Friday, February 29, 2008

4th DUI in 8 years for California DUI guy $110,000 bail

California DUI lawyer news

A California man was arrested on his fourth California DUI - driving under the influence charge in eight years.

Steve Ariente, 56, was stopped in downtown Morgan Hill after he was seen speeding at about 10 p.m. on Thursday, according to California DUI police.

Officer David Ray pulled over Ariente and administered field sobriety tests, which he failed, according to California DUI police.

He was arrested on suspicion of California DUI - driving under the influence of alcohol and transported to the police department for booking, according to California DUI police.

When he was being processed, officers asked him to remove his shoes and socks and when he did police said a "baggie of white powdery substance" fell from his pant leg.

Officers examined the bag and determined that it appeared to be about 1.5 grams of cocaine, California DUI police said.

Ariente had previously been convicted of California DUI - driving under the influence twice in 2000 and for California DUI in 2004, California DUI police said.

Ariente was booked into county jail and charged with possession of narcotics and four or more California DUI drunk driving offenses within 10 years, according to California DUI police. His California DUI bail was set at $110,000.

He needs a top California DUI defense attorney specialist as he is looking at a felony with state prison possibilities.

Thursday, February 28, 2008

Sitting at flashing red light for 41 seconds not PC to stop

San Diego DUI lawyer news - California DUI attorney edition case

Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 689a
Criminal law -- Driving under influence -- Search and seizure -- Vehicle stop -- Officer's observation that defendant's vehicle sat at flashing red light for 41 seconds when there was no other traffic present and then drove through intersection in a safe manner created only a mere suspicion of criminal activity, not a well-founded reasonable suspicion justifying stop -- Officer had no justification to conduct safety stop where defendant was not exhibiting behavior that should be characterized as dangerous to another person or vehicle, and officer's safety suspicions that defendant was injured or vehicle was malfunctioning should have been alleviated by defendant's normal driving technique and vehicle's obvious operation in driving through intersection -- Error to deny motion to suppress

JAMES EDWARD JONES, JR., Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 00-239 AC. Lower Court Case No. 395250 W. Opinion filed August 9, 2001. An appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida, Edward Newman, Judge. Counsel: Jason P. Gray, for appellant. Katherine Fernandez Rundle, State Attorney, and Anne Wedge-McMillen, Assistant State Attorney, for appellee.

(Before JUDITH L. KREEGER, STANFORD BLAKE, and PETER LOPEZ, JJ.)

(STANFORD BLAKE, J.) James Edward Jones, Jr., the appellant, was convicted of driving under the influence after the trial court denied his pretrial motion to suppress all evidence derived from the initial stop. Jones appeals the trial court's decision alleging that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. We find that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision on Jones' pretrial motion to suppress.

In determining whether the officer obtained reasonable suspicion, this court follows the guidelines in State v. Russell, 659 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). ``An investigatory stop is authorized when a law enforcement officer `encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws[.]' Sec. 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). There must be a reasonable, or founded, suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. See, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7,109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989); Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993). To justify a stop, a police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably justify the stop.'' Id. at 467.

In the case at bar, the police officer testified that at 4:19. a.m. he observed Jones' car sitting at a flashing red light for 41 seconds when there was no other traffic present. As the officer made a U-turn to pull up behind Jones' car, Jones drove through the intersection in a safe manner. The officer activated his lights and pulled Jones to the side of the road to investigate whether Jones was impaired.

This court finds that these facts create only a ``mere'' suspicion of criminal activity and not a well-founded reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See, Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993); A.H. v. State, 693 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Bush v. State, 594 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). During the officer's less than one-minute observation, Jones sat at a light and then drove safely through the intersection. In this age of cellular phones and interchangeable car cd players, a pause in driving should not lead an officer to suspect criminal activity without additional facts. The only additional fact given by the officer was that Jones drove safely through the intersection. Jones safe driving behavior does not provide the officer with the additional facts necessary to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

The trial court found that there was justification for a stop based on a temporary safety stop allowable under Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975). During a safety stop, a police officer is justified in temporarily detaining an individual to conduct a safety investigation as to whether the individual is suffering from health problems or the individual's car is malfunctioning. See, Bailey, 319 So. 2d at 26. However, the case at bar distinguishes itself from the safety stop in Bailey. In Bailey the driver was exhibiting dangerous driving behavior, i.e., slight weaving, that may reasonably lead an officer to believe that the driver was impaired or the car was malfunctioning. See, Id. at 24. Here, Jones was not exhibiting behavior that should be characterized as dangerous to another person or vehicle because he was not moving and there was no other vehicle present.

In addition, even if it can be assumed that sitting at the flashing light should equate to dangerous driving behavior, the Jones' stop continues to distinguish itself from the Bailey safety stop. In Bailey the police officer had a belief that the driver was injured or the car was malfunctioning based on a three-mile observation of the car's weaving pattern prior to the stop. See, Id. Here, prior to the stop, the officer observed Jones drive safely through the intersection. At that point, the officer's safety suspicions that Jones was injured or the car was malfunctioning should have been alleviated by Jones' normal driving technique and the car's obvious operation. Therefore, the officer had no justification to conduct a Bailey safety stop.

For the above stated reasons, we hold that there were no well-founded facts to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor, in the alternative, justification for a safety stop under Bailey. The trial court's denial of Jones' motion to suppress all evidence derived from the initial stop is reversed. (JUDITH L. KREEGER and PETER LOPEZ, JJ. concur.)


* * *

California DUI follow-up mystery to Hilton investigation

California DUI attorney news

California DUI law enforcement agencies are staying mum about some specifics surrounding the escapades of a member of the Hilton clan for whom California DUI - driving under-the-influence arrests appear to be family rites of passage.

As previously reported, Barron Hilton, 18, who lives with his parents in Beverly Hills, and is described by none other than the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department as the “younger brother of Paris Hilton,” was arrested in Malibu on Tuesday, Feb. 12, for driving under the influence.

Sheriff’s California DUI deputies had received a call that a vehicle was being driven erratically near Latigo Canyon Road and Pacific Coast Highway just before 8 a.m., according to California DUI lawyers.

A California DUI deputy’s report states that the driver of a second vehicle on Pacific Coast Highway reported witnessing that Hilton, driving a black Mercedes Benz, was allegedly weaving on the road and, at times, driving on the wrong side of the highway.

The California DUI witness followed the vehicle until the young scion stopped at Corral Canyon Road and PCH and got out of the car. The witness, according to the California DUI report, then told Hilton to sit on a bus bench and wait for sheriff’s deputies.

When California DUI deputies arrived, they said they conducted a California DUI / drunk driving investigation and arrested Hilton for California DUI - driving under the influence. He was also alleged to be in possession of a fake driver license.

Hilton was booked at Lost Hills Sheriff’s Station where he was held over­night, then released on California DUI bail. It was reported that Hilton had a .14 blood alcohol reading. In California, .08 is considered legal intoxication for drivers over 21. For drivers under 21, any blood alcohol level constitutes legal intoxication according to California DUI attorneys. That’s the part of the California DUI incident that involves Hilton.

That California DUI information, according to California DUI lawyers, the Lost Hills traffic liaison, is being turned over to the L.A. District Attorney’s office. Nothing has been filed with the DA's office yet, and they cannot put the matter under review until the material is received. Where things get a little murkier is with the California Highway Patrol’s part of the California DUI case, which involves Hilton’s female passenger, whose name cannot be released, according to California DUI lawyers.

Hines says this isn’t a case of celebrity coddling, but the passenger, reported to be 19, cannot be named because no arrests have been made in an ongoing investigation. Hines refuted media reports attributed to him that the passenger was Skye Peters, the daughter of film producer Jon Peters, who is sometimes described as the god-daughter of local Barbra Streisand. Skye Peters and Hilton made headlines last December when the pair were found by police at the Bel Air Hotel after being reported missing. It is being alleged that this unidentified female may have been driving the car, which is registered to a third party also unidentified, when it was involved in a collision prior to Hilton taking the wheel. If the woman is well known, one can’t tell from the name being circulated, but Hines says the possibility of a fake driver license hasn’t been ruled out. What Hines did disclose is that the victim in the alleged collision identified the female as the driver when the accident occurred at about 6:30 a.m., earlier that Tuesday morning.

