were actually "under the influence" at time of arrest.

Marijuana in a Vehicle: Drivers found in possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in their vehicle are liable for a maximum $100 misdemeanor fine under Vehicle Code 23222 (larger amounts are punishable under H&SC 11357(a) and 11359).

Forfeiture: Unlike federal law, California law requires a conviction for forfeiture of property involved in a drug crime. Also unlike federal law, state law does not permit forfeiture of personal real estate for marijuana cultivation. Vehicles may be forfeited only if 10 pounds or more of marijuana is involved. Health and Safety Code 11470.

California Law search full text of codes: www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html

Federal Law: Marijuana is also illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act. Federal charges are typically brought only in large cases where commercial distribution is suspected (e.g., cultivation of several hundred plants).

http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/articles

Sunday, April 27, 2008

California DUI lawyers can fight California DUI cases


California DUI cases are not at all hopeless. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/victory.html

One must protect his or her California DUI rights by hiring a premier California DUI Attorney Specialist. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/about.html

California DUI / drunk driving punishment and penalties for being convicted of a California DUI are severe. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/penalty.html

California DUI convictions are truly not inevitable. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/ttips.html

California DUI arrestees retain excellent California DUI - DMV defense attorneys because they want to fight their California DUI cases. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/why.html

California DUI attorney prosecutors will point to several factors as evidence that one was drunk driving: poor navigation of one's vehicle, an odor of alcohol flowing from one's breath, one's appearance of being intoxicated or California DUI, one's poor performance on the California DUI field sobriety tests, and any reliable, trustworthy and accurate results of the California DUI blood or breath alcohol test. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/Age-Nutrition-Fitness.html

California DUI evidence can be ambiguous, subject to multiple & subjective interpretations. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/Intoxication-Subjective.html or http://www.sandiegoduilawyer.com/Retrograde-Extrapolation.html

California DUI evidence can be shown by a qualified California DUI attorney to be unreliable, untrustworthy and innacurate. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/Scientific-Variations.html

California DUI evidence can be shown by a California DUI lawyer to be based on faulty assumptions. http://www.sandiegoduilawyer.com/assume.html

In short, California DUI evidence can be open to attack by competent California DUI attorneys. e.g. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/Widmark-Calculations.html

California DUI defense lawyers have a number of California DUI defenses might raise in certain cases. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/defenses.html

Not every California DUI attorney defense applies in every California DUI case. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/blood.html or http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/fermentation.html

California Drunk Driving / California DUI laws vary; California DUI laws change every year. California DUI attorneys must be current. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/courts.html

Too many innocent people get convicted of California DUI every court day, often by pleading guilty even in the face of questionable California DUI prosecution evidence. Try not to be one of those unfortunate people. http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

San Diego DUI Lawyer - San Diego Attorney Drunk Driving / San Diego DWI Lawyer can help you beat the charge: http://www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com .

San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you. http://www.SanDiegoDUILawyer.com

www.SanDiegoDUI.com is a thorough San Diego California DUI information source for San Diego California drunk driving arrest. California Rights, California Laws, California Defenses, California Penalties, California DMV, California Court, Military, California DUI Boating, Helpful Tips and other comprehensive California drunk driving info.

You can find a California DUI lawyer who can save your license and who will keep you out of California jail.

San Diego California DUI Lawyer


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Web announcement for www. San Diego Drunk Driving Attorney .net

April 27, 2008

The San Diego County DUI Law Center Announces its New Web Site Launch, with a sleek new look and a Comprehensive Resource Center for California. San Diego California DUI Attorney Rick Mueller, sponsor of the San Diego County DUI Lawyer Center, is pleased to provide a new center for California DUI attorney information at: www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net. San Diego, California (ProWEB)

The new design for the California DUI Attorney web site provides San Diego and California drivers access to many DUI resources, such as California DUI breath test defenses, California DUI blood test defenses, California DUI / Drunk Driving expungement, California DUI local courts to attend, California DMV information, out-of-state DUI, and many other California DUI / Drunk Driving Attorney FAQs.

The California DUI web site also offers access to a San Diego California DUI specialist who can offer support, addresses what to do if one receives a California DUI while on, at or near military property, and what to expect if one receives a DUI while boating: California DUI - BUI. San Diego California's specific penalties and useful Avoid a California DUI tips are viewable.

California DUI Attorney Rick Mueller addresses important DUI news and industry trends in his California DUI Attorney Blog. This comprehensive discussion provides a portal for users to learn more about California drunk driving arrests, as well as submit their questions or concerns regarding California DUI laws.

California DUI Blog readers may also contact California DUI Defense Attorney Rick Mueller through the web site's free DUI survey at www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/survey

California DUI Attorney



California DUI Attorney Rick Mueller is known as a DMV Guru and speaks in numerous seminars on the topic of San Diego DUI Law. California DUI / Drunk Driving Attorney Rick Mueller is recognized as a contributor to the California Drunk Driving Law book, and is a Specialist Member of the California DUI Attorneys Association.

http://www.sandiegoduilawyer.com/blog.html

Saturday, April 26, 2008

Premier San Diego California DUI Attorneys

Find some of the best California DUI/drunk driving defense available in the San Diego, California area.

If you find yourself facing a San Diego California DUI charge, www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com should be your first free online San Diego California DUI / drunk driving attorney consultation.

San Diego California DUI attorney Rick Mueller practices exclusively with drivers arrested for San Diego California DUI. He has developed his own style to keep the San Diego California DUI punishments less severe, but more importantly to vigorously try to get the San Diego California drunk driving case dismissed.

A frequent strategy of San Diego California DUI attorney Rick Mueller is to aggressively question the validity of the San Diego California drunk driving arrest. On many occasions, a San Diego California DUI police officer may do certain things that violate the statutory rights of the motorist. If the San Diego California police violated your rights, the San Diego California DUI Prosecution may lose the effectiveness of its case against you.

Another way this San Diego California DUI defense attorney can help you is to properly handle the San Diego California DMV administrative hearing.

When you are arrested for a San Diego California DUI, the San Diego California Department of Motor Vehicles holds a hearing to determine whether or not you are eligible to continue driving. Often the San Diego California DMV chooses to revoke the license. With the help of San Diego California DUI lawyers like Rick, you may act to maintain your ability to drive to and from work and maintain a regular income.

For a very experienced San Diego California DUI criminal defense lawyer, visit http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net or:

Click to contact top San Diego DUI Attorneys:

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Seek top San Diego California DUI defense assistance today

California DUI Attorney news

Saturday, April 26, 2008

San Diego California DUI Lawyer / Drunk Driving Criminal Defense Attorney

San Diego California DUI Attorney Rick Mueller is a San Diego California Drunk Driving Lawyer specializing in DUI defense and drunk driving cases in San Diego California, including San Diego California DMV matters.

Having a premier San Diego California DUI / Drunk Driving criminal defense attorney on your case makes a huge difference. People arrested for DUI in San Diego California want to hire a to San Diego California DUI criminal lawyer who knows the courts and DMV hearing officer in San Diego.

San Diego California DUI Defense experience means that you’ll have access to the best knowledge and education on your side — an informed, experienced criminal or San Diego California DUI defense lawyer working for you exclusively.

Your San Diego California DUI case is too important not to get the best, and most expert, legal assistance with over 24 years of experience. Seek help from a San Diego California DUI attorney who will fight your San Diego California case.

http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

or

http://www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com

Friday, April 25, 2008

Latest checkpoint info for California DUI cases

California DUI attorney - checkpoint update

April 25, 2008

The Santa Clarita Valley Sheriff's Station and the California Highway Patrol will conduct a joint California DUI / drivers license enforcement checkpoint starting approximately 8:30 p.m. Friday and concluding about 2:30a.m. Saturday, California DUI lawyers warn.

The goal of the California DUI checkpoint is to educate the community on the hazards of drunk driving while enforcingCalifornia DUI / drunk driving laws.

The California DUI checkpoint is an ongoing attempt to safely remove drunk and unlicensed drivers from Santa Clarita Valley streets and deter those who may be considering drinking and driving or operating a vehicle without a valid license.

California DUI officials will determine the location of the checkpoint based on previous D.U.I. activity and statistics, and announce the actual checkpoint location at a later time, California DUI criminal defense attorneys understand.

http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net

Thursday, April 24, 2008

California DUI resources & California DUI law

April 24, 2008

If you were unfortunately arrested for a California DUI in San Diego, you need a highly qualified San Diego DUI lawyer to take your case.

If you have been charged for driving under influence in San Diego, California, it is considered to be invaluable to your peace of mind and, ultimately, the outcome of your California DUI case, to have the best San Diego DUI lawyer navigate you on your behalf through the California DUI court system.

Another important aspect which has to be taken into consideration is being represented by the fact that it is in your best interest to learn all the applicable San Diego California DUI laws you will be subject to if you have just been arrested for California DUI - driving under influence.

The California DUI laws are considered to be quite tough in San Diego California. The minimum California DUI charges which many people are most likely facing are being represented by 23152(a) and 23152(b). 23152(a) relates the fact that it is a misdemeanor to drive under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, and 23152(b) sustains the fact that it is a misdemeanor to drive with 08% or more of alcohol in your blood. Both the 23152 (a) and 23152 (b) offenses will be charged, in most California DUI cases. Your California DUI attorney will deal with these California DUI charges.

What has to be kept in mind is that the law of San Diego California clearly states that a suspect charged with California DUI - drunk driving can be convicted of both the (a) and (b) offenses, as it also states that the person can only be punished for one of the above offenses. This basically means that opting for San Diego California DUI lawyers may be critical to the success of your California DUI case.

Yet another important aspect which has to be taken into consideration is being represented by the fact that San Diego California DUI lawyers will help you navigate through the tough local laws through experience and personal connections, because you never want to think you can defend yourself in your California DUI case.

For more California DUI resources about a Premier San Diego California DUI Attorney or especially about San Diego county drunk driving, please review one of these links:


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More California DUI checkpoints on the way

California DUI attorneys news

April 24, 2008

Picnic Day weekend tally: Seven California DUI arrests, nine citations issued
The Davis Police Department has released the results of Yolo County�s "Avoid the Eight" team's California DUI saturation patrol of the city during Picnic Day weekend, California DUI attorneys report.

Per a department California DUI news release, the California DUI patrol saturated Davis on Saturday night and stopped 70 vehicles, put 14 drivers through a California DUI field sobriety test, issued nine citations for various vehicle code violations and arrested three people for suspected California DUI - drunken driving. Four additional drivers were arrested on California DUI charges by patrol officers Friday and Saturday nights, California DUI attorneys learned.

California DUI authorities report the "Avoid the Eight" team is planning a California DUI checkpoint during the Memorial Day weekend, California DUI attorneys understand.

http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/about

California DUI pending legislation bill

California DUI Attorney news

California DUI attorneys are told ignition interlock bills are pending for persons convicted of California DUI.

MESSAGE FROM STATE REPRESENTATIVE MIKE FEUER

Public safety has long been a top priority of mine. My legislative package this year contains four important bills to help keep our communities secure. One American life is lost every 22 minutes in an alcohol-related traffic collision. Drunk drivers endanger themselves, other drivers, and pedestrians every time they get behind the wheel. In the past, we often couldn’t tell if someone was driving drunk until they got into an injury or fatality-causing accident. But today, a technological device called an ignition interlock device (IID) can be installed in any automobile that verifies a driver’s sobriety before it allows the car to start. If a driver’s breath registers even a minimal blood alcohol content, they will not be able to drive. (And they won't get a California DUI or need a California DUI attorney.)

My bill, AB 2784, would require that anyone convicted of a California DUI - drunk driving offense be required to install an IID for a specified period of time. A first offense would require five months, a second offense twelve months, and so on.

www.sandiegodui.com

California DUI attorney news - celebrities

California DUI attorney news - celebrities

The disposition of California DUI cases involving celebrities aren’t handled any differently than all of the other California DUI cases wending their way through the county’s labyrinthian legal system.

Take Barron Hilton, 18, scion to the Hilton family fortune and brother of self-perpetuated celebrity Paris of the same name, pleaded no contest in Malibu Municipal Court on April 9 to t

2 misdemeanor counts from a California DUI drunk-driving incident last month.
Pleading no contest, or nolo contendere, is not an admission of guilt, but the charges are not contested. It was reported that Hilton had a .14 blood alcohol reading. In California, .08 is considered legal intoxication for drivers over 21. For drivers under 21, any blood alcohol level constitutes legal intoxication.
Hilton was given three years summary California DUI probation by Commissioner H. Jay Ford, and his driver license was suspended for a year.

Hilton was not in court as his lawyer entered his California DUI pleas to California DUI drunken driving and possessing a false driver license. A third charge related to California DUI driving under the influence and a count of being an unlicensed driver were dismissed in the deal.
Hilton was ordered to pay $2000 in fines and penalties and participate in three alcohol education programs, including one run by the state Department of Motor Vehicles, one that requires a visit to a morgue, and a third run by Mothers Against Drunk Driving.

Hilton was arrested in Malibu Feb. 12 behind the wheel of a 2008 Mercedes-Benz E350 registered to a Nevada corporation that was spotted weaving on Pacific Coast Highway. At some point prior to 8 a.m., he may have struck another vehicle, a gas station pump and employee. Hilton faces a June 4 hearing to determine restitution on these allegations. Witnesses’ testimony stated that a 19-year-old female passenger who was in the car with Hilton and may have assumed the wheel at some time during the erratic driving, was also responsible for a hit-and-run incident on Pacific Coast Highway.

The California Highway Patrol has kept that aspect of the investigation under wraps because it has not yet produced any charges.

The son of longtime local residents Farrah Fawcett and Ryan O’Neal has pleaded not guilty to drug charges stemming from a Malibu arrest. Redmond James O’Neal, 23, entered pleas last Friday to two felony charges of possessing heroin and methamphetamine and two misdemeanor counts that include California DUI.

Prosecutors said O’Neal was arrested after sheriff’s deputies spotted his car speeding on Pacific Coast Highway before dawn on Jan. 26. According to the official report, the younger O’Neal was released on bond from the Lost Hills Sheriff’s Station on the day of his arrest.

He is set to appear in Malibu Superior Court on May 29 for a preliminary hearing scheduling to determine if he will stand trial, California DUI attorneys say.


http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

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Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Hit California Fire Engine? DUI Attorney needed

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

4/23/08

California DUI attorneys report Sacramento police have determined the driver of a car that crashed into a Sacramento City fire engine was California DUI - driving under the influence at the time of the collision.

Kirsten Ross's blood alcohol level was .06 percent at the time of the crash. Because she was 20 years old, police say she was driving under the influence and that was the primary factor in the crash. However, the investigation is continuing, California DUI attorneys believe.

Ross was killed after her 2004 Honda collided with the truck at 9th and L streets on April 12. The fire engine was responding to a report of a fire and was running with its lights and siren. A passenger in Ross' car was also killed. None of the firefighters was injured according to California DUI attorney sources.

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/penalties

New Posts by well-known California DUI Attorney Author

California DUI Attorney / Author Lawrence Taylor has
recent posts at http://www.duiblog.com/ which may be
of interest to other California DUI Lawyers:

New MADD Strategy: Shut Down the Lawyers
The Sacred Breathalyzer
The Latest DUI SuperCop
Are DUI Roadblocks Effective?
Law Trumps Scientific Truth in DUI Cases
How to Overcome Scientific Facts: Pass a Law
90 Teenagers Breathalyzed for Root Beer
One Drink = Felony DUI
N.J. Supreme Court Rules on Breathalyzer Challenges
Why Cops Can Only Testify to Incriminating Evidence
The National College for DUI Defense
Catheter Forced Up Penis After DUI Arrest
"The Federal DUI Immunity Act of 1998"
Breathing Paint Fumes = High Breathyalyzer Results?

As many of you are aware, there is a Library of over 500 past topics on the right side of the page, consisting of such subjects as:

How Breathlayzers Work - and Why They Don't
Field Sobriety Tests: Designed for Failure?
Police Using Pre-Written DUI Reports
Nystagmus: A Fraudulent Field Sobriety Test?
Diabetes and the Counterfeit DUI
Nystagmus: The Eye Test (Parts I, II and III)
Breathalyzers and Radio Frequency Interference
DUI Marijuana: Does Marijuana Impair Driving?
Fermentation in Blood Samples Produce...Alcohol
The "Mouth Alcohol" Problem
Do "Mouth Alcohol Detectors" Work?
Breathalyzer Inaccuracy: Testing During the Absorptive Phase
Breathalyzer Inaccuracy: Post-Absorptive
Racial Differencs in the Effects of Alcohol
Rising Blood-Alcohol Levels in DUI Cases
The Unknown Variable: The Officer
Why Breathalyzers Don't Measure Alcohol
Whatever Happened to the Presumption of Innocence?
The Police Officer as DUI "Expert"

Mr. Taylor's DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE book is excellent,
according to any California DUI Attorney who has it.

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

California DUI Checkpoint by Roseville PD yields DUI arrests

California DUI Attorney news - Checkpoint update

From 9 p.m. Friday, until 2 a.m. Saturday, the Roseville Police Department conducted a California DUI sobriety and driver's license checkpoint on Sunrise Avenue at Sun Tree Drive. California DUI officers screened 839 vehicles that passed through the California DUI checkpoint, and arrested six drivers: four on suspicion of California DUI , one on a felony drug warrant, and one on suspicion of California DUI, driving while suspended, and violation of parole. California DUI officers also issued five citations to drivers for driving without valid driver's licenses, and had six vehicles towed.

A detective from a neighboring law enforcement agency drove an unmarked vehicle through the California DUI checkpoint, and noticed the driver in line in front of him tossing something out of his vehicle. The detective alerted Roseville Police. Officers searched the area around the man's vehicle and recovered a marijuana pipe. The driver, David Leroy Long, 50, of Rocklin, was arrested on suspicion of DUI, driving on a suspended driver's license, and violation of parole. He is currently in custody in the Placer County Jail on a no-bail parole hold, California DUI attorneys learned.

The Roseville Police Department conducts California DUI sobriety and driver's license checkpoints regularly both to take unsafe drivers off the road, and to raise public awareness about the serious consequences of drinking and driving, California DUI attorneys are told.

Funding for Roseville's California DUI sobriety checkpoints is provided by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, California DUI lawyers believe.

http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/articles

No DUI charges in California vehicular manslaughter of brother

California DUI Attorney news

Prosecutors have filed misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter charges against a Salinas man in connection with an accident outside Mazda Raceway Laguna Seca that killed his brother.
Dominick Narigi, 19, will be arraigned this morning on a single count arising from the July 22 accident. While California Highway Patrol officials initially blamed the accident on alcohol, no such charges have been filed.

Assistant District Attorney Berkley Brannon said prosecutors have no way of knowing if Narigi was under the influence at the time because medical personnel at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center failed to take a blood-alcohol level the day of the accident.

Narigi, his 21-year-old brother, Anthony, and two others were leaving the Red Bull U.S. Grand Prix motorcycle races at Laguna Seca, with Narigi at the wheel, when their 2002 GMC Yukon veered into a culvert for unknown reasons. The CHP said Narigi overcorrected and the vehicle rolled.

The rear passengers, who were wearing seatbelts, suffered only minor injuries, but Narigi and his brother were ejected. The brothers were airlifted to Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, where Anthony was removed from life support three days later. Dominick Narigi underwent at least four surgeries before his release.

The accident prompted an outpouring of community support for the surviving brother and his parents, John and Roxanne Narigi. John Narigi has been general manager of the Monterey Plaza Hotel for 14 years and helped lead the renovation of Monterey High's football stadium, where Dominick was a star linebacker in 2006.
A 2004 Palma High School graduate, Anthony Narigi's memorial service was attended by more than 1,000 people.

In August, the CHP said it had ruled out mechanical failure and concluded that Dominick Narigi was driving under the influence and made an unsafe turn "due to the level of impairment."

Spokesman Larry Starkey said at the time that the CHP would recommend felony vehicular manslaughter and drunken-driving charges be filed and said it was investigating how the 18-year-old obtained alcohol at the races.

On Tuesday, Brannon said witnesses told the CHP that Narigi was drinking Red Bull and vodka at the Red Bull hospitality tent at the raceway. He then said his office's investigation was hampered when the witnesses and the passengers in the car hired lawyers and refused to speak to prosecutors unless subpoenaed.

The District Attorney's Office issued those subpoenas and planned to impanel a rare criminal grand jury this week, but released the witnesses when a negotiated settlement apparently was reached.

Brannon said Tuesday no deal was signed, but "I hope he comes in and pleads guilty tomorrow."

Defense attorney Paul Meltzer of Santa Cruz declined comment.

Brannon said his office never received evidence that would support criminal charges against anyone for providing alcohol to Narigi at the races. The evidence provided, he said, would support nothing but a charge of simple negligence, such as speeding or making an unsafe turn.

He said there are major differences between Narigi's case and those of defendants like Dana McCormick — who was convicted as a minor of felony vehicular manslaughter while drunk in an accident that killed two people at Lake San Antonio in 2004 — and Charles Seaborn, who is charged with felony vehicular manslaughter while drunk in the 2007 death of a Carmel bicyclist.

McCormick had previously been convicted of drunken-driving, she was racing at time of the accident and there was a blood-alcohol level taken immediately, he said. In Seaborn's case, Brannon alleged, tests were taken the next morning that can be extrapolated back to infer that he was drunk.

Witnesses reported Narigi had four drinks over the course of an entire day, the prosecutor said.

"All anyone knows is that drinks were being served at the Red Bull tent at Laguna Seca. But this is not a case where we can prove he was under the influence for purposes of driving," conceded the California DUI Prosecuting Attorney

California DUI defense attorneys applaud the DA's correct call. http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Mock California DUI at high school draws praise

www.SanDiegoDUIlawyer.com California lawyer / California DUI / drunk driving attorney news

Faces of high school students who watched the events unfold told it all. Their eyes were fixated on a real-time California DUI / drunk driving collision that was simulated in front of Foothill High School's front entrance this morning, California DUI / drunk driving lawyers report.

As fire engines, ambulances and a coroner's van responded to the aCalifornia DUI / drunk driving ccident scene and a helicopter circled above, hundreds of students saw how emergency services personnel would respond to a deadly California DUI / drunk driving car accident and the effects drinking and driving could have on other people. A handful of students played roles in the California DUI / drunk driving incident, including passengers and drivers. One student, a female basketball star, was "killed" in the collision, her body sprawled out on the hood of the car, while others were "taken by ambulance" to the hospital, one of them who was extricated from the car by firefighters using the Jaws of Life, California DUI / drunk driving attorneys hear. One of the drivers of the two vehicles involved was then given a series of sobriety tests, later handcuffed and presumably "hauled off to jail."

The mock California DUI / drunk driving accident was part of the "Every 15 Minutes" anti-DUI program, which gets its name from the frequency in which a person is killed in an alcohol or drug-related collision in the United States. During the event, Foothill Road was closed off between West Las Positas Road and Muirwood Drive, California DUI / drunk driving attorneys understand.

This is the seventh year the Pleasanton Police Department and the Pleasanton Unified School District has presented the program, which rotates high schools every other year. Last year, it was held at Amador Valley High School. The California DUI / drunk driving program is directed toward a junior and senior audience, students who are of age to drive.

Principal John Dwyer closed the simulation by telling the audience that California DUI / drunk driving or drinking and driving is not to be taken lightly, especially at a time of the year where teens are going to be attending prom and starting their summer vacation.

The California DUI / drunk driving simulation was an eerie reminder that a DUI-related collision had occured just this past October on Foothill Road, just north of Highland Oaks Drive. Laurel Williams, 19, a 2006 Foothill graduate, was killed on impact. The driver of the car she was riding in, Katie McKewon, 20, also an '06 Foothill grad, was charged with California DUI / drunk driving / gross vehicular manslaughter in her death and faces four years in prison time. Her blood alcohol reading was more than three times the legal limit for people 21 and older, California DUI / drunk driving attorneys report. Her California DUI / drunk driving sentencing will take place May 23.

California DUI / drunk driving attorneys applaud this anti - California DUI / drunk driving idea. http://www.sandiegoduihelp.com

Rockin' Richie Sambora does not contest California DUI

California DUI Attorney news story

Rockin' Richie Sambora does not contest California DUI

Today, Richie Sambora's California DUI / criminal defense attorney plea bargained his California DUI case. His California DUI lawyer entered a plea of no contest to California Vehicle Code Section 23152(b) - driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 only.

The California DUI - driving under the influence charge was dismissed. California DUI prosecutors dropped child endangerment charges, according to California DUI Attorneys.

Sambora was popped for California DUI last month. His 10-year-old daughter Ava was in the car at the time. California DUI blood test results allegedly show Sambora had a .13 blood alcohol level. Although the the Laguna Beach Police Dept. recommended that California DUI prosecutors file a child endangerment charge, California DUI prosecuting attorneys dropped child endangerment.

Sambora got one of the most effective California DUI - criminal defense lawyers in America on his side: Blair Berk, who has repped scores of celebs, from Mel Gibson to Lindsay Lohan. The stars aligned in his favor, because California DUI prosecutor Dennis Conway is considered pretty fair and therefore didn't pursue child endangerment. Well-respected Judge Craig Robison didn't say: "I'm so frickin' tough with celebrities". There is no truth to the rumor Judge Robison will be in his next rock n roll video, California DUI lawyers maintain.

Sambora will pay a $390 California DUI fine plus significant mandatory penalty penalties totalling approximately $1,600. Richie was placed on three years informal California DUI probation and must attend a California DUI alcohol education course. He was ordered that he cannot drink or do drugs during his California DUI probation, California DUI attorneys report.
www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

Retrograde Extrapolation in California DUI cases - under .08?

California DUI attorneys regularly deal with the concept of retrograde extrapolation.
http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/articles.html

Your California DUI blood-alcohol concentration level (BAC) is below the .08 percent legal limit at the time you provide a California DUI breath or blood test at the jail or police station.
http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/Still-Arrested.html

Will you still be prosecuted for California DUI? Will you need a California DUI lawyer?

Or your BAC is lower at the time of that required California DUI implied consent test than it was at the time of a roadside breath (preliminary alcohol screening aka PAS) test.

You wonder how your true BAC can be proven at time of driving based on a California DUI test done later.

It’s a definite California DUI issue. One can try to guess what the true BAC was in a California DUI case by projecting backwards, using average alcohol absorption and elimination rates, but it’s only an inaccurate guess based on assumptions.

It's called "retrograde extrapolation" — a pretty name for trying to guess backwards. The San Diego DUI prosecutor in a California DUI trial often offers BAC test evidence guessing one's BAC...back to the time of driving.

The blood-alcohol level at the time of a California DUI chemical test is not relevant to the California DUI charge. The California DUI prosecutor therefore attempts offer evidence to show what the BAC was when the California DUI arrestee was actually driving.

This is commonly done by “extrapolating” backward - i.e. computing the earlier blood-alcohol level by estimating how much alcohol had been eliminated or “burned off” in the period between California driving and California DUI testing.

But retrograde extrapolation requires two California DUI assumptions:

(1) The California DUI arrestee's blood-alcohol level was declining; and
(2) The California DUI arrestee's the rate of elimination is known.

This second California DUI assumption further involves the California DUI prosecution lab employee's (aka expert's) assumption that the “burn-off” rate was .015 percent per hour (sometimes the assumed rate is .02 percent).

Over the California DUI Defense Attorney's objection, how does the California DUI prosecution know that the California DUI arrestee was eliminating (assuming he or she was eliminating rather than still absorbing) at that rate and not at .005 percent, .3 percent or some other possible scientific rate?!

Quite simply, the California DUI prosecuting lawyer does not know. The California DUI attorney prosecutor's laboratory employee merely assumes that the California DUI arrestee was eliminating and that he or she eliminated at the average rate.

The California DUI problem is that everyone has a different metabolism, and even a given person will metabolize alcohol at different rates depending on many variables.

In one important study, researchers found a wide range of metabolism rates: some individuals can absorb alcohol and reach peak blood-alcohol levels ten times faster than others. (Kurt Dubowski, “Absorption, Distribution and Elimination of Alcohol: Highway Safety Aspects”, Journal on Studies of Alcohol (July 1985)).

As a result, legitimate California DUI scientists conclude that the practice of estimating earlier BAC levels in California DUI cases is highly inaccurate and should be discouraged in most California DUI attorneys' cases.

California DUI breath test defenses are found at http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/defenses.html .

Monday, April 21, 2008

75th anniversary of end of Prohibition - celebrate with no California DUI arrest

California DUI criminal defense lawyer news

How to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the end of Prohibition in America? With a cold beer. That’s exactly what some of the nation’s brewers did last week to mark the end in 1933 of our 14-year failed experiment in enforced sobriety. They had a party.

April 7th is a day to recognize the past 75 years of beer and the beer community’s contribution to Americans’ quality of life. The explosion of creativity and innovation by those who make beer is an American success story, said the president of the Brewers Association.

Perhaps. But the end of Prohibition also fueled the explosion of drunk driving, binge drinking, accidents and violent crime that is beer’s contribution to the dark side of alcohol’s history. Untreated alcohol problems waste an estimated $184.6 billion dollars per year in health care, business and criminal justice costs, and cause more than 100,000 deaths, according to the Marin Institute in California.

This toll is mostly due to irresponsible drinking by a small percentage of people who don’t know when to stop. It’s also a prime example why legalizing other drugs is not the answer to the failed war on drugs.

America wages this war on drugs. It has failed over the decades because it focuses on the supply of illegal drugs instead of seeking to reduce the demand for them. When people like me get successful treatment, we no longer buy cocaine from Colombia or marijuana from Milwaukee. That doesn’t mean, though, that I oppose efforts to seize illegal drugs. Or that they should be made legal.

Look no further than alcohol — the most used and abused drug in America — to understand the devastation they cause. And don’t be fooled: Marijuana is no more “harmless” than beer to some people who use it. Any mood- and mind-altering substance can have devastating effects.

It is not unusual for people who are treated for addiction to replace one drug of choice for another hoping they can still experience the high without the consequences. Rarely are they successful. And more often than not, they end up once again using the drug that got them in trouble in the first place.

Addiction is about the loss of control over any substance. If you couldn’t control your drinking, you can’t control any other drug. Abstinence in recovery means just that: no booze. No marijuana. No nothing.

California DUI attorneys do not promote drinking & driving either.

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

DUI Checkpoint Status Report for California

California DUI criminal defense attorney news

A Claremont California DUI - drunk driving checkpoint will take place Friday night and Saturday morning at an unknown location, California DUI lawyers report.

The California DUI checkpoint will take place at 6 p.m. Friday and conclude at 2 a.m. Saturday, according to California DUI attorneys.

Motorists will be stopped to determine they are not California DUI = under the influence of alcohol and drugs, have a seatbelt on properly and hold a valid drivers license, according to California Drunk Driving lawyers.

What to expect if approaching a California DUI checkpoint http://www.sandiegoduihelp.com/duiblog/2007/07/what-to-expect-at-dui-checkpoint.html .

The California Office of Traffic Safety through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration provided grant funding for the California DUI checkpoint, according to California DUI / Drunk Driving Attorneys.

A California DUI checkpoint attorney may help http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/about.html


http://www.blogger.com/posts.g?blogID=18502792&label=&searchType=CURRENT&txtKeywords=california+checkpoint&numPosts=50

California DUI Checkpoint OC location announced for this week

California DUI lawyer news

The Costa Mesa Police Department will conduct a California DUI sobriety and drivers license checkpoint this week, California DUI attorneys learn.

The California DUI checkpoint set up to stop northbound cars on Harbor Boulevard at Gisler Avenue will be from 8 p.m. to 2 a.m. Friday.