According to Hines, the female driver was heading west in PCH in lane one at an unknown speed, while the victim was heading west in lane two. The woman drove into lane two and the right side mirror of the Mercedes hit the door of the victim’s Ford pickup. Hines said the woman and Hilton switched seats at some point after this incident, but when is not clear from the California DUI report.
Further complicating the California DUI case is an injury report made by a complainant the day after the California DUI arrest, which Brooks said is “puzzling” as there were five deputies at the scene when Hilton was arrested and nothing was said about an employee at the service station having being injured when they were there. The complainant alleges that he was hit by the Mercedes when it pulled into the service station. This matter is under separate investigation. This latest California DUI story intrigues California DUI attorneys.

California DUI checkpoint this friday

California DUI lawyer checkpoint news

The Costa Mesa Police Department will conduct a California DUI sobriety/license checkpoint from 6 p.m. to midnight Friday in the northbound lane of Santa Ana Avenue at 18th Street.

California DUI Police hope the California DUI checkpoint will educate the public about the dangers of California DUI driving under the influence and/or without a valid driver’s license.

The California DUI program was made possible by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety.

“We have been committed to saving lives by aggressively seeking out and removing impaired drivers from the roadways of Costa Mesa for nearly three decades,” Traffic Safety Bureau Officer Tony Yannizzi said.

Costa Mesa California DUI police arrested 1,062 such California DUI impaired drivers in 2007.

According to Mothers Against Drunk Driving, drunk driving is the nation’s most frequently committed violent crime, with two people dying every hour from alcohol-related collisions.

California DUI checkpoint this friday

California DUI lawyer checkpoint news

The Costa Mesa Police Department will conduct a California DUI sobriety/license checkpoint from 6 p.m. to midnight Friday in the northbound lane of Santa Ana Avenue at 18th Street.

California DUI Police hope the California DUI checkpoint will educate the public about the dangers of California DUI driving under the influence and/or without a valid driver’s license.

The California DUI program was made possible by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety.

“We have been committed to saving lives by aggressively seeking out and removing impaired drivers from the roadways of Costa Mesa for nearly three decades,” Traffic Safety Bureau Officer Tony Yannizzi said.

Costa Mesa California DUI police arrested 1,062 such California DUI impaired drivers in 2007.

According to Mothers Against Drunk Driving, drunk driving is the nation’s most frequently committed violent crime, with two people dying every hour from alcohol-related collisions.

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

California DUI for woman who hits cop car

A California woman who rammed into an El Dorado County sheriff's vehicle early on Wednesday morning was arrested on suspicion of California DUI/ drunken driving.

Brooke Sullivan, 26, hit deputy Rory McIntyre's patrol vehicle at about 2:15 a.m. Wednesday during a traffic enforcement stop at Highway 50 and Blue Lakes Avenue.

McIntyre was taken to Barton Memorial Hospital for injuries, Lt. Les Lovell said, and has since been released.

Sullivan was booked into the El Dorado County Jail for California DUI. Her bail was set at $25,000.

15 years to life to California DUI Death/Second-degree Murder

California DUI attorney news

California DUI man with three prior California DUI drunk driving convictions was found guilty Tuesday afternoon of second-degree murder in the death of an Arvin woman.

A California DUI jury in Kern County Superior Court also found Esteban Demecio Hernandez guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, with prior convictions; California DUI causing bodily injury; and driving with a suspended license.

According to evidence presented in California DUI court, Hernandez had a blood alcohol level of 0.24 — three times the legal limit — when the head-on crash occurred in March 2007, said a California DUI Attorney.

Accident reconstruction experts determined that Hernandez’s Mazda drifted nine feet into the southbound lane of Comanche Drive, less than a mile north of Sunset Boulevard at 8:44 p.m., colliding with a 1989 Honda driven by 40-year-old Reynalda Bazaldua.

Bazaldua was killed and her daughters, Brenda Hernandez, now 13, and Natalie Patino, now 6, received minor injuries.

All four of the people involved in the California DUI crash were wearing seat belts, according to the CHP.

Esteban Hernandez had completed an 18-month drinking-and-driving program as a condition of his probation following three prior DUI convictions, California DUI attorney prosecutors said.

“The jury reached a proper verdict,” California DUI attorney prosecutors believe. “The theory on the second-degree murder charge was not specifically that he intended to kill someone that night, but that he acted with implied malice.”

In other words, Hernandez’s priors and his completion of an anti-drunken driving course means that he was fully aware of the possible deadly consequences of his actions.

The jury deliberated about 31⁄2 hours before reaching its verdict.

Mary Flores, Bazaldua’s sister-in-law and the aunt of the girls, said “nobody wins” in a case like this.

She said she was angry when she learned that Hernandez had three chances to change, to alter his behavior — and chose not to do so.

“I just want the girls to know what they feel in their heart for their mother will always be there,” she said. “We will never forget Reyna.”

Hernandez faces a minimum prison sentence of 15 years to life, California DUI lawyers say.

California DUI sentencing is scheduled for March 25.

MLB Star Scott Spiezio has California DUI warrant

California DUI attorney news

A California DUI arrest warrant was issued for St. Louis Cardinals utilityman Scott Spiezio, who is charged with hit-and-run and driving under the influence of alcohol stemming from a night of drinking in Newport Beach, California DUI attorney prosecutors said today.

The 35-year-old Irvine resident was charged yesterday with California DUI, driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more, hit-and-run with property damage, aggravated assault, battery and assault, all misdemeanors, said the California DUI / Orange County District Attorney's Office.

Spiezio allegedly got into his 2004 BMW after leaving a bar in Newport Beach on Dec. 30, and, while speeding, cut across several lanes, crossed through oncoming traffic lanes and crashed into a fence, knocking down a fence pole and blowing out the front two tires of the car, California DUI attorney prosecutors allege.

He allegedly went to a friend and neighbor's condominium in Irvine -- disheveled and apparently injured, California DUI attorney prosecutors claim.

While the friend tried to clean up Spiezio, the former Angels player allegedly vomited in the friend's room. When the friend made a comment about it, Spiezio attacked the man, punching him repeatedly and throwing him against a wall, California DUI lawyer prosecutors believe.

Cardinals' spokesman Brian Barlow has said the team was unaware of the California DUI warrant.

Dept. of Corrections Sergeant gets California DUI

California DUI attorney news

A California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation sergeant was arrested in Elk Grove on Friday night for California DUI driving under the influence, according to sheriff's California DUI arrest records released Tuesday.

Sgt. William Rollin, 39, was arrested around 10 p.m. on the 8900 block of Sierra Street in Elk Grove, according to California DUI Police Department sources.

Rollin was charged with California DUI - driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more and California DUI / driving under the influence, California DUI arrest records show.

Sacramento County Sheriff's Department records show that Rollin was cited and released for California DUI, but Elk Grove Police Department Spokesman Officer Christopher Trim said that Rollin was transported to the Sacramento County Main Jail at 10:37 that night.

"Our policy is if they've got a DUI, unless there's an injury, we take them to the jail," California DUI jailers said.

19 year old gets 3 years for 3rd Degree burns of Injured California DUI victim

California DUI defense attorney news

A 19-year-old man who drove California DUI / drunk and injured two passengers was sentenced Tuesday to three years in prison.

Billie Ryan Atchley, 19, pleaded guilty to California DUI with bodily injury last month.

"He simply accepted it," said Atchley's California DUI defense attorney, Kyle Humphrey. "He never really wanted to fight the charges."

On Nov. 3, Atchley was driving a 1994 Pontiac west on Highway 178, missed a turn east of Oswell Street, drove up an embankment and struck a tree, according to published California DUI reports. The car flipped and caught fire.

Passenger Martin Michael Lopez was pulled from the car. Atchley and William Drakos were thrown from the vehicle. Lopez and Drakos had also been drinking, according to published California DUI reports.

Lopez suffered third-degree burns on 25 percent of his body.

Drakos is the son of Christopher James Drakos. He and his father are facing misdemeanor charges for providing alcohol to minors at their northeast Bakersfield home in 2006.

During his California DUI sentencing, Atchley apologized to the passengers and their family members, according to California DUI defense lawyer Humphrey.

"He was genuinely sorry," California DUI attorney Humphrey said. "There were no winners."

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Mischa Barton starlet charged with California DUI

California DUI lawyer news

Mischa Barton has officially joined the ranks of other famous starlets charged with California DUI / Drunk Driving.