The California DUI checkpoint is to educate the public about the dangers of California DUI - driving under the influence of alcohol or without a drivers license, California DUI / Drunk Driving criminal defense lawyers are told.

More than 1,000 drivers were arrested for California DUI / driving under the influence last year in Costa Mesa. Funding for the California DUI program is provided by California’s Office of Traffic Safety and is generally considered an awareness tool for California DUI officers, California DUI defense lawyers understand. The California DUI department works closely with Mothers Against Drunk Driving, according to California DUI criminal attorneys.

The California DUI organization will have its crashed car trailer on site to remind people of the consequences of drinking and driving, California DUI defense attorneys believe.


http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/victory.html

Sunday, April 20, 2008

California DUI attorney - Texas Mata case on retrograde extrapolation

California DUI attorney - retrograde extrapolation case

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,

En Banc.

Raul MATA, Appellant,

v.

The STATE of Texas.

No. 133-00.

June 6, 2001.

Defendant was convicted following jury trial in the County Court, Bexar County, Tony Jimenez, J., of driving while intoxicated (DWI). Defendant appealed. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, 13 S.W.3d 1. Granting petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals, Keasler, J., held that: (1) science of retrograde extrapolation, as used in DWI cases to estimate a defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) at time of alleged offense, can be reliable in a given case, depending on factors including expert's ability to explain the science with clarity, timing and number of tests performed, and expert's knowledge of a defendant's personal characteristics; and (2) state failed to make requisite showing by clear and convincing evidence that expert's testimony in present case was reliable.

Remanded.

Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Womack, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keller, P.J., joined.

Johnson, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Price, J., joined.

West Headnotes

[1] Criminal Law 1036.6

110k1036.6

Defendant in prosecution for driving while intoxicated (DWI) preserved alleged error with respect to state expert's testimony regarding whether defendant was intoxicated at time of arrest, though written motion to suppress attempted to suppress only the results of breath test administered more than two hours later, where defendant at suppression hearing argued for suppression of expert's testimony on ground that it was not reliable, and trial court denied motion after hearing defendant's argument. Rules of Evid., Rule 702; Rules App.Proc., Rule 33.1(a)(1)(A).

[2] Criminal Law 388.1

110k388.1

A trial court's responsibility, under rule governing admission of scientific evidence, is to determine whether proffered scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable and relevant to assist the jury. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[3] Criminal Law 388.1

110k388.1

Proponent of scientific evidence must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the evidence is reliable by showing the validity of the underlying scientific theory, the validity of the technique applying the theory, and proper application of the technique on the occasion in question. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[4] Criminal Law 388.1

110k388.1

Factors that may affect reliability of scientific evidence include, but are not limited to: (1) extent to which underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by relevant scientific community, if such community can be ascertained; (2) testifying expert's qualifications; (3) existence of literature supporting or rejecting underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) technique's potential rate of error; (5) availability of other experts to test and evaluate technique; (6) clarity with which underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to court; and (7) experience and skill of person who applied technique on occasion in question. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[5] Criminal Law 388.1

110k388.1

In weeding out so-called "junk" science when ruling on proffered scientific testimony, trial judges are called upon to serve as "gatekeepers." Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[6] Criminal Law 388.1

110k388.1

Proffered scientific testimony must be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[7] Criminal Law 1153(1)

110k1153(1)

Court of Criminal Appeals will not disturb the trial court's decision to admit scientific evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[8] Criminal Law 304(3)

110k304(3)

Court of Criminal Appeals, in reviewing admissibility of scientific testimony, may take judicial notice of scientific literature not presented by either party at trial or on appeal. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[9] Criminal Law 480

110k480

Reliance by Court of Appeals on its opinion in another case as evidence of state expert's qualifications in present prosecution for driving while intoxicated (DWI) was inappropriate. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[10] Automobiles 411

48Ak411

(Formerly 110k388.2)

Science of retrograde extrapolation, as used by experts in driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases to estimate a defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) at time of offense based on results of a subsequently administered breath test, can be reliable in a given case, as necessary for admission under rule relating to scientific evidence. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[11] Automobiles 411

48Ak411

(Formerly 110k388.2)

[11] Criminal Law 488

110k488

(Formerly 110k388.2)

In determining reliability of retrograde extrapolation, as used in driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases to estimate a defendant's blood alcohol content

(BAC) at time of offense, expert's ability to apply the science and explain it with clarity to the court is a paramount consideration; in addition, expert must demonstrate some understanding of difficulties associated with retrograde extrapolation, must demonstrate awareness of the subtleties of the science and the risks inherent in any extrapolation, and must be able to clearly and consistently apply the science. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[12] Automobiles 411

48Ak411

(Formerly 110k388.2)

In evaluating the reliability of a retrograde extrapolation, as used by expert in driving while intoxicated (DWI) case to estimate defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) at time of offense, court should consider (a) the length of time between the offense and the test(s) administered; (b) the number of tests given and the length of time between each test; and (c) whether, and if so, to what extent, any individual characteristics of the defendant were known to the expert in providing his extrapolation. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[13] Automobiles 411

48Ak411

(Formerly 110k388.2)

Characteristics and behaviors that, if known to expert who uses retrograde extrapolation to estimate blood alcohol content (BAC) at time of alleged driving while intoxicated (DWI) offense, are relevant to determining reliability of that testimony might include, but are not limited to, defendant's weight and gender, defendant's typical drinking pattern and alcohol tolerance, how much defendant had to drink on day or night in question, what defendant drank, duration of drinking spree, time of last drink, and how much and what defendant had to eat either before, during, or after the drinking. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

[14] Automobiles 422.1

48Ak422.1

(Formerly 110k388.2)

State failed in driving while intoxicated (DWI) prosecution to make required showing by clear and convincing evidence that expert's retrograde extrapolation as to defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) at time of offense was reliable; expert's testimony contained inconsistencies that prevented him from explaining science of retrograde extrapolation with any clarity, only one BAC test was performed and it did not occur until over two hours after alleged offense, and expert had no knowledge of any personal characteristics of defendant. Rules of Evid., Rule 702.

*904 George Scharmen, San Antonio, for Appellant.

Mary Beth Welsh, Assist. DA, San Antonio, for State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION


KEASLER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MEYERS, PRICE, HOLLAND, JOHNSON, and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.

At Raul Mata's trial for driving while intoxicated, an expert witness testified that Mata's blood alcohol content two hours after his arrest showed that he was intoxicated at the time of his arrest. We must decide whether this expert's testimony met the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., [FN1] and Kelly v. State. [FN2] We conclude that it did not.

FN1. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

FN2. 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

Factual Background

Officer Kenneth Thompson pulled Mata over at 3:05 a.m. on May 25, 1992, for a traffic violation. He smelled alcohol on Mata's breath, so he asked Mata to perform some field sobriety tests. After the tests, Officer Thompson arrested Mata for driving while intoxicated. Over two hours later, at 5:14 a.m., Mata took two breath tests in quick succession and registered a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .19.

The State charged Mata with driving while intoxicated both by driving with a BAC in excess of .10 and by driving without the normal use of his mental and physical faculties.

Suppression Hearing

Mata filed a motion to suppress the results of his breath test because, among other reasons, they were obtained "from scientific techniques which have not been shown by clear and convincing evidence to be reliable and relevant." He relied on Rules 403 and 702 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence--the applicable rules at the time of Mata's 1993 trial.

At the suppression hearing, George Allen McDougall, Jr., testified that he was the breath test technical supervisor for Bexar County. He explained that an individual's BAC is reflected by an alcohol concentration curve which begins at the low point when there is no alcohol in the person's blood and rises as the alcohol is absorbed into the bloodstream until it *905 reaches the peak, that is, the maximum alcohol concentration. Then the curve falls as the alcohol dissipates from the bloodstream to the low point when there is no alcohol left. McDougall testified that he had "done some calculations like this on his own" and that to draw such a curve for an individual, he would need "more than a couple" of reference points. He would need "a lot of them." McDougall conceded that, although Mata blew into the breathalyzer twice, the readings were only two minutes apart and, for purposes of drawing an alcohol concentration curve, constituted only a single reading. That single reading did not give McDougall enough information to determine whether Mata was in the absorption phase or the elimination phase at the time of the breath test.

McDougall testified that, in order to determine an individual's BAC at the time the individual was driving, he "assume[s] several variables." He testified to several possibilities: the individual could have had a higher BAC at the time he was driving than at the time of the breath test; the individual could have had a lower BAC at the time he was driving than at the time of the breath test; or the individual could have the same BAC at both times. McDougall testified that he determines how high the BAC could have possibly been and how low it could have possibly been. Then "between those two somewhere is where the actual value will be."

McDougall agreed that the alcohol concentration curve of an individual who drank on an empty stomach would rise higher and faster than the curve of an individual who drank on a full stomach. He conceded that without a number of tests, and without knowing an individual's weight and whether he had eaten anything, he could not determine the steepness of that individual's alcohol concentration curve. He testified that, regardless of what the person had in his stomach, "an hour and a half is adequate for a complete absorption of the drinks." [FN3] He testified that alcohol eliminates at a rate of .02 grams per 210 liters. [FN4]

FN3. See Appendix A.

FN4. See Appendix B.

When given a hypothetical case based on the facts of this case, McDougall testified that if an individual's breath test registered .19 two hours and nine minutes after that person had been driving, McDougall would say that the person had a higher BAC at the time of the test than at the time of the driving. He also testified that, nevertheless, based on those facts, he would believe the person was intoxicated at the time of the driving.

McDougall testified that, given Mata's BAC of .19 two hours after his arrest, he believed Mata was impaired at the time of driving and had lost the normal use of his mental or physical faculties at the time he was driving. But he emphasized that he was not saying that Mata's BAC at the time of driving was . 10--only that it was at least .08. He said Mata's BAC range was between .12 or .13 all the way up to .25. He testified that these figures were based on Mata having an empty stomach. If he had a full stomach, the range would be more narrow--that is, from a low end of .16 up to a high end of .21 or .22. Then, when asked if Mata's BAC could have been less than a .10, McDougall said "there was an 'extreme situation' in which that was possible." [FN5]

FN5. See Appendix C.

McDougall conceded that he did not know how much Mata weighed, how much Mata had to eat or drink before taking the breath test, or when Mata's last drink was.

*906 Defense counsel argued that McDougall's testimony was unreliable insofar as it attempted to extrapolate Mata's .19 breath test result back to the time of his arrest. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

Trial

At trial, McDougall testified to his background again. When the prosecutor asked McDougall to give the jury a range for a person's BAC at the time of driving if two hours later his breath test showed a BAC of .19, defense counsel examined McDougall outside the presence of the jury "concerning the underlying facts or data upon which he relies to render this opinion, so that the Court may determine that the expert has a sufficient basis for his opinion."

During voir dire examination, McDougall testified that, while elimination rates are standard, absorption rates vary from person to person. He testified that the absorption phase does not last more than one hour. He then testified that it could last up to an hour and a half if the person had a full stomach. But he maintained that it was not possible for a person's BAC to peak two hours after he quit drinking. When presented with an exhibit showing a person's BAC peaking two hours after drinking stopped, McDougall testified that that case involved a very small amount of alcohol, which was not the norm. He later testified that he had "tested thousands of individuals" and, "with all of the studies that [he had] read," it was his experience that the BAC will not rise for more than one and a half hours after the first drink, whether the person has a full or empty stomach. [FN6]

FN6. See Appendix A.

McDougall acknowledged that he did not know when Mata began drinking or when he stopped or when Mata reached his peak BAC. He explained that, without knowing when Mata peaked, he considers all the possible peak points to calculate the BAC range for Mata at the time of the arrest. He testified that the normal or average person eliminates alcohol at a rate of .02 per hour, that he uses the .02 elimination rate, [FN7] and that he bases his calculations on a "normal drinking pattern." According to McDougall, an individual who "chug-a-lugs" shots of hard liquor in a short period of time is not engaging in a "normal" drinking pattern. He admitted that, if he were to include the chug-a-lug situation in his calculations, there would be "a lot of variability." He conceded that a study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reflected that a person's BAC can rise 10 points in one hour in the chug-a-lug situation, but he repeated that this was not a "normal" drinking pattern. [FN8]

FN7. See Appendix B.

FN8. See Appendix D.

At the conclusion of the voir dire, defense counsel argued that McDougall was only qualified to testify about the "average" or "normal" person, but he could not apply his calculations to Mata, because he did not know if Mata engaged in "normal" drinking patterns, and he did not know if Mata had been eating, how much he had been eating, how much he had had to drink, or his weight. The trial court allowed McDougall to offer his opinion before the jury.

Before the jury, McDougall testified that, given a .19 BAC two hours after driving, he would estimate a person's BAC while driving to be between .13 and . 23. [FN9] He also testified that the person's BAC *907 could be lower than .10 if he chug-a-lugged a lot of hard liquor just before being stopped. [FN10] He first testified that it would take five shots to increase from a .10 to a .19 in two hours. He later testified that it would take seven to twelve shots. [FN11]

FN9. See Appendix C.

FN10. See Appendix C.

FN11. See Appendix E.

In performing a hypothetical calculation, McDougall utilized a .02 or .03 elimination rate. He later testified that the elimination rate could range from .018 to .025. [FN12]

FN12. See Appendix B.

McDougall again testified that he based his calculations and estimates on "normal drinking patterns" and he did not know if Mata followed such patterns. [FN13] He also testified that he did not believe a person's peak BAC could occur more than an hour and a half after the arrest. [FN14]

FN13. See Appendix D.

FN14. See Appendix A.

The jury convicted Mata of driving while intoxicated and the court sentenced him to 90 days in jail, probated for two years, and a fine of $400. Mata filed a motion for new trial arguing that the trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress and in allowing into evidence "the opinion of ... McDougall ... because that opinion was non-scientific and unreliable." After hearing argument, the trial court denied Mata's motion.

Court of Appeals

In his first two points of error on appeal, Mata argued that the trial court erred in overruling his suppression motion because McDougall's testimony was unreliable and because the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by the unfair prejudice. Mata relied in part on Daubert and Kelly. The court of appeals summarily rejected these claims, quoting a portion of its prior opinion in Hartman v. State [FN15]:

FN15. 2 S.W.3d 490 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) (en banc).

Given McDougall's impeccable qualifications, including extensive personal observations of the alcohol absorption and elimination process, and the limits which McDougall placed on his opinion, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting his testimony. Once the trial court so found, any further doubts as to the veracity of McDougall's opinions were for the trier of fact to weigh in its deliberations. [FN16]

FN16. Mata v. State, 13 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999) (quoting Hartman, 2 S.W.3d at 493-94).

The appellate court did not discuss the requirements of Daubert or Kelly and whether those requirements were met in this case. In a lengthy dissent, Justice Cadena concluded that McDougall's testimony was not sufficiently reliable under Kelly and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it. [FN17]

FN17. Id. at 4-37 (Cadena, J., dissenting).

We granted Mata's petition for discretionary review to decide whether McDougall's testimony was admissible pursuant to the requirements of Daubert and Kelly.

Preservation of Error

[1] The State argues that Mata did not preserve error because his written motion to suppress did not attempt to suppress McDougall's testimony. Instead, it attempted to suppress the results of the breath test. The court of appeals found the error preserved. [FN18]

FN18. Id. at 2 n. 1.

*908 Appellate Rule 33.1(a)(1)(A) provides that error is preserved if the "complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion" that states the grounds "with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint." At the suppression hearing, Mata argued for the suppression of McDougall's testimony on the grounds that it was not reliable. The trial court denied the motion to suppress after hearing Mata's argument. We conclude that Mata timely informed the trial court of his grounds with sufficient specificity and, therefore, that he preserved error.

Legal Background

[2][3][4] Evidence Rule 702 provides that an expert witness may testify as to his opinion based on scientific knowledge if it will help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. A trial court's responsibility under Rule 702 is to determine whether proffered scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable and relevant to assist the jury. [FN19] The proponent of the scientific evidence must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the evidence is reliable. [FN20] This is accomplished by showing the validity of the underlying scientific theory, the validity of the technique applying the theory, and proper application of the technique on the occasion in question. [FN21] Factors that may affect reliability include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be ascertained; (2) the testifying expert's qualifications; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the technique's potential rate of error; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person who applied the technique on the occasion in question. [FN22]

FN19. Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

FN20. Jackson, 17 S.W.3d at 670.

FN21. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573.

FN22. Ibid.

[5][6][7] While Rule 702 involves the "dual inquiry of relevance and reliability," the "overarching subject of Rule 702 is the scientific validity of the evidence at issue." [FN23] In weeding out the so-called "junk" science, trial judges are called upon to serve as "gatekeepers." [FN24] The proffered testimony must be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute. [FN25] We will not disturb the trial court's decision to admit scientific evidence absent an abuse of discretion. [FN26]

FN23. Jordan, 928 S.W.2d at 554-55, quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2797.

FN24. Id. at 555.

FN25. Ibid.

FN26. Hinojosa v. State, 4 S.W.3d 240, 250- 51(Tex.Crim.App.1999); Griffith v. State, 983 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

Analysis

The science which we analyze today is known as "retrograde extrapolation." Retrograde extrapolation is the computation back in time of the blood-alcohol level--that is, the estimation of the level at *909 the time of driving based on a test result from some later time. [FN27]

FN27. See Lawrence Taylor, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 5.2 (5th ed.) (2000).

As alcohol is consumed, it passes from the stomach and intestines into the blood, a process referred to as absorption. [FN28] When the alcohol reaches the brain and nervous system, the characteristic signs of intoxication begin to show. [FN29] The length of time necessary for the alcohol to be absorbed depends on a variety of factors, including the presence and type of food in the stomach, [FN30] the person's gender, [FN31] the person's weight, [FN32] the person's age, [FN33] the person's mental state, [FN34] the drinking pattern, [FN35] the type of beverage consumed, [FN36] the amount consumed, [FN37] and the time period of alcohol consumption. [FN38] At some point after drinking has ceased, the person's BAC will reach a peak. After the peak, the BAC will begin to fall as alcohol is eliminated from the person's body. The body eliminates alcohol through the liver at a slow but consistent rate. [FN39]

FN28. NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, ALCOHOL ALERT, "Alcohol Metabolism," No. 35 (Jan.1997).

FN29. Jennifer Pariser, Note: In Vino Veritas: The Truth About Blood Alcohol Presumptions in State Drunk Driving Law, 64 N.Y.U.L.REV. 141, 146 (1989), citing S. Brent & S. Stiller, HANDLING DRUNK DRIVING CASES, § 4:2 (1985); Edward Fitzgerald & Dr. David Hume, The Single Chemical Test for Intoxication: A Challenge to Admissibility, 66 MASS. L.REV. 23, 28 (1981).

FN30. Pariser, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. at 147, citing 2 R. Erwin, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES CRIMINAL/CIVIL § 15.04[1][b][i], at 15 (3d ed.1988); Rodney Gullberg, Variation in Blood Alcohol Concentration Following the Last Drink, 10 J. OF POLICE SCIENCE & ADMIN. 289 (1982); Alan Jones et al., Peak Blood Ethanol Concentration and the Time of Its Occurrence After Rapid Drinking on an Empty Stomach, 36 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 376, 381 (1991).

FN31. NIAAA ALCOHOL ALERT, "Alcohol Metabolism," No. 35 (Jan.1997).

FN32. Y. Al-Lanqawi et al., Ethanol Kinetics: Extent of Error in Back Extrapolation Procedures, 34 BRITISH J. OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 316, 320 (1992).

FN33. Ibid.

FN34. Jones et al., 36 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCE at 381.

FN35. Ibid.

FN36. Ibid.

FN37. Gullberg, 10 J. OF POLICE SCIENCE & ADMIN. at 289.

FN38. Ibid.

FN39. Pariser, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. at 149.

In 1932, Swedish chemist E.M.P. Widmark first calculated absorption and elimination rates in the body, and his work still represents the benchmark for other scientists' studies today. Widmark created what we know today as the "BAC curve," which represents the rise and fall of an individual's BAC as his body absorbs and eliminates alcohol. A reading from a single breath test will not reflect where the person is on his BAC curve. In other words, it will not indicate whether the person is in the absorption phase, at his peak, or in the elimination phase. [FN40]

FN40. Pariser, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. at 152, citing W. Frajola, DEFENDING DRINKING DRIVERS 16.1 (1985).

So if a driver is tested while in the absorption phase, his BAC at the time of the test will be higher than his BAC while driving. If tested while in the elimination phase, his BAC at the time of the test could be lower than while driving, depending on whether he had reached his peak before or after he was stopped. Obviously, the greater the length of time between *910 the driving and the test, the greater the potential variation between the two BACs.

To clarify, we are not addressing whether retrograde extrapolation is necessary in order for the State to prove a defendant guilty in a DWI case. [FN41] Nor do we address whether test results showing a defendant's BAC at some time after the alleged offense are admissible at trial in the absence of retrograde extrapolation. [FN42] Our only concern today is whether McDougall reliably applied the science of retrograde extrapolation in Mata's trial.

FN41. Compare, e.g., McCafferty v. State, 748 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (evidence insufficient without retrograde extrapolation); State v. Ladwig, 434 N.W.2d 594 (S.D.1989) (same); Desmond v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 522, 779 P.2d 1261 (Ariz.1989) (same); Allman v. State, 728 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (same); State v. Rollins, 141 Vt. 105, 444 A.2d 884 (Vt.1982) (same); State v. Geisler, 22 Conn.App. 142, 576 A.2d 1283 (Conn.App.1990) (same), appeal denied, 215 Conn. 819, 576 A.2d 547 (Conn.1990), vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1019, 111 S.Ct. 663, 112 L.Ed.2d 657 (1991); with Haas v. State, 597 So.2d 770 (Fla.1992) (evidence sufficient without retrograde extrapolation); Sullivan v. State, 517 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (same); People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136, 497 N.E.2d 657, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y.1986) (same); Commonwealth v. Slingerland, 358 Pa.Super. 531, 518 A.2d 266 (Pa.Super.Ct.1986) (same); Comm. v. Wirth, 936 S.W.2d 78, 84 (Ky.1996) (same); State v. Kubik, 235 Neb. 612, 456 N.W.2d 487 (1990) (same).

FN42. See, e.g., Mireles v. Dep't of Public Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128 (Tex.1999) (test results admissible without retrograde extrapolation); State v. Barber, 42 Conn.App. 589, 681 A.2d 348 (Conn.Ct.App.1996) (same); Desmond, supra (same).

Scientific Literature

[8] We may take judicial notice of scientific literature not presented by either party at trial or on appeal. [FN43] Our research revealed a number of articles on the subject. Mark Montgomery of the College of Public Health at the University of Florida and Mark Reasor of the Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology in West Virginia contend that retrograde extrapolation is reliable. [FN44] They concede that "the scientific community is divided" on this issue. [FN45] But they believe that extrapolation to a range of BACs can be accomplished reliably, as long as "justifiable assumptions are made that are based on sound principles of pharmacology, toxicology, and physiology." [FN46] The authors set forth several hypothetical cases in which, given several known factors, they are able to calculate the subject's expected BAC at the time of driving. In each hypothetical case, the known factors include the subject's weight, the length of time in which drinking occurred, and the time at which the drinking stopped.

FN43. Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 764-65 and 765 n. 1. (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

FN44. Mark Montgomery & Mark Reasor, Retrograde Extrapolation of Blood Alcohol Data: An Applied Approach, 36 J. OF TOXICOLOGY AND ENVTL. HEALTH 281-292 (1992).

FN45. Id. at 282.

FN46. Id. at 288.

Other scientists are more cautious in their examination of reliability. Richard Watkins, Assistant Director of the Phoenix Crime Detection Lab, and Eugene Adler, a toxicologist for the Arizona Department of Public Safety Crime Lab, write that retrograde extrapolation is somewhat reliable. [FN47] In their study on the effect of drinking on a full versus an empty stomach, they discovered that "the alcohol elimination rate was lower in the full stomach condition *911 compared to the empty stomach condition. The difference was statistically significant." [FN48] They concluded that it was possible to make estimates of BACs at some time removed from the breath test that were "sufficiently reliable." [FN49] But they nevertheless cautioned that, "[h]owever useful such estimates may be in [DWI] cases, it should be remembered that the process of alcohol absorption is highly variable. The limitations and pitfalls associated with retrograde extrapolations are often not appreciated by laymen and the courts." [FN50] The authors concluded that "[a]ny attempt at retrograde extrapolation should be made with caution, and performed by persons able to assess and discuss the applicability of a retrograde extrapolation to a particular situation." [FN51]

FN47. Richard Watkins & Eugene Adler, The Effect of Food on Alcohol Absorption and Elimination Patterns, 38 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 285-291 (1993).

FN48. Id. at 288.

FN49. Id. at 290.

FN50. Ibid.

FN51. Ibid.

Still others are even more wary of the science. Alan Jones, Ph.D., Associate Professor in the Department of Alcohol Toxicology at the University Hospital in Sweden, Kjell Ake Jonsson, M.D. and Ph.D., Clinical Associate at the Department of Clinical Pharmacology and Internal Medicine at the University Hospital, and Aldo Neri, M.D., Research Technician at the Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Research at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, Sweden, point out the potential for error in the science. [FN52] They write that retrograde extrapolation is a "dubious practice" and that expert testimony on the issue "requires careful consideration of the absorption kinetics of ethanol and the factors influencing this process." [FN53] They explain that "[t]he absorption profile of ethanol differs widely among individuals, and the peak [BAC] and the time of its occurrence depend on numerous factors. Among other factors, the drinking pattern, the type of beverage consumed, the fed or fasted state, the nature and composition of foodstuff in the stomach, the anatomy of the gastroinstestinal canal, and the mental state of the subject are considered to play a role." [FN54]

FN52. Jones et al., 36 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 376-385 (1991).

FN53. Id. at 377.

FN54. Id. at 381.

These authors point out the limitations of the Widmark equations. In their study, they found that "rapid consumption of a moderate dose of ethanol on an empty stomach" resulted in a peak BAC that was "higher than would be expected.. according to Widmark calculations." [FN55] They refer to this as the "overshoot effect ." They explain that after this "early peak" there would be a "diffusion plunge." They state that "[i]f the apparent rate of elimination is calculated from the change in [BAC] between two time points immediately after an overshoot, that is, on a diffusion plunge, the results are abnormally high." [FN56] Professor Jones and his colleagues conclude that "[t]he status of ethanol absorption in drunk drivers at the time of the offense is a more difficult question to tackle. In practice, this will depend on such circumstances as the previous drinking spree--the duration and quantities consumed--and the time lapse from the end of drinking to the time of arrest or the time an accident occurred." [FN57] The authors "highly recommend" that such "speculation" be avoided by states defining the offense of *912 driving drunk as having a certain BAC at the time of the breath test rather than at the time of the driving. [FN58]

FN55. Ibid.

FN56. Id. at 381-83.

FN57. Id. at 384.

FN58. Ibid.

P.R. Jackson, G.T. Tucker, and H.F. Woods, all of the University of Medicine and Pharmacology at Royal Hallmshire Hospital in Great Britain, agree that retrograde extrapolation should be used with caution. [FN59] They state that the method used should "account for possible variations from several sources." [FN60] The "major possible source of error," the authors state, is when "continuing absorption is ignored, as this can make a large difference to the shape and position of" the BAC curve. [FN61] Another source of error "arises from the unique status of the observed subject" because there is "generally no information as to his or her position in the population distribution of the parameters describing ethanol elimination." [FN62] These authors conclude that, "in the absence of continuing absorption," reasonably reliable BAC estimates can be made. But "when absorption continues after drinking, especially when at a slow rate, backtracking calculations become markedly inaccurate." [FN63]

FN59. P.R. Jackson et al., Back-tracking Booze with Bayes--the Retrospective Interpretation of Blood Alcohol Data, 31 BRITISH J. OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 55-63 (1991).

FN60. Id. at 61.

FN61. Id. at 61-62.

FN62. Id. at 62.

FN63. Ibid.

Jones and Neri, in another paper, agree that Widmark's method, while it can be "practical and reliable" in some instances, is not reliable "if alcohol is consumed together with a meal" because "the resulting blood-ethanol concentrations are underestimated." [FN64]

FN64. A.W. Jones & A. Neri, Reinvestigation of Widmark's Method for Quantitative Evaluation of Blood-Ethanol Profiles: Influence of Alcohol Dose and Mode of Drinking, 33 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 1469 (1987).

The complicating factors were discussed by Y. Al-Lanqawi of the Department of Pharmacology and Clinical Pharmacology at the University of Dundee Medical School, and his colleagues. [FN65] He writes that "[i]ndividuals vary with respect to age, sex, body weight and lean body mass, all of which may effect the disposition of ethanol. In addition, the absorption of ethanol into the body may be variable and may continue over a long period of time." [FN66] He found that retrograde extrapolations using the "mean elimination rate" observed in their study resulted in a rate of error of "essentially zero." [FN67] He nevertheless noted that "the variability in the extrapolation error obtained in individual suspects with the mean elimination rate was considerable." [FN68]

FN65. Al Lanqawi et al., 34 BRITISH J. OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY at 321.

FN66. Id. at 320.

FN67. Ibid.

FN68. Ibid.

In particular, Al-Lanqawi discovered that the potential rate of error increased as time went on. Indeed, "this variability was particularly large" when extrapolation back one hour or more was attempted. [FN69] Finally, Al-Lanqawi and his colleagues found that the mean elimination rate in their study was 25% greater than the "frequently cited population mean rate" of .015. "When the latter slope was used in the back extrapolation procedure, a consistent underestimation in the plasma ethanol *913 concentration was observed in the majority of the subjects." [FN70]

FN69. Ibid.

FN70. Ibid.

Finally, Edward Fitzgerald, a lawyer in Massachusetts, and Dr. David Hume, a professor of analytical chemistry at M.I.T., write that there are "serious questions about the reliability of any later single test as an indicator of an earlier BAC." [FN71] They explain that most extrapolations are based upon certain assumptions which simply are not true, including the assumption that a person's BAC will decline once drinking has stopped. In fact, they say, in most DWI cases, the person is arrested shortly after his last drink. [FN72] His stomach has not yet absorbed all the alcohol, and his BAC will continue to rise for some time after arrest, resulting in a tested BAC which is higher than what it was at the time of the driving. Another assumption these authors criticize is the assumption that all people have an alcohol elimination rate of .015. While that is the average rate of elimination, the authors point out that the actual individual range is generally between .01 and .02, with values seen as high as .04 and as low as .006. [FN73] They conclude that the attempt to engage in retrograde extrapolation is "fraught with difficulties." [FN74]

FN71. Fitzgerald & Hume, 66 MASS. L.REV. at 28 (1981).

FN72. Id. at 31.

FN73. Id. at 31.

FN74. Id. at 32.

Other Courts

Few jurisdictions have considered the reliability of retrograde extrapolations. One reason for this is that many states have eliminated any need for retrograde extrapolation as a matter of law. Their statutes provide for a rebuttable presumption that an individual is guilty of DWI if his BAC at the time of the test is over the legal limit, assuming the test was conducted within a specified or reasonable time from the driving. [FN75] In these states, a BAC of .10 or more at the time of the breath test would essentially prove the State's case; it is then the defendant's burden to prove that his BAC was lower than the legal limit at the time he was driving. In contrast, at the time of Mata's offense, our statute required the State to prove that the defendant had a BAC of .10 "while operating a motor vehicle." [FN76]

FN75. See, e.g., cal. Veh.Code § 23152(b); nev. Rev. Stat . § 484.381(1); ind.Code Ann. § 9-11-4-15; iowa Code Ann. § 321J.2(7); minn.Stat. § § 169.121 subd. 2.

FN76. Former tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Art. 6701l-1 (repealed 1995), now located at tex. Penal Code § 49.04.

We found only two courts that have touched upon the reliability of retrograde extrapolation. An Arizona appellate court has stated in a footnote, without citation to authority, that the science of retrograde extrapolation "has achieved general acceptance in the scientific field." [FN77] The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, on the other hand, appears to disagree. That court, while finding the issue was not preserved for appeal, cautioned that its opinion should not be interpreted as "tacit approval" for the use of retrograde extrapolations. [FN78] Citing a law review article, the Court stated that

FN77. Ring v. Taylor, 141 Ariz. 56, 69 n. 6, 685 P.2d 121, 134 n. 6 (Ariz.Ct.App.1984).

FN78. Smith v. Tuscaloosa, 601 So.2d 1136, 1140 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).

"[c]areful analysis of these studies indicates that retrograde extrapolation is an unreliable method of determining a defendant's*914 condition at the time of operation. The inadequacies of retrograde extrapolation extend beyond mere technical inaccuracies to problems which are inherent in the basic premises and calculations of this technique. These inadequacies render retrograde extrapolation inherently untrustworthy and therefore inappropriate for use as evidence to convict drunk drivers." [FN79]

FN79. Ibid., quoting E. Abbott, "One for the Road"--The Reliability of Retrograde Extrapolation and the Implications for Vermont Statutes, 16 VT.L.REV. 395, 397 (1991).

The Expert

[9] Under Kelly we may also examine the clarity with which the expert explained the underlying scientific theory and technique. Initially, we note that McDougall is a popular expert in Bexar County DWI prosecutions. [FN80] The court of appeals found that he has "impeccable qualifications, including extensive personal observations of the alcohol absorption and elimination process." But we find nothing in the record supporting any "extensive personal observations of the alcohol absorption and elimination process" or any ability to perform retrograde extrapolations. It was inappropriate for the court of appeals to rely on its opinion in Hartman as evidence of McDougall's qualifications in this case. Nevertheless, Mata conceded at trial that McDougall was qualified to perform retrograde extrapolations generally; he complained only that McDougall could not reliably apply the technique to Mata.

FN80. See Coward v. State, 993 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.); Mireles v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 993 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999), aff'd, 9 S.W.3d 128 (Tex.1999); State v. Reed, 888 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1994, no pet.); Kapuscinski v. State, 878 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1994, pet. ref'd); State v. Krager, 810 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1991, pet. ref'd); State v. Kost, 785 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd); Douthit v. State, 739 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.App.-- San Antonio 1987, no pet.); Harrell v. State, 725 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

In reviewing the testimony, we find that, while McDougall's testimony indicates a general understanding of the BAC curve and the concepts of absorption and elimination, it reflects failure to explain the theory to the court with any clarity. First, McDougall contradicted himself within his testimony. He testified, at various times, that the absorption phase could not last longer than an hour, or an hour and a half, or two hours. [FN81] He testified that Mata's BAC at the time of driving would have been at least . 08, then .12 or .13. He testified that Mata's high-end BAC would have been . 25, then .23. [FN82]

FN81. See Appendix A.

FN82. See Appendix C.

In addition, McDougall seemed unaware of the subtleties inherent in any retrograde extrapolation calculation. He initially testified that the average elimination rate was approximately .02, but most of the literature suggests it is .015, [FN83] and McDougall did not acknowledge the difference (a difference of 33%) or explain it. He later testified that elimination rates could range from .018 to .025, but he nevertheless stated that he used a .02 or .03 elimination rate in his calculations. McDougall's .03 elimination rate is not only outside his own stated range, it is *915 twice the generally-accepted elimination rate. The dissent believes McDougall "clearly misspoke" [FN84] in referring to elimination rates, but we find nothing in the record to indicate this. The dissent also suggests that McDougall's erroneous elimination rate is irrelevant since scientific literature also suggests that the .015 rate is too slow, and "recent literature indicates that anything from .015 to .02 is ... normal." [FN85] But our focus today is not on what the proper elimination rate is or should be. We merely observe that McDougall's testimony was inconsistent and failed to acknowledge scientific evidence to the contrary. This is just another factor we consider in determining whether McDougall explained the science to the court with clarity.

FN83. See Fitzgerald & Hume, 66 MASS. L.REV. at 31 (average elimination rate is .015); Pariser, 64 N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 152 n. 76, citing Watson & Batt, Prediction of Blood Alcohol Concentrations in Human Subjects: Updating the Widmark Equation, 42 J. STUD. ALCHOL 547 (1981); Taylor, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 5.2.3 (Widmark's research indicates average elimination rate of .015).

FN84. Post, op. at 905 (Keller, P.J., dissenting).

FN85. Id., op. at 905.

Moreover, McDougall's math appeared to be in error. At the suppression hearing, McDougall calculated a high-end BAC for Mata as being .25 on an empty stomach and .22 on a full stomach. He testified that he used a . 02 elimination rate. But if Mata's BAC was .19 at the time of the test, and McDougall was using the average elimination rate of .02, McDougall should have calculated a high-end BAC of .23 at the time of the offense, which was two hours before the test. McDougall did not explain the difference in the numbers. At trial, he corrected his math and calculated a high-end BAC for Mata as being .23. McDougall's changing his calculations from the pretrial hearing to the trial is a factor we can consider in determining the reliability of his testimony.

McDougall's inconsistent statements did not stop here. Regarding the number of drinks required to increase from below a .10 to a .19 in two hours, McDougall first testified that five drinks would be sufficient, then changed his testimony to seven to twelve drinks. [FN86]

FN86. See Appendix E.

Finally, McDougall conceded that his calculations were based on a "normal drinking pattern." He acknowledged that the "chug-a-lug" situation was not a normal drinking pattern, and he also acknowledged that he had no idea how much Mata had had to drink, what he had had to drink, or how long Mata had been drinking. As a result, McDougall essentially conceded that all of his calculations as to Mata were speculative. [FN87]

FN87. See Appendix D.

Conclusion

Our study of retrograde extrapolation leads us to several conclusions. Initially, we recognize that even those who believe retrograde extrapolation is a reliable technique have utilized it only if certain factors are known, such as the length of the drinking spree, the time of the last drink, and the person's weight. [FN88] McDougall knew none of those factors, or any other individual characteristics of Mata, for that matter. In addition, there appears to be general disagreement on some of the fundamental aspects of the theory, such as the accuracy of Widmark's formulas, [FN89] *916 whether a standard elimination rate can be reliably applied to a given subject, [FN90] and the effect that food in the stomach has on alcohol absorption. [FN91] Nevertheless, given the studies, other concepts seem indisputable, including that multiple tests will increase the ability to plot a subject's BAC curve, a test nearer in time to the time of the alleged offense increases the ability to determine the subject's offense-time BAC, and the more personal information known about the subject increases the reliability of an extrapolation.

FN88. Montgomery & Reasor, 36 J. OF TOXICOLOGY AND ENVTL. HEALTH at 287-88.

FN89. Compare Jones et al., 36 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCE at 381 (consumption of alcohol on empty stomach results in rates different from Widmark equations); Jones & Neri, 33 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY at 1469 (consumption of alcohol on full stomach results in rates different from Widmark equations); with Montgomery & Reasor, 36 J. OF TOXICOLOGY AND ENVTL. HEALTH at 282 (finding retrograde extrapolations generally reliable).

FN90. Compare Watkins & Adler, 38 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCE at 288 (standard elimination rate cannot apply because elimination rates vary depending on full or empty stomach, and variation is statistically significant); Pariser, 64 N.Y.U.L.REV. at 152 n. 76 (individuals will have higher or lower elimination rates than standard elimination rates); with Montgomery & Reasor, 36 J. OF TOXICOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH at 282 (finding retrograde extrapolations generally reliable).

FN91. Compare Watkins & Adler, 38 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCE at 288 (food does not affect the time it takes to reach peak BAC); with Jones et al., 36 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCE at 381 (food does affect the time it takes to reach peak BAC).

[10][11] We believe that the science of retrograde extrapolation can be reliable in a given case. The expert's ability to apply the science and explain it with clarity to the court is a paramount consideration. In addition, the expert must demonstrate some understanding of the difficulties associated with a retrograde extrapolation. He must demonstrate an awareness of the subtleties of the science and the risks inherent in any extrapolation. Finally, he must be able to clearly and consistently apply the science.

[12][13] The court evaluating the reliability of a retrograde extrapolation should also consider (a) the length of time between the offense and the test(s) administered; (b) the number of tests given and the length of time between each test; and (c) whether, and if so, to what extent, any individual characteristics of the defendant were known to the expert in providing his extrapolation. These characteristics and behaviors might include, but are not limited to, the person's weight and gender, the person's typical drinking pattern and tolerance for alcohol, how much the person had to drink on the day or night in question, what the person drank, the duration of the drinking spree, the time of the last drink, and how much and what the person had to eat either before, during, or after the drinking.

Obviously, not every single personal fact about the defendant must be known to the expert in order to produce an extrapolation with the appropriate level of reliability. As the Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized, if this were the case, no valid extrapolation could ever occur without the defendant's cooperation, since a number of facts known only to the defendant are essential to the process. [FN92] If the State had more than one test, each test a reasonable length of time apart, and the first test were conducted within a reasonable time from the time of the offense, then an expert could potentially create a reliable estimate of the defendant's BAC with limited knowledge of personal characteristics and behaviors. In contrast, a single test conducted some time after the offense could result in a reliable extrapolation only if the expert had knowledge of many personal characteristics and behaviors of the defendant. Somewhere in the middle might fall a case in which there was a single test a reasonable length of time from the driving, and two or three personal characteristics *917 of the defendant were known to the expert. We cannot and should not determine today the exact blueprint for reliability in every case. Suffice it to say that the factors must be balanced.

FN92. Wirth, 936 S.W.2d at 84.

Application

[14] In this case, the inconsistencies in McDougall's testimony prevented him from explaining the science to the court with any clarity. Regarding the other factors, there was only one test of Mata's BAC, and it occurred over two hours after the alleged offense. This is a significant length of time and seriously affects the reliability of any extrapolation. Add to that the fact that McDougall did not know one single personal characteristic of Mata--he did not know whether Mata had eaten anything that night and if so, how much; how much Mata had had to drink; what Mata had been drinking; when Mata's last drink was; the length of Mata's drinking spree; or even Mata's weight.

We find that the factors in this case weigh against a finding of reliability. Even the scientists who find retrograde extrapolations reliable would require more known quantities than what McDougall had in this case. Given McDougall's inconsistent testimony, along with the single breath test conducted over two hours after the driving, we conclude that, in this case, the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that McDougall's retrograde extrapolation was reliable.

Judgment

We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admitting that part of McDougall's testimony pertaining to the extrapolation of Mata's BAC. We remand this cause to the court of appeals for a determination of harm under Appellate Rule 44.2.

KELLER, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

WOMACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

JOHNSON, J., filed a concurring opinion in which PRICE, J., joined.

HERVEY, J., did not participate.

APPENDIX A

Testimony Regarding Length of Absorption Phase

Suppression Hearing

Q: And is it conceivable then that over a period of two hours, if a person had a very full stomach, that it is going to take awhile for them to reach their peak of alcohol concentration?

A: Yes.

Q: Regardless of how much they have had to drink, if they have a full stomach, you know, lots of meat and potatoes, it is just going to take some time for it to get up there?

A: Yes.

Q: Two hours maybe?

A: I think an hour and a half is adequate for a complete absorption of the drinks. It doesn't take two hours to digest a stomach full of food. So all of the alcohol would be absorbed in the hour and a half.

Q: An hour and a half?

A: Yes, and it would be less than that if it were not a full stomach.

Voir Dire

Q: Consequently, if all you have is the test result and you have the arrest time, the only angle that [you] can draw, nothing [sic ] that the peak occurred after the test, is the angle from zero, at the time of *918 arrest, to the point of the chart on the test?

A: No, I don't agree with that.

Q: Okay. Tell me why you disagree with that?

A: I don't know of any situation where a person would be in the absorption phase after an hour. So let's assume that he was arrested and he drank just before he was arrested. He could be rising for an hour and then he would peak. I don't know of any instance where he would peak two hours later.

Q: Okay. Are you saying that an individual who has a full stomach on him, a meal of potatoes, would not peak more than two hours?

A: If the person had an empty stomach he would peak in about half an hour to 45 minutes. And if he is on a full stomach it would be somewhere around an hour to an hour and a half at the very most.

Q: So are you saying that it is not possible?

A: For him the peak two hours later, no. He has to peak before two hours. He has to peak in about an hour.

Q: Well, I am just going to show you this chart that we have gone over. I know you have seen it. This is that chart based upon the U.S. Department of Transportation, Alcohol and Safety study and we referred to this. And you will note that the second or the lower of the two was based upon, you know, the same amount of alcohol with an individual immediately after eating a meal of potatoes and it shows that this person is peaking right at about two hours, doesn't it?

A: Yes, it does.

Q: Now, would you say you would disagree with that?

A: Here is the problem. On this particular chart our peak is at a .04. That is a very limited alcohol concentration.

Q: It is lower.

A: So it is a very small amount of alcohol in the amount of potatoes. It varies greatly with more alcohol. It would not be delayed as much for a greater amount of alcohol. Potatoes can't dilute the alcohol any more than potatoes can dilute the alcohol.

Q: I agree, but what it does is it slows down the system and it slows down the alcohol getting into the gut, basically?

A: Yes, but that is also dependent upon the concentration of the alcohol and the amount of the alcohol. This is a limited amount of alcohol. This is just two ounces.

Q: Well, here it says two ounces of pure alcohol and 8 ounces of water, equivalent to 5 ounces of 80 proof Vodka. Would you agree with that?

A: Yes, sir.

* * *

Q: This is an extreme. Okay. I agree with you that that is extreme on one end. But would you agree with me that there is also an extreme on the other end that in some individuals, that they could have been drinking for a long period of time and had achieved a high level of alcohol in their system, perhaps several hours before this, and then continued to rise for a period of time?

A: For an hour to an hour and a half. That is the most.

Q: Yes.

A: Anything more than that I don't believe. It has not been my experience and I have tested thousands of individuals and it has not been my experience that their *919 alcohol concentration rises more than an hour and a half after their last drink.

Q: Even though this survey might suggest otherwise?

A: That is not a survey. That is an experiment done with a gulp of five ounces on potatoes and then you measure the alcohol concentration.

Q: Right. And one was done on a full stomach and one was done on an empty stomach and there was a variability. You will agree with that?

A: I am not going to accept the two hours as an absolute, no. In my experience with all of the studies that I have read it is between half an hour to an hour and a half to reach a peak, after drinking on a full or empty stomach. Within the limitations of that graph they could have been [talking] about an hour and a half and it looks like two hours. It is not very significant.

Trial

Q: What would [it be] if the peak in this situation came after the test? How would that change your range?

A: I don't believe it would have occurred more than an hour and a half after the arrest. I don't know of an instance, in my own experience, I don't know of anybody that has reached a peak more than an hour and a half after the last drink.

Q: You have not come across that situation?

A: No, but I must admit that I have not tested a chug-a-lugger.

APPENDIX B

Testimony Regarding Elimination Rates

Suppression Hearing

Q: And for the alcohol to be metabolized and processed out of the system, we are talking about--that is when we talk about this absorption/elimination. In other words, it is going to rise fairly rapidly in terms of absorption and then it will dissipate or eliminate at .02 percent grams per 210 liters, is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Approximately?

A: Yes, sir.

Voir Dire

Q: Now, alcohol ... eliminates at about a .02 per hour, something like that?

A: Yes, sir.

* * *

Q: What you are saying then as I understand it is, that you take the time of the test, and following the .02 elimination rate, you would draw a chart up to, say the time of the arrest and past it to a potential peak, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

* * *

Q: Now, the reason we can testify about this range right here, or you can, is that you have two knowns. You have the known breath test and you have the known standard elimination rate which is pretty standard among all persons. Will you agree with me?

A: Yes, sir.

Trial

Q: Could you draw for the jury a graph in the form of an XY axis, showing us that range?

A: By XY, do you mean alcohol concentration versus time?

Q: Right.

A: I guess I can.

Q: Your Honor, may the witness step down to the diagram?

*920 Court: Yes.

A: This is time and this would be alcohol concentration. The only time that I really have is the time of the test. And this is the only real test and I will put that at .19 up here, a .193 and the time of the test. Alcohol is eliminated at the rate of one drink per hour. Two hours before it could have been as high as a .23. And then, let's say it was at a .02 or .03 elimination per hour, it would make it at .06 less than this--a .13. His alcohol concentration would have been somewhere in that range (indicating on the chart).

* * *

Q: Now, let's talk about the elimination rates. Is that a fairly standard number in all persons' elimination rate?

A: .02 per hour of alcohol concentration for a 150 pound person is pretty stable. It ranges from [.018 to a .025]. A .02 is very close to normal.

Q: So we are not going to see any large shift in elimination rates over a period of time. It is going to be right around a .02?

A: If all he is doing is eliminating and if he has completed absorption.

Q: And that will probably be pretty close to the same for the average person throughout?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So given an elimination rate of .02, if we assume, based upon your chart, that the individual peaked prior to the test then you can draw sort of a line back showing, you know, on this chart a rise of .02 per hour?

A: If he peaked two hours before or if he peaked prior to that.

Q: Right. And that is what this line would represent because these are known things, right? We know that we have a breath test score of a .193 or whatever it was and we know about a .02 elimination rate, over time. Now, what about absorption rates?

A: They vary more because of the amount of food in the stomach and also the amount of the concentration of the alcohol being consumed.

APPENDIX C

Testimony Regarding BAC Range

Suppression Hearing

Q: You are not testifying, today, about what his conditions were while he was in actual, physical control of a motor vehicle, are you?

A: Yes, I believe I was.

Q: What are you saying about his condition when he was in actual, physical control of a motor vehicle?

A: That he was impaired and that he had lost the normal use of his mental or physical faculties at the time that he was in control of a motor vehicle.

Q: You are not saying that he had a breath alcohol content of .10 or higher, are you?

A: No, I am saying that he had an alcohol concentration of at least a .08 or higher.

Q: So you will state that in your opinion, at a .08, it means an individual has lost the normal use of their mental or physical faculties?

A: Yes.

Q: If that is the result of ingesting alcohol?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, however, you will agree that the State, in terms of the breath alcohol testing program, the State minimum is a .10?

A: Yes, I will.

*921 Q: All right. But based upon the information that you have, you just really can't give us a figure for this individual based upon that test taken two hours later, can you?

A: I can't give you an individual number. I can give you a range, but not a number.

Q: And they will ask--so I am going to ask you, what is that range?

A: I think it is possible for the person to be as much as a .06 less than a . 19, two hours and ten minutes earlier. It could have been as low as a .12 or a .13.

Q: I am sorry, a what?

A: A .12 to a .13 at the low end, and somewhere about a .25 at the high end, somewhere in between there.

Q: So we are talking about a range here of .13?

A: To a .25, yes, two hours previous.

Q: A range then including 12 points?

A: Yes.

Q: So it is a 12 point range that you will testify to?

A: Yes.

Q: Are you saying that there is not a possibility that it could be lower than 10, a .10?

A: No. There is an extreme situation where it is possible that it could be less than a .10.

* * *

A: He could have been as low as maybe a .16 on a full stomach and not quite as high [as] a .25, maybe a .21 or .22.

Trial

Q: A male blows a .193 two hours after they were stopped, two hours after we know at least that they had stopped drinking two hours prior. Can you give us a range as to what his alcohol concentration would have been at the time he was stopped?

A: I believe the high side would have been somewhere around a .04 higher than that, which would be a .23 and then his body would have eliminated the equivalent of two drinks during those two hours. On the low side, his body could have absorbed two or three drinks and as much as a .04 or a .06, reached a peak and either maintained that level or decreased a little bit until the time of arrest, which would make him, I guess, at the low side of a .13. So I would say somewhere between a .13 and a .23.

* * *

Q: Mr. McDougall, can you conceive of any factuall [sic] facts that would support an alcohol concentration below a .10 at the time that he was stopped?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. What would that be?

A: If just before he was stopped if he chug-a-lugged a lot of hard liquor, hard alcohol.

* * *

Q: Now, in this particular case you have testified that you thought there was a range of .13 to .23?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: However, you previously testified that the range could have been from a point .12 to a point .25. Is that correct?

A: That is very possible. I don't know if we used the same assumptions.

Q: I don't want to put words in your mouth and that is why I marked this and I want to make sure that you are the same George Allen McDougall that testified in this case back in June of 1993. There is *922 no other George Allen McDougall, is there, testifying?

A: Well, my father, but he is not testifying.

Q: Okay. Then I will submit to you that this was your testimony in response to my questions.

A: It could have been as low as a .12 or a .13. That is what I testified to here, and to a .25, yes. Yes, what did I say previously, a .23? It is possible I could have testified to that.

APPENDIX D

Testimony Regarding Normal Drinking Patterns

Voir Dire

Q: Let's assume that we do have a .19, and we have that .19 an hour and 55 minutes, tested, after the arrest. And that is all the information that you have?

A: That is correct.

Q: Now, not nothing [sic ] when that peak occurs, before or after, why is that figure any different in factoring your theoretical analysis of range than the figure that we are dealing with here?

A: Because you are assuming that he chug-a-lugged twice as much alcohol to get to that level.

Q: Perhaps. See, I am not assuming that. I think that you have to assume that. You have to assume many different variables is what I am saying?

A: I don't think that I have to assume that. I think that I can assume a normal drinking pattern. And if you want to raise the issue of the possibility of a chug-a-lug, then we can talk about it. But I don't assume that as normal. I am sorry, but I don't assume that chug-a-lugging alcohol is normal. In my drinking experience that is very unusual.

Q: Well, that is true?

A: I am not going to give you an example based on a very unusual situation.

Q: But you will agree with me, won't you, that there are persons that drink that much?

A: Who drink that much, yes, but not chug-a-lug. But yes, there are people that drink that much. Yes, I will agree with you.

Q: Mr. McDougall, the point I am trying to make is that you don't know anything about Mr. Mata or his drinking habits and what he had to drink on that night, so you cannot factor in any of these variables to determine the angle, you know, back which we can recreate this range.

A: No, but I can state the parameters under which I am making my hypothetical answer and you can live with that or you can illustrate the limitations of my parameters. But I think my parameters are very well within the bounds of what you are going to find.

Q: But what you are saying is you are basing your parameters on some hypothetical individual?

A: Yes, on a normal drinking individual.

Q: But that may mean something totally different to this jury than it does to you because you are a breath test supervisor?

A: But I am not adverse to explaining what my parameters are and they can assume those parameters and they can understand the parameters I am using. I am not using any magic.

Q: No, and I agree with that, but wouldn't you agree that your experience with drinking and with the capacities of individuals and the vari [e]ties within the population, that your experience is far different than these people on this jury. You have a much broader range of information.

*923 A: And with that knowledge a chug-a-lug is even more exceptional. To state that a chug-a-lug--which is the only possibility that we are talking about here, is that he actually gulped down a quart of liquor just before the arrest and then he went driving.

Q: Right, that is one of the possibilities that you have to consider?

A: That is one that would not be considered normal. I am sorry.

Q: Well, you say normal but you have to apply that opinion to Mr. Mata. Are you saying to this court that you would limit your testimony not to Mr. Mata but to a hypothetical individual who is not him?

A: No, I would explain what is normal and if you were to bring up other parameters then I will tell you what those other parameters will do to an individual. I will explain it and lay it all out.

Trial

Q: You say when he could have peaked within a normal drinking pattern--is that what you just said?

A: Yes.

Q: But you don't know what the drinking pattern is of Mr. Mata?

A: That is correct.

Q: So that range is based upon an assumption that doesn't apply to Mr. Mata, is that correct?

A: It may not, yes, sir.

Q: So that range that we have there may not be his range?

A: That is possible, yes.

Q: This is a hypothetical based upon your person, the average person?

A: Yes.

APPENDIX E

Trial Testimony Regarding Amount of Liquor Required to Increase BAC by 10

Points

Q: Mr. McDougall, can you conceive of any factuall [sic ] facts that would support an alcohol concentration below a .10 at the time that he was stopped?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. What would that be?

A: If just before he was stopped if he chug-a-lugged a lot of hard liquor, hard alcohol.

Q: About how much? Can you tell us at this point about how much he would have to chug-a-lug to blow a .10 and up to a .19?

A: Again I need to know his body weight. If we are talking about a 150 pound person then that is five extra drinks, from a .10 to a .19. He would have to consume at least five shots of alcohol for 150 pounds and proportionally more if he weighs more than 150 pounds.

Q: So a 150 pound person, it would be about five shots?

A: Five shots of hard liquor.

Q: And how many ounces constitute the shot?

A: An ounce and a quarter.

Q: And that would be right before the person was stopped?

A: That would be so that the person had consumed the alcohol but it hadn't had a chance to get into his blood stream yet, which means very close to the time that he was arrested. He would have to very quickly be drinking and be very quickly arrested thereafter.

Q: Are you assuming in this fact situation as in a .09, or are you assuming he is a .00 at the time that he had the five shots?

*924 A: No, he would be at five shots in addition to a .10. Let's assume that he is at .10 and to reach a .19 he would have to consume at least five shots if he weighed 150 pounds.

Q: If the person was stone, cold sober and had not a drop to drink at the time that they were stopped, they would have to drink significantly more than the five shots?

A: He would have to consume about 12 shots, from .00 to .19. Yes, 12 shots of hard liquor.

* * *

Q: Based upon the factual hypothetical that we talked about earlier, what are you considering the abnormal drinking pattern?

A: Chug-a-lugging a bottle of hard liquor and gulping it down as fast and as much as you can in a short period of time.

Q: And this hypothetical that we talked about, him going from a [.10 to a . 19] [FN93], that it had to take him five shots just before he got arrested, do you agree with that?

FN93. The reporter's record actually states ".01 to a .09" at this point. But nowhere in the "hypothetical ... talked about earlier" did these numbers occur. Instead, the "hypothetical talked about earlier" concerned increasing from a .10, the legal limit, to a .19, Mata's BAC. Moreover, in the prosecutor's very next two questions, the reporter's record reflects the numbers .10 and .19. The reference to ".01 to a .09" is either a typographical error or a misstatement by the prosecutor. Either way, the record indicates that both the prosecutor and McDougall understood the hypothetical as referring to the numbers .10 and .19.

A: No. Those aren't the same. Chug-a-lugging is drinking much more than that. It would be seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven or twelve drinks consumed very quickly.

Q: For him to come from below a .10 up to a .19?

A: Yes, he would have to have much more than that.

Q: And an individual from that fact situation, this person that blows a .19, two hours after arrest, they have above a .10 at the time that they are stopped?

A: I believe so, yes.

KELLER, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

The Court acknowledges that "retrograde extrapolation" testimony constitutes reliable evidence under Rule 702 [FN1] if the principles of the theory are applied correctly. However, the Court contends that the retrograde extrapolation analysis in this case was improperly conducted. I respectfully disagree.

FN1. Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The Court first contends that McDougall's testimony reflects a failure to explain the theory with any clarity. In support of this contention, the Court points to what it believes are various contradictions in McDougall's testimony. The Court finds that McDougall contradicted himself in testifying that absorption could last no longer than an hour, an hour and a half, or two hours. My reading of the testimony reveals no contradiction. McDougall testified that usually absorption would take no longer than an hour, and at most it would take an hour and a half. McDougall acknowledged a study that showed absorption *925 taking two hours, but McDougall cautioned that the study involved relatively small amounts of alcohol (well below the legal limit) that were diluted by food. McDougall maintained that larger volumes of alcohol were not so easily diluted and were absorbed within the hour and a half time frame.

The Court also contends that McDougall contradicted himself by testifying that Mata's BAC at the time of driving would have been at least .08, then .12 or . 13. But an examination of the testimony shows no contradiction. McDougall set .12 or .13 as the low end but acknowledged an "extreme situation" that could result in a lower BAC of .08.

Citing Widmark's research and other literature suggesting that the average elimination rate is .015 per hour, the Court finds fault with McDougall's testimony that the average elimination rate is .02. But earlier in its opinion the Court cites other literature that says Widmark's average is too slow. [FN2] Moreover, recent literature indicates that anything from . 015 to .020 is accepted as "normal." [FN3] "Disagreements between experts about the variables and correct elimination rates to be applied go to the weight of the evidence as do the differences in the experts' credentials." [FN4] The Court faults McDougall for failing to acknowledge contrary opinions in the literature, but McDougall was not asked about contrary opinions. He was simply asked for his own opinions on the elimination rate. As a qualified expert, McDougall could base his opinion on what he believed to be the most accurate literature on the subject and what accords most with his experience, which, according to his testimony, included the testing of two thousand individuals. If McDougall had been questioned about the contrary literature and had failed to acknowledge it, that might be cause for concern, but such was not the case here.

FN2. Court's opinion at 20 (citing Y. Al-Lanqawi et al., Ethano Kinetics: Extent of Error in Back Extrapolation Procedures, 34 BRITISH J. OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 316, 320 (1992)).

FN3. J. Nicholas Bostic, Alcohol-Related Offenses: Retrograde Extrapolation after Wager, 79 MICHIGAN BAR J. 668, conclusion section (June 2000).

FN4. Id.

The Court further argues that McDougall committed a math error by giving a high-end range of .25, when the high-end should have been a .23 given a test result of .19 and using an elimination rate of .02 per hour for two hours. But, the supposed math error seems to be eliminated if one considers that the . 25 estimate was made at the motion to suppress hearing, where McDougall used the .196 base test result. McDougall testified at trial that the average elimination rate ranged from .018 to .025, although .02 was considered "normal." Adding a .025 elimination rate to .196 over two hours would yield a .246--or .25 if one rounds up. At trial, the prosecution used the other sample as the basis for comparison, giving a base test result of .193. McDougall then calculated the high end as .23, which is consistent with the testified elimination rate of .02.

The Court also contends that McDougall assumed an elimination rate of .03 in his testimony, thereby going beyond his own stated range of elimination rates. A close examination of the testimony, however, shows that McDougall was referring to the low end of the alcohol concentration range--which is produced by measuring absorption rates, not elimination rates. McDougall clearly misspoke here when he used the word "elimination" instead of "absorption." That slip of the tongue does *926 not mean McDougall was unable to explain retrograde extrapolation with any clarity; it simply means that McDougall is human and can be expected to make a mistake now and then. If the parties had thought it to be important, they could have corrected this slip of the tongue through questioning. And in fact, in other testimony at trial, McDougall expressly stated that a total absorption of .04 or .06 could be expected over a two hour period, which is consistent with the ".02 to .03" per hour rate given in the testimony of which the Court complains. [FN5]

FN5. See Court's opinion, Appendix C. Consistent with his one and a half hour time frame for absorption, McDougall indicated that the peak could have been maintained or reduced a little before arrest.

The Court finally contends that McDougall contradicted himself when he first testified that five drinks would be required to increase from below a .10 to a .19 in two hours but later testified that seven to twelve drinks would be required. But the record shows the latter testimony was in response to a hypothetical assuming a BAC "from .01 to .09." The Court contends that this range was either a stenographic error or a misstatement by the prosecutor but that the witness clearly understood the prosecutor's question to refer to the previous hypothetical involving a range of .10 to .19. It may be, however, that the prosecutor misspoke, and in so doing, confused the witness. McDougall's earlier testimony involved two hypotheticals: (1) five drinks (shots of hard liquor) to raise someone from a .10 to a .19, and (2) twelve drinks to raise someone from a .00 to a .19. McDougall may have believed that the prosecutor was referencing the latter hypothetical in giving his answer. At any rate, after McDougall's seven to twelve drink answer, the prosecutor clarified the hypothetical as coming from "below a .10 up to a .19." Such a hypothetical could include a base level of .00 through .09 with .19 as the end result--which would make McDougall's range of seven to twelve drinks consistent with his previous testimony. Moreover, if there was a contradiction, no one bothered to question McDougall about it. Had someone done so, perhaps McDougall would have supplied an explanation for the apparent disparity or explained whether he had misheard or misunderstood the hypothetical. The trial court could have easily concluded from the evidence before it that McDougall could explain the theory of retrograde extrapolation with sufficient clarity.