On Tuesday, the L.A. District Attorney slapped the 21-year old actress with four misdemeanor counts: California DUI - driving under the influence, driving with a blood alcohol level of .o8 or higher, driving without a license, and possession of marijuana (under an ounce).

It was last Dec. 27 that the OC star was pulled over and arrested in West Hollywood, Ca. after California DUI cops said she "was seen straddling two lanes of traffic and failed to signal when making a turn."

When California DUI deputies pulled her over, they determined that she "was an unlicensed driver and was California DUI - driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage."

Mischa is due in California DUI court on Feb. 28. Her California DUI attorney has not yet presented any statement on her behalf.

MADD bill requires interlocks in all California DUI cases

California DUI attorney news

Assemblymember Mike Feuer introduced AB 2784, which requires the installation of an ignition interlock device (IID) on any vehicle owned or operated by a person convicted of a California DUI - driving under the influence (DUI) offense. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the California Highway Patrol are naturally the sponsors of the California DUI bill.

In 2006, there were 199,147 California DUI arrests made statewide in California, which averages out to 545 California DUI arrests every day. Of those California DUI arrests, 42,849 were repeat offenders. In this same year California DUI drivers caused 37,981 California DUI collisions, resulting in the deaths of 983 people and injuries to 23,191. On average, MADD's mad science (without factual support) maintains a driver arrested for California DUI has driven under the influence 87 times before being stopped for California DUI. AB 2784 is MADD´s number one legislative priority this year. Where they come up with 87 is beyond speculation.

"AB 2784 will save lives." claims Feuer. "This bill will prevent DUI drivers from starting their vehicles when they have alcohol in their systems, while affording them the freedom to attend to their daily activities."

The California DUI bill will be heard in their first policy committees in March and April. California DUI lawyers need to bring in these folks for a reality check.

Monday, February 25, 2008

California DUI checkpoint hits "deuce" jackpot

California DUI lawyer news

Vacaville DUI crackdown results in several California DUI arrests
02/25/2008

A DUI saturation patrol in Vacaville during the weekend yielded numerous California DUI citations and California DUI arrests, including two on suspicion of drunken driving.

From 8 p.m. Saturday to 2 a.m. Sunday, California DUI officers traversed Vacaville in search of traffic violators and otherwise California DUI impaired drivers, California DUI police said.

The effort resulted in two California DUI Drunk Driving related arrests, two narcotics-related arrests, 32 citations for moving violations, the towing of five vehicles, and more.

To report suspected California DUI drunk drivers, call the Vacaville Police Department at 449-5200 or call 911.

Sunday, February 24, 2008

Music Charity Dedicated to Promoting the Dangers of DUI

California DUI defense lawyer news

PR Supports Music Charity Dedicated to Promoting the Dangers of California DUI / Drunk Driving

Music vs. California DUI / Drunk Driving links up with MLC PR to raise awareness about the dangers of California DUI /drunk driving, while engaging the power of music in their cause.

Los Angeles, California

February 24, 2008

MLC PR, a sister company of M. Loring Communications, and Music vs. Drunk Driving, will be linking up in order to raise awareness about the dangers of California DUI / drunk driving. MLC PR plans point the public’s attention toward the worthy cause while promoting the charity via media support.

In September 2007, Allison “Tereska” Navarro founded Music vs. Drunk Driving (MVDD) on the basis of promoting an awareness of the dangers of California DUI - driving under the influence of alcohol. Allison Navarro, founder and CEO of Music vs. Drunk Driving says, “I started Music vs. Drunk Driving because I wanted to raise awareness to people all over the world about the dangers of drunk driving. It is one of those problems that people overlook, and do not pay much attention to, unless they are personally affected by it.”

Now, the organization is dedicated to being a source of knowledge for teens and adults, offering information on how to prevent California DUI / drunk driving and underage drinking, while also intertwining the power of mainstream and indie music. Music vs. Drunk Driving believes that music holds the key to the story for young kids and adults today – and that it should be used to communicate and influence society in a positive way. Since their beginning, MVDD has been involved in numerous events including: The Inland Empire Music Awards, The Orange County Music Awards, and Walk Like MADD. Now, the organization is continually trying to plan more anti California DUI events nationally.

“We are happy to be working with a young group of people so dedicated to their cause,” says Loring of Music vs. Drunk Driving. “In the short time they have been established, they have already accomplished feats that could take any charity years to do. Allison Navarro has done a great service to the public and music community and her passion for this charity is truly inspiring.”

Music vs. Drunk Driving is supported by many bands already, including: A Cursive Memory, Bank, Blue Monkey, Boys Like Girls, Farewell Fahrenheit, Forever The Sickest Kids, Good Charlotte, Hellogoodbye, Hemingway, Lost?, Mae, Metrostation, Mury, National Product, Never Say Forever, New Found Glory, Putman Hall, Rive, Run Away Airplane, Slapdash, Strike Twelve, The Perfect Victim, The Trade, Touch Response, Tumbledown, We Are The Fury, and many more.

Please visit www.musicvsdrunkdriving.com or www.myspace.com/musicvsdrunkdriving to learn more to help stop someone from getting a California DUI .

Police Chief faces possible California DUI

California DUI attorney news

Controversial Gustine Police chief Kris Anderson faces possible California DUI / Drunk Driving charges after being pulled over by Highway Patrol officers early Sunday in Tracy and failing a California DUI field sobriety test, a California DUI CHP spokesman confirmed.

The California DUI arrest happened after CHP officers received a call of a Jeep weaving in and out of traffic on westbound Interstate 580 near Corral Hollow Road in Tracy at 12:03 a.m. Sunday, California DUI police said.

California DUI police allege Anderson was behind the wheel of the 2002 Jeep SUV and, after being stopped by California DUI officers, Anderson failed a California DUI field sobriety test. A California DUI breathalyzer test was also conducted; the results of that California DUI test could not be released.

Anderson was arrested on suspicion of California DUI - driving under the influence of alcohol, but he was not booked into custody. Instead, Anderson was released to a family member.

Rickman said that between preparations for Saturday night's storm and light CHP staffing in the area, it was not unusual for a California DUI suspect to be released without going through the booking process. Sure.

For Anderson, the California DUI arrest marked the latest chapter in his controversial tenure as Gustine's top cop. After being hired in January 2007 to head the ten-man department, members of the Gustine Police Officers' Association unanimously called for Anderson's resignation with a no-confidence vote in July.

Saturday, February 23, 2008

3 DUI Guy and Woman sought for drunk driving murder arrested

California DUI attorney news

The Fellows woman being sought on second-degree murder charges for the California DUI / drunk driving crash that killed a McKittrick man last summer was arrested by Kern County Sheriff's deputies in Bakersfield over the weekend.

Donna Kathleen Brinkman, 44, was featured in last week's Taft's Most Wanted.

Brinkman was picked up on, California DUI police said.


She is accused of driving California DUI drunk on July 28 and striking Robert Morrison, 76, who was walking across Highway 33 in McKittrick.

Brinkman is being held in the Sheriff's Lerdo pretrial facility on $250,000 bail and was scheduled to be arraigned for California DUI on Friday.

3 California DUI cases - one man

Police arrested a Petaluma man Thursday night on suspicion of DUI and hit-and-run in three separate California DUI crashes.

Police received a call around 5:20 p.m. from a resident in the 700 block of Greenbriar Circle about a man seen stumbling from his car to an apartment, California DUI drunk driving police said.

The man left the apartment and drove away before police arrived, and the caller followed him but lost sight of his vehicle, California DUI lawyers understand. The caller did not notify California DUI police, however, when the man left the apartment, California DUI attorneys heard.

California DUI Police dispatchers then received a call at 5:54 p.m. about a rear-end, hit-and-run collision at Ellis and East Washington streets. The California DUI suspect matched the description of the man seen leaving the apartment and the driver of the car that was hit followed the driver who fled in his vehicle, California DUI lawyers heard.

Dispatchers received another call a minute later about a head-on collision involving multiple vehicles and serious injuries at Payran Street and Jess Avenue. Callers said the suspect ran from the scene and that his white 1990 Nissan Maxima. The Nissan matched the car involved in the earlier reports, California DUI attorneys believe.

California DUI Police determined that 21-year-old Ciriaco Mendoza fled the collision at Ellis and East Washington streets at a high rate of sped and struck a 1994 Volvo head-on while trying to pass traffic over double yellow lines on the Payran Street Bridge.

Mendoza then tried to flee again but collided with the two vehicles he was attempting to pass, Savano said. Mendoza then fled on foot south on Jess Avenue and southbound along railroad tracks. Officer Rick Cox caught Mendoza at Lakeville and Madison streets and he was identified as the suspect involved in all three incidents, California DUI lawyers are told.

Mendoza was booked into the Sonoma County jail for California DUI felony DUI, felony hit-and-run and driving without a license. His California DUI bail is $30,000.

The 19-year-old driver of a Volvo that was struck on the bridge was the only one injured, California DUI attorneys suspect. He suffered a broken shoulder and wrist and was taken to a local hospital.

Police said the California DUI incidents illustrate the importance of reporting California DUI drunken drivers. California DUI attorneys are told Petaluma police increased DUI arrests 32 percent from 455 in 2006 to 603 in 2007 but DUI collisions still are the fifth highest cause of vehicle accidents in the city.

California DUI Alcohol involved collisions increased by 20 percent from 53 in 2006 to 64 in 2007, California DUI attorneys are told.

California DUI Cop injured trying to arrest California DUI guy

California DUI news

An American Canyon police officer was injured while arresting a man who failed to pull over during a traffic stop Thursday afternoon, California DUI police said.

At about 3:15 p.m., Morris Brice, 48, was seen swerving across all lanes of traffic on Highway 29 near Rio Del Mar, American Canyon Sgt. Craig Nickles said.

After refusing to pull over and leading police on a short chase, officers were able to stop Brice's vehicle with a spike strip and the car ended up in the center divider, California DUI police said.

Brice continued to refused to comply with the officer's orders and was Tasered by police during the California DUI arrest, California DUI police said.

During the struggle a California DUI officer injured his arm, and was treated and released later in the day, California DUI cops said.

Police found alcohol in the vehicle and arrested Brice on suspicion of California DUI - driving under the influence, resisting arrest and battery of a police officer. He was taken to a local hospital with minor injuries, California DUI police said.

DUI Detector in Your Car? California DUI Attorneys wonder.

California DUI attorney news

Saturday, 23 February, 2008

California DUI DRUNK DRIVING DETECTOR: An engineer from Nissan demonstrates a concept car designed to prevent California DUI drunk driving and falling asleep at the wheel, which has a facial recognition system to monitor the drivers eyes for detecting signs of drowsiness. The California DUI system also has a special gear stick knob with a highly sensitive odour sensor to detect alcohol in the perspiration on a drivers palm. The California DUI car was presented yesterday in Tokyo during the companys advanced technology seminar.

Friday, February 22, 2008

Coach can coach again after pleading No Contest to California DUI

California DUI attorney news

After coach Frank Lemos got into a California DUI drunken-driving crash while in Bakersfield with the Dos Palos High wrestling team, he was told he wouldn't be able to coach at the school for two full years.

But on Thursday night, the Dos Palos school board put Lemos back on the roster a year early.

"The suspension has been lifted," Dos Palos-Oro Loma Unified School District board President Paul Goodman told the audience at Thursday night's board meeting. "The decision was unanimous."

The announcement was met with applause and handshakes from four Dos Palos High School football players. The football players had previously presented a petition to the board requesting Lemos be reinstated as a coach.

"We understand coach made a huge mistake," said lineman and 11th-grader Joseph Maldonado. "He's working very hard to make things right."

Lemos had been arrested Jan. 20, 2007, in Bakersfield for California DUI after he rear-ended a taxicab about 1:30 a.m. on the Rosedale Highway, according to the California Highway Patrol. The wrestling coach had been driving a school-owned eight-passenger van by himself when he crashed about a mile away from the Clarion Hotel in Bakersfield. A chaperone and 15 Dos Palos High School wrestlers -- who were competing in a tournament at Centennial-Bakersfield High -- were in their rooms at the hotel.

The taxi driver, 44-year-old Alejandro Lopez of Bakersfield, suffered minor injuries and refused medical aid at the scene, according to a CHP report. Lemos was unharmed, arrested and booked at the Kern County Jail at 3:31 a.m. on suspicion of California DUI driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs causing bodily injury, and DUI 0.08% blood alcohol with bodily injury. The second charge was later dropped.

In April 2007, Lemos pleaded no contest to the California DUI drunken-diving charge in Kern County Superior Court. His punishment was a one-day jail sentence, a $1,729 fine, three days of community service to be served in Merced and three years probation.

Lemos -- also a full-time physical education teacher, assistant football coach and girls softball coach at the time -- was placed on paid administrative leave while the district conducted an investigation. That California DUI investigation did not find reason to keep Lemos from teaching at the high school, as he is a P.E. instructor at Dos Palos High this year -- his 18th at the school.

But -- until Thursday night -- he was not reinstated to coach, which Walker said is the reason he made the request to the board Thursday night. "He wanted to have the suspension reduced to one year."

Lemos made his request to the board in private, during the closed-session part of the meeting. Most personnel matters are dealt with in closed session, as they often involve employees' private information.

The board's action does allow Lemos to coach at the school, but it doesn't automatically put Lemos back on any sport's coaching staff.

"He'll have to go through the same process any other coach would," Walker said, meaning Lemos will need to apply for the coaching jobs and be hired with board approval.

Regardless, both parents and players at the meeting were happy to see Lemos reinstated.

"Mr. Lemos has shown how a negative can be turned into a positive," by taking responsibility for his actions, said parent Susan Foster, who also provided the board with a petition supporting Lemos signed by adults in the community.

Maldonado said some of his teammates have been "waiting since Pop Warner" to play for Lemos and head football coach Mike Sparks. "We're looking forward to a successful season."

Dead Dog case leads to escalation of california dui charges

california dui attorney news - San Diego Drunk Driving Defense Lawyer case

NORTH COUNTY california dui COURTS – A california dui court hearing for a california dui drunken-driving suspect who jumped off the San Diego-Coronado Bridge with an Oceanside police dog has been postponed until April 17.
Cory Byron, 27, survived the 200-foot fall Dec. 31, but the dog, Stryker, died.

The continuance of Byron's california dui preliminary hearing was granted by Vista Superior Court Judge Dan Goldstein yesterday after california dui prosecutors said new california dui charges will be filed against him soon. The ccalifornia dui harges are related; three women were in a car Byron allegedly hit in Oceanside with a pickup he was driving.

The california dui incident was first thought to be a noninjury, hit-and-run crash. The women, however, say they suffered significant injuries, california dui prosecutor Paul Myers said.
“They've had a lot of medical problems since then,” he said.

Byron, who lives in Vista, has been charged with animal cruelty to a police dog and evading police in a reckless manner, both felonies, as well as misdemeanor california dui drunken driving and misdemeanor hit-and-run.

Myers said outside court yesterday that the misdemeanor california dui charges probably will be raised to felony charges of hit-and-run causing injury and california dui drunken driving causing injury.

Myers also said the District Attorney's Office still intends to pursue the animal-cruelty charges.

An infrared video shot from a police helicopter shows the crucial moments leading to Byron's jump from the bridge.

Byron's california dui defense lawyer, Anthony Solare, said his client had no intention of hurting the dog and didn't know the animal had fallen off the bridge until later.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

LA Cop Popped for California DUI

California dui attorney news

Perhaps not a good way for the LAPD and other law enforcement agencies to start their anti-drunk-driving campaign:

A Los Angeles Police Department traffic division officer was arrested during the weekend for investigation of California dui - driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, officials said Monday. Brian Lawrence Gossh, 27, was arrested in Van Nuys for California dui, booked into jail Sunday and then released, said LAPD Officer Karen Smith. She did not know when Gossh would be arraigned for California dui, citing an internal investigation and personnel issues as reasons for not commenting further on the California dui. No California dui attorney has given a statement on his behalf.

1 year in jail for California DUI Golf Cart Injuries

California DUI lawyer news

A 38-year-old California woman, who was drunk when she crashed a golf cart carrying a half-dozen children and an adult friend, pleaded guilty Wednesday to one count of California DUI / Drunk Driving with great bodily injury.

Judith Ann Black also admitted that there were multiple victims injured in the California DUI accident, and that her blood-alcohol level was more than .15, nearly twice the legal limit, at the time of the California DUI crash.

As part of her California DUI plea agreement, Black will get no more than a year in jail, in addition to California DUI probation, when sentenced on April 4, California DUI prosecutor Arthur Chang said outside court.