The Court next contends that there were insufficient facts in the present case from which to conduct a proper retrograde extrapolation analysis. The Court lists the following non-exclusive characteristics to consider: weight, sex, typical drinking pattern, tolerance for alcohol, how much the person had to drink on the occasion, what the person drank, duration of the drinking spree, time of the last drink, and how much the person had to eat. McDougall knew that appellant was a man. Although he did not know appellant's weight, McDougall testified that his calculations had taken weight into account. Perhaps McDougall was referring to the hypothetical of a person weighing 150 pounds that was given to him at trial. If appellant's weight varied greatly from 150 pounds, he could have brought that out through cross-examination and posed a hypothetical that included his actual weight.

Moreover, McDougall testified that his figures assumed a normal drinking pattern, but he was willing to explain how the estimates would change for a chug-a-lug situation. Further, McDougall testified to the top and bottom ends of the range of possible intoxication based upon the breath *927 result of . 19. His figures assumed an empty stomach because the figures for a full stomach would be closer to the tested value, and hence, within the range given. Finally, while he did not know whether appellant was in the absorption phase or elimination phase, McDougall gave figures that took both of these possibilities into account.

While McDougall's knowledge of appellant's personal characteristics was sparse, he did not attempt to arbitrarily estimate a single value for appellant's BAC. If he had done so, the Court's criticism would be well-taken. But McDougall was a very thoughtful witness. He set up a rather large range of BAC values and explained the assumptions upon which that range was based. In doing so, McDougall took into account the universe of likely factors based upon the information given. If appellant believed that McDougall had neglected to consider a particular factor or set of factors, appellant was free to pose the appropriate hypothetical and obtain a corresponding opinion. In fact, McDougall plainly said that a variety of factors could influence a person's BAC.

McDougall testified to a BAC range that, regardless of the factors involved, showed appellant was almost certainly above the legal limit. In that regard, the testimony was both reliable and helpful to the jury.

I respectfully dissent.

WOMACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KELLER, P.J., joined.

In this case the material fact was the concentration of alcohol in the appellant's body at the time he was arrested while driving, which was 3:05 a.m. [FN1] About two hours later the defendant gave two samples of his breath, a few minutes apart, for testing. [FN2] The testing instrument reported his alcohol concentration as being 0.196 in the first sample and 0.193 in the second. [FN3] George McDougall was asked what the range of alcohol concentration of "a male" would have been when he was arrested if he had stopped drinking at least two hours earlier. [FN4] McDougall answered:

FN1. See Testimony of Kenneth Wayne Thompson, 3 Reporter's Record (hereinafter "RR") at 146, 189.

FN2. See Testimony of Arnold Santos, 3 RR192, 195, 196.

FN3. Testimony of George Allen McDougal, Jr., 233. Alcohol concentration is "the number of grams of ethyl alcohol that are found in 210 liters of the vapor being analyzed." Id. at 232.

FN4. "A male blows a .193 two hours after they were stopped, two hours after we know at least that they had stopped drinking two hours prior. Can you give us a range as to what his alcohol concentration would have been at the time he was stopped?" Id. at 257.

I believe that the high side would have been somewhere around a .04 higher than that, which would be a 0.23 and then his body would have eliminated the equivalent of two drinks during those two hours. On the low side, his body could have absorbed two or three drinks and as much as a .04 or a .06, reached a peak and either maintained that level or decreased a little bit until the time of arrest, which would make him, I guess, at the low side of a .13. So I would say somewhere between a .13 and a .23. [FN5]

FN5. Ibid.

He explained that "he would need to know his body weight" to know how much alcohol was in the male's system when he was tested. He said he could conceive that the male could have had an alcohol concentration below 0.10 at the time he was stopped *928 if "just before he was stopped he chug-a-lugged a lot of hard liquor, hard alcohol." To say how much alcohol, he would need to know the male's body weight. [FN6]

FN6. Ibid.

On cross-examination he agreed that, because he lacked several pieces of information, the breath test in this case did not tell the defendant's alcohol level at the time he was driving. [FN7] He did not observe the defendant's driving or his drinking or whether he had had anything to eat, and he did not know the defendant's weight. [FN8] He agreed that he did not know when "the peak of the [defendant's] blood alcohol absorption/elimination occurred," that he could give a better answer if he knew that fact, and that his opinion was "based upon some assumptions about absorption and elimination rates," which varied among individuals. [FN9] He also admitted that his opinion was based on "a normal drinking pattern," and that he did not know the defendant's drinking pattern . [FN10]

FN7. Id. at 264.

FN8. Ibid.

FN9. Id. at 270.

FN10. Id. at 295.

Q. So that range is based upon an assumption that doesn't apply to Mr. Mata, is that correct?

A. It may not, yes, sir.

Q. So that range that we have there may not be his range?

A. That is possible, yes.

Q. This is a hypothetical based upon your person, the average person?

A. Yes. [FN11]

FN11. Id. at 296.

All of the testimony that I have mentioned was given to the jury. It also should be noted that, outside the presence of the jury when the district court was considering the admissibility of McDougall's testimony, the defense counsel asked similar questions, concluding with these:

Q. So your hypothetical has to deal with an average person or a reasonable person and not specifically with my client?

A. With a reasonable possibility of drinking, yes.

Q. What you consider are the reasonable possibilities of drinking?

A. Exactly. [FN12]

FN12. Id. at 252.

I have set forth these details because, in my view, they determine the outcome of this case, in which the witness's qualifications are not challenged and in which his testimony clearly referred to a hypothetical or average person. I do not think the trial court abused its discretion in finding that such general testimony would "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," Tex.R. Evid. 702. The jury was given general information about alcohol concentration's varying over time as alcohol is introduced, absorbed, metabolized, and eliminated; about the usual speed with which this may happen in an average person; and about the fact that these processes vary among individuals and in response to the behaviors that accompany the drinking.

The case might be different if the witness had expressed an opinion about the defendant's blood alcohol, or if his qualifications had been challenged. Of course I express no view about such questions.

I would affirm the judgments below.

*929 JOHNSON, J., joined by PRICE, J., concurring.

Rates for alcohol absorption and burn-off are an appropriate matter of inquiry and exposition in a trial for driving while intoxicated. However, using such rates to establish that the defendant was driving while intoxicated may be a problem because Texas law is stated in terms of concentration of alcohol in the blood (BAC) at time of driving rather than time of testing. Extrapolation back from the BAC at the time of testing to the BAC at the time of driving is an endeavor fraught with the danger of inappropriately bamboozling the jury into thinking that such an extrapolation can be anything close to accurate. The information which is usually available to the expert doing the extrapolation is woefully inadequate to make even an educated guess about a range of possible BACs.

According to Nichols and Whited,

The intoxication of an individual depends on the absorption, distribution, and elimination of alcohol through the body. The rate of absorption, distribution and elimination varies greatly between individuals, and can have a substantial effect on an individual's intoxication and chemical test results. Despite the substantial variability of these factors, the chemical tests used to determine the intoxication of an individual are based on the "average" person under constant conditions. The "average" person is created using a number of assumptions that do not take into account the substantial individual variation.

DONALD H. NICHOLS & FLEM K. WHITED, III, DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 14-2 (2d ed.1998).(DDL). Add to this the reality that elimination begins as soon as the first alcohol reaches the liver. EDWARD F. FITZGERALD, INTOXICATION TEST EVIDENCE 2-14 (2d ed.2000).(ITE). Thus absorption and elimination occur simultaneously until all of the ingested alcohol has been absorbed. TEXAS BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAM OPERATOR MANUAL 5-10 (1996).(OM).

The original work in the area of absorption and burn-off rates was done in the 1930s by E.M.P. Widmark. Unfortunately, his work has been subjected to "gross simplification." ITE at 3-8. All of Widmark's work was done on subjects who drank a metered amount of alcohol on an empty stomach. Id. at 3-2 et seq. In the original test group of 30 subjects, only 3(10%) tested in the absorption range of 0.65 and 0.70, 19(63%) tested under 0.65 and 8(27%) tested over 0.65. The subjects' elimination rates varied from 0.006 to 0.04 with most being widely distributed between 0.010 and 0.020. Widmark and later researchers established that both absorption and elimination rates vary widely and are dependent on a large number of factors, including gender. Today, however, "experts" take the averages rate for males and apply them to everyone. They then testify authoritatively that "the average person" absorbs and eliminates alcohol at fixed, known rates, generally claimed to be 0.68 for absorption and .015 for elimination, and make no mention of the myriad variables known to have marked effect on those rates.

Absorption and burn-off rates are highly variable, even in a single individual. The generally accepted rate of burn-off is about one beer per hour, based on the "average man." However, the "average man," like the "average family" with 2.4 children, doesn't exist; the only rates which have relevance are the rates of the person on trial. Absorption and elimination rates are affected by a myriad of factors, including most commonly, weight, gender, physical condition, metabolic rate, time of day, when, what, and how much *930 the defendant last ate, when, what, and how much and how the defendant drank, medications taken or not taken, point in a woman's menstrual cycle, emotional state, and whether the defendant is an alcoholic. We can extrapolate in regard to which way each known factor, in isolation, will affect absorption and burn-off, but prediction becomes more complicated each time another factor is added to the equation. Very quickly, accurate extrapolation becomes impossible. The impossibility is highlighted when the values of only a few of these many variables are known to the extrapolator. See generally, ITE, Chapter 11.

The first inquiry must be into where on the absorption/elimination curve the BAC sample falls. Id. at 2-1. Given the procedures mandated by police policy, that inquiry can almost never be accurately answered; determination by law enforcement of BAC via breath or blood is usually the result of a single sample. At least two, and preferably three, samples taken over time are absolutely necessary. Id. at 4-11--19. After drinking begins, the BAC will rise to some peak value, then decrease until all alcohol has been metabolized. If, at the time of testing, a person is in the absorption phase, in which the BAC is increasing, the BAC at time of driving would be lower than the tested value. The opposite is true if at the time of testing the person is in the elimination phase, in which the BAC is decreasing. Without knowing even the sample's general location on the BAC curve, all other calculations are specious sophistry. A single high reading can be useful as an indication of intoxication, e.g. when the BAC is 0.20 one hour after driving, but even then is not helpful in determining what the actual BAC was at the time of driving. Id. at 4-15--16. Even if the position on the BAC curve at the time of testing can be determined, the task of determining BAC at the time of driving gets no easier.

According to the TEXAS BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAM OPERATOR MANUAL (1996), the manual for breath-test operators published by the Texas Department of Public Safety (OM), a "200 lb. man must consume twice as much alcohol as a 100 lb. man to attain the same alcohol concentration." Id. at 5-7. Even that statement is a generalization; alcohol is distributed through the body dissolved in the water contained in the body. OM at 5-5. For the above statement to be true, we must assume that the two men have identical levels of tissue water, for instance, 70%. The equation changes again if the individual is a woman; women tend to have less water and more body fat than men. Id. at 5-8. A woman is therefore likely to have a higher blood-alcohol level than a man of equal weight after consuming the same quantity of alcohol. Id.

Even that may not be true if the man is obese and the woman has extremely low body fat. ITE at 2-6. Generally, the better the person's physical condition (high muscle, low body fat), the lower the peak BAC will be. Id. The rate at which a person metabolizes alcohol is affected by the health of that person, especially the health of the person's liver. Id. at 2-13. Size, shape, and capacity of the liver affect the rate of elimination. Id. at 4-40. At least seventeen shapes are considered "normal," id., and liver size is related to body weight, DDL at 14-139. If the person is an active alcoholic, the rate will be even more unpredictable; alcoholics tend to metabolize ethanol more rapidly (DDL at 14-149--53, OM at 5-5) and at least partially by a different chemical process than non-alcoholics (ITE at 4-5).

One of the major influences on how quickly and how high BAC rises is whether ingestion of alcohol is accompanied by ingestion of food. As noted above, the *931 original research into BAC was done only on subjects drinking on an empty stomach, yet the rates derived from that research are now applied indiscriminately to all scenarios. The presence of food in the stomach slows the rate of gastric emptying, and that rate is known to have a dramatic effect in how much and how quickly alcohol gets into the small intestine, where the vast majority of alcohol is absorbed. Id. at 2-3. Absorption in the small intestine is quick. Id. at 2-3. DDL at 14-47 et seq. Absorption in the stomach is generally slow and inefficient, so the longer alcohol stays in the stomach, the longer it will take to reach peak BAC. Id. at 2-2. DDL at 14-70. Also, when alcohol stays in the stomach, the digestive process breaks down some of the ethanol into smaller pieces which do not cause intoxication when absorbed by the body, and so the peak BAC is lower than if the alcohol were consumed on an empty stomach. DDL at 14-52, 14-70, ITE at 14-115.

A number of factors affect gastric emptying. Protein slows emptying more than sugars, which slow emptying more than carbohydrates, which slow emptying more than fats. DDL at 14-63. Large meals slow emptying more than small ones. Id. at 55. Size, shape, and position of the stomach also affect emptying, and at least nine positions and nineteen shapes are recognized as "normal." ITE at 4-2, 4-39. Because gastric emptying is controlled by the nervous system, emotions affect the rate; fear decreases it, while excitement tends to accelerate it. DDL at 14-70. Trauma may shut down emptying altogether. ITE at 2-10--11. The alcohol itself can alter the rate; alcohol ingested in large quantities causes the pyloric sphincter to close, preventing emptying. Id. at 14-37, 14-68--69, OM at 5-5. Carbonated beverages mixed with alcohol accelerate emptying. ITE at 14-69, OM at 5-5. Surgery such as stapling also alters the rate of emptying, ITE at 14-73--74, as does gravity, id. at 14-73, some kinds of drugs, such as Tagamet, id. at 14-73, and some diseases (id. at 14-74). [FN1]

FN1. Gastric ulcers and diabetes decrease gastric emptying rates, while duodenal ulcers increase them. DDL at 14-74--75.

Which kind of alcoholic beverage was ingested and in what quantity and manner also affect BAC. Distilled liquors produce a higher BAC than beer or wine for a given amount of alcohol. DDL at 14-38 et seq. Large quantities increase the time needed to reach peak BAC. Id. at 14-44 et seq. Chugging produces a higher, quicker peak BAC than an equal amount of alcohol consumed over a longer period of time. DDL at 14-88--89.

Other factors which may affect peak BAC and rates of absorption and elimination include altitude, DDL at 14-33, point in menstrual cycle, id. at 14-79, 14-159 et seq., oral contraceptives, id. at 14-84, ITE at 4-7, drugs, especially if they act on the stomach or circulation or are metabolized by the liver, ITE at 2-13, body temperature, DDL at 14-139--40, and time of day, DDL at 14-85--86, 14-164--66. Add in physiological differences, such as inherited or developed tolerances or sensitivities, and accurate prediction becomes even more problematic.

To make accurate prediction even more improbable, recent research has shown that two of the basic assumptions used in extrapolating to the time of driving, a smooth BAC curve and linear elimination rates, are not in fact true. The BAC curve is not smooth, as it is usually presumed to be, but rather is irregular and contains unpredictable spikes. DDL at 14-171. *932 Other research has shown that elimination rates are non-linear and vary over time. The importance of such a finding is that "if elimination is nonlinear, then it is impossible to estimate someone's blood alcohol concentration at a time earlier or later than when the blood alcohol measurement is made...." Id. at 14-166.

A simple mathematical formula for the number of possible combinations of variables is 2 to the power equal to the number of variables, e.g., 5 variables indicates 2 5, producing 32 possible results. Noted above are at least twenty variables. The number of possible results is thus 2 20, or 1,048,576. However, this simple equation assumes that each variable has only two values and does not consider any possible interactions between variables. The general equation is the number of possible values, "m," raised to the power of the number of variables, "n," or m n. Assuming an average of 5 values per variable and twenty variables, the number of possible results, 5 20, is 24,414,062. Each variable in the BAC calculation has many possible values. Many of the variables have a possibility of interacting with each other and further complicating the matter. Even assuming a relatively small number of possible values, the number of possible results increases exponentially and quickly becomes mind-boggling.

In most cases, the expert who is attempting to extrapolate BAC to the time of driving has little information about the defendant or the circumstances surrounding the ingestion of alcohol beyond the single BAC reading, the gender of the driver, and perhaps an approximate weight. Even with full information, the complexity of the interaction of the variables makes the accuracy of any claimed BAC value, or range of values, suspect. "For all these reasons the actual BAC curve which will result from the ingestion of a given amount of alcohol on a given occasion by a particular person is, at best, highly unpredictable, although many experts testify as though they can, in fact, predict 'the' BAC which will result on a given occasion." ITE at 2-7 (emphasis in original). The majority chooses not to go so far as to call attempted extrapolation from a single BAC sample back to the time of driving "junk science." I do not feel so constrained, and junk science has no place in a courtroom where the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.

With these comments, I join the majority.

46 S.W.3d 902

Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top)

* PD-0133-00 (Docket) (Jan. 19, 2000)

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/blog

Chula Vista San Diego California Drunk Driving Checkpoint Results for Weekend

California Drunk Driving Criminal Defense Attorney news

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/penalties

CHULA VISTA, California

7 social drinkers were arrested for suspected San Diego California Drunk Driving during a seven-hour San Diego California Drunk Driving - DUI saturation patrol in Chula Vista, San Diego California Drunk Driving Lawyers said Sunday.

The San Diego California Drunk Driving patrol involved putting five or six extra patrol cars on the main corridors of the city to watch for possible San Diego California Drunk Driving / DUI or respond to reports from citizens or other San Diego California Drunk Driving officers, San Diego California Drunk Driving Criminal Defense Lawyers hear.

Besides the seven San Diego California Drunk Driving / DUI arrests, one person was cited for driving without a valid license and 13 others were cited for various vehicle code violations, San Diego California Drunk Driving Defense Attorneys are informed.

Eight vehicles were impounded, San Diego California Drunk Driving Defense Lawyers said.

The San Diego California Drunk Driving program that implements the extra San Diego California DUI patrols is funded by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety and the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, according to San Diego California Drunk Driving / San Diego California DUI lawyers.

If those arrested took a San Diego DUI blood test, they should visit http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/blood.html .

California Cities Cited for Most Intensive Efforts to Curb California DUI Driving

San Diego Drunk Driving Attorney - California DUI Lawyer info

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

California DUI Attorneys often ask which US cities have the most drinkers or biggest drunks, or most DUI cases: http://www.menshealth.com/drunk/ has the answer.

How does one figure out which US cities drink the most alcohol:

Look at the federal bureau of investigation numbers on DUI / Drunk Driving arrest rates in each city. (These are DUI arrests, not DUI convictions, so if one's DUI criminal defense lawyer avoids a DUI for someone, the DUI arrest still counts in these numbers.)

Cities with the greatest nationwide / California DUI police efforts to cut down on California DUI driving:

Anaheim, California DUI police
Bakersfield, California DUI police
Freemont California DUI police
Fresno, California DUI police
Los Angeles California DUI police
Modesto California DUI police
Oakland California DUI police
Riverside California DUI police
Sacramento California DUI police
San Diego California DUI police


Next, compare the number of alcohol-related liver disease deaths in each city. One's liver metabolizes alcohol, and the more one drinks, the more damage one does. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provide this public information.

Binge drinking too often is a path to alcoholism. For men, having five or more drinks in one sitting classifies you as a binge drinker. Check their stats on the number of binge drinkers in each city.

In addition to DUI arrests, one can obtain information on the number of fatal car accidents involving DUI / Drunk Driving / Impaired / Intoxicated drivers from the U.S. Department of Transportation.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving rates cities based on efforts to cut down on excessive drinking.

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/articles

California DUI lawyers are proud that California has the top 10 cities with the most intensive DUI police efforts in the country.

If you want to get a California DUI off your record/dismissed/expunged, go to
http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/expunge.html .

Saturday, April 19, 2008

Power Knocked Out in Palm Springs after California DUI Accident

California DUI attorney news www. San Diego Drunk Driving Attorney .net

DUI Crash Knocks Power Out in Palm Springs

April 19, 2008

A guy was jailed early Saturday on a felony California DUI - drunk driving charge after he allegedly lost control of his Mustang and struck a power pole just south of Palm Springs International Airport, California DUI lawyers said.

At 2:20 a.m., the California DUI accident, at Ramon and El Cielo roads, brought down power lines and caused outages in some parts of the resort city, say California DUI attorneys.

About 1,000 customers lost power momentarily after the crash, California DUI lawyers hear. Most of them had power restored within minutes, California DUI attorneys added.

A passenger in the Mustang was injured, California DUI lawyers are told.

The Mustang driver, Noel Hernandez Montes, 21, was arrested on suspicion of felony California DUI - drunk driving, according to California DUI attorneys.

California DUI Police believe he was under the influence of alcohol. California DUI blood test results are pending. www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net help is available.

Checkpoint info with California, Avoid the Five DUI Task Force

California DUI attorney news

Tehama County's Avoid the Five DUI Task Force will conduct a California DUI saturation patrol in the Red Bluff area.

As part of the North State Avoid Program, the Tehama County Avoid the Five DUI Task Force is comprised of California DUI / Drunk Driving officers from California Highway Patrol, Red Bluff Police Department, Tehama County Sheriff's Department, Tehama County District Attorney's Office and Corning Police Department and is dedicated to combating California DUI / Drunk Driving / driving under the influence.

If you are arrested for a California DUI, seek help from a California DUI lawyer.




http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/penalty.html

Friday, April 18, 2008

new California DUI attorney case considers resentencing a DUI defendant in California

Brand new California DUI attorney case - resentencing a DUI defendant in California

Filed 4/18/08 P. v. McCoy CA1/3

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY ROBERT McCOY,

Defendant and Appellant.
A118741
(Mendocino County Super. Ct.

No. SCUKCRCR 06-71443)


After defendant Anthony Robert McCoy pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol and admitted to a prior prison term allegation, the trial court imposed an aggravated term of three years on the substantive offense and a consecutive term of one year for the prior prison term enhancement, for an aggregate term of four years in state prison. Execution of sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation for 60 months. After the court found defendant had violated probation, the court put into effect the previously suspended sentence of four years in state prison. On appeal, defendant seeks a new sentencing hearing on the ground that the record does not show the trial court judges who adjudicated his violation of probation and imposed the previously suspended sentence were aware they had the discretion to reinstate him to probation. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 29, 2006, while he was on parole for a felony conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), defendant was arrested for the same offense. In a felony complaint, he was charged with various vehicle code offenses and several sentence enhancements were alleged. At a proceeding before Judge Cindee F. Mayfield, defendant pleaded guilty to a felony DUI offense (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5, subd. (a)(1)), and he admitted to a prior prison term allegation under Penal Code section 667.51. Defendant was advised that he could be sentenced to a maximum term of four years in state prison, consisting of the aggravated term of three years for the DUI offense, and a consecutive term of one year for the prior prison term enhancement.

Before sentencing, the probation department filed a report recommending that the then 34-year-old defendant be sentenced to the maximum term of four years in state prison. The probation officer noted that since the age of 18, defendant had 33 convictions, including seven misdemeanor convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and a felony conviction for driving under the influence with prior convictions. After his felony DUI conviction in 2000, defendant was placed on formal probation and given an opportunity to seek treatment for his alcohol addiction. After several probation violations and failures at treatment, he was sentenced to state prison for two years. He was placed on parole in February 2003, and proceeded to violate it several times. His most serious parole violation occurred in July 2005, when he committed his seventh DUI offense. The charge was reduced to a misdemeanor and he was allowed to serve his sentence concurrent to his parole violation.

At sentencing, defense counsel argued that this was an appropriate case for the court to impose the maximum term of four years in state prison, suspend execution of sentence, and place defendant on probation with the condition that he successfully complete a Drug Court program. Judge Mayfield agreed with defense counsel’s arguments. Defendant was sentenced to four years in state prison, consisting of the aggravated term of three years on the substantive DUI conviction2 and a consecutive term of one year on the prior prison term enhancement, and execution of the sentence was suspended. Defendant was placed on formal probation for 60 months with the condition that he serve one year in county jail with credit for time served. Upon completion of his jail sentence, defendant was required to enroll in and successfully complete an adult Drug Court program, including residential treatment. Defendant did not appeal his sentence.

About one year later, on May 31, 2007, the probation department filed a violation of probation petition. The petition alleged that on December 26, 2006, defendant had been released from custody but had failed to report to a residential drug treatment facility and had absconded; and on December 29, 2006, “Drug Court was terminated as unsuccessful.” The probation department recommended that defendant remain in custody and that the case be referred for a “Custody Credit Memo” or a section 1203c3 report. On June 1, Judge Mayfield arraigned defendant on the petition. Defendant’s probation was summarily revoked pending a hearing on the petition. Because defendant had absconded after being released from jail, bail was denied.

On June 13, 2007, Judge David Nelson adjudicated the probation violation petition. At the beginning of the hearing, defense counsel stated that defendant was prepared to admit to violating probation and she asked the court to refer the case to the probation department for either a section 1203c report or “a memo of time credits.” When the court asked if a supplemental probation report was necessary, defense counsel noted that a full probation report had already been prepared and no further report was needed because defendant had been terminated from drug court, the court had already imposed a prison term with execution of sentence suspended, and thus, all that was needed was a section 1203c report or a memorandum with respect to time credits.

After waiving his rights to a hearing, defendant admitted he violated his probation as alleged in the probation officer’s petition. The court then stated: “All right. The admission is entered and the Court finds it was entered voluntarily with a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. I will refer it to probation for a custody credit memorandum and also a [section 1203c] report.” Sentencing was continued to June 20th.

On June 20, 2007, Judge Richard Henderson presided at the continued sentencing hearing. The court asked whether the case was “brought back primarily to determine custody credits.” Defense counsel replied: “It is. Based upon the admission and the termination from drug court with an EOSS [execution of sentence suspended] I think the Court at this stage needs to impose the term. . . . [A]t this stage I will submit it on the time credits.” The prosecutor submitted the matter without comment. The court then stated: “The Court will at this time . . . impose the . . . term of four years which had been suspended. The Court will -- obviously, I guess probation was revoked -- terminated. The Court determines that [defendant] will be entitled to a 144 days credit . . . .”4

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the record does not show that the trial judges that adjudicated his violation of probation and sentenced him were aware of their discretionary authority to reinstate him to probation on the same or modified terms. We conclude defendant’s argument does not warrant resentencing.

After accepting the defendant’s admission that he violated probation, the trial court had the discretionary authority to either reinstate probation on the same or modified terms or terminate probation and execute the previously imposed and suspended sentence. (People v. Medina (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 318, 321-323.) However, it is only when an issue entrusted to the trial court’s discretion is properly presented to the court for decision that the court must exercise its discretion. (People v. Angus (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 973, 987.) And, an “abuse of discretion is not presumed from a silent record, but must be clearly shown . . . .” (People v. Preyer (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 568, 574.)

In this case, neither Judge Nelson nor Judge Henderson was asked to exercise his discretion to reinstate defendant to probation after he admitted that he violated his probation. Instead, both trial judges granted defendant the specific relief requested by his counsel: (1) that the court put into effect the previously-suspended sentence, which by necessary implication terminated his probation, and (2) that the court award him credit for time served in custody. Having failed to request the trial judges to exercise their discretionary authority to reinstate him to probation, defendant cannot now argue that remand is warranted to permit an exercise of that discretion. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880-881; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353; cf. People v. Jackson (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 929, 935 [defendant could properly raise on appeal that the trial court erroneously assumed it could extend defendant’s probation because defendant had not lead the court into making the error].)

In an apparent attempt to avoid the consequences of his failure to raise the issue of reinstatement to probation below, defendant unpersuasively argues that the record shows the trial judges were either unaware of, or misunderstood, their discretionary authority, which is, itself, an abuse of discretion warranting remand. The trial judges did not state either explicitly, or by necessary implication, that they had no discretion or authority other than to impose the previously suspended prison term.5 Defendant asks us to infer that Judge Nelson concluded he had no discretion because he went immediately from finding a violation of probation to referring the matter to probation for a custody credit memorandum and a section 1203c report. However, Judge Nelson’s statement was no more than an affirmative response to the specific relief requested by defense counsel; it does not support an inference that he was acting under the mistaken belief that he had no other choice. (People v. Angus, supra, 114 Cal.App.3d at p. 987.) Similarly unavailing is defendant’s argument that Judge Henderson’s comment that “obviously I guess probation was revoked-- terminated,” demonstrates that he believed he had no other choice because Judge Nelson had not explicitly terminated probation. Judge Henderson’s comment was nothing more than an appropriate acknowledgement that the record should explicitly reflect that defendant’s probation was revoked and terminated, which was necessarily implied by Judge Nelson’s earlier grant of the relief requested by defense counsel.

Even assuming any purported failures by the trial judges to properly make or articulate their discretionary rulings, we need not remand the matter for resentencing unless defendant establishes prejudice. (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 355; see also People v. Jackson (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 620, 624-626.) Defendant has not met his burden. On this record, we are convinced that even if we were to remand the matter, it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable sentence would be imposed. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Accordingly, resentencing is not warranted.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

McGuiness, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Siggins, J.

_________________________

Jenkins, J.



1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.



2 In choosing the aggravated term, the court agreed with the probation officer that the circumstances in aggravation far outweighed the circumstances in mitigation. The probation report indicated that defendant’s acknowledgement of wrongdoing at an early stage in the criminal process was a mitigating factor. The circumstances in aggravation were: defendant’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous and of increasing seriousness, he was on parole for the same conduct when the current offense was committed, and his performance on both probation and parole had been unsatisfactory.



3 Section 1203c provides, in relevant part: “[W]henever a person is committed to an institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, whether probation has been applied for or not, or granted and revoked, it shall be the duty of the probation officer of the county from which the person is committed to send to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation a report of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the prior record and history of the defendant, as may be required by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).)



4 Judge Henderson granted defense counsel’s request to continue the matter for a further hearing on defendant’s entitlement to custody credits. On June 29, 2007, Judge Clayton L. Brennan awarded defendant additional credit for time served in custody.



5 Consequently, this case is factually distinguishable from the following cases cited by defendant: People v. Meloney (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1145, 1165, People v. Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 206, 214; People v. Hard (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 272, 283 & fn. 3; People v. Medina, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 320. In those cases, the trial judges explicitly and erroneously stated that they had no discretion or authority other than to impose the challenged sentence.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



California DUI lawyers have to stay on top of California DUI and California Drunk Driving law.

California DUI accident & death in Glendora today

California DUI attorney news

1 Killed In Suspected DUI Crash In California

GLENDORA, California

A suspected DUI driver slammed into a stalled car on a freeway in Glendora on Friday, killing a 20-year-old man inside the disabled vehicle, California DUI attorneys said.

The first accident was reported around 1:40 a.m. on the eastbound Foothill (210) Freeway just east of Grand Avenue, when a Ford Focus struck the center divider, according to California DUI lawyers.

Moments later a Jeep Cherokee crashed into the Ford, causing fatal injuries to its driver, California DUI attorneys report. The victim's name was not immediately released.

The woman driving the Cherokee allegedly appeared to be intoxicated and was taken into custody after being given a California DUI sobriety test, California DUI lawyers discovered.