Charges of DUI with injury and willful injury to a child were dismissed.

“We didn't think it was the kind of case, she was the kind of person that should go to prison,” Chang said. “We just thought it was the best deal.”

Black entered her California DUI plea before Riverside County Superior Court Judge John Monterosso at a California DUI felony settlement conference, intended to allow both sides to reach agreement in a case before moving forward to a California DUI preliminary hearing.

Black was arrested last May 26 following the California DUI crash at Canyon Lake Drive North and Lands End Place.

She had been heading home from a fiesta held in a gated community near Canyon Lake, along with another adult and six children packed into a golf cart that generally seats six adults, according to California DUI police.

Black's 7-year-old son suffered the most serious injuries. He was taken to a trauma center and has since recovered.

“We thought his injuries were more serious,” Chang said. “He had a lot of abrasions and it looked really bad, but there were no internal injuries or broken bones.”

Four other children, including Black's 6-year-old child, were treated for minor injuries.

The other adult, a friend of Black's with two of her own children aboard the cart, was uninjured, according to California DUI police.

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

California DUI Cop Goes on Vacation - Continuance of Trial case

California DUI lawyer case
Filed 2/20/08

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ROBYN MAUREEN JENSEN,
Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.
B200619
(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 6BV02418)

(Craig D. Karlan, Judge)


ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; application for writ of prohibition. Writ denied.

Law Offices of Jon Bryant Artz and Jon Bryant Artz for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Patrick D. Moran and Cassandra Hart-Franklin, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

_______________________




Petitioner Robyn Jensen petitions for a writ of prohibition directing the trial court to take no further action other than to dismiss the charges against her on the basis of an alleged violation of her right to a speedy trial. (Pen. Code,1 § 1382.) We deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jensen was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and driving with a blood alcohol content of above 0.08 percent (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), with the allegation pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23578 that her blood alcohol content exceeded 0.15 percent. On February 23, 2007, the parties agreed to set the case for trial on March 22, 2007.

On March 21, 2007, the prosecution filed and served by fax a motion to continue the trial, listing the basis for the request as the fact that “Officer Tanner [the arresting officer] is out of town on pre-scheduled vacation returning April 16, 2007 and is not available to testify at the Jury Trial set for March 22, 2007.” On the following day, the day that the trial was supposed to begin, the prosecution asked for a continuance of the trial on the same basis, and Jensen objected on the ground that the vacation of a police officer is not good cause for the continuance of a trial past the statutory time period set forth in section 1382.

Argument was held on the continuance motion on March 29, 2007, the final day in the statutory period for Jensen to be tried. The parties stipulated that: a subpoena was issued by the District Attorney’s office for Officer Tanner on February 27, 2007, and was received by a Beverly Hills Police Department representative on that date; that Officer Tanner was not personally served with the subpoena and that the cadet responsible for serving the officer just left it in the officer’s box; and that Officer Tanner left on vacation on or about March 21, 2007. The deputy district attorney reported that on March 21 she received the subpoena back with a notation stating that the officer was on vacation, and that she confirmed with the Beverly Hills Police Department that the officer was on vacation.

The trial court found that there was good cause to continue the trial and that the prosecutor had exercised due diligence in seeking the attendance of Officer Tanner at trial. After subsequent proceedings, this petition for a writ of prohibition followed. We issued an order to show cause.

DISCUSSION
To establish good cause for a continuance because of the unavailability of a witness, a party must show that he or she “exercised due diligence to secure the witness’s attendance, that the witness’s expected testimony was material and not cumulative, that the testimony could be obtained within a reasonable time, and that the facts to which the witness would testify could not otherwise be proven.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1171, relying on Owens v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238, 250-251 (Owens).) We review the trial court’s ruling on the continuance motion for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Shane (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 196, 203 (Shane); People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 852.)

Cases concerning continuances sought because a material witness is unavailable fall generally into two categories: cases in which the witness was subpoenaed and cases in which the witness was not subpoenaed. When a witness was served with a subpoena but fails to appear as commanded, there is usually good cause for a continuance. “To penalize and dismiss the case of a litigant who has no advance knowledge of a witness’ default is unreasonable and unwarranted. We think a subpoenaed material witness’ failure to appear for trial may constitute good cause under section 1382 for the continuance of a trial beyond its statutory period.” (Gaines v. Municipal Court (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 556, 560 (Gaines).) When a witness is not under subpoena, his or her absence generally does not constitute good cause for the continuance of a trial (Baustert v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1277-1279 (Baustert) [after prosecutor released police officer from subpoena that required presence on trial dates that conflicted with officer’s planned vacation, prosecutor could not show due diligence and good cause for a continuance]; Caputo v. Municipal Court (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 412, 419 [no good cause where prosecutor made no effort to subpoena officer before he left on vacation, despite knowing of vacation plans]; Pickett v. Municipal Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1158, 1162-1163 [no good cause for continuance based on the prosecutor’s mere belief that several witnesses might be out of town or teaching on the trial date where no attempt was made to locate and subpoena those witnesses, as “[t]he failure to attempt to secure the attendance of a witness for whom a continuance is sought indicates a lack of due diligence”]; Cunningham v. Municipal Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 153 (Cunningham) [prosecutor knew officer was going on vacation but neglected to subpoena him before he left; failure to subpoena police officer precluded a finding of due diligence].)

This distinction between subpoenaed witnesses and unsubpoenaed witnesses rests on the question of due diligence. A prosecutor who issues subpoenas is exercising the requisite due diligence in securing the attendance of witnesses at trial, while a prosecutor who does not issue subpoenas has not made sufficient effort to ensure their presence. (Gaines, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 561 [“the prosecutor exercised due diligence in subpoenaing his witnesses for trial, and was not required to employ any additional mode of process, either formal or informal”].) As the Baustert court explained, there is no due diligence, and therefore, no good cause for a continuance where “the People did not attempt to subpoena the witnesses to attend on the dates set for trial, but instead moved to continue the trials to times more convenient for the witnesses.” (Baustert, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278.)

In light of this case law, a critical inquiry here in determining whether the prosecution demonstrated good cause for the requested continuance is whether this police officer was served with a subpoena. Jensen argues that Officer Tanner was not properly served, because he was not given the subpoena by the agent of the Beverly Hills Police Department. Jensen, however, stipulated that the subpoena “was received by a [member] of the Beverly Hills Police Department in charge of issuing the subpoenas on or about February 27th of ’07. And the procedure is that after a representative of Beverly Hills Police Department receives our subpoena, then they personally serve or put [it] in the officer’s box, that subpoena.’ This appears to comply with section 1328, subdivision (c)’s requirement that “If any peace officer . . . is required as a witness before any court or magistrate in any action or proceeding in connection with a matter regarding an event or transaction which he or she has perceived or investigated in the course of his or her duties, a criminal subpoena issued pursuant to this chapter requiring his or her attendance may be served either by delivering a copy to the peace officer personally or by delivering two copies to his or her immediate superior or agent designated by his or her immediate superior to receive the service . . . .” (Italics added.)

Section 1328, subdivision (c) describes what is supposed to happen after the subpoena is served by delivery to the officer’s immediate superior or designated agent: “If service is made upon the immediate superior or agent designated by the immediate superior, the immediate superior or the agent shall deliver a copy of the subpoena to the peace officer as soon as possible and in no event later than a time which will enable the peace officer to comply with the subpoena.” (Italics added.) This provision suggests that for the purpose of this subdivision, service is complete upon receipt of the subpoena by the superior or the designated agent, even though the actual delivery to the officer has not yet occurred. Applying this subdivision, it appears that the prosecutor did exactly what she was supposed to do under the law: only days after the trial date was set, with weeks remaining until the trial date, she caused the subpoena to be transmitted to the Beverly Hills Police Department, where it was accepted. Service was complete at this point, at least with respect to the responsibilities of the attorney issuing the subpoena. (§ 1328, subd. (c).)

It appears that the police department then failed to ensure that a copy of the subpoena was delivered “to the peace officer as soon as possible and in no event later than a time which will enable the peace officer to comply with the subpoena.” (§ 1328, subd. (c).) Contrary to Jensen’s contention, this apparent failure cannot reasonably be charged to the district attorney. Just as “counsel who prosecute or defend a criminal cause are not required to anticipate a police witness’ disobedience of a subpoena” (Gaines, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 561), they similarly cannot be expected to anticipate that the police department will fail to properly deliver a subpoena that has been served upon it and accepted by the department in accordance with statute. Indeed, to hold otherwise would prevent attorneys from relying on the subpoenas they issue, require them to supervise internal police department procedures over which they have no legal control, or “demand that prosecutors [and other counsel] become clairvoyants.” (Shane, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 205.) In order to establish due diligence, attorneys would be required to personally contact every police officer served with a subpoena pursuant to section 1328, subdivision (c) and confirm his or her actual receipt of the served subpoena. We cannot imagine that when the Legislature enacted this procedure ostensibly to streamline service of subpoenas on peace officers, it actually intended to create a more onerous mechanism by which counsel issuing subpoenas to peace officers would be required to monitor the police department’s practices for distributing subpoenas and contact every peace officer who is subpoenaed to verify that he or she received the subpoena. The Court of Appeal has declined to impose additional due diligence requirements on counsel beyond serving subpoenas to compel witnesses’ attendance at trial. Service of the subpoena is the responsibility of the attorney, and once service was effected, counsel is “not required to employ any additional mode of process, either formal or informal” to ensure the witness’s availability or attendance. (Gaines, at p. 561.)

Jensen argues that even if the subpoena was served, the police officer’s failure to appear at trial is attributable to the prosecutor. This is not the law. “If a police officer disregards a subpoena issued on behalf of either the prosecution or the defense, he defaults as a witness and not as an agent of counsel. Although a police officer is usually employed and paid by some public entity, so is the prosecutor, the public defender, even the judge who presides, and the mere fact of public employment does not make a police witness a judicial officer (Pen. Code, § 1050) or make him an agent of the prosecutor with authority to bind the State of California on the matter of speedy trial.” (Gaines, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d. at p. 561.)

We readily recognize that the vacation of a police officer is not, by itself, good cause for continuing a case beyond the statutory time period. Cunningham, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at pp. 155-156; Baustert, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) Vacation or no vacation, the party seeking a continuance has the burden of showing the existence of the five factors that establish good cause for the continuance. (Baustert, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279 [“the fact that a witness plans to be on vacation cannot alone constitute good cause for a continuance past a section 1382 deadline without a showing by the party requesting the continuance that the five Owens [supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 250-251] criteria are met.”].) Here, the trial court properly did not consider the vacation status of the officer as good cause by itself, instead determining whether good cause was shown “on a case-by-case basis, based upon a number of factors, including the ‘prior commitments of all witnesses, including police officers.’” (Brown v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 260, 266.) The trial court evaluated a situation in which a prosecutor promptly issued her subpoena upon the setting of the trial date. Because of the conduct of the Beverly Hills Police Department, the prosecutor was not informed of the officer’s unavailability until the day before trial, at which point the officer was already on vacation and unavailable. Here, the statutory provisions, though designed to simplify the process of serving subpoenas on peace officers, instead created a complicated and unusual situation in which a police officer could be legally served with a subpoena and yet not be aware of that service, thus going on vacation apparently without knowing that he was defying a subpoena;2 and a prosecutor, secure in her knowledge that she had properly and timely subpoenaed her central witness, could be surprised the day before the trial when the Beverly Hills Police Department finally notified her that the officer was unavailable, at which point in time she no longer had the option of requesting that the trial date be advanced to accommodate the witness’s schedule and could only request a continuance.

Under these unusual circumstances, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the prosecutor had demonstrated good cause for a continuance. The prosecutor fulfilled her responsibilities with respect to the subpoena and ensured that the officer was served within the language of section 1328, subdivision (c). Due diligence requires exactly what was present here, “a genuine attempt to secure a witness’s attendance in court on the date set for trial, notwithstanding the witness’s plans to be on vacation.” (Baustert, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278.) The prosecutor was not informed by the police department of the officer’s unavailability until the day before the trial began, after the police officer had already left the country on vacation, leaving her with no alternative but to request a continuance. As the subpoenaed officer was the arresting officer in this driving under the influence case, there is no question that his testimony was material and not cumulative, and that the facts to which he would testify could not otherwise be proven. The testimony could also be obtained within a reasonable time, as the officer’s anticipated return was April 16, 2007. Accordingly, we cannot discern any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that good cause existed to justify a short continuance beyond section 1382’s statutory time frame for trying these misdemeanor charges.

DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of prohibition is denied. The order to show cause is discharged. Upon finality of this opinion, the stay of further proceedings in the superior court is vacated.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

ZELON, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

WOODS, J.



1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.



2 There is no evidence in the record that Officer Tanner knew of the subpoena before he departed on vacation

Hit California DUI Cop Car? Go to Jail for Felony DUI

California DUI lawyer news

BANNING California DUI - A suspected California DUI / drunk driver was arrested Monday night after running from California DUI police, sideswiping a California DUI patrol car and refusing to put his hands up even after his California DUI vehicle became stuck in a field. Levon Bruke, 23, was arrested on suspicion of felony evasion, assault with a deadly weapon, California DUI / Drunk Driving, hit and run, reckless driving and driving on the wrong side of the road.

Bruke was driving on the wrong side of the road at 9:11 p.m. in the 5000 block of W. Ramsey Street when officers tried to pull him over, according to a Banning California DUI police.

Bruke continued to drive slowly through intersections and slid off the road at Sunrise Avenue, knocking over a street sign and getting his vehicle stuck, California DUI police said.

He then drove toward California DUI officers and between the curb and a patrol car, where his car became wedged. Bruke ignored orders to put his hands up and drove through a fence into a dirt field, according to California DUI lawyers.

After getting his vehicle stuck in the field, Bruke went into reverse and hit a block wall and California DUI officers were able to take him into custody. No California DUI attorney has spoken on his behalf yet.

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Increased California DUI penalties under proposed bill

California DUI lawyer news - new legislation?

Assemblyman John J. Benoit, R-Bermuda Dunes, Tuesday introduced a California DUI bill increasing California DUI penalties for manslaughter when driving under the influence and closing loopholes creating inconsistent penalties for California DUI - driving under the influence.

AB 2073 would target five California DUI areas:

Manslaughter: Under current California DUI law, an individual driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs / California DUI who causes a victim to suffer great bodily injury can receive a maximum six-year state prison sentence. However, a person driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs and causes the death of a California DUI victim can receive a maximum four-year California DUI sentence. The California DUI bill resolves the disparity by increasing the maximum California DUI sentence to six years.

Repeat California DUI Offenders: AB 2073 makes any California DUI defendant with a prior felony California DUI conviction ineligible for probation and adds a mandatory three years onto subsequent California DUI convictions. This California DUI addresses the issue of repeat offenders, who -- despite alcohol abuse education, fines, loss of driving privilege, and auto insurance penalties -- continue to to engage in criminal reckless behavior, according to Benoit.

California Drunk Boating: When someone is charged with California BUI - boating under the influence, their prior California DUI convictions can be used to enhance the penalty for BUI and be treated as a second or third California DUI offense. However, the converse is not true when dealing with someone charged with a California DUI with a prior BUI. AB 2073 would allow prosecutors to enhance California DUI charges if there are prior BUI Convictions.

California DUI Blood Tests: Under current California DUI law, a person arrested for California DUI - suspicion of driving under the influence has the choice of submitting to their choice of a blood, breath or urine test. However, the quantifiable amount of drugs cannot be determined in a urine sample. Removing a urine test as an option will assist the prosecution of drugged drivers, according to Benoit.

Conforming BUI and DUI Statutes of Limitations: In 2004, the Legislature passed a law lengthening the statute of limitations for qualifying DUI priors from seven to 10 years. The bill would amend the Harbors and Navigation Code so the statute of limitations for BUIs is similarly lengthened to 10 years, reflecting the seriousness of the DUI offenses and ensuring that repeat California DUI offenders receive the appropriate treatment and punishment, Benoit's office said.

The California DUI bill was introduced at the behest of the California District Attorneys Association, according to Kyle Packham, an aide to Benoit.

No opposition has surfaced yet to AB 2073, but Packham said it could draw opposition from California DUI public defenders opposed to longer sentences for their California DUI clients.

"With eight years of experience in DUI enforcement, making over 1,000 arrests, I have seen how taking the wheel while under the influence of alcohol and drugs creates daily tragedies in our communities,'' said Benoit, a former California Highway Patrol commander.