California DUI attorney Charles Unger of Glendale should be able to assist her, assert California DUI attorneys specializing in California DUI law. www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/about

Thursday, April 17, 2008

Discovery violation in California DUI grounds to exclude evidence?

California criminal defense DUI lawyer news

Filed 4/17/08 P. v. Fisher CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRADLEY ALLEN FISHER,

Defendant and Appellant.
D051472
(Super. Ct. No. SCD205244)


APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Roger W. Krauel, Judge. Affirmed.

A jury convicted Bradley Allen Fisher of driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol level of at least .08 percent (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)),1 and Fisher admitted four prior convictions for driving under the influence within the past 10 years, including a prior felony conviction for which he served a prison term. Fisher also pled guilty to a count of driving with a license that was suspended or revoked as a result of a prior conviction for driving under the influence. (§ 14601.2, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Fisher to four years in prison.

Fisher argues that his conviction should be reversed because (1) the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he had a blood alcohol level of at least .08 percent while he was driving, and (2) his right to due process was violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony from an expert witness regarding the contents of a lab report that the trial court had ruled would not be admitted into evidence because of a discovery violation. As we will explain, we conclude that Fisher's arguments are without merit, and accordingly, we affirm.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2007, at approximately 3:32 p.m., Officer Tony Carter of the San Diego Police Department made a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Fisher. Officer Carter observed that Fisher's speech was slurred, he smelled strongly of alcohol and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Fisher told Officer Carter that he recently had drunk three shots of brandy, but he did not know when he had taken his last drink. Fisher stated that "maybe" he had a drink within the last hour. Fisher also indicated that he had last eaten in the "morning." Officer Carter arrested Fisher for being under the influence of alcohol.

Officer Patrick Laco of the San Diego Police Department arrived on the scene and had Fisher blow into a preliminary blood alcohol screening device. The device registered a blood alcohol level of .096 percent at approximately 4:00 p.m. Fisher refused to blow into the device for a second reading. Later the same day, Officer Laco tested the preliminary blood alcohol screening device that he had used to screen Fisher, and he confirmed that the device was calibrated within a tolerable range.

Fisher was transported to police headquarters, where a blood sample was taken from him at 5:08 p.m., approximately an hour and a half after he was stopped by Officer Carter. An analysis of the blood sample showed a blood alcohol level of .07 percent.

Fisher was charged with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (§ 23152, subd. (a)) (count 1), one count of driving while having a blood alcohol level of at least .08 percent (§ 23152, subd. (b)) (count 2), and one count of driving with a license that was suspended or revoked because of a prior conviction for driving under the influence (§ 14601.2, subd. (a)) (count 3). With respect to counts 1 and 2, the information also alleged that Fisher had incurred three or more convictions for driving under the influence, including one felony. Fisher pled guilty to count 3.

At the jury trial on counts 1 and 2, after being given a hypothetical set of facts based on the details of Fisher's case, the prosecution's expert witness, Larry Dale, testified that in his opinion someone of Fisher's weight who was found to have a blood alcohol level of .07 percent at approximately 5:00 p.m. would have had a blood alcohol level of between .09 and .10 percent at 3:32 p.m., assuming that the person had fully absorbed the alcohol into his bloodstream by 3:32 p.m. Dale explained that full absorption of alcohol into the bloodstream generally occurs in approximately half an hour after consumption on an empty stomach.

Dale also testified that the test result of .07 percent blood alcohol was arrived at by averaging the results of two separate lab tests and then dropping the third digit. The third digit was dropped based on a regulation promulgated by the California Department of Health Services, which states that in a lab report regarding the results of a forensic blood alcohol test, "[a]nalytical results shall be reported to the second decimal place, deleting the digit in the third decimal place when it is present." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, § 1220.4, subd. (b).) Because the lab worksheet showing the detailed results from the test of Fisher's blood sample had not been produced in discovery by the prosecution, the trial court ruled that it would not admit that worksheet into evidence. However, referring to that worksheet, Dale testified at trial that the averaged test result of .07 percent blood alcohol was achieved by dropping the third digit from the averaged test result of .079 percent. Upon objection and a motion to strike by defense counsel, the trial court instructed the jury to "disregard the testimony concerning .079."

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, premised on Dale's testimony that the test results from Fisher's blood sample showed an average blood alcohol level of .079 percent before the third digit was dropped. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial. It stated, "The reference to .079 was made one time; and at that point there was a timely motion to strike, which was granted, and an admonition added to that by the court. That figure only appeared in the testimony at that point in time in the trial. It was not used in the hypothetical. It was not evidence of a blood alcohol at the time of driving, and there was no calculation based upon that .079. I share defense counsel's concern about it being mentioned; but in the overall picture of the trial, I don't believe that the mention violates the due process rights of the defendant."

A jury convicted Fisher on count 2 for driving with a blood alcohol level of at least .08 percent, and acquitted him on count 1 for driving under the influence of alcohol. Fisher admitted the prior convictions charged in the information, and the trial court sentenced Fisher to four years in prison.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Fisher's Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence

Fisher argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was driving with a blood alcohol level of at least .08 percent.

Recognizing that Dale's expert testimony provided evidence that Fisher's blood alcohol level was between .09 and .10 percent at the time he was stopped by police, Fisher attacks Dale's opinion. He argues that Dale's opinion "was based on assumptions and estimates that did not necessarily apply to Mr. Fisher," and points out that Dale "admitted that there could be variances in alcohol absorption and burnoff rates." Fisher argues that because there was no evidence to indicate how far in advance of the traffic stop he had three shots of brandy, "[t]here was . . . a possibility that [he] had not fully absorbed the alcohol at the time of the stop, in which case, his blood alcohol level would have been lower at the time he was driving than at the time his blood was drawn." Also attacking Dale's assumption about the rate of absorption of alcohol, Fisher argues that "it was unknown whether [he] had an empty stomach," and thus whether Dale accurately assumed the 30-minute alcohol absorption rate applicable to a person with an empty stomach. Fisher argues that although there was testimony that he told Officer Carter at approximately 3:30 p.m. that he had last eaten in the "morning," he could have meant late morning, and he could have had a large breakfast that was still in his stomach.2

" 'In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence . . . , we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] 'The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' " (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 464.) Reversal is not warranted "unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].' " (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) "[I]t is not within our province to reweigh the evidence or redetermine issues of credibility." (People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 412.) Significantly too, " '[i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the defendant will not warrant interference with the determination of the jury.' " (People v. Love (1960) 53 Cal.2d 843, 850-851, italics added.)

Applying these standards and viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that Fisher had a blood alcohol level of at least .08 percent when he was stopped by Officer Carter. Dale testified that in his expert opinion someone in Fisher's situation would have had a blood alcohol level between .09 and .10 percent. Although Dale assumed that by the time of the traffic stop Fisher had already absorbed into his bloodstream all of the alcohol he had consumed, testimony in the record provides substantial evidence for that assumption. Specifically, (1) the results of the test administered using the preliminary alcohol screening device showed a reading of .096 percent; (2) Officer Carter observed that Fisher had slurred speech, smelled strongly of alcohol and had bloodshot and glassy eyes; and (3) Fisher stated that "maybe" he had consumed alcohol within the last hour.3 Based on all of this evidence, the jury was entitled to credit Dale's expert opinion despite the lack of conclusive evidence as to the time that Dale imbibed alcohol, and on that basis to reasonably find that Fisher had a blood alcohol level of at least .08 percent while he was driving.

B. Fisher's Challenge to the Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion for a Mistrial

Fisher argues that the trial court "should have granted the mistrial motion because the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that was inadmissible based on the prosecution's . . . discovery violation. The unfair testimony deprived Mr. Fisher of his right to a fair trial."4 We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court's ruling denying the motion for a mistrial.

In support of his argument, Fisher relies on People v. Hudson (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 733, 735, 741 (Hudson), which concluded that in a prosecution for multiple rapes, the prosecutor improperly "resorted to inflammatory rhetoric, violated the trial court's rulings, brought out inadmissible matters in the guise of questions and statements, used extremely vulgar forms of argumentative questions and injected prejudicial innuendo by his editorial comments in front of the jury," and thus the defendant "was deprived of his right to a fair trial guaranteed to him by the due process clauses of the United States and California Constitutions."

Among the many instances of prosecutorial misconduct in Hudson was the prosecutor's refusal to follow the ruling of the trial court regarding the permissible scope of questioning regarding a police interrogation of the defendant on another suspected crime. Specifically, the trial court instructed that in any further questioning regarding the interrogation, the prosecutor was to clarify that the suspected crime was a misdemeanor and that the prosecutor was not to mention the nature of the suspected crime. Nevertheless, the prosecutor continued to refer to the interrogation without indicating that it related to a misdemeanor, and he divulged the nature of the crime (which was indecent exposure) by stating that it was "another offense involving a woman as the victim." (Hudson, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 740.) The prosecutor compounded the problem in closing argument by again improperly referring to the interrogation. (Ibid.) Fisher argues that this item of prosecutorial misconduct (which was one in a long list), is analogous to the prosecutor in this case eliciting testimony that the lab worksheet, excluded from evidence, showed a test result of .079 percent blood alcohol before the third digit was dropped.

We acknowledge that Hudson demonstrates that prosecutorial misconduct during a trial may, in extreme instances, rise to the level that the defendant is prevented from receiving a fair trial. (Hudson, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 741.) However, this case falls far short of such an instance.

First, there is no indication that the prosecutor intentionally withheld documents from the defense, and the trial court made no such finding. It was the prosecutor who brought to the trial court's attention the fact that Dale had brought with him to court documents that she was not aware of and that had not been produced to defense counsel. The prosecutor conceded that she had violated the applicable discovery rules by failing to produce the documents, albeit unintentionally.

Second, as we read the record, it is not clear that the prosecutor was intending to elicit from Dale that the test result, before dropping the third digit, was .079 percent. Referring to the lab worksheet that the trial court had excluded from evidence, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony:

"Q: So how many times was that sample tested?

"A. It was split into two different vials. Each was tested independently. Results were then averaged, and each individual result was well within the standards of accuracy required and then those two values were averaged and came up with the .07.

"Q. What was the average of those two values that you just described?

"A. The average before the .07 was a .079. By title 17, we have to drop the third digit and just report the first two."

By simply asking for "the average of those two values that you just described," the prosecutor was not necessarily asking Dale to give the test result to the third digit, and she may not have anticipated that he would do so.

Third, as we read the record, the trial court does not appear to have made the ruling that Fisher claims it did, i.e., that the prosecutor was barred from eliciting testimony regarding facts that were set forth in the excluded lab worksheet. Instead, the trial court appeared to rule that the witness could testify to the content of the documents, but that the documents themselves would not be admitted into evidence. The trial court tentatively ruled, "If this witness can testify to those -- [exhibits] 4, 5, 6, and 7 [i.e., the documents that were not produced] -- my tentative would be to say, then, we are excluding [exhibits] 4, 5, 6, and 7 from being admitted into evidence." The trial court then confirmed its tentative ruling "to deny admission into evidence of exhibits 4, 5, 6, and 7."

Fourth, after Dale testified to the test result of .079 percent and defense counsel objected, the trial court immediately admonished the jury to disregard that testimony. In addition, as the trial court pointed out in its ruling denying the motion for a mistrial, the hypothetical set of facts under which Dale gave his opinion about Fisher's blood alcohol level at the time of the traffic stop did not include a test result of .079 percent as one of the hypothetical facts. Instead, the hypothetical was based on a blood alcohol level of .07 percent, and Dale's opinion based on that hypothetical was sufficient to support a conviction.

Under all of these circumstances, we conclude that if any prosecutorial misconduct in fact occurred, it was so slight and had such an insignificant impact on the result of the trial that it did not rise to level of depriving Fisher of a fair trial in violation of this right to due process. The trial court accordingly did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

AARON, J.



1 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.



2 Although Fisher does not cite case law directly on point, we understand Fisher to be relying on the concept that "[w]here an expert bases his conclusion upon assumptions which are not supported by the record, upon matters which are not reasonably relied upon by other experts, or upon factors which are speculative, remote or conjectural, then his conclusion has no evidentiary value. [Citations.] In those circumstances the expert's opinion cannot rise to the dignity of substantial evidence." (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Zuckerman (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1135.)



3 Further, the jury could reasonably infer based on Fisher's admission that he had not eaten since the morning that at approximately 3:30 p.m., he had an empty stomach, and thus fully absorbed the alcohol into his bloodstream in approximately half an hour after consumption, as assumed in Dale's opinion.



4 Fisher does not contend that, absent the trial court's ruling on the discovery violation, the lab test result as reported to the third decimal point was inadmissible. Indeed, the regulation promulgated by the California Department of Health Services requiring that a lab test result of blood alcohol level be reported to the second decimal point does not create an evidentiary rule in criminal cases requiring exclusion of test results reported to the third decimal point. (People v. Wood (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 17.)

checkpoint update for California DUI lawyers

California DUI checkpoint in San Rafael last week yielded one arrest for suspected California DUI drunken driving and 20 assorted citations.

The California DUI checkpoint was from 7 p.m. Friday to 1 a.m. Saturday at Lincoln and Grand avenues.

California DUI Police also cited four people for driving with a suspended license, 15 for driving without having been issued a license, and one for possession of marijuana, said California DUI attorneys.

Police impounded 19 vehicles during the California DUI checkpoint, which was paid for with a California DUI grant, California DUI lawyers hear.

The Napa police are doing their part this Saturday to get drunk drivers off the road.

They will be conducting DUI saturation patrols within the city limits.
The patrols will be in areas where there has been a high number of traffic crashes and arrests involving drunk drivers.

Napa police is attempting to cut down on collisions involving DUI drivers. Police suggest those who have been drinking and believe they need to get behind the wheel of a car to call a cab, a friend, take the bus or even walk.
The funding for the DUI saturation patrols comes from a grant received from the California Office of Traffic Safety through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Mock California DUI at high school

California DUI attorney news

High School students in Vallejo are learning about the legal consequences of a California DUI - drunk driving arrest today.

More than 100 students in the government and economics class are serving as advisory jurors in the California DUI trial at the school of 27-year-old Michael Campbell, of Vallejo, who was arrested for drunken driving in March 2007, California DUI attorneys said.

Campbell is being tried before Commissioner Raymond Wieser in the school's theater. Deputy District Attorney Robert Jones is trying the California DUI case and Deputy Public Defender / California DUI lawyer Dawn Polvorosa is representing Campbell, California DUI lawyers report.

The students will deliberate and advise Wieser of their decision but Wieser will render a verdict, California DUI attorneys suspect.

Jesse Bethel is one of four high schools in Solano County scheduled to host an actual DUI trial this year, California DUI attorneys are told. It is part of the DUI Court in the Schools Program funded through a grant from the Administrative Office of the Courts, California DUI lawyers beleive.

After the California DUI trial, Wieser will participate in an interactive civic lesson with the students, California DUI lawyers understand. Representatives from west Contra Costa County also are attending the trial with the intention of hosting one in their jurisdiction, according to California DUI attorneys. www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net

California DUI checkpoint update

California DUI lawyer news

California DUI lawyer heard of a crackdown on drunken driving that's been credited with reducing DUI fatalities along Highway 1 in north Monterey County which has won funding for at least seven additional months.

California DUI attoneys are told heightened enforcement between Castroville and Watsonville began Aug. 1, 2007, paid for by a $250,000 grant from the state Office of Traffic Safety. Although the grant was set to expire July 31, the OTC decided to keep the crackdown going at current levels until March of 2009. The 13-mile stretch is one of the most dangerous in California and was one of three in the state targeted for DUI-prevention funding last year. Despite the danger, the narrow, two-lane highway connecting the counties of Monterey and Santa

Cruz is heavily traversed by both commuters and tourists. In a three-year period from 2004 to 2007, 12 people died in DUI crashes along the stretch, the CHP reported. But since the program began, the enforcement corridor has seen just one DUI fatality.

The CHP has added patrols and sobriety checkpoints on weekends, holidays and other days with historically high rates of drunken driving.

"When people see a strong CHP presence on this stretch of road, they'll know not to drink and drive," said CHP Capt. Scott Lynch.

In addition to putting more patrol cars on the road, the program includes a special task force made up of Caltrans, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, state Sen. Abel Maldonado, R-Santa Maria, and Calcagno, who represents north county.

For its part, Caltrans has added a soft median to the highway to help prevent deadly cross-median crashes, said Susana Cruz, a Caltrans spokesowman and task force member.

Caltrans will also post four signs, two at both ends of the safety corridor, that read "Arrive Alive - Don't Drink and Drive."

The DUI prevention effort isn't intended to increase the number of DUI arrests in the area, said Officer Jim Covello, a spokesman for the CHP's Monterey-area office, but to decrease the number of crashes.

"There's not a correlation between more officers and more arrests," he said. "More officers are often a visual deterrent."

Statistics on the number of DUI arrests on the stretch since August weren't immediately available.

DUI arrests have increased over the past few years countywide, with 260 in 2005, 262 in 2006, 282 in 2007 and a projected 358 this year, California DUI lawyers report.

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

California DUI checkpoint in Riverside County (Indio) this weekend

April 16, 2008 This weekend's California DUI checkpoint

The Indio Police Department will conduct a California DUI checkpoint Friday to catch anyone California DUI driving under the influence of alcohol.

The California DUI checkpoint will be from 7 p.m. to 2 a.m. at an undisclosed California DUI location.

It is being donce as part of an ongoing California DUI effort by the California DUI police department to reduce California DUI traffic collisions and California DUI fatalities that come from people California DUI driving under the influence, according California DUI lawyer information.

www. San Diego Drunk Driving Attorney .net

Premier San Diego California DUI Lawyers list

Premier San Diego California DUI - DMV Attorneys:

April 16, 2008

San Diego DUI Lawyer


San Diego DUI



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Unreliable California DUI Field Testing Does Not Account for Age, Nutrition & Fitness




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California DUI attorneys go after bad cops in DUI cases

California DUI Lawyers article

Judge Hands DUI Defendants Tool at DMV

The Recorder - By Matthew Hirsch - April 16, 2008


A DUI arrest can quickly take someone from the driver's seat to the hot seat, and maybe a jail cell. But some defense lawyers say there's not enough scrutiny on the cops when the state moves to suspend a driver's license at the DMV. An Alameda County Superior Court judge's ruling might change that.


Judge Frank Roesch's ruling, issued Monday, says a DUI defendant in a license suspension hearing at the California Department of Motor Vehicles can go ahead and seek police personnel records and citizen complaints. The attorney general's office had argued in a brief that those records should remain confidential. Last year, San Francisco defense attorney Peter Goodman asked a DMV hearing officer to let him review records for a California Highway Patrol officer who had arrested his client, Andrew Brown, on an Oakland freeway. The DMV officer refused based on the state's view that he lacked the authority to entertain the request, which is known as a Pitchess motion. Goodman challenged the decision in superior court.


Deputy Attorney General Jennifer Perkell, in an April 4 opposition to Goodman's petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, argued that only a court of law can review peace officer personnel records. Perkell conceded in her brief that the statute cited by Goodman, Evidence Code §1043, does provide that a Pitchess motion may be filed with an "administrative body." But she said most of the statute's wording refers exclusively to "courts," not administrative tribunals. And, "even if this court concludes, based on [a] single reference to an 'administrative body,' that a Pitchess motion can be filed with and entertained by certain types of administrative tribunals, a DMV administrative hearing is not the type of tribunal contemplated by this provision," Perkell wrote.


"In DMV administrative matters," Perkell continued, "the presiding authority is a mere hearing officer who is an employee of the DMV and is not a licensed attorney. This person has no legal training or expertise. And, unlike a criminal-court judge, the hearing officer is also not in the business of reviewing confidential peace-officer records for relevance to a defense to a criminal charge; instead the hearing officer's duties are to apply loose evidentiary standards to evidence relating to the ability of the driver to safely operate a motor vehicle." Roesch was not as troubled by the DMV officers' lack of legal training.


"While DMV hearing officers are not administrative law judges, they are capable of determining whether an officer's file contains relevant and discoverable information after taking into consideration the competing interests at stake," he wrote in a two-page order. The attorney general's office did not appear in court Monday to present oral argument before Roesch entered judgment in the case. Spokesman Gareth Lacy said the attorney general's office would recommend an appeal to a higher court. "We didn't oppose the tentative ruling because we want this heard in an appellate court," he said.


Joshua Dale, executive director of the California DUI Lawyers Association, said DUI tests in California can be subjective, and oftentimes disputes boil down to the police officer's recollection measured against the driver's account. And unlike in many other U.S. states, the police in California don't videotape themselves giving field sobriety tests and making DUI arrests, Dale said.


"We don't have these other tools and so getting Pitchess through DMV would be very helpful. It's all about trying to determine the truth," said Dale, a San Francisco solo who has practiced DUI law since 1994. Dale admits that many people arrested on a DUI "are just guilty." (Ed Note – What’s that Josh?) But he said that of about 180,000 people cited each year for driving under the influence, "probably about a third" have issues to be resolved by a lawyer.


Still, few defense lawyers ask DMV hearing officers to review police records, Dale said: "I think they're forced to go through the criminal court to get [them] instead." A solo attorney who's had a private practice since 1980, Goodman said this is the first time he has asked for police records in a DMV case. "Frankly, this was the first case where it came to mind that a Pitchess motion was an appropriate vehicle for finding out what kind of history the officer had." Goodman said the DA's office did not file criminal charges against Brown, but the longtime pediatrician was facing a one-year license suspension. Goodman also said many clients can't afford to aggressively litigate a DMV case. He said he generally charges $5,000 to handle a writ petition in superior court.


According to Brown's court papers, he had consumed two Grey Goose Vodka-and-cranberry cocktails with dinner after work, then went to an Oakland sports bar and drank almost two large cups of beer before leaving for home shortly before midnight. He was pulled over by a California Highway Patrol officer where Interstate 580 connects with Highway 24. But in testimony at the DMV, Brown's recollections differed from those of CHP Officer J.P. Desmarais. For example, Desmarais testified that he asked Brown if he had any physical impairments, and that Brown said no. Brown said he told Desmarais that he suffered from five separate medical conditions.
In breath tests, Brown registered blood alcohol levels ranging from .08 to .09 percent, according to his own court papers. The legal limit in California is .08 percent.

DUI convictions not violent felonies for prison enhancement purposes

California DUI attorney newsflash

The Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that convictions for DUI / drunk driving do not count as violent felonies for enhancing prison sentences, California DUI attorneys report.

The justices, by a 6-3 vote, said that even though great harm can result from DUI -drunken driving, it is different from other crimes that involve purposeful action. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the majority opinion, California DUI lawyers discovered.

Larry Begay had three felony convictions for DUI / drunk driving in New Mexico. He pleaded guilty to possessing a gun, which is illegal after having been convicted of a felony, California DUI attorneys understand.

The Armed Career Criminal Act makes defendants eligible for longer prison terms if they have three prior criminal convictions for crimes that are either violent felonies or serious drug offenses, according to California DUI lawyers.

DUI attorneys throughout the country applaud the decision. California DUI attorneys appreciate the wisdom of the Supremes.

Legislators wisely reject silly California DUI law to deport illegal immigrants who are convicted of a California DUI

California DUI criminal defense lawyer news

The state assembly public safety committee yesterday voted five to two against "Sara's Law," California DUI Law Proposal # AB 1882.

Sara's California DUI Law is aimed at deporting illegal immigrants who commit California DUI / drunk driving offenses.

It was named after Sara Cole, the Los Gatos mother who was seriously injured last year when she was run down by Lucio Rodriguez, a repeat California DUI / drunk driver.

Rodriguez, who is an illegal immigrant, is now serving a five-year California DUI sentence in California DUI state prison. The California DUI bill's sponsor, Assemblyman Martin Garrick of San Diego, says he will re-introduce Sara's California DUI Law next year.

http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

Drunk civil litigant gets jury result in California

California DUI criminal defense attorneys news

A Santa Maria jury Tuesday concluded that a California Highway Patrol officer sued by a paraplegic Orcutt woman was partly responsible for causing her harm, and acted with negligence.

The jury, however, laid the majority of the responsibility for injuring Melisa Camp on the driver of the Ford Mustang that flipped on Aug. 29, 2003, at East Main Street and Philbric Road, East of Santa Maria, leaving Camp severely injured. Camp was a passenger in the car. The driver, Ryan Funk, was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time. He testified during the trial that he was ultimately charged with felony driving under the influence, to which he entered a plea and for which he served a sentence, California DUI lawyer report.

Jurors found that Funk, Camp and fellow passenger Raymond Medina were also negligent, and this negligence was a substantial factor in hurting Camp.

CHP Officer Frank Lewis is named in the lawsuit filed by Camp along with his employer, the state of California. Lewis responded to the crash.

Camp, 35, is permanently paralyzed from the waist down, but the cause of her paralysis was in dispute. Her attorney, Tom Stolpman, said the evidence would show that Camp was carried twice after the crash by a friend and her husband, which worsened her injuries.

Lewis should have assessed Camp's condition, he said, and recognized that Camp would suffer further injury by being moved.

Meanwhile, attorneys for Lewis and the state have said the evidence would show that Camp was paralyzed before officers arrived at the accident. The attorneys have said that nothing officers did caused or aggravated Camp's injuries.

The jury returned with their verdict Tuesday afternoon in Santa Barbara County Superior Court, after deliberating for several days. The trial began April 2.

Jurors were given 22 questions to address in their deliberations.

Their verdict dealt only with the liability portion of the trial, and they are set to begin hearing evidence today regarding the awarding of damages in the case.

Funk was driving Camp, Medina and Lori Barker to their individual homes from Louie B's bar in Santa Maria the morning of the crash. Funk was drunk and unlicensed, driving the Mustang at 90 mph around a curve, according to court documents per California DUI attorneys.

The Mustang flipped off the road, rolled end-over-end and landed on its wheels in an agricultural field. All the occupants reportedly left the car without assistance.

Shortly after, Lewis and another CHP officer arrived at the accident scene.

Camp was carried by Medina to a waiting car, according to trial testimony.

Lewis assessed Camp's condition at the scene of the accident, the jury found, but was negligent in doing so. This negligence was a substantial factor in aggravating the injuries that Camp suffered in the roll-over crash, according to the verdict.

When Lewis inquired about her condition at the scene, Camp denied that she was injured, the jury said, and indicated to the officer that she did not want an ambulance.

The jury found that Lewis ordered the occupants of the vehicle that crashed to leave the scene of the accident, and was negligent in these actions. His order substantially aggravated Camp's injuries, according to the jury.

Lewis did not order the car's occupants to leave the crash aftermath under threat of arrest as the plaintiff alleged, the jury found.

According to court documents and the jury, Funk bears 70 percent of the responsibility for causing Camp harm, Lewis has 15 percent, Camp has 13 percent and Medina carries 2 percent of the responsibility, California DUI attorneys understand.

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

You must take Breath or Blood Test if arrested for a California DUI

California DUI criminal defense attorney news

California DUI lawyers are often asked by people arrested for a California DUI if they HAVE to take a chemical test: Yes is the answer. Except if you are over 21 you do not have to blow in the voluntary, small hand-held breath test gadget.

You are required by California DUI law to submit to a California DUI chemical test to determine the alcohol and/or drug content of your blood. You did not submit to or complete a California DUI blood or California DUI breath test after being requested to do so by a California DUI peace officer. As of January 1999, a California DUI urine test is no longer available unless:

The California DUI officer suspects you were driving under the influence of drugs or a combination of drugs and alcohol, or
Both the California DUI blood or California DUI breath tests are not available, or
You are a hemophiliac, or
You are taking anticoagulant medication in conjunction with a heart condition.

California DUI attorneys warn California DUI arrestees if they fail to take the required blood or breath test, a forced blood draw may occur and the California DUI prosecutor will use it against you with a consciousness of guilt jury instruction; California DMV will also use it against you to take your license for at least one year in a California DUI refusal hearing. www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

Monday, April 14, 2008

DUI with meth California case

California DUI attorney news

People v. Davis (Unpub., DCA3 – 4-10-08)

A jury convicted def. Davis of DUI of alcohol and drugs (VC §23152(a); count one), being under the influence of methamphetamine (H&S Code §11550(a); count two), and driving on a suspended license (VC §14601.2(a); count three). He admitted a prior DUI conviction as to count one (VC §23550.5(a)(1) ), a prior driving-on-a- suspended- license conviction as to count three (VC §14601.2(d)(2) ), and 3 prior prison terms (PC §667.5(b)). He was sentenced to state prison for 5 years, consisting of the middle term of 2 years on count one plus 3 years for the prior prison terms. The prosecutor amended count three to the lesser offense of violation of VC §14601.1. Concurrent county jail terms were imposed for counts two and three. On appeal, def. contends (1) the prosecutor committed several acts of prejudicial misconduct during closing summation, (2) evidence of a HGN test was erroneously admitted, and (3) his mistrial motion was erroneously denied.

Early in the morning of January 14, 2006, CHP Officer White observed def. driving a pickup truck without illuminated headlights. White effected a traffic stop of the truck. Def. did not have a driver’s license, and White detected the odor of alcohol from within the truck. After def. acknowledged that he had consumed some beer, White asked him to get out of the truck. Officer White had def. perform a series of FST’s on which he had various difficulties. In addition, White noticed that def.’s pupils were dilated and unresponsive to light or movement; he was unsteady on his feet; he appeared to have trouble paying attention; and he was fidgety. White asked def. when he had last consumed methamphetamine. Def. looked down and replied, “you got me.” White arrested def. At the station, Officer White administered a breath test, which showed that def.’s BAC was 0.068%. White also administered additional sobriety tests, on which def. had various difficulties. From his observations, White believed that def. had ingested a combination of substances. Following an advisement of his constitutional rights, def. admitted that he had smoked both marijuana and methamphetamine earlier in the day. Blood tests confirmed the presence of components of alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine. Records of the DMV indicated that def.’s driver’s license was suspended in August 2005.

The defense presented no evidence or testimony. During summation, defense counsel argued that def.’s driving pattern showed that he was not under the influence. Counsel further argued that Officer White prejudged def.’s level of sobriety and did not conduct a thorough investigation. The COA affirmed the judgment.

Richie Sambora faces California DUI & Child Endangerment

California DUI attorney news

How bad will it get for rock star Richie Sambora in his California DUI case?

The Laguna Beach Police Department has requested two misdemeanor counts against Sambora--one for California DUI - driving under the influence and one for child endangerment.

Sambora was popped for a California DUI on March 25 after cops noticed him driving allegedly "erratically." His daughter Ava was in the car with him at the time; since she is under 14, he faces child endangerment charges in addition to California DUI charges, California DUI lawyers report.

He may be looking at possible jail time, says California DUI attorneys. It is possible there can be a not guilty verdict or this can be plea bargained to a lesser offense, and/or he could get something else in lieu of jail.

Sambora is scheduled to appear in California DUI court on May 7. If he is ordered back in rehab, third time is the charm. California DUI lawyers know he must now get the best California DUI attorney available. www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/survey

California DUI checkpoints stepped up

California DUI attorney news

April 14, 2008

California DUI police beefs up California DUI / Drunk Driving enforcement

California DUI police are continuing their high-profile California DUI drunkn driving enforcement and preparing to install cameras at key intersections in Citrus Heights to help them ticket drivers running red lights.

California DUI police arrested three suspected California DUI drunk drivers Friday night at a DUI checkpoint on Sunrise Boulevard near Sunrise Mall, California DUI lawyers report. A fourth suspected California DUI driver was taken into custody by officers participating in stepped up California DUI drunken driving enforcement over the weekend, California DUI attorneys understand.