"The worst anguish is the loss of a loved one because of someone's drunk driving. My bill creates stiffer penalties for DUI manslaughter, which is actually less severely punishable than causing great bodily injury. My bill is a significant public safety measure that will better protect drivers on California streets, highways, and harbors.''


California DUI lawyers need to look at this.

7 to 10 year expansion analysis of California DUI prior convictions

"Ex Post Facto" Analysis of a California DUI Conviction Now Within 10 Years of a Subject California DUI Offense

At issue in California is the jurisprudential brick and mortar of the criminal justice system: The people’s right to a government that abides by the laws it both establishes and enforces. Constitutional temperance requires that the repugnance of an alleged crime cannot justify the departure from the bedrock of the United States Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause operates to constrain legislative power by demanding fundamental fairness illuminated by governmental restraint.

Prior to January 1, 2005, the State of California assured defendants convicted of Vehicle Code §23152(a)(b); §23153(a)(b) or Vehicle Code §23103 pursuant to §23103.5 (Alcohol related Reckless Driving) they would only be subject to having DUI convictions used to increase consequences of separate convictions of DUI were they to have had separate offenses, which resulted in convictions, within seven years from the date of a new offense. After the seven year period elapsed, they were no longer subject to having a DUI offense aggravated because the period of disability had elapsed. In other words, they were able to come out from under a cloud and walk in the sunshine.

The issue of whether an extension of a disability period was a violation of Ex Post Facto rules was first raised and rejected in People v. Sweet (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 78where the Court held that the change from the five year prior statute to the seven year statute was not an Ex Post Facto violation. The same Court of Appeal that decided Sweet, re-affirmed it in People v. Forrester (Gilbert, J.) That Court also issued the decision in People v. Wohl (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 270 (Gilbert, J.) (Applied reasoning of Sweet to felony prosecution) The flaws in the original Sweet opinion were revisited in Wohl and recently in Forrester which also failed to properly analyze the impact of Stogner.

Simply stated, Forrester, like Sweet held that increased punishments for DUI recidivists attached to the latest offense, not the prior offense, and as a result, were not retroactive or Ex Post Facto because the increased punishment was for the new case which occurred after the passage of the amendments to Vehicle Code §23540 et.seq. Some might call this sophistry. Others might argue that the Forrester/Sweet Court’s view of Ex Post Facto is entirely too narrow because that court’s analysis of retroactivity was anchored by its analogy to general recidivist case law. The analogy is imperfect and the cases relied upon are readily distinguishable because the recidivist statutes relied upon did not contain legislatively granted time limitations. DUI multiple offender statutes impose another, wholly independent element which requires that a defendant commit the predicate offense and a subsequent offense within the time originally defined by the legislature. Once that time had passed, any amendments to such legislation effects a change in that time limitation and is retroactive. The lynchpin of Sweet’s Ex Post Facto analysis is the notion that the extension of the disability period is not “retroactive” because it is based solely on the new violation that occurred after the change in the legislation. The fact that the previous, separate offense is an element of the new offense (See People v. Wohl, supra at 274)(Court assumed this “for sake of argument”) undermines Sweet’s logic as does an examination of the cases relied upon for that notion. The opinion cites People v. Venegas, (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 823 and People v. Weaver, (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 119, 125 for the proposition that a statute does not function retroactively “merely because it draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment for its operation.” Sweet, supra at 571. Weaver cites Venegas for this proposition and Venegas cites Abrams v. Stone (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 33, 40-41. Abrams is inapposite because it is a civil case and constitutional principles of Ex Post Facto simply do not apply. (See Calder, supra.) Abrams in fact supports Petitioner’s contention that application of the amended Vehicle Code §23540 to his time barred separate offense is retroactive as understood by Justice Chase in Calder. The Court noted:

This meaning of the word 'retroactive' applies both to the rule which disfavors the construction of a statute as having retroactive application (82 C.J.S., Statutes §§ 412, 414, p. 980 et seq.), and to the retroactive character of a statute as grounds of possible unconstitutionality. (16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 414 et seq., p. 856 et seq.)‘ ( Holt v. Morgan, 128 Cal.App.2d 113, 116, 117). We fail to perceive what different legal effect was created by the statutory amendments here in question . . . . Abrams v. Stone, supra, at 40. (Emphasis added)

Thus, while it may be true that a statute is not retroactive in operation merely because it draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment for its operation, it is a retroactive law if its operation creates a different legal effect than that which occurred before. In California, the law at issue is both retrospective and retroactive. It is retrospective in that it refers in its operation to events, specifically separate DUI offenses, which occurred in the past. It is retroactive, in that it changes the conditions attached to some of those separate convictions by including time barred convictions which have expired prior to the amendments to Vehicle Code §23540 et. seq.

At the time of the California DUI Defendant’s predicate offense, he or she was assured that that offense would count as a sentence enhancement for no more than seven years. This provision, looked at from the perspective of this offense, is better termed a sunset clause. At some point in the future, the legislature has promised that the sun will set on that conviction, and Petitioner will be finally free from its shadow. Seven years then elapsed, and that offense, by grace of the legislature, ceased to count as a prior offense for any subsequent offenses. Now, the legislature, by passage of a new statute, seeks to extend the sunset clause that by its own terms has expired. In this way, changing the action of a law which has already by its own terms concluded its effect can not be correctly termed anything but retroactive.

The fact that the changed statute alters the consequences of a limitation period that had elapsed is the critical factor that distinguishes and makes inapposite the cases Sweet used for authority that the penalty attaches to the new crime and not the previous ones. The Court in Sweet cites to Gryger v. Burke (1948) 334 U.S. 728, and In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910 for that proposition, but in both cases the recidivist statutes in issue had no sunset provisions, so there had never been a situation where the defendant had been sentenced under one provision, served that provision to completion, and then had the provision reimposed. Even in Venegas, supra, the court dealt with the passage of an entirely new law which affected the defendant, rather than one in which the defendant knew of, and endured his disability to completion, only to have it revived. Furthermore, Sweet’s reliance on People v. Lujan (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp 15, is misplaced since Lujan dealt with an entirely different situation, that of the renumbering of the DUI offenses and the creation of the per se DUI offense. Nor does People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, shed any further light on the fundamental issue in this case, since Snook dealt only with the order of the defendant’s convictions relative to each other, not relative to changes in the law.

In contrast, the opinion in Calder explicitly recognized that Ex Post Facto principles may be violated by penal enhancements such as those applied in Vehicle Code §23540 et.seq. Justice Peterson noted:

[I]t appears, that ex post facto laws have an appropriate signification; they extend to penal statutes, and no further; they are restricted in legal estimation to the creation, and, perhaps, enhancement of crimes, pains and penalties. The enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty; and therefore they may be classed together.” Calder, supra, at 697. (Emphasis added)

In Weaver v. Graham, supra the Court addressed whether a change to prisoners’ abilities to earn good time credits could be applied, not to deprive prisoners of good time credits already earned, but to affect the reciprocity of inmates’ good time credits as reward for good behavior after the law’s effective date. The Court distilled from the web of ex post facto jurisprudence the essence of the inquiry, to wit: “The critical question is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” Id. at 31. (Emphasis added) Here, unlike general recidivist statutes, the offending legislation changes the legal consequences of the predicate offense by extending the clock on its sunset provision.

Amicus, relies on Justice Chase’s original characterizations of what are Ex Post Facto violations enumerated as Category (2) and Category (4) in Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 U.S. (Dall) 389. These two Categories of Ex Post Facto were analyzed and explained in Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607, which held that a statute which revived a time-barred prosecution was a violation of Ex Post Facto because it (1) aggravated the original crime and made it greater than it was when committed because the defendant is subject to “punishment that the courts lacked the power to impose” before the amendment (Calder Category 2) (Stogner, supra at 615); and (2) it alters rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony “than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender” (Calder Category 4) (Stogner v. California supra at 612).

As applied to Forrester, the amending legislation aggravated his original 1997 offense and made it more burdensome because it extended the disability period attached to it after it had expired - raising it from the dead and depriving him of a vested defense, thereby subjecting Appellant to “punishment that the courts lacked the power to impose”.

The amending legislation changed the quantum of evidence necessary to establish the existence of a necessary quasi-element of the felony offense, namely the existence of a prior conviction for an offense which occurred within the proscribed period.

The amending legislation altered the rules of evidence as they pertained to proof of the 1997 offense. After December 31, 2004 a District Attorney could not have proven that person’s prior DUI came within the meaning of Vehicle Code §23550. Thus, because no “quantum of evidence” could have provided the requisite proof, the amending legislation which became effective on January 1, 2005 violates Ex Post Facto rules if applied retroactively.

Sweet and its progeny must be rejected in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Stogner, supra and the amendment to Vehicle Code §23550 must be deemed to be a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to prior offenses that were more than seven years old on January 1, 2005. As noted by the venerable Justice Learned Hand in Falter v. United States (1928) 23 F.2d 420, 425-426, cert denied, 277 U.S. 590:

Certainly it is one thing to revive a prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life. The question turns upon how much violence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play. For the state to assure a man that he has become safe from its pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its assurance, seems to most of us unfair and dishonest. But, while the chase is one, it does not shock us to have it extended beyond the time first set, or, if it does, the stake forgives it. Id. at 426.

The same can be said for extending the period of disability which subjects a citizen convicted of DUI to greater penalties for future violations. If that period of disability has lapsed, it can no longer be legislatively revived without violating the prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws. The general rule is that, where a complete defense has arisen under a statute limiting a criminal action, it cannot be taken away by a subsequent repeal or amendment. See, People v. Chesebro, (1990) 185 Mich.App. 412,416, 463 N.W.2d 134, 135-136; cited with approval by the Court in Stogner at 618.

The harm that would be manifested if the amending legislation could be applied to a person's 1997 DUI conviction is of the kind that the Ex Post Facto Clause seeks to avoid. By “its own rules” (see Carmell v. Texas (2000) 529 US. 513, 533), the legislature advised defendant that his prior DUI conviction could have an enhancement effect for seven years. After that period, not before, the legislature changed those rules. Since the legislature thereby acted after it had assured defendant that he “had become safe from its pursuit,” the legislative amendment would “seem . . . unfair and dishonest.” (Falter v. United States, supra, 23 F.2d at 426.) Further, since it did not act until the earlier limitations period had lapsed, the legislature deprived defendant of “fair warning” (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28) of continued criminal liability after he could otherwise have assumed he had left behind the disabilities associated with his prior DUI conviction. As noted in Stogner, “[A] Constitution that permits such an extension, by allowing legislatures to pick and choose when to act retroactively, risks both ‘arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation’ and erosion of the separation of powers . . .” Id. at 612.

How should courts in California interpret Stogner? The court in Forrester continues to perpetuate the flawed analysis of Sweet by stubbornly insisting that the retroactive increase in the look back period does not change the effect of the original predicate offense making its terms more onerous to a criminal defendant.

Stogner teaches us that retroactively reviving time barred statutes of limitations is Ex Post Facto when it aggravates the original crime or makes it greater than when committed. Applying the amendments to Vehicle Code §23540 et.seq. to offenders who had a predicate offense more than 7 but less than 10 years prior to the new offense undeniably expands the length of the “look back” or “wash out” periods for the predicate offense beyond the time that the legislature, by it’s grace, applied to this offense. The retroactive application of Vehicle Code §23540 to a person thereby aggravates his or her predicate crime and inflicts greater punishments where the offender was not, by law subject to them.

Real California DUI Court in Schools on Cable

California DUI attorney news

REAL California DUI Drunk Driving COURT IN SCHOOLS CALIFORNIA CHANNEL CABLE BROADCAST

TWO California DUI VIEWING OPPORTUNITIES:
FEBRUARY 21, 2008 10:15AM 11:45AM
MAY 1, 2008 (LAW DAY) 9:00AM 10:30AM

Teen driving and California DUI driving under the influence (DUI) are leading causes of death among teenagers. This live interactive statewide cable television broadcast will allow middle and high school students to view a live California DUI / Drunk Driving sentencing proceeding and learn about the consequences of California DUI -driving under the influence.

During this California DUI broadcast, students will:
View and participate in an actual California DUI sentencing
Have an opportunity to ask questions of the California DUI judge, California DUI attorneys and the California DUI defendant involved
Learn California DUI facts and statistics about DUIs
Know the California DUI consequences of a DUI on individual drivers, crash victims,
and local communities

REGISTER TODAY!
School Registration & Curriculum:
http://www.register123.com/web/102069

The California Channel Cable Listing by County:
http://www.calchannel.com/carriage.htm

For more California DUI information, please contact program staff:
Danielle Tate, 415-865-7677; danielle.tate@ jud.ca.gov or
Kelly Parrish, 415-865-8018; kelly.parrish@ jud.ca.gov

California DUI programPresented in coordination with the California Office of Education; AOC Education Division/Center for Judicial Education and Research; and California Channel. Funded by the California Office of Traffic Safety

California DUI felony accident - 2 teenagers die

California DUI attorney news

The California DUI CHP is investigating a double fatal California DUI accident that claimed the lives of two teenagers and injured two more Saturday night.

California DUI Investigators said three factors-speed, alcohol and inexperience, combined to create a deadly situation.

Shortly before midnight Saturday an SUV with five teens inside veered out of control on a narrow country road near Kerman, killing Melina Sandoval,19, of Madera and Thomas Nazaroff,14, of Kerman.

The CHP said the car was speeding down Mckinley Avenue near Sycamore when the front passenger grabbed the steering wheel and jerked it to the right, causing the driver to lose control.

The SUV flipped several times, ejecting both Sandoval and Nazaroff, who were riding in the backseat, from the car. The driver and another passenger suffered minor and moderate injuries and were taken to community Regional Medical Center.

California DUI Investigators said none of the three teens in the backseat were wearing their seat belts at the time of the California DUI accident.

It was also determined that all five, including the driver, had been drinking.

Because of the circumstances surrounding the California DUI accident, the driver could be facing felony DUI and vehicular manslaughter charges.

Monday, February 18, 2008

Central Coastal California DUI Cops Overreact

California DUI attorney news

A Santa Maria teenager is in serious trouble after California DUI police say he tried to evade California DUI cops.

Santa Maria California DUI police say 19-year-old Lucio Mendez took off when they were trying to pull him over for a traffic stop on the 1400 block of Claremont Street.

They claim he got in a California DUI accident and tried to run away before he was caught.

He is being charged with felony evading, hit and run, and California DUI - driving under the influence.

No Headlights + Hit Cop Car Head-on = Felony California DUI

California DUI lawyer news

A Los Angeles police sergeant whose patrol car collided head-on with that of an alleged California DUI / drunken driver whose headlights were off was released from a hospital Monday after being checked out for minor injuries.

"He was a little banged up, but he's home now," said a California DUI official.

The name of the officer involved in the wreck was withheld.

Carlos Revlorio, 25, was booked on suspicion of felony California DUI / drunken driving and locked up in lieu of $100,000 bail.

The California DUI collision on San Fernando Road just north of Osborne Street occurred about 10:30 p.m. Sunday, just a short distance from the Foothill Station.
The police car was going north on San Fernando when it was struck head-on by a Toyota Camry with its headlights off, knocking the officer's car into two parked cars, without causing injuries to the passengers in the California DUI driver's car.

The suspect had just made an illegal U-turn mid-block.

The man then failed a California DUI sobriety test and was booked was for California drunk driving / DUI .

Sunday, February 17, 2008

California DUI attorneys deal with officers going after 1,000 DUI arrests

California DUI attorney have to deal with officers who have been provided incentives for most DUI arrests, like this officer who racked up his 1,000th DUI arrest.



This driver's DUI blood-alcohol level alone would have made the arrest stand out.

Terry Lee Andrews, 57, who was taken to the Bayfront Medical Center after crashing into another vehicle, had a blood-alcohol level of 0.376, more than four times the level at which a driver is presumed impaired or DUI. He had been drinking at a club before he made a U-turn into traffic.

For Officer Robbie Arkovich, the DUI arrest marked a personal milestone. It was his 1,000th DUI arrest, the most department veterans can remember by an officer.

Arkovich joined the department's DUI driving-under-the-influence unit about nine years ago. It didn't take long for him to log his first DUI drunk driving arrest.

Then Arkovich nabbed another DUI driver. And another DUI . Before long, he was racking up DUI arrests the way baseball Hall of Famer Tony Gwynn collected hits.

Arkovich, 41, shrugs off the DUI statistics. He says plenty of other officers would have reached that DUI number if they had stuck with the job.

But most DUI officers don't stay