Almost 1,300 drivers came through the California DUI checkpoint. California DUI officers conducted 10 California DUI field sobriety tests, wrote 124 citations for vehicles with safety or registration problems, identified one stolen vehicle and had a total of 16 vehicles towed, California DUI lawyers learned.

The next California DUI checkpoint is tentatively scheduled April 25.

The California DUI program is being paid for with a grant provided by the state Office of Traffic Safety, California DUI attorneys believe. www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorny.net

California DUI restitution case

California DUI attorney case

Filed 4/10/08 P. v. Meza CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Butte)

----

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FELIX DANIEL MEZA,

Defendant and Appellant.
C055143
(Super. Ct. No. CM025215)


On July 9, 2006, 23-year-old defendant Felix Daniel Meza, speeding in a stolen truck, failed to stop for a pursuing officer. Defendant drove through a metal gate and an open field, running over two cats and missing several horses, and collided with a horse stable. He fled on foot but was eventually caught. A search of his person revealed 1.7 grams of marijuana. His blood alcohol content was .096 percent.

Defendant entered a no contest plea to vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1), felony evading (Veh. Code,

§ 2800.2, subd. (a); count 2) and driving under the influence of .08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count 5) with two prior drunk driving convictions in 2005. In exchange, the remaining counts were dismissed with a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

The court granted probation for a term of three years subject to certain terms and conditions including 95 days in jail with credit for 95 days served. The court reserved jurisdiction over victim restitution. After a contested restitution hearing, the court ordered, inter alia, defendant to pay $35,816.97 to the owners of the stolen truck.

On appeal, defendant challenges a certain part of the court-ordered restitution to the owners of the stolen truck, contending that the trial court’s award of $130 to cover a bug shield was based on unreliable, inaccurate and vague evidence. On this record, the contention is frivolous. We will affirm.

Both the prosecutor and defense counsel filed briefs on the issue of restitution. The owners of the stolen truck provided a written estimate of their financial loss which included an American flag bug shield in the amount of $130. Defense counsel submitted an exhibit reflecting that an American flag bug shield could be purchased on e-Bay for $85.99 plus $19.99 shipping for a total of $105.98.

At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated that the insurance company reimbursed the owners of the stolen truck in the amount of $35,336.97. The prosecutor stated that the owners wanted the amount stipulated to and were “also asking for $130 for a bug shield that he installed, $420 for a bed liner that he had installed, and $100 for labor for installation of a hitch.” Defense counsel argued that the owners were entitled to their insurance deductible of $250, $400 for the bed liner if not covered by insurance and an amount, which was in dispute, for the bug shield. The court queried whether the bed liner and bug shield were considered by the insurance company in setting the value. The prosecutor stated that the items were added after the owners purchased the truck. The owner stated he did not know whether the insurance company took the items into account in setting the value but stated that “after [defendant] crashed [the truck] the bug shield was nowhere to be found.” The owner was present when the truck was appraised but did not know whether the appraiser took the bed liner into consideration. The owner did not recall whether he told the appraiser about the bug shield. The court ordered defendant to pay the owners of the stolen truck “the amount that the insurance company paid, $35,336.97, plus the $250 deductible, plus the $130 bug shield which wasn’t present on the vehicle at the time it was appraised, plus the $100 in labor to install the hitch.” When asked about the bed liner, the court responded, “No, I’m considering that that was evaluated. It was certainly in front of the appraiser at the time it was evaluated.”

Penal Code section 1202.4 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“(f) Except as provided in subdivision (q), in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss

claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Determination of the amount of restitution ordered pursuant to this subdivision shall not be affected by the indemnification or subrogation rights of any third party. . . . [¶] (3) To the extent possible, the restitution order shall be prepared by the sentencing court, shall identify each victim and each loss to which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the following: [¶] (A) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.”

The victim of a crime is entitled to full restitution from the offender unless the court finds compelling reasons for ordering a lesser award and states reasons. (Cal. Cons., art. I, § 28; Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) The trial court’s order for reimbursement of the owners’ out-of-pocket expense for the bug shield is reasonably related to defendant’s crime. But for defendant’s taking and wrecking of the truck, the owners would not have incurred the expense.

“‘[T]he trial court is entitled to consider the probation report when determining the amount of restitution.’ [Citation.] For example, statements by the victims of the crimes about the value of the property stolen constitute ‘prima facie evidence of value for purposes of restitution.’ [Citations.] ‘This is so

because a hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution. [Citation.] When the probation report includes information on the amount of the victim’s loss and a recommendation as to the amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with contrary information to challenge that amount.’ [Citation.] Absent a challenge by the defendant, an award of the amount specified in the probation report is not an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048.)

Here, the owners presented a written estimate of their loss. Defendant challenged the amount claimed for the bug shield. The owners claimed $130 to reimburse them for the out-of-pocket cost to buy and install the American flag bug shield missing from their truck defendant stole and subsequently wrecked. Their statement constituted prima facie evidence of the value of the bug shield. Defendant submitted information obtained from e-Bay for a bug shield at the cost of $105.98. But he failed to demonstrate that the bug shield online was equivalent to the bug shield the owners obtained to replace the one missing as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. Further, defendant presented no evidence of the installation cost. Simply put, defendant failed to present reliable information to contest the amount the owners claimed. We find no abuse; the trial court’s order made the owners whole. (People v. Akins (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1382.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SIMS , Acting P.J.

We concur:

NICHOLSON , J.

ROBIE , J.

Sunday, April 13, 2008

California DMV information - mini-trial after DUI

California DMV / DUI Hearing



California DUI / DMV hearings are for a possible license suspension and are like a mini-California DUI trial without a jury, but with much different California DMV rules, California DMV laws and California DMV procedures.

California DUI / DMV hearings are presided over by a Driver Safety Officer (DMV hearing officer) rather than a real judge, an employee of the DMV not trained in law who acts as both prosecutor and judge. As unfair as it is, she or he can legally object to your evidence, rule on her or his own objection, dually engage your California DUI / DMV lawyer, and admit or not admit either party's evidence.



California's Driver Safety Offices offers evidence in the form of documents and/or witnesses. The California Driver Safety Officer offers the California drunk driving / DUI police report, DMV records, California DUI alcohol reports and the important California DUI officer's sworn statement entitled a "DS 367." With no Fifth Amendment right at the hearing, your California DUI / DMV attorney usually will not want you to be present at the hearing since the Driver Safety Officer can call you as a witness and force you to testify against yourself if you ill-advisedly appear.



The California DMV Driver Safety Officer's decision will usually be mailed a few days or even weeks after the hearing. A California DMV / DMV suspension can be set aside or sustained. If the California DMV suspension is sustained, the decision can be appealed to the DMV in Sacramento and/or to the California Superior court by filing a California DMV petition for writ of mandamus.




A California DUI lawyer's defenses at an APS hearing are specialized and technical, more so than in criminal court. Frequent California DUI / DMV proof problems - as well as legal, procedural and bureaucratic obstacles - are possible grounds for setting aside the suspension.




Because of the peculiar nature of California DUI / DMV hearings and the absence of an independent California DUI judge to offer some protection, you are strongly advised not to try to represent yourself. Because these are not California DUI criminal proceedings, California County public defenders are unavailable.




Your California DUI / DMV attorney has just 10 CALENDAR DAYS after the DUI arrest to call the California DMV Driver Safety Office to timely demand a hearing. You waive your right to a hearing after the 10 day deadline is up.



If your California DUI / DMV attorney has not been retained within 10 days of the arrest, you should contact the local Driver's Safety Office yourself, request a 5 day extension so you can get a California DUI / DMV Attorney Specialist.




Alternatively, if your request for an extension is denied by the California DMV supervisor, request an In-person hearing, the Discovery (evidence), a Stay (stop) of the Suspension, and the Name of the Driver Safety Officer.




Please ask for the name of the person you speak with. Please do not discuss the reasons why you are contesting the suspension. A local California Driver Safety Office is located at 9174 Sky Park Avenue, Suite 200, San Diego (858/627-3901 or fax 858/627-3925).




The California DMV may not be able to schedule a hearing before your 30-day temporary license expires. Your California DUI / DMV lawyer will request a Notice of Stay of the 30-day temporary license until a California DMV hearing is provided and a California DMV decision is actually rendered.







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California DUI Attorney EVALUATION FORM at http://www.sandiegodui.com/survey.html .

A California DUI Lawyer can help you beat the California DUI charge: http://www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com .

California DUI attorney Rick Mueller, a California Drunk Driving / DUI Defense Attorney handling California DUI & DMV cases, shows how California DUI Lawyers can help. http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net

California DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a premier California Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a California DUI Attorney will help you.

California DUI attorney specialist Rick Mueller is a well-recognized California Drunk Driving, DUI & DMV Defense attorney with over 24 years of experience. Known as a "DMV Guru," Rick dedicates 100% of his law practice to aggressively defending those accused of California DUI - driving under the influence of alcohol.

California DUI Attorney Rick Mueller Background and Contact Information http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/about.html




California DUI and DMV Penalties http://www.sandiegoduilawyer.com/penalty.html




Out of State License/Resident & Driving Record http://www.sandiegoduilawyer.com/out_of_state.html




http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net- Excellent California DUI information source for California drunk driving arrest.

California DUI Defense Rights, Laws, Penalties, DMV, Court, Military, Helpful Tips and other comprehensive information. Vigorous California DUI lawyer who can save your license and keep you out of jail.




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Saturday, April 12, 2008

California DMV/DUI 101 Workshop on May 7, 2008

California DUI / DMV defense attorney announcement

"DMV/DUI 101 Workshop" A primer for what to do with your first DUI

Content Partner: Beverly Hills Bar Association
Price: $115.00*
Member Price: $80.00

Description: This course is an introduction to one of the most common charges in the California criminal courts. It will cover the basics of DUI defense and representing clients before the Department of Motor Vehicles.


Practice Areas: Criminal Law, State Criminal Law

Online Media Type: Video

Production Date: 05/07/2008 6:30 PM

Level: Intermediate

Category: Standard

Duration: 2 Hours, 0 Minutes

Online Format: Live Webcast

Click here for information on subscription discounts and Group Viewing opportunities.

Purchase of this product provides online access for 180 days. If you are purchasing a live webcast, you will receive complimentary access to the on-demand version for 180 days once it becomes available -- usually within a week of the live webcast. Please note that the on-demand version may, or may not be accredited in your state.

If you intend to take a course for CLE credit, please make sure your state is listed in the "Accreditation" section to the upper right of the program description. West LegalEdcenter cannot be responsible for accreditation in states not listed, and accreditation displayed is unique to the purchased program format (e.g., live webcast).

This product is intended for individual use by the named purchaser. Group viewings may be arranged for five or more attorneys within the same organization prior to viewing by emailing sales@westlegaledcenter.com.

California DUI / DMV defense lawyers are urged to attend.

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/about

Arrested for California DUI & Attack Cop? Battery!

California DUI criminal defense attorney news

Upon being arrested on suspicion of California DUI - driving and taken back to the Vallejo police station, a man violently assaulted a police officer Monday evening, California DUI attorneys report.

California DUI Police received a report of an intoxicated man at a gas station on Highway 29 near Highway 37 and located the suspect a short time later driving on the 4300 block of Sonoma Boulevard, California DUI lawyers are told.

California DUI officers found two open alcohol containers in the suspect's vehicle, and arrested 36-year-old Tobias Berardi on suspicion of California DUI, California DUI attorneys believe.

Back at the station, a California DUI officer was attempting to administer a breathalyzer when Berardi allegedly attacked the officer and began strangling him, California DUI lawyers are informed.

Another California DUI officer tried to get control of the suspect and Berardi continued to fight both California DUI officers until they were eventually able to get him in handcuffs, California DUI attorneys are told.

Berardi was booked into Solano County Jail on suspicion of California DUI and battery of a California DUI police officer, California DUI criminal defense attorneys report.

The California DUI officer was not seriously injured during the attack, California DUI criminal defense lawyers suspect.

Even though arrested for battery, the man still must contact DMV within 10 days through a California DUI attorney.

All a California DMV attorney has to do is knock out one (1) DMV issue to save your license & you avoid any reissue fee and/or Proof of Insurance SR-22 filing!

California DUI Lawyers list:

California DUI Lawyer


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California DUI Attorney Expungement

California DUI Lawyer Expungement information

California Drunk Driving Lawyer expungement
http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/expunge.html

California's expungement law permits someone convicted of a California DUI crime to have her or his California DUI Attorney petition the California DUI court to re-open the California DUI Lawyer's case, set aside the California DUI Attorney plea, and dismiss the California DUI case.

In order for one to qualify for California DUI expungement, he or she must have successfully completed the entire California DUI probationary term, paid all California DUI fines and California DUI restitution, not served a sentence in state prison for the California DUI offense, and not currently being charged with a crime, including a new California DUI .

If the requirements are met for eligibility, a court may grant the California DUI Attorney's petition if it finds that it would be in the interest of justice to do so. A successful California DUI Lawyer's expungement will not erase the criminal record of the California DUI charge, but rather the finding of guilt will be changed to a dismissal. The California DUI Attorney's petitioner then honestly and legally can answer to a question about his California DUI criminal history, with some exceptions, that he has not been convicted of that California DUI crime, according to California DUI Attorneys.

http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/expunge.html

Friday, April 11, 2008

Saab Alcokey next on California DUI attorneys' list?

California DUI attorneys www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net announcement

Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), in partnership with California state Assembly Member Mike Feuer (D-Los Angeles) and the California Highway Patrol, will be holding a news conference in support of critical anti-California DUI / drunk driving legislation that can reduce the number of California DUI / drunk driving deaths on California’s roadways. A.B. 2784, introduced by Assembly Member Feuer, would require all convicted California DUI drunk drivers, including first-time California DUI offenders, to install alcohol ignition interlocks on their vehicles. ThisCalifornia DUI bill passed California’s Assembly Committee for Public Safety today, Tuesday, April 8.

The mention of this California DUI law reminded Gripen of the Saab Alcokey, which is still in trials at the moment in Sweden. I thought I’d write to Saab Sweden and see how things are going with it and if it’ll be production-ready any time soon.

The alcokey is on the move. We are right now doing a broad test on vehicles in the Saab fleet of cars. We know that the project has taken a bit longer to get finished but we want to make sure that the interaction between the car and the user will be really smooth.

Think there is no room for malfunction or bad experiences. I mean, how would it feel to not be able to start your car if you’re all sober. And vice-versa is not good either!

So it’s still in the California DUI lab by the sound of things.

It’d sell well in California, I’m sure. You could sell one to the Lohan household, the Spears place, get a couple of spares at the Hilton’s and then there’s the Bartons, California DUI lawyers claim.

Farrah Fawcett's son pleads to California DUI charges

California DUI lawyer news

California celebrity son Redmond O'Neal, by mother Farrah Fawcett and father Ryan O'Neal, pleaded not guilty today to charges of California DUI, felony possession of heroin and methamphetamine, California DUI attorneys are told.

He was arrested for California DUI lawyer in January after Los Angeles County Sheriffs pulled him over for speeding on PCH in Malibu, California DUI lawyers report.

In 2005, Redmond pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and methamphetamine.

His next California DUI court date is May 29, California DUI attorneys said.

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

Checkpoints upcoming - California DUI roadblocks

California DUI lawyer news

VICTORVILLE - Sheriff's deputies will be conducting a California DUI sobriety and driver's license checkpoint from Saturday night until Sunday morning.

The California DUI checkpoint will be from 7 p.m. to 3 a.m. at an undisclosed location, California DUI attorneys discovered.

The Sheriff's Department paid for the California DUI checkpoint through a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and local funds.

The Woodland Police Department will also be conducting a California DUI sobriety checkpoint over a six-hour period next weekend near East Street and Oak Avenue.
The cCalifornia DUI heckpoint will last from 8 p.m. Friday, April 18, to 2 a.m. Saturday, April 19.

If you're driving while impaired, either on alcohol or drugs, you will be caught, said Woodland Police Chief Carey Sullivan.

The objective is not to produce a large number of arrests, but rather to reduce the number of California DUI intoxicated drivers on the road, California DUI lawyers are told.

Any persons found to be driving under the influence will be booked into the Yolo County Jail and have their vehicle towed, California DUI attorneys believe. Driving under the influence is a crime they will not tolerate, California DUI lawyers suspect.

Funding for the department's California DUI prevention program was provided by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

www.sandiegoduihelp.com

California DUI / Drunk Driving Attorney news - Ironic Tragedy when students get killed in suspected drunk driving crash

California DUI / Drunk Driving Attorney news - Ironic Tragedy

High School students had been preparing to stage a dramatic mock California DUI / Drunk Driving car crash as a cautionary tale about the hazards of drinking and driving as prom and graduation season approaches.

Then real life intervened: a true California DUI / Drunk Driving tragedy.

On April 8, 2008, a high school football player was killed and three classmates were seriously injured in a California DUI / Drunk Driving car crash on Pacific Coast Highway in Malibu after an alleged night of partying that California DUI / Drunk Driving attorneys are told involved alcohol. A fourth passenger suffered minor injuries.

The junior running back allegedly had been drinking and was driving the car that rolled over and crashed, California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyers are told.

Survivors told California DUI / Drunk Driving investigators that they had been drinking during a night of partying in Los Angeles. Investigators found a large, empty bottle of Jagermeister and, on the floor of the car, a glass pipe and a pill bottle containing medical marijuana.

California DUI / Drunk Driving tests to determine whether Murphy was legally intoxicated are pending. California DUI / Drunk Driving investigators said the teens apparently were not wearing seat belts in the 10 p.m. California DUI / Drunk Driving crash, a sad irony. The school had planned its mock car crash as part of a program called "Every 15 Minutes," California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyers report.

One of the student actors scheduled to take part in the two-day event was among those critically injured in the single-car crash, California DUI / Drunk Driving attorneys believe.

The school would be canceling the California DUI / Drunk Driving demonstration this year. But educators and California DUI / Drunk Driving law enforcement officials say this week's California DUI / Drunk Driving tragedy underscores a horrible California DUI / Drunk Driving message they have for years been trying to pound into high school students' heads.

Superintendent of the Conejo Valley Unified School District, said the message is simple: Don't drink and drive.

California DUI / Drunk Driving investigators called to the scene could smell alcohol on Murphy's body and on the passengers: three 17-year-olds and a 16-year-old, said California DUI / Drunk Driving attorney sources.

The teens told investigators that they went to see a hip-hop group, Living Legends, play at Amoeba Music on Sunset Boulevard, but they showed up late and missed the show. So the group headed to the Santa Monica Pier, where they told California DUI / Drunk Driving investigators that they drank from a bottle of Jagermeister.

California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyers believe that as Murphy drove north on Pacific Coast Highway, he lost control in the 32000 block just north of Broad Beach Road, veered to the right into a mountainside and the car flipped end-over-end, coming to rest upside down.

The California DUI / Drunk Driving crash shut down PCH overnight and for several hours Wednesday morning as crews cleared debris. A skateboard, a Dodgers cap, tennis shoes and other clothing littered the road. Skid marks were visible on a nearby embankment.

Officer Brooks of the Sheriff's Department, said he often spoke to high school students and their parents about California DUI / Drunk Driving; he has noticed the effort schools have made to deter students from drinking at this time of year. More high schools are offering nonalcoholic after-prom parties and sponsoring programs to combat California DUI / Drunk Driving, California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyers understand.

All parents should still talk to their children about drunk driving and review their options, California DUI / Drunk Driving attorneys warn. Let them know that if they do get drunk, they can always call home for a ride so they do not drive.

"Every 15 Minutes" is part of a health class curriculum that takes place each spring. The California DUI / Drunk Driving program refers to statistics showing that every 15 minutes someone dies from a crash involving alcohol. School administrators probably will meet with law enforcement officials to discuss expanding California DUI / Drunk Driving outreach to students in the wake of the California DUI / Drunk Driving crash.

www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/articles

Thursday, April 10, 2008

new California DUI IID law?

California DUI attorney news
April 10, 2008
LOS ANGELES, CA- Assemblymember Mike Feuer was joined by California Highway Patrol Commissioner Joe Farrow and MADD National CEO Chuck Hurley to support critical anti-drunk driving legislation than reduce the number of drunk driving deaths on California´s roadways. AB 2784 (Feuer) would require all convicted drunk drivers, including first-time offenders, to install ignition interlock devices (IIDs) on their vehicles. Following the news conference there was a live demonstration of the technology.

An IID is a breath test device linked to a vehicle´s ignition system. When a driver wishes to start his or her vehicle, he or she must first blow into the device, but the vehicle will not start unless the driver´s alcohol level is below the limit of .08.

"The development of the ignition interlock device has made drunk driving increasingly preventable," said Assemblymember Feuer. "California must become a national leader in the fight against drunk driving by passing comprehensive interlock legislation."

In 2006, drunk drivers killed nearly 1,300 people in California. IIDs are proven to save lives, but it is estimated that only one out of eight convicted drunk drivers each year currently has an interlock on their vehicle. While current DUI laws in California require IIDs for those convicted of driving on a DUI-suspended license, the use of these lifesaving devices in California is limited and discretionary.


"Far too often, law enforcement officers stop DUI drivers only to learn it´s not their first offense. It´s time we stop this cycle," said California Highway Patrol Commissioner Joe Farrow. "Ignition interlock devices will prevent drivers from starting a car if they have any measurable amount of alcohol in their system. By preventing drunk drivers from getting on the road, we know we can save innocent people from being injured or killed."

Four states, including New Mexico, Arizona, Illinois, have already passed legislation that requires IIDs for all convicted drunk drivers – and twelve more states are considering similar legislation this year´s legislative session. In New Mexico, there has already been a 25 percent decrease in fatalities from drunk driving since its IID law was implemented just a few years ago.

"We know that this technology works," said Chuck Hurley, National CEO of MADD. "Now we need to implement these advances on our roads, every day in every state across the nation. Too many drunk driving offenders are back on the road, and it is our duty to ensure that they do not risk the lives of others and that they only drive while sober."

AB 2784 passed out of the Assembly Public Safety Committee yesterday with a vote of 6:1. It will be heard next in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Top, active California DUI Lawyers

California DUI / Drunk Driving criminal defense attorney information

California DUI defense is a highly specialized field. Selecting a California DUI Attorney in a California DUI / drunk driving case is difficult. At the bottom is a list of premier, active California DUI attorney specialists.

Always first ask the following questions of a prospective California DUI / DMV defense lawyer:

Does the California criminal defense lawyer handle California DUI / Drunk Driving cases only? Or does he or she accept other types of criminal or civil cases as well? (This is sort of like a general practitioner doctor attempting specialized surgery.)

What percentage of the California criminal defense attorney's caseload consists of California DUI / Drunk Driving Cases?

Does the California criminal defense lawyer have access to expert witnesses in California DUI / Drunk Driving police procedures and California DUI / Drunk Driving blood/breath analysis?

Will California DUI / Drunk Driving breath machine documents and California DUI / Drunk Driving chemical test maintenance records be reviewed?

Does the California criminal defense attorney make general or specific promises as to the outcome results he or seh can get in the California DUI / Drunk Driving / DMV cases? (This is something no ethical California DUI / Drunk Driving defense attorney would do, as specific results are unpredictable and one may not predict an outcome.)

Are California DUI / Drunk Driving / DMV defense attorney fees set forth in an immediately reviewable written agreement or proposal?

Do the fees cover the critical California DUI - DMV license administrative per se license suspension hearing?

Did the California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyer attend a reputable law school?

Is he or she a member of the National College for DUI Defense?

Is he or she a Specialist Attorney per the California DUI Lawyers Association?

Have there been any State Bar complaints against the California criminal defense attorney?

The following California criminal defense lawyers specialize in California DUI / Drunk Driving defense, are Specialist Members of the California DUI Lawyers Association, and/or have excellent reputations in the California DUI / Drunk Driving defense field:


Donald Bartell Board Member -Specialist Member
Bartell Beloian and Hensel
5053 La Mart Drive Suite 201
Riverside, CA 92507
PHONE: 951 788-2230 FAX: 951 788-9162
EMAIL: djbartell@pacbell.net

Blackie Burak Board Member -Specialist Member
Law Offices of Blackie Burak
500 Ygnacio Valley Road Suite 490
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
PHONE: 925 933-4500 FAX: 925 933-4515
EMAIL: cocolaw@flash.net

Paul Burglin Board Member -Specialist Member
Burglin Law Offices
187 E. Blithedale Avenue
Mill Valley, CA 94941
PHONE: 415 389-6900
EMAIL: burglin@msn.com

Don Gray Drewry Board Member -Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
14895 East 4th Street Suite 485
San Leandro, CA 94578
PHONE: 510 346-6666 FAX: 510 346-6668
EMAIL: dgdattorney@aol.com

Lynn Gorelick Board Member -Specialist Member
Gorelick & Gorelick
24301 Southland Drive Suite 620
Hayward, CA 94545
PHONE: 510 785-1444 FAX: 510 670-8746
EMAIL: lynn@gorelick-law.com

Richard A. Hutton Board Member -Specialist Member
Hutton & Wilson
1055 East Colorado Boulevard Suite 310
Pasadena, CA 91106
PHONE: 626 397-9700 FAX: 626 397-9707
EMAIL: hutwillaw@aol.com

Ron Jackson Board Member -Specialist Member
Law Offices of Ronald A. Jackson
2100 Goodyear Avenue #11
Ventura, CA 93003
PHONE: 805 650-8588 FAX: 805 650-4968
EMAIL: ron@ron-jackson.com

K Randy Moore Board Member -Specialist Member
Law Office of K. Randolph Moore
332 N 2nd Street
San Jose, CA 95112
PHONE: 408 298-2000 FAX: 408 298-6046
EMAIL: lawyermoore@msn.com

Felipe Plascencia Board Member -Specialist Member
Law Office of Felipe Plascencia
320 W. Whittier, Blvd., Ste. 200
La Habra, CA 90631
PHONE: (562) 697-9076 FAX: (562) 697-9078
EMAIL: duiwarrior@adelphia.net

Barry T. Simons Board Member -Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
260 St. Ann's Drive
Laguna Beach, CA 92651
PHONE: 949 497-1729 FAX: 949 497-3971
EMAIL: info@simonslaw.com

Vincent John Tucci President / "General" /Former Board Member - Specialist Member
Braden & Tucci
82 Discovery
Irvine, CA 92618
PHONE: (949) 872-2700 FAX: (949) 872-2708
EMAIL: VTucci@aol.com

Robert J. Wilson Board Member -Specialist Member
Hutton & Wilson
1055 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 310
Pasadena, CA 91106
PHONE: 626-397-9700 FAX: 626-397-9707
EMAIL: hutwillaw@aol.com

Daniel L. Barton Specialist Member
Nolan, Armstrong & Barton, LLP
600 University Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94301
PHONE: 650 326-2980 FAX: 650 326-9704
EMAIL: Dbarton@nablaw.com

Myles L. Berman Specialist Member
Law Offices of Miles L. Berman
9255 Sunset Suite 720
Los Angeles, CA 90069
PHONE: 310 273-9501 FAX: 320 273-8085
EMAIL: duilaw@topgundui.com

Michael Borkowski Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
331 J Street, Suite 200
Sacramento, CA 95814
PHONE: 916 441-1077 FAX: 916 991-2153

G. Cole Casey Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
110 West C Street #1400
San Diego, CA 92101
PHONE: 619 237-0384 FAX: 619 237-0109
EMAIL: cole@duisandiego.com

William Cole Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
PO Box 6329
Lake Tahoe, NV 89449
PHONE: 775 588-5138 FAX: 775 588-1326
EMAIL: tahoedui@aol.com

Joshua M. Dale Specialist Member
Law Offices of
3200 Geary Blvd., 2nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94118
PHONE: 415 750-4350 FAX: 415 750-4351
EMAIL: jdale@joshdale.com

Derek A Danielson Specialist Member
Law Offices of Derek A Danielson
9255 Sunset Blvd Suite 720
Los Angeles, CA 90069
PHONE: 310 273-9501 FAX: 310 273-8085
EMAIL: Derekslaw@aol.com

Michael L. Davidson Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
411 Borel Avenue Suite 500
San Mateo, CA 94402
PHONE: 800-246-0246 FAX: 650 345-9875
EMAIL: mldesq@pacbell.net

Ronald Dinan Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
411 Russell Avenue
Santa Rosa, CA 95403
PHONE: 707 571-5550 FAX: 707 571-5521
EMAIL: rondinan@aol.com

Kirk W. Elliott Specialist Member
Roberts & Elliott
10 Almaden Boulevard Suite 500
San Jose, CA 95113
PHONE: 408 275-9800 FAX: 408 287-3782
EMAIL: kelliott@robertselliott.com

Eugene Ellis Specialist Member
Mr. DUI San Diego
3990 9th Avenue
San Diego, CA 92103
PHONE: 619-563-1010
EMAIL: e.ellis@cox.net

Michael Fremont Specialist Member
Front Line Law
191 Calle Magdelina Suite 220
Encinitas, CA 92024
PHONE: 760 635-0640 FAX: 760 635-0654
EMAIL: michaelfremont91@cs.com

Darryl W. Genis Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
Three, West Carrillo Street, Ste. 203
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
PHONE: 805 966 0812 FAX: 805 966 0813
EMAIL: dwgenis@msn.com

Allan Gorelick Specialist Member
Law Offices of Allan Gorelick
24301 Southland Drive, Suite 620
Hayward, CA 94545
PHONE: 510 785-1444 FAX: 510 670-8746
EMAIL: allan@gorelick-law.com

Richard Helphand Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
535 N Brand Boulevard Suite 500
Glendale, CA 91203
PHONE: 818 240-1974 FAX: 818 240-1676
EMAIL: rhelphan@pacbell.net

Robert J. Herron Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
610 Pacific Coast Hwy Suite 209
Seal Beach, CA 90740
PHONE: 562 594-4464 FAX: 562 493-2889
EMAIL: herronlaw@aol.com

Wally G. Hesseltine Specialist Member
Pedder, Stover, Hesseltine & Walker LLP
3445 Golden Gate Way PO Box 479
Lafayette, CA 94549-0479
PHONE: 925 283-6816 FAX: 925 283-3683
EMAIL: whess@pedderlaw.com

Stuart A. Holmes Specialist Member
Law Office of Stuart A. Holmes
250 West 1st Street Suite 312
Claremont, CA 91711-4740
PHONE: 909 621-5886 FAX: 909 625-3038
EMAIL: stuart.holmes@verizon.net

Bruce Kapsack Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
1440 Broadway Suite 902
Oakland, CA 94612
PHONE: 510 645-0027 FAX: 510 645-4220
EMAIL: Bruce@KandBlaw.com

Michael J. Kennedy Specialist Member
Ledger & Kennedy
1111 E Tahquitz Canyon Way, Ste. 101
Palm Springs, CA 92262-6789
PHONE: (760)320-6691 FAX: (760)320-2121
EMAIL: capmotion@earthlink.net

Tom Knutsen Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
3900 Newpark Mall Road 3rd Floor
Newark, CA 94560
PHONE: 510 713-2880 FAX: 510 713-2883
EMAIL: Knutsen2@pacbell.net

Todd A. Landgren Specialist Member
Atorney at Law
1920 Main Street #1000
Irvine, CA 92614
PHONE: 949 752-1122 FAX: 949 756-0596
EMAIL: Todd@Toddlandgren.com

Bill Mayo Specialist Member
Mayo Law Clinic
132 W. 2nd Street
Chico, CA 95927+5227
PHONE: 530-898-8468 FAX: 530-230-2846
EMAIL: wmayo@mayolawclinic.com

Tom McKenna Specialist Member
Law Office of Thomas F. McKenna
500 Ygnacio Valley Road, Suite 300
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
PHONE: 925 933-7500 FAX: 925 933-4515
EMAIL: TMCK718769@aol.com

Linda McNiel Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1180
Willits, CA 95490
PHONE: 707 459-5916 FAX: 707 459-2535
EMAIL: lmcniel@pacific.net

Rick Mueller Specialist Member
San Diego County DUI Law Center
Attorney at Law
PO Box 503483
San Diego, CA 92150
PHONE: 858 587-6055 FAX: 858 451-9097
EMAIL: rick@sandiegodui.com
WEBSITE: www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

Michael Norris Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
120 Fisherman's Wharf
Redondo Beach, CA 90277
PHONE: 310 376-0922 FAX: 310 374-2647
EMAIL: morris@mminternet.com

Marshall M. Schulman Specialist Member

Law Officew of Marshall M. Schulman
120 Montgomery Street Suite 1600
San Francisco, CA 94104
PHONE: 415 837-0702 FAX: 415 837-0703
EMAIL: lawmarsh@aol.com

Becca R. Simmons Specialist Member
Simmons Law Offices
800 El Camino Real West Suite 180
Mountain View, CA 94040
PHONE: 650-903-2274 FAX: 650 728-2139
EMAIL: mossbeach1view@yahoo.com

Mark H. Sollitt Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
911 Industrial Way, Ste. F
Lodi, CA 95240
PHONE: 209-369-9050 FAX: 209-369-9060
EMAIL: sollittlaw@hotmail.com

Daryl B. Thompson Specialist Member
Attorney at Law
625 The City Drive Suite 360
Orange, CA 92868
PHONE: 714 740-1095 FAX: 714 740-1059
EMAIL: dbtesq@aol.com

Joe Vandervoort Specialist Member
Vandervoort Law Offices
330 Wall Street
Chico, CA 95928
PHONE: 530 342-2858
EMAIL: duiking@duiking.com

Virginia L. Landry
Law Offices of Virginia L. Landry, Inc.
15635 Alton Parkway, Suite 117
Irvine, CA 92618-7323
PHONE: 949 585-7400 FAX: 949 585-7407
EMAIL: virginia@landrylaw.net

San Diego California DUI Lawyer


San Diego California DUI


California DUI Attorney


San Diego California DUI Help

California DUI Attorney articles

California DUI attorney articles

April 9, 2008

California Drunk Driving / DUI / Driving Under the Influence Lawyer News

What You Must Do Within 10 Days of being arrested in San Diego County...
License Ramifications of California DUI on Illinois Resident...
FAQ Article: New California DUI Reportability Laws & Insurance Ramifications...
Why San Diego California needs to require San Diego DUI police videos...
Are San Diego Breath Tests Reliable?...
Advances in San Diego DUI Breath Testing Technologies...
Significance of a Breath Temperature on a San Diego DUI breath test machine...
Is Odor of Alcohol Probable Cause to Arrest for a San Diego DUI?...
Retrograde Extrapolation - San Diego DUI guess of higher BAC at time of driving...
Have a Hangover? You may be prosecuted for "DUH" - Driving Under the Influence of a Hangover...
San Diego DUI Prosecution Expert's ASSUMED "BAC"...
What was that hand-held gadget I blew into? A PAS (Preliminary Alcohol Screening) Test ...
Stop unauthorized release of hospital blood test & medical treatment records...

To view these articles, go to http://www.sandiegoduilawyer.com/articles.html .

53,000 gallon California spill Captain convicted of DUI

California DUI / Drunk Driving criminal defense attorney news

April 9, 2008

The pilot of the container ship that allegedly spilled 53,000 gallons of fuel oil into the San Francisco Bay was convicted of DUI and took prescription drugs that could have affected his cognitive abilities.

Captain John Cota was apparently diagnosed with alcoholism and developed pancreatitis as a result of his drinking, according to testimony at a National Transportation Safety Board hearing. One NTSB investigator questioned why a local pilots board hadn't noticed a worsening pattern after a 2004 incident in which Cota was enraged and irrational on-board a ship, and another in 2006 in which a vessel he was piloting ran aground.

Cota apparently should not have been granted a pilot license by the Coast Guard after a physical last year, according to a medical witness who referred to a long list of medical conditions including sleep apnea, which can cause problems sleeping and drowsiness during the day.

Cota is facing possible federal civil charges and declined to testify at the hearing. He was taking anti-anxiety pills, Wellbutrin for depression and medications for pain, migraines, glaucoma and to combat his sleep apnea, among other prescriptions.

Cota's DUI / Drunk Driving / defense attorney did not comment.

With Cota piloting, the 900-foot Cosco Busan sideswiped a support of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in heavy morning fog, gashing the ship's side and fuel tank. The spill fouled the fragile bay, killing or injuring thousands of birds and closing beaches.

Documents released by the NTSB at the first day of the hearing Tuesday showed that the medications Cota took prompted the Coast Guard to ask him to voluntarily turn in his mariner's license in the weeks after the accident because of concerns about his judgment, according to California DUI / Drunk Driving attorney sources.

http://www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/articles.html

NTSB investigator Dr. Barry Strauch revealed Wednesday that Cota was convicted of DUI / Drunk Driving - driving under the influence in February 1999, apparently was diagnosed with alcoholism and entered an alcohol rehabilitation program. A waiver was granted so he could retain his pilot's license, Strauch said. The alcohol use was likely the cause of his pancreatitis, California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyers said.

One of the medications Cota took was Lorazapam, the generic version of the anti-anxiety drug Xanax, which Bourgeois said the FAA doesn't let their pilots use. The pills have a half-life of 11 or 12 hours and "that's not something you'd want to have onboard when you're trying to do important duties," the doctor said. Medications could have interacted with each other to exacerbate side-effects.

Transcripts of the voyage data recorder show Cota was confused about the Cosco Busan's navigation systems the morning of the crash. Cota boarded locally to assist the Chinese-speaking crew and struggled to understand the ship's devices in near-zero visibility. "Yeah, it's foggy, I shouldn't have gone," Cota says shortly after the crash. He tells the ship's master he misunderstood the chart and the master's explanations of it, apparently mixing up different symbols.

Yet Cota denied to an NTSB interviewer that an apology he offered the master was a statement of wrongdoing and accused the ship's master of misreading the charts.

There was debate Wednesday over Cota's record, with Strauch, the NTSB investigator, citing previous incidents including one in 2004 where Cota grew irate at crew members on a ship called Tarawa over non-regulation equipment.

He berated the crew with "offensive and derogatory language," according to a letter by the San Francisco Board of Pilot Commissioners closing out the incident, which a review board treated as a "medical issue." Cota was removed temporarily but subsequently deemed fit.

In 2006, Cota was reprimanded for "lack of situational awareness" by the Board of Pilot Commissioners after a freighter he was piloting ran aground. A list released by the NTSB shows that not counting the Cosco Busan, Cota was involved in 12 incidents of groundings or ship damage since being licensed in 1981, but not all of those involved pilot error. California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyers point to other possible errors. www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net

Barron Hilton pleads to California DUI charges, to visit morgue

California DUI lawyer news

April 9, 2008

Barron Hilton is the younger brother of Paris and Nikki. Arrested for California DUI, his BAC was allegedly .14, almost twice the legal limit. Because Barron is 18, and 21 is the legal California DUI drinking age, even a .01 BAC is illegal according to California DUI attorneys.

Barron allegedly had a fake ID and ran over an attendant at a Malibu gas station. In California, he will of course do no California DUI time, per California DUI lawyers.

Barron pleaded no contest to California DUI - driving under the influence Wednesday and was sentenced by a Malibu court to three years California DUI probation. As part of his California DUI terms, he was ordered to visit a morgue.

Barron, 18, also pleaded no contest to having a fake ID. A second California DUI count and a charge of being an unlicensed driver were dropped, local California DUI lawyers confirm.

Barron was also sentenced to two alcohol education classes and had his license suspended for a year. His California DUI criminal defense attorney is due back in California DUI court on June 4 for a California DUI restitution hearing for the gas station employee's car he allegedly hit.

California DUI / Drunk drivers of California, you have been warned. If you drive drunk, and almost kill countless others, you WILL go to a class and be inconvenienced in order to attend California DUI alcohol classes. Visit www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/survey for a free California DUI evaluation.

Specific facts for your San Diego California DUI defense

California DUI attorney news

If you or your loved have been arrested for a San Diego California DUI, you may want to know the basics of San Diego California DUI Law in San Diego California.

San Diego California DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller at the San Diego County DUI Law Center provides answers to many of the common San Diego California DUI questions daily.

This preeminent firm consists of a San Diego California DUI attorney with 24 years of courtroom experience specializing in all DUI & DMV matters.

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Hit Fire Hydrant in Driveway? California DUI

California DUI lawyer news www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorny.net

A 19-year-old Joshua Tree California man was arrested on suspicion of California DUI driving under the influence of alcohol Friday night after he allegedly ran into a fire hydrant while trying to turn into his driveway, California DUI lawyers report.

According to California DUI attorneys, Bryan J. Rote was driving his 2006 Dodge Ram pickup eastbound on Division Street with three juvenile passengers shortly before 11:30 p.m. when the California DUI incident occurred.

California DUI attorneys are told Rote was approaching his address at about 30 mph, and perhaps because of his alleged level of intoxication and the alleged unsafe speed at which he was driving, he was allegedly unable to safely make a right-hand turn into his driveway.

His pickup somehow veered off the roadway and struck a fire hydrant. The vehicle then collided with a mailbox and a chain-link fence, California DUI lawyer sources indicate.

Unfortunately, Whittemore hit his head and passed out during the California DUI collision, California DUI attorneys were informed.

Tuesday, April 8, 2008

California DUI attorneys need to continue to point out to California DUI judges Welsh v. Wisconsin

California DUI attorneys need to continue to point out to California DUI judges that California DUI police may not just come into one's Home!

U.S. Supreme Court
WELSH v. WISCONSIN, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)
466 U.S. 740
WELSH v. WISCONSIN
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

No. 82-5466.

Argued October 5, 1983
Decided May 15, 1984



On the night of April 24, 1978, a witness observed a car that was being driven erratically and that eventually swerved off the road, coming to a stop in a field without causing damage to any person or property. Ignoring the witness' suggestion that he wait for assistance in removing his car, the driver walked away from the scene. The police arrived a few minutes later and were told by the witness that the driver was either very inebriated or very sick. After checking the car's registration, the police, without obtaining a warrant, proceeded to the petitioner's nearby home, arriving at about 9 p. m. They gained entry when petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, and found petitioner lying naked in bed. Petitioner was then arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of a Wisconsin statute which provided that a first offense was a noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding for a maximum fine of $200. Petitioner was taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a breath-analysis test. Pursuant to Wisconsin statutes, which subjected an arrestee who refused to take the test to the risk of a 60-day revocation of driving privileges, petitioner requested a court hearing to determine whether his refusal was reasonable. Under Wisconsin law, a refusal to take a breath test was reasonable if the underlying arrest was not lawful. The trial court, ultimately concluding that petitioner's arrest was lawful and that his refusal to take the breath test was therefore unreasonable, issued an order suspending petitioner's license. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated the order, concluding that the warrantless arrest of petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.

Held:

The warrantless, nighttime entry of petitioner's home to arrest him for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense, was prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 748-754.


(a) Before government agents may invade the sanctity of the home, the government must demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. An important factor to be considered when determining [466 U.S. 740, 741] whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense has been committed. Pp. 748-753.

(b) Petitioner's warrantless arrest in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal traffic offense cannot be justified on the basis of the "hot pursuit" doctrine, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime, or on the basis of a threat to public safety, because petitioner had already arrived home and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident. Nor can the arrest be justified as necessary to preserve evidence of petitioner's blood-alcohol level. Even assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of this exigent circumstance, given the fact that the State had chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment was possible, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. Pp. 753-754.

108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245, vacated and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 755. BURGER, C. J., filed a separate statement, post, p. 755. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 756.

Gordon Brewster Baldwin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Archie E. Simonson.

Stephen W. Kleinmaier, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General. *


[ Footnote * ] Charles F. Kahn, Jr., filed a brief for the Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), held that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. [466 U.S. 740, 742] But the Court in that case explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as `exigent circumstances,' that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search." Id., at 583. Certiorari was granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for a nonjailable traffic offense.


I

A
Shortly before 9 o'clock on the rainy night of April 24, 1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or property occurred. Concerned about the driver and fearing that the car would get back on the highway, Jablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped at the scene, and Jablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and asked Jablonic for a ride home. Jablonic instead suggested that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. Ignoring Jablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from the scene.

A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned Jablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. [466 U.S. 740, 743]

Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9 p. m. When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the police gained entry into the house. 1 Proceeding upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of Wis. Stat. 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a breath-analysis test.


B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under the Wisconsin Vehicle Code in effect in April 1978, one arrested for driving while intoxicated under 346.63(1) could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee was required [466 U.S. 740, 744] to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified, the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 days. 3

The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal . . . to submit to a test was unreasonable." 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975). It is not disputed by the parties that an arrestee's refusal to take a breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). 4 Although the statute [466 U.S. 740, 745] in effect in April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)." 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-1982). See also 67 Op. Wis. Atty. Gen. No. 93-78 (1978) ("statutory [466 U.S. 740, 746] scheme . . . contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for submission to a test"). 5

Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while intoxicated. At the time in question, the Vehicle Code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. 346.65(2) (1975). Since that time, the State has made only minor amendments to these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).


C
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the State filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by [466 U.S. 740, 747] filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the primary issue at the refusal hearing - whether the petitioner acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 744-746 - had already been determined two months earlier by the same trial court.

As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore unreasonable. 7 Accordingly, the court issued an order suspending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686 (May 26, 1981), App. 114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore reasonable. 8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in turn reversed the Court of Appeals, relying on the existence of [466 U.S. 740, 748] three factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to prevent destruction of evidence. See 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U.S. 1200 (1983). 9


II
It is axiomatic that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 -14 (1948). 10 It is not surprising, therefore, [466 U.S. 740, 749] that the Court has recognized, as "a `basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S., at 586 . See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 -475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the presence of `exigent circumstances'"). See also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296 -297 (1984) (plurality opinion); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 -212 (1981); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id., at 583-590. At the same time, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id., at 583, thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of the exigent-circumstances exception. 11 Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated," United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 318, and that the police bear a heavy burden [466 U.S. 740, 750] when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 -43 (1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 -299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 -771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the home, see Santana, supra.

Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, 12 that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.

This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed: [466 U.S. 740, 751]


"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, no such emergency was present in this case. This method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or security, it is notable that few of the searches found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools from their money by the `numbers' lottery is one that ought to be suppressed, I do not think its suppression is more important to society than the security of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." Id., at 459-460 (footnote omitted).

Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that the gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor [466 U.S. 740, 752] to be weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 313, 320, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient to note that many other lower courts have also considered the gravity of the offense an important part of their constitutional analysis.
For example, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22 (CA2 1978) (allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for nonfelonious crimes. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent-circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded"); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292 N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 1315 (1978) (burglary without weapons not grave offense of violence for this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Ore. App. 665, 617 P.2d 911 [466 U.S. 740, 753] (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence). The approach taken in these cases should not be surprising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these particular holdings or considering every possible factual situation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.

We therefore conclude that the common-sense approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures," and hold that an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, see Payton, application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed.

Application of this principle to the facts of the present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. [466 U.S. 740, 754]

Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. 346.65(2) (1975); 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984); supra, at 746. This is the best indication of the State's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 6, supra. Given this expression of the State's interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. 14 To allow a warrantless home entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will not sanction.


III
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for a civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however, is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is [466 U.S. 740, 755] remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 15


It is so ordered.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE would dismiss the writ as having been improvidently granted and defer resolution of the question presented to a more appropriate case.


Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686 (May 26, 1981), App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, however, because the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). For purposes of this decision, therefore, we assume that there was no valid consent to enter the petitioner's home.

[ Footnote 2 ] Since the petitioner's arrest, 346.63 has been amended to provide that it is a code violation to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. 346.63(1)(a), (b) (1981-1982). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised by the present case.


[ Footnote 3 ] Since the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. 343.305 (1981-1982). Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, 343.305(3), (8), the potential length of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on the arrestee's prior driving record, 343.305(9)(a), (b). An arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan, 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct bearing on the issues raised by the present case.


[ Footnote 4 ] "The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sample as an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however, that the arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede the taking of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitutionally [466 U.S. 740, 745] taken incident to the lawful arrest." 64 Wis. 2d, at 494, 219 N. W. 2d, at 292 (emphasis added).

Nor is there any doubt that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies federal constitutional standards when determining whether an arrest, even for a nonjailable traffic offense, is lawful. The court, for example, explained the basis for its holding in this case as follows:


"The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breath-alyzer test, as required by [state statute].

"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his residence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to believe that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circumstances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence. . . . [T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We affirm the findings of the [trial court], holding that the co-existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless arrest . . . .

. . . . .

"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the defendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a warrantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 11." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 326-327, 321 N. W. 2d, at 246-247, 249-250 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).

[ Footnote 5 ] Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal Constitution.


[ Footnote 6 ] The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this was his second such citation in the previous five years. See 346.65(2) (1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a nonjailable traffic offense that constituted only a civil violation under the applicable state law. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 , 96 (1964).


[ Footnote 7 ] When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge specifically indicated:


"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. See also id., at 112-113.

[ Footnote 8 ] The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra.


[ Footnote 9 ] Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding before this Court.

The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 746-747, and n. 6, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the State introduced evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.


[ Footnote 10 ] In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:


"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is . . . a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security [466 U.S. 740, 749] and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." 333 U.S., at 13 -14 (footnote omitted).

[ Footnote 11 ] Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly limited to felony arrests. See, e. g., 445 U.S., at 574 , 602. Because we conclude that, in the circumstances presented by this case, there were no exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry, we have no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.


[ Footnote 12 ] Even the dissenters in Payton, although believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on such arrests. See id., at 616-617 (WHITE, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("The felony requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes").


[ Footnote 13 ] See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Albany L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, "Knock on Any Door" - Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).


[ Footnote 14 ] Nor do we mean to suggest that the prevention of drunken driving is not properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. 169.121 subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1983); S. D. Codified Laws 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.


[ Footnote 15 ] On remand, the state courts may consider whether the petitioner's arrest was justified because the police had validly obtained consent to enter his home. See n. 1, supra.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion but add a personal observation.

I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up to - and to do something about - the continuing slaughter upon our Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is due to drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of alcohol or drug ingestion. I have spoken in these Reports to this point before. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657 , and 672 (1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (concurring opinion). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 555 -559 (1983).

And it is amazing to me that one of our great States - one which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and emphatic in its prosecution of the drunken driver - still classifies driving while intoxicated as a civil violation that allows only a money forfeiture of not more than $300 so long as it is a first offense. Wis. Stat. 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984). The State, like the indulgent parent, hesitates to discipline the spoiled child very much, even though the child is engaging in an act that is dangerous to others who are law abiding and helpless in the face of the child's act. See ante, at 754, n. 14 (citing other statutes). Our personal convenience still weighs heavily in the balance, and the highway deaths and [466 U.S. 740, 756] injuries continue. But if Wisconsin and other States choose by legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is, unfortunately, nothing in the United States Constitution that says they may not do so.

JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.

At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976). But the requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment, see Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371-372 (CA4 1974); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 5.1 (1978), and we have never held that a warrant is constitutionally required to arrest for nonfelony offenses occurring out of the officer's presence. Thus, "it is generally recognized today that the common law authority to arrest without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by statute, and this has been done in many of the states." E. Fisher, Laws of Arrest 130 (1967); see ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Appendix X (1975); 1 C. Alexander, The Law of Arrest 445-447 (1949); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 541, 673, 706 (1924).

Wisconsin is one of the States that have expanded the common-law authority to arrest for nonfelony offenses. Wisconsin Stat. 345.22 (Supp. 1983-1984) provides that "[a] person may be arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traffic regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic regulation." Relying on this statutory authority, officers of the Madison Police Department arrested Edward Welsh in a bedroom in his home for violating Wis. Stat. 346.63(1) (1977), which proscribes the operation of a motor [466 U.S. 740, 757] vehicle while intoxicated. Welsh refused to submit to a breath or blood test, and his operator's license was eventually revoked for 60 days for this reason pursuant to Wis. Stat. 343.305 (1975).

In the civil license revocation proceeding, Welsh argued that his arrest in his house without a warrant was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and that his refusal to submit to the test could not be used against him. This contention was not based on the proposition that using the refusal in the revocation proceeding would contravene federal law, but rather rested on the fact that Wis. Stat. 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975) had been interpreted to require that an arrest be legal if a refusal to be tested is to be the basis for a license revocation.

On review of the license revocation, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin appears to have recognized that, under the Wisconsin statute, Welsh's license was wrongfully revoked if the officers who arrested him had violated the Federal Constitution. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). The court acknowledged that "the individual's right to privacy in the home is a fundamental freedom" and made clear that the State bore the burden of establishing exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless in-home arrest. 108 Wis. 2d, at 327, 321 N. W. 2d, at 250. But it discerned a strong state interest in combating driving under the influence of alcohol, id., at 334-335, 321 N. W. 2d, at 253-254, and held that the warrantless arrest was proper because (1) the officers were in hot pursuit of a defendant seeking to avoid a chemical sobriety test; (2) Welsh posed a potential threat to public safety; and (3) "[w]ithout an immediate blood alcohol test, highly reliable and persuasive evidence facilitating the state's proof of [Welsh's] alleged violation . . . would be destroyed." Id., at 338, 321 N. W. 2d, at 255. For two reasons, I would not overturn the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. [466 U.S. 740, 758]

First, it is not at all clear to me that the important constitutional question decided today should be resolved in a case such as this. Although Welsh argues vigorously that the State violated his federal constitutional rights, he at no point relied on the exclusionary rule, and he does not contend that the Federal Constitution or federal law provides the remedy he seeks. As a general rule, this Court "reviews judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956). Because the Court does not purport to hold that federal law requires the conclusion that Welsh's refusal to submit to a sobriety test was reasonable, it is not clear to me how the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin offends federal law.

It is true that under the Wisconsin statutory scheme, an arrestee's refusal to take a breath or blood test would be reasonable and would not justify revocation of operating privileges if the underlying arrest violated the Fourth Amendment or was otherwise unlawful. What the State has done, however, is to attach consequences to an arrest found unlawful under the Federal Constitution that we have never decided federal law itself would attach. The Court has occasionally taken jurisdiction over cases in which the States have provided remedies for violations of federally defined obligations. E. g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934). But it has done so in contexts where state remedies are employed to further federal policies. See Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 289, 300 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of course applies to the police conduct at issue here. In providing that a driver may reasonably refuse to submit to a sobriety test if he was unlawfully arrested, Wisconsin's Legislature and courts are pursuing a course that they apparently hope will reduce police illegality and safeguard their citizens' rights. Although the State is entitled to draw this conclusion and to implement it as a matter of state law, I am very doubtful that the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment would [466 U.S. 740, 759] require exclusion of the fruits of an illegal arrest in a civil proceeding to remove from the highways a person who insists on driving while under the influence of alcohol. If that is the case - if it would violate no federal policy to revoke Welsh's license even if his arrest was illegal - there is no satisfactory reason for us to review the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's judgment affirming the revocation, even if that court mistakenly applied the Fourth Amendment. For me, this is ample reason not to disturb the judgment.

In any event, I believe that the state court properly construed the Fourth Amendment. It follows from Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), that warrantless nonfelony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Although I continue to believe that the Court erred in Payton in requiring exigent circumstances to justify warrantless in-home felony arrests, id., at 603 (WHITE, J., dissenting), I do not reject the obvious logical implication of the Court's decision. But I see little to commend an approach that looks to "the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus." Ante, at 751.

The gravity of the underlying offense is, I concede, a factor to be considered in determining whether the delay that attends the warrant-issuance process will endanger officers or other persons. The seriousness of the offense with which a suspect may be charged also bears on the likelihood that he will flee and escape apprehension if not arrested immediately. But if, under all the circumstances of a particular case, an officer has probable cause to believe that the delay involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely endanger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect's escape, I perceive no reason to disregard those exigencies on the ground that the offense for which the suspect is sought is a "minor" one. [466 U.S. 740, 760]

As a practical matter, I suspect, the Court's holding is likely to have a greater impact in cases where the officer acted without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence. If the evidence the destruction or removal of which is threatened documents only the suspect's participation in a "minor" crime, the Court apparently would preclude a finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. I do not understand why this should be so.

A warrantless home entry to arrest is no more intrusive when the crime is "minor" than when the suspect is sought in connection with a serious felony. The variable factor, if there is one, is the governmental interest that will be served by the warrantless entry. Wisconsin's Legislature and its Supreme Court have both concluded that warrantless in-home arrests under circumstances like those present here promote valid and substantial state interests. In determining whether the challenged governmental conduct was reasonable, we are not bound by these determinations. But nothing in our previous decisions suggests that the fact that a State has defined an offense as a misdemeanor for a variety of social, cultural, and political reasons necessarily requires the conclusion that warrantless in-home arrests designed to prevent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence of that offense are always impermissible. If anything, the Court's prior decisions support the opposite conclusion. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 -540 (1967); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 -455 (1948). See also State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Ore. App. 665, 617 P.2d 911 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981).

A test under which the existence of exigent circumstances turns on the perceived gravity of the crime would significantly hamper law enforcement and burden courts with pointless litigation concerning the nature and gradation of various crimes. The Court relies heavily on Justice Jackson's [466 U.S. 740, 761] concurring opinion in McDonald v. United States, supra, which, in minimizing the gravity of the felony at issue there, illustrates that the need for an evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes could not be confined to offenses defined by statute as misdemeanors. To the extent that the Court implies that the seriousness of a particular felony is a factor to be considered in deciding whether the need to preserve evidence of that felony constitutes an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless in-home arrest, I think that its approach is misguided. The decision to arrest without a warrant typically is made in the field under less-than-optimal circumstances; officers have neither the time nor the competence to determine whether a particular offense for which warrantless arrests have been authorized by statute is serious enough to justify a warrantless home entry to prevent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence.

This problem could be lessened by creating a bright-line distinction between felonies and other crimes, but the Court - wisely in my view - does not adopt such an approach. There may have been a time when the line between misdemeanors and felonies marked off those offenses involving a sufficiently serious threat to society to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. But the category of misdemeanors today includes enough serious offenses to call into question the desirability of such line drawing. See ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures 131-132 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1965) (discussing ultimately rejected provision abandoning "in-presence" requirement for misdemeanor arrests). If I am correct in asserting that a bright-line distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is untenable and that the need to prevent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence of some nonfelony crimes can constitute an exigency justifying warrantless in-home arrests under certain circumstances, the Court's approach will necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of [466 U.S. 740, 762] particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts are poorly equipped.

Even if the Court were correct in concluding that the gravity of the offense is an important factor to consider in determining whether a warrantless in-home arrest is justified by exigent circumstances, it has erred in assessing the seriousness of the civil-forfeiture offense for which the officers thought they were arresting Welsh. As the Court observes, the statutory scheme in force at the time of Welsh's arrest provided that the first offense for driving under the influence of alcohol involved no potential incarceration. Wis. Stat. 346.65(2) (1975). Nevertheless, this Court has long recognized the compelling state interest in highway safety, South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 -559 (1983), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin identified a number of factors suggesting a substantial and growing governmental interest in apprehending and convicting intoxicated drivers and in deterring alcohol-related offenses, 108 Wis. 2d, at 334-335, 321 N. W. 2d, at 253-254, and recent actions of the Wisconsin Legislature evince its "belief that significant benefits, in the reduction of the costs attributable to drunk driving, may be achieved by the increased apprehension and conviction of even first time . . . offenders." Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 1023, 1053.

The Court ignores these factors and looks solely to the penalties imposed on first offenders in determining whether the State's interest is sufficient to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. Ante, at 754. Although the seriousness of the prescribed sanctions is a valuable objective indication of the general normative judgment of the seriousness of the offense, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (plurality opinion), other evidence is available and should not be ignored. United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 24-27 (CA9 1981); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp. 5, 9 (SD Ohio 1976). Although first offenders are subjected [466 U.S. 740, 763] only to civil forfeiture under the Wisconsin statute, the seriousness with which the State regards the crime for which Welsh was arrested is evinced by (1) the fact that defendants charged with driving under the influence are guaranteed the right to a jury trial, Wis. Stat. 345.43 (1981-1982); (2) the legislative authorization of warrantless arrests for traffic offenses occurring outside the officer's presence, Wis. Stat. 345.22 (1981-1982); and (3) the collateral consequence of mandatory license revocation that attaches to all convictions for driving under the influence, Wis. Stat. 343.30(1q) (1981-1982). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); United States v. Craner, supra. It is possible, moreover, that the legislature consciously chose to limit the penalties imposed on first offenders in order to increase the ease of conviction and the overall deterrent effect of the enforcement effort. See Comment, 35 Me. L. Rev. 385, 395, n. 35, 399-400, 403 (1983).

In short, the fact that Wisconsin has chosen to punish the first offense for driving under the influence with a fine rather than a prison term does not demand the conclusion that the State's interest in punishing first offenders is insufficiently substantial to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed, "[t]his is a model case demonstrating the urgency involved in arresting the suspect in order to preserve evidence of the statutory violation." 108 Wis. 2d, at 338, 321 N. W. 2d, at 255. We have previously recognized that "the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). Moreover, a suspect could cast substantial doubt on the validity of a blood or breath test by consuming additional alcohol upon arriving at his home. In light of the promptness with which the officers reached Welsh's house, therefore, I would hold that the need to prevent the imminent and ongoing destruction of evidence of a serious [466 U.S. 740, 764] violation of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless in-home arrest. See also, e. g., People v. Ritchie, 130 Cal. App. 3d 455, 181 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1982); People v. Smith, 175 Colo. 212, 486 P.2d 8 (1971); State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N. W. 2d 650 (1966); State v. Amaniera, 132 N. J. Super. 597, 334 A. 2d 398 (1974); State v. Osburn, 13 Ore. App. 92, 508 P.2d 837 (1973).

I respectfully dissent. [466 U.S. 740, 765]
California Highway Patrol Cell phone information, California DUI attorneys newsflash

CONTACT: Fran Clader Media Relations Office
(916) 657-7202 2555 First Avenue
Sacramento, CA 95818
Wireless Telephone Laws FAQs
Two new laws dealing with the use of wireless telephones while driving go into effect July 1, 2008. Below is a list of Frequently Asked Questions concerning these new laws.
Q: When do the new wireless telephone laws take effect?
A: The new laws take effect July 1, 2008
Q: What is the difference between the two laws?
A: The first prohibits all drivers from using a handheld wireless telephone while operating a motor vehicle. (Vehicle Code (VC) §23123). Motorists 18 and over may use a hands-free device. Drivers under the age of 18 may NOT use a wireless telephone or hands-free device while operating a motor vehicle(VC §23124).
Q: What if I need to use my telephone during an emergency, and I do not have a hands- free device?
A: The law allows a driver to use a wireless telephone to make emergency calls to a law enforcement agency, a medical provider, the fire department, or other emergency services agency.
Q: What are the fines if I’m convicted?
A: The base fine for the FIRST offense is $20 and $50 for subsequent convictions. According to the Uniform Bail and Penalty Schedule, with the addition of penalty assessments, a first offense is $76 and a second offense is $190.
Q: Will I receive a point on my drivers license if I’m convicted for a violation of the wireless telephone law?
A: NO. The violation is a reportable offense: however, DMV will not assign a violation point.
Q: Will the conviction appear on my driving record?
A: Yes, but the violation point will not be added.
- more -
Q: Will there be a grace period when motorists will only get a warning?
A: NO. The law becomes in effect on July 1, 2008. Whether a citation is issued is always at the discretion of the officer based upon his or her determination of the most appropriate remedy for the situation.
Q: Are passengers affected by this law?
A: No. This law only applies to the person driving a motor vehicle.
Q: Do these laws apply to out-of-state drivers whose home states do not have such laws?
A: Yes
Q: Can I be pulled over by a law enforcement officer for using my handheld wireless telephone?
A: YES. A law enforcement officer can pull you over just for this infraction.
Q: What if my phone has a push-to-talk feature, can I use that?
A: No. The law does provide an exception for those operating a commercial motor truck or truck tractor (excluding pickups), implements of husbandry, farm vehicle or tow truck, to use a two-way radio operated by a “push-to-talk” feature.
Q: What other exceptions are there?
A: Operators of an authorized emergency vehicle during the course of employment are exempt as are those motorists operating a vehicle on private property
DRIVERS 18 AND OVER
Drivers 18 and over will be allowed to use a hands-free device to talk on their wireless telephone while driving. The following FAQs apply to those motorists 18 and over.
Q: Does the new “hands-free” law prohibit you from dialing a wireless telephone while driving or just talking on it?
A: The new law does not prohibit dialing, but drivers are strongly urged not to dial while driving.
Q: Will it be legal to use a Blue Tooth or other earpiece?
A: Yes, however you cannot have BOTH ears covered.
Q: Does the new hands-free law allow you to use the speaker phone function of your wireless telephone while driving?
A: Yes.
Q: Does the new “hands-free” law allow drivers 18 and over to text page while driving?
A: The law does not specifically prohibit that, but an officer can pull over and issue a citation to a driver of any age if, in the officer’s opinion, the driver was distracted and not operating the vehicle safely. Text paging while driving is unsafe at any speed and is strongly discouraged.
- more -
DRIVERS UNDER 18
Q: Am I allowed to use my wireless telephone hands free?
A: NO. Drivers under the age of 18 may not use a wireless telephone, pager, laptop or any other electronic communication or mobile services device to speak or text while driving in any manner, even hands free. EXCEPTION: Permitted in emergency situations to call police, fire or medical authorities. (VC §23124).
Q: Why is the law stricter for provisional drivers?
A: Statistics show that teen drivers are more likely than older drivers to be involved in crashes because they lack driving experience and tend to take greater risks. Teen drivers are vulnerable to driving distractions such as talking with passengers, eating or drinking, and talking or texting on wireless phones, which increase the chance of getting involved in serious vehicle crashes.
Q: Can my parents give me permission to allow me to use my wireless telephone while driving?
A: NO. The only exception is an emergency situation that requires you to call a law enforcement agency, a health care provider, the fire department or other emergency agency entity.
Q: Does the law apply to me if I’m an emancipated minor?
A: Yes. The restriction applies to all licensed drivers who are under the age of 18.
Q: If I have my parent(s) or someone age 25 years or older in the car with me, may I use my wireless telephone while driving?
A: NO. You may only use your wireless telephone in an emergency situation.
Q: Will the restriction appear on my provisional license?
A: No
Q: May I use the hands-free feature while driving if my car has the feature built in?
A: NO. The law prohibits anyone under the age of 18 from using any type of wireless device while driving, except in an emergency situation.
Q: Can a law enforcement officer stop me for using my hands-free device while driving?
A: No. For drivers under the age of 18, this is considered a SECONDARY violation meaning that a law enforcement officer may cite you for using a hands-free wireless phone if you were pulled over for another violation. However, the prohibition against using a handheld wireless telephone while driving is a PRIMARY violation for which a law enforcement officer can pull you over.
###

California DUI lawyers always warn folks not to use a cell phone while driving.

California DUI attorney seminars this year

List of upcoming California DUI lawyer seminars

April 8, 2008

Upcoming 2008 DUI Seminars Around CA & the Country


March 27-29—Dallas—15th Annual Mastering Scientific Evidence in DWI/DUI Cases— www.tcdla.org

April 18—San Diego-California District Attorneys Association DUI Prosecutions Seminar— www.cdaa.org/ training/

May 1-2 - New York - Big Apple VIII; DWI on Trial - New York State Bar

May 2-3 - Tucson - 21st Annual, Aggressive Defense of the Accused Impaired Drive - Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

May 31 - 5th MABA DUI at Loyola Law School (Sat. 8:30 to 4:30) - contact MABA

June 6-7—Laramie—Understanding the Intricacies of a DWUI case — www.wytla.org

June 21—Monterey—California Public Defenders Association Annual DUI Update Seminar— www.cpda.org

June 26 - 28 - Irvine - SFST Practioner Course - LA PIER & ASSOCIATES

July 17-19—Harvard—National College for DUI Defense Annual Summer Session— www.ncdd.com

September 18-20—Las Vegas—NACDL/NCDD Annual “DWI Means Defend With Ingenuity” - www.nacdl.com

September—Rancho Mirage—California Attorneys for Criminal Justice CACJ Annual Rules of the Road— www.cacj.org

Complete List of California DUI Alcohol Programs

Complete List of California DUI Alcohol Programs
BY California DUI attorneys

Many California DUI lawyers are asked contact information for
the California DUI alcohol program providers.

DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
2007 EDITION
State of California
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs
Driving-Under-the-Influence Program Branch
1700 K Street, Fifth Floor
Sacramento, California 95814
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Directory Update/Correction Form ii
Directory Description iii
DUI License Number Description iv
Licensed DUI Program Listing 1
ii
For changes or corrections, please complete this form and mail to:
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs
Driving-Under-the-Influence Program Branch
1700 K Street, 5th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 322-2964
County:
License Number:
Effective Date:
NEW INFORMATION
Contact Person/Program Director:
Program Name:
Location Address:
Mailing Address (if different):
Telephone: ( ) Fax: ( )
OLD INFORMATION
Contact Person/Program Director:
Program Name:
Location Address:
Mailing Address (if different):
Telephone: ( ) Fax: ( )
Program Director Signature:
iii
HOW TO USE THIS DIRECTORY
Licensed driving-under-the-influence programs are listed by county using the following format:
COUNTY
License Number* Services Licensed to Provide
Legal Program Name
Business Program Name Contact Person
Mailing Address Telephone Number
City, State, Zip Fax Number (If applicable)
STREET ADDRESS: (If this is different from mailing address)
*Several license numbers reflect the county code followed by “0”s. This identifier does
not reflect actual licensure of the county office. These counties have requested to have all
referrals directed to their office.
SAMPLE
02-002-01-120 FOP/ 18-MO/ 30-MO
XYZ DUI Program, Inc.
DUI Program Jane Smith
P.O. Box 4221 (981) 256-5412
Anytown, CA 12345 (981) 256-8301
STREET ADDRESS: 2341 45th Street
Anytown, CA 12345
iv
DUI PROGRAM LICENSE NUMBER DESCRIPTION
Licensed programs are listed by county. Each organization is identified within a county by a three-digit
code. Any program number other than 01 indicates that the organization has more than one licensed
program within that county. The last three digits indicate the level of service licensed in sequential order.
A "1" indicates a first offender program; "2" an 18-month multiple offender program, and "3" a 30-month
multiple offender program. A "0" indicates that the program is not licensed to provide that level of
service.
00-000-00-000
County------------------------------
Organization----------------------------
Program Number-----------------------------
Level of Program Service----------------------
SAMPLES
01-001-01-120 Alameda County
Safe Driving Corporation
Program No. 1
First and 18-Month Programs
01-001-02-120 Alameda County
Safe Driving Corporation
Program No. 2
First and 18-Month Programs
01-002-01-020 Alameda County
Alameda Co. Drinking Driver Program
Program No. 1
18-Month Programs
19-003-01-120 Los Angeles County
Social Rehabilitation Foundation
Program No. 1
First and 18-Month Programs
19-005-03-123 Los Angeles County
Health Foundation Center
Program No. 3
First, 18-Month & 30-Month Programs
19-006-01-023 Los Angeles County
Sunset Boulevard Driving School
Program No. 1
18-Month and 30-Month Programs
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 1 of 67
0100201100
0100301100
0100501100
0100601120
Bi-Bett Education Program
Second Chance, Inc.
Axis Community Health, Inc.
Occupational Health Services, Inc.
Bi-Bett
Second Chance, Inc.
Axis Community Health, Inc.
Managed Health Network
22429 Hesperian Boulevard
6330 Thornton Avenue, Suite B
11840 Dublin Boulevard
344 Pendleton Way
Hayward, CA 94541
Newark, CA 94560
Dublin, CA 94568
Oakland, CA 94621
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(510) 783-8708
(510) 792-4357
(925) 556-2520
(510) 430-3699
(510) 783-8725
(510) 745-1693
(925) 556-0224
(510) 569-3743
Gil Maldonado
Nora Rocha
Ali Garcia
Victor Salinas
PO Box 643
Newark, CA 94560
Mailing Address:
County: Alameda
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 2 of 67
0100602120
0100603020
0300101120
0400101120
Occupational Health Services, Inc.
Occupational Health Services, Inc.
Amador County DDP
Prevention Education Program, Inc.
Managed Health Network
Managed Health Network
Behavioral Health Services
Prevention Education Program, Inc., A California Corporation
2847 B Whipple Road
11875 Dublin Boulevard, Suite D176
1001 Broadway, Suite 106
1215 Mangrove Avenue, Suite C
Union City, CA 94587
Dublin, CA 94568
Jackson, CA 95642
Chico, CA 95926
First Offender/18 Month
18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(510) 430-3699
(510) 430-3699
(209) 223-6556
(530) 891-6148
(510) 569-3743
(510) 569-3743
(209) 223-3460
(530) 345-5514
Victor Salinas
Victor Salinas
Patricia Bartosiewicz
Suzanne Lorenz
344 Pendleton Way
344 Pendleton Way
Oakland, CA 94621
Oakland, CA 94621
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
County: Alameda
County: Amador
County: Butte
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 3 of 67
0400301120
0400302120
0500101120
0600201120
Solutions for Positive Choices
Solutions for Positive Choices
Calaveras County Driving Under the Influence Program
Alcohol Recovery Center Colusa
Solutions
Solutions
Calaveras County Health Service Agency
S & B Services, Inc.
645 Normal Avenue
1855 Myers Street
891 Mountain Ranch Road
642 5th Street, Suite 3
Chico, CA 95928
Oroville, CA 95966
San Andreas, CA 95249
Colusa, CA 95932
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(530) 898-8333
(530) 532-6969
(209) 754-6555
(530) 458-0534
(530) 898-8060
(530) 532-6968
(209) 754-6559
(530) 458-2060
Janifer Wisniski
Norma Brooks
Rita Downs
Sam Beasley
County: Butte
County: Calaveras
County: Colusa
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 4 of 67
0700201120
0700301120
0700302120
0700501120
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Council Of Contra Costa Co., Inc.
Future Solutions
Dawn Center
Neighborhood House Of North Richmond
Alcohol And Drug Abuse Council Of Contra Costa, Inc.
Bi-Bett
Bi-Bett
Neighborhood House Of North Richmond
2020 North Broadway, Suite 101
560 Lennon Lane, Suite 200
1251 California Avenue, Suite 600
820 23rd Street
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Walnut Creek, CA 94598
Pittsburg, CA 94565
Richmond, CA 94804
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(925) 932-8100
(925) 932-7791
(925) 439-1332
(510) 229-5000
(925) 932-8392
(925) 932-7793
(925) 439-0322
(510) 235-3112
Diane Folsom
Patricia Jarratt
Danna Bower
Veronica King
County: Contra Costa
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 5 of 67
0700801120
0700802120
0800201120
0900101120
Occupational Health Services, Inc.
Occupational Health Services
Humboldt Addictions Services Program
Sierra Recovery Center
Managed Health Network
Managed Health Network
Humboldt Addictions Services Program
Sierra Recovery Center
1070 Concord Avenue, Suite 222
11299 San Pablo Avenue, Suite W
1231 Northcrest Drive
1137 Emerald Bay Road
Concord, CA 94520
El Cerrito, CA 94530
Crescent City, CA 95531
South Lake Tahoe, CA 96150
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(925) 356-3512
(510) 620-1034
(707) 464-7849
(530) 541-5190
(925) 798-1145
(925) 798-1145
(707) 465-6522
(530) 541-6031
Joe Russo
Joe Russo
Sandra Morrison
William S. McIlyar
County: Contra Costa
County: Del Norte
County: El Dorado
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 6 of 67
0900201120
0900202120
1000201120
1000202120
EDCA Lifeskills
EDCA Lifeskills
D.A.T.E.
D.A.T.E.
EDCA Lifeskills
EDCA Lifeskills
Fresno County Hispanic Commission On Alcohol And Drug Abuse Services, Inc.
Fresno County Hispanic Commission On Alcohol And Drug Abuse Services, Inc.
893 Spring Street
6065 Highway 193
1803 Broadway Street
2640 Jensen Avenue
Placerville, CA 95667
Georgetown, CA 95634
Fresno, CA 93721
Sanger, CA 93657
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(530) 622-8193
(530) 622-8193
(559) 268-6475
(559) 875-0249
(530) 622-4017
(530) 622-4017
(559) 268-6967
(559) 875-0276
David Del Rio
David Del Rio
Domingo Zapata
Domingo Zapata
893 Spring Street
1803 Broadway Street
Placerville, CA 95667
Fresno, CA 93721
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
County: El Dorado
County: Fresno
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 7 of 67
1000301120
1000302120
1000501120
1000502120
Kings View Community Services
Kings View Community Services
Special Services Community Center
Special Services Community Center
Kings View
Kings View
A & J Social Services
A & J Social Services
4111 North Golden State Boulevard
1521 Tollhouse, Suite G
855 West Ashlan Avenue, Suite 101
661 South Madera Avenue
Fresno, CA 93722
Clovis, CA 93612
Clovis, CA 93612
Kerman, CA 93630
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(559) 277-9880
(559) 325-9174
(559) 348-0129
(559) 846-8444
(559) 277-8998
(559) 325-1663
(559) 348-1367
(559) 348-1367
Candie Smith
Candie Smith
Joseph Montes
Joseph Montes
4111 North Golden State Boulevard
Fresno, CA 93722
Mailing Address:
County: Fresno
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 8 of 67
1000503120
1200101120
1200102120
1300201100
Special Services Community Center
Humboldt Alcohol Recovery Treatment
Humboldt Alcohol Recovery Treatment - Fortuna Comm. Srvs.
Imperial Valley Safety Services
A & J Social Services
Fortuna Adventist Community Services
Fortuna Adventist Community Services
Jungers, Edward N.
749 G Street
2331 Rohnerville Road
1806 E Street, Suite A
480 Olive Avenue, Suite 3A
Reedley, CA 93654
Fortuna, CA 95540
Eureka, CA 95501
El Centro, CA 92243
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(559) 637-1036
(707) 725-9381
(707) 725-9381
(760) 353-7780
(559) 637-1036
(707) 725-1613
(707) 725-1613
(760) 353-7784
Joseph Montes
Rhonda Lewis
Rhonda Lewis
Edward N. Jungers
2331 Rohnerville Road
Fortuna, CA 95540
Mailing Address:
County: Fresno
County: Humboldt
County: Imperial
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 9 of 67
1300301020
1400101120
1500101120
1500102120
Sober Road, Inc.
Inyo County Substance Abuse Services
S.T.E.P.S
S.T.E.P.S.
Sober Roads, Incorporated
Inyo County Department Of Health And Human Services
Special Treatment, Education And Prevention Services, Inc.
Special Treatment, Education And Prevention Services, Inc.
395 Broadway Avenue, Suite 11
162 Grove Street
3533 Mount Vernon Avenue
10822 Rosedale Highway
El Centro, CA 92243
Bishop, CA 93514
Bakersfield, CA 93306
Bakersfield, CA 93312
18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(760) 352-8888
(760) 873-6533
(661) 871-3353
(661) 587-8817
(760) 352-8517
(760) 873-3277
(661) 587-8727
Pamela Robertson
Grace Cook
Linda Eviston
Linda Eviston
County: Imperial
County: Inyo
County: Kern
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 10 of 67
1500301120
1500302120
1500303120
1500304120
Traffic and Alcohol Awareness School of Kern, Inc.
Traffic and Alcohol Awareness School of Kern, Inc.
Traffic and Alcohol Awareness School of Kern, Inc.
Traffic and Alcohol Awareness School of Kern, Inc.
Traffic And Alcohol Awareness School Of Kern, Inc.
Traffic And Alcohol Awareness School Of Kern, Inc.
Traffic And Alcohol Awareness School Of Kern, Inc.
Traffic And Alcohol Awareness School Of Kern, Inc.
324 Oak Street, Suite A
525 Bear Mountain Boulevard
623 Main Street
511 Central Valley Highway
Bakersfield, CA 93304
Arvin, CA 93203
Delano, CA 93215
Shafter, CA 93263
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(661) 322-8862
(661) 322-8862
(661) 322-8862
(661) 322-8862
(661) 322-7906
(661) 322-7906
(661) 322-7906
(661) 322-7906
Jim McManus
Jim McManus
Jim McManus
Jim McManus
PO Box 40400
PO Box 40400
PO Box 40400
PO Box 40400
Bakersfield, CA 93384
Bakersfield, CA 93384
Bakersfield, CA 93384
Bakersfield, CA 93384
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
County: Kern
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 11 of 67
1500305120
1500306120
1500307120
1600101120
Traffic and Alcohol Awareness School of Kern, Inc.
Traffic and Alcohol Awareness School of Kern, Inc.
Traffic and Alcohol Awareness School of Kern, Inc.
Kings View Community Services
Traffic And Alcohol Awareness School Of Kern, Inc.
Traffic And Alcohol Awareness School Of Kern, Inc.
Traffic And Alcohol Awareness School Of Kern, Inc.
Kings View
210 East Center Street, Taft College Westec
443 West Church Street
15666 K Street
289 East 8th Street
Taft, CA 93268
Ridgecrest, CA 93555
Mojave, CA 93501
Hanford, CA 93230
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(661) 322-8862
(760) 371-9412
(760) 371-9412
(559) 582-9307
(661) 322-7906
(760) 384-4969
(760) 384-4969
(559) 582-9042
Jim McManus
Pamela Nichols
Pamela Nichols
Candie Smith
PO Box 40400
PO Box 187
PO Box 187
4111 North Golden State Boulevard
Bakersfield, CA 93384
Ridgecrest, CA 93556-0187
Ridgecrest, CA 93556-0187
Fresno, CA 93722
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
County: Kern
County: Kings
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 12 of 67
1700201120
1700202120
1800201120
1900101123
Lake County DDP
Lake County DDP
Cascade Circle, Inc.
ABC Traffic Safety Program
Lake County Alcohol And Other Drug Services
Lake County Alcohol And Other Drug Services
Cascade Circle, Inc.
A Better Citizen Foundation, Inc.
991 Parallel Drive, Suite B
7000-B South Center Drive
Please call for location.
12018 East Centralia Road, Suite 200
Lakeport, CA 95453
Clearlake, CA 95422
Please call for more info., CA
Hawaiian Gardens, CA 90716
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(707) 263-8162
(707) 994-6494
(530) 222-8302
(562) 860-9999
(707) 263-9336
(707) 994-7164
(530) 222-5872
(562) 860-6748
Laura Solis
Laura Solis
Phyllis Horner
Wendy Perez
922 Bevins Court
922 Bevins Court
3161 Bechelli Lane, Suite 204B
2901 West MacArthur Boulevard, Suite 208
Lakeport, CA 95453
Lakeport, CA 95453
Redding, CA 96002
Santa Ana, CA 92704
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
County: Lake
County: Lassen
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 13 of 67
1900102123
1900103100
1900104100
1900201123
ABC Traffic Safety Program
ABC Traffic Safety Program
Covina Valley Traffic Safety Program
ADAPT Programs, Inc.
A Better Citizen Foundation, Inc.
A Better Citizen Foundation, Inc.
A Better Citizen Foundation, Inc.
ADAPT Programs, Inc.
8623 A Garvey Avenue
44742 North Beech Street
453 East Arrow Highway, Suite J
1644 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 303
Rosemead, CA 91770
Lancaster, CA 93534
Azusa, CA 91702
Los Angeles, CA 90017
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(626) 572-7001
(661) 945-8683
(626) 967-6363
(213) 483-5703
(626) 572-7004
(661) 945-2319
(626) 967-6366
(213) 483-5363
Secilia Manzo
Alice Rios
Viola Bernal
Ronald Webster
2901 West MacArthur Boulevard, Suite 208
2901 West MacArthur Boulevard, Suite 208
2901 West MacArthur Boulevard, Suite 208
Santa Ana, CA 92704
Santa Ana, CA 92704
Santa Ana, CA 92704
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 14 of 67
1900301123
1900401123
1900402100
1900501123
NCADD East San Gabriel And Pomona Valleys
High Gain Program
High Gain Program
Alcohol Drug Council - High Gain Project
National Council On Alcoholism And Drug Dependence Of East San Gabriel And Pomona Valleys
National Council On Alcoholism And Drug Dependence Of East San Gabriel And Pomona Valleys
National Council On Alcoholism And Drug Dependence Of The South Bay
Alcohol Drug Council - High Gain Project
4626 North Grand Avenue
9100 South Sepulveda Boulevard, Suite 105
1334 Post Avenue
1424 4th Street, Suite 205
Covina, CA 91724
Westchester, CA 90045
Torrance, CA 90501
Santa Monica, CA 90401
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(626) 331-5316
(310) 644-3659
(310) 328-1587
(310) 451-5881
(626) 332-2219
(310) 216-6747
(310) 328-1964
(310) 576-0945
Cheryl Ruedi
Manuel D. Luben
Deborah Guillen
Jayne Wise
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 15 of 67
1900601123
1900701120
1900801120
1900901120
Alternative Action Program
Center For Counseling And Education, Inc.
City Of Long Beach DDP
CLARE Foundation, Inc.
Dennis M. Giroux & Associates, Inc.
Center For Counseling And Education
City Of Long Beach
CLARE Foundation, Inc.
2511 South Barrington Avenue
7060 Owensmouth Avenue
2525 Grand Avenue
1020 Pico Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064
Canoga Park, CA 91303
Long Beach, CA 90815
Santa Monica, CA 90405
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(310) 479-8353
(818) 992-0460
(562) 570-4100
(310) 314-6222
(310) 479-7771
(818) 992-0462
(562) 570-4049
(310) 314-6221
Dennis Giroux
Wendie Warwick
Michael St. Jean
Leslie Robinson
909 Pico Boulevard
Santa Monica, CA 90404
Mailing Address:
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 16 of 67
1901101120
1901201123
1901204100
1901301123
Inland Valley Drug And Alcohol Recovery Services
Driver Safety Schools, Inc.
AM/PM Culver City Budget School
East Los Angeles Alcoholism Council
Inland Valley Drug And Alcohol Recovery Services
Driver Safety Schools, Inc.
Driver Safety Schools, Inc.
East Los Angeles Alcoholism Council
375 South Main Street, Suite 111
6850 Van Nuys Boulevard, Suite 100
4240 Overland Avenue
916 South Atlantic Boulevard
Pomona, CA 91766
Van Nuys, CA 91401
Culver City, CA 90230
Los Angeles, CA 90022
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(909) 622-7311
(818) 787-7878
(310) 837-1818
(323) 268-9344
(909) 868-1432
(818) 787-4076
(310) 837-4473
(323) 268-9348
Stacy Smith
Rebecca Howe
Joanne Gorby
Elizabeth Urrutia
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 17 of 67
1901401123
1901501123
1901502123
1901503023
Harbor Area High Gain Program, Inc.
The High Road Program
The High Road Program
The High Road Program
High Gain Foundation
The High Road Program
The High Road Program
The High Road Program
330 East Third Street
700 South Arroyo Parkway
14430 Sherman Way
44823 Date Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90802
Pasadena, CA 91105
Van Nuys, CA 91405-2340
Lancaster, CA 93534
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(562) 436-9801
(626) 795-4590
(818) 785-9119
(661) 942-2241
(562) 436-9803
(626) 795-9540
(818) 785-2150
(661) 942-7040
Robert Saucedo
Thomas Holland
Deborah Pagliuso
Sasha Petrovich
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 18 of 67
1901601123
1901602100
1901701120
1901901123
King-Drew DDP
King-Drew DDP
Northeast Valley Health Corp. DUI Prog
Right On Programs
Charles R. Drew University Of Medicine And Science
Charles R. Drew University Of Medicine And Science
Northeast Valley Health Corporation
Right On Programs, Inc.
9307 South Central Avenue
2711 North Wilmington Avenue
12800 Foothill Boulevard, Unit A
522 East Broadway, Suite 101
Los Angeles, CA 90002
Compton, CA 90220
Sylmar, CA 91342
Glendale, CA 91205
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(323) 564-6982
(310) 631-5884
(818) 365-2571
(818) 240-1683
(323) 564-3970
(310) 631-6348
(818) 837-6427
(818) 240-2858
Damu Vusha
Robert Garrett
Vince Avila
Cherie Marshall
9307 South Central Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90002
Mailing Address:
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 19 of 67
1901902123
1902001123
1902002123
1902003123
Padre
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Right On Programs, Inc.
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
401 South Glenoaks Boulevard, Suite 201
2904 South Main Street
5518 North Long Beach Boulevard
24506 1/2 Lyons Avenue
Burbank, CA 91502
Los Angeles, CA 90007
Long Beach, CA 90805
Newhall, CA 91321
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(818) 843-7375
(213) 748-9444
(562) 428-6426
(661) 255-7720
(818) 843-8058
(213) 746-7254
(562) 428-9771
(661) 255-1030
Cherie Marshall
Ampelia Flores
Yolanda Litzinger
Alison Plante
522 East Broadway, Suite 101
Glendale, CA 91205
Mailing Address:
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 20 of 67
1902004123
1902005123
1902101123
1902102123
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Safety Education Center, Inc.
Safety Education Center, Inc.
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Safety Consultant Services, Inc.
Safety Education Center, Inc.
Safety Education Center, Inc.
4120 Tweedy Boulevard
13501 East Whittier Boulevard
1515 West Cameron Avenue, Suite 300
844 North Hollywood Way
South Gate, CA 90280
Whittier, CA 90605
West Covina, CA 91790
Burbank, CA 91505
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(323) 567-0527
(562) 945-2493
(626) 960-3977
(818) 848-8667
(323) 567-7421
(562) 693-8785
(626) 960-9151
(818) 848-6398
Rebecca Ramirez
Ray Rojas
Patricia Hidalgo
Carmen Lopez
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 21 of 67
1902103123
1902201123
1902301123
1902302100
Safety Education Center, Inc.
Self Improvement And Alternative Measures
Southern California Alcohol and Drug Programs, Inc.
Southern California Alcohol and Drug Programs, Inc.
Safety Education Center, Inc.
Self-Improvement And Alternative Measures, Inc.
Southern California Alcohol And Drug Programs, Inc.
Southern California Alcohol And Drug Programs, Inc.
18700 Sherman Way, Suite 118
3450 West 43rd Street, Suite 217
11500 Paramount Boulevard
13205 South Street
Reseda, CA 91335
Los Angeles, CA 90008
Downey, CA 90241
Cerritos, CA 90701
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(818) 708-1198
(323) 292-0581
(562) 923-4545
(562) 402-2466
(818) 708-2287
(323) 296-4157
(562) 869-1295
(562) 402-8077
Elizabeth Rivera
Yvonne McCoy
Jose Barcenas
Dean Goodrich
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 22 of 67
1902401123
1902501123
1902601123
1902602123
Driver Benefits Programs
Behavioral Systems Southwest
Twin Palms Recovery Center
Twin Palms Recovery Center
Driver Benefits Incorporated
Behavorial Systems Southwest, Inc.
Twin Palms Recovery Center
Twin Palms Recovery Center
2370 West Carson Street, Suite 150
6411 Hollywood Boulevard, 2nd Floor
3574 Lexington Avenue
218 North Glendora Avenue
Torrance, CA 90501
Hollywood, CA 90028
El Monte, CA 91731
City Of Industry, CA 91744
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
First Offender/18 Month/30 Month
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(310) 320-9550
(323) 461-2779
(626) 443-4008
(626) 968-8875
(310) 320-9448
(323) 461-4107
(626) 443-1059
(626) 968-4565
William Wickline
Charles E. Morris
Truth Moulton
Truth Moulton
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 23 of 67
1902801100
1902803100
1902901100
1903001100
A-LA Driver Education Center
A-LA Driver Education Center
Alhambra Safety Services
Avalon-Carver AB 541 DDP
A Los Angeles Driver Education Center
A Los Angeles Driver Education Center
Alhambra Safety Services
Avalon-Carver Community Center
8350 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 107
147 North San Vicente Boulevard
926 E. Garvey Avenue, Suite A
4920 South Avalon Boulevard
West Hollywood, CA 90069
Beverly Hills, CA 90211
Monterey Park, CA 91755
Los Angeles, CA 90011
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(213) 388-7135
(213) 388-7135
(626) 571-6988
(323) 232-4391
(323) 655-1934
(323) 655-1934
(626) 571-2477
(323) 234-1008
Dan Haynesworth
Dan Haynesworth
Nancy Wu
Martha Nelson
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 24 of 67
1903101100
1903102100
1903401100
1903501100
Behavioral Health Services, Inc.
Behavioral Health Services, Inc.
City Of Pasadena Recovery Center
Dial Alcohol & Drug Education Center
Behavioral Health Services, Inc.
Behavioral Health Services, Inc.
City Of Pasadena Recovery Program
Dial Education Center, Inc.
15519 Crenshaw Boulevard
1318A North Avalon Boulevard
1845 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 1508
6306 York Boulevard
Gardena, CA 90249
Wilmington, CA 90744
Pasadena, CA 91103
Highland Park, CA 90042
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(310) 978-8479
(310) 549-2710
(626) 744-6073
(888) 446-6222
(310) 679-9034
(310) 549-2715
(626) 744-6096
(213) 384-3144
Yolanda Farley
James Morrow
Robert T. Douglas
Won Lee
3540 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite M1
Los Angeles, CA 90010
Mailing Address:
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 25 of 67
1903502100
1903503100
1903504100
1903801100
Dial Alcohol & Drug Education Center
Dial Alcohol & Drug Education Center
Dial Alcohol & Drug Education Center
Aztec Driving School
Dial Education Center, Inc.
Dial Education Center, Inc.
Dial Education Center, Inc.
East Los Angeles Health Task Force
3261 West 4th Street, Suite 203
11631 Victory Boulevard, Suite 104
3540 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite M1
7503 South Atlantic Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90020
North Hollywood, CA 91606
Los Angeles, CA 90010
Cudahy, CA 90201
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender
First Offender
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Phone:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
Fax:
(888) 446-6222
(888) 446-6222
(888) 446-6222
(323) 261-2171
(213) 384-3144
(213) 384-3144
(213) 384-3144
(323) 261-0135
James Shin
James Shin
James Shin
Susanna Arellano
3540 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite M1
3540 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite M1
2120 East 6th Street
Los Angeles, CA 90010
Los Angeles, CA 90010
Los Angeles, CA 90023
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
Mailing Address:
County: Los Angeles
DRIVING-UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE PROGRAM
DIRECTORY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service
Contact
Telephone
License Number
Legal Name
DBA Name
Address
System: DLS
Report: D0481
Version 2.2
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 03:40:53 PM
Page 26 of 67
1903802100
1903803100
1904001100
1904002100
Aztec Driving School
Aztec Driving School
Fred Kennedy Associates, Inc.
Fred Kennedy Associates, Inc.
East Los Angeles Health Task Force
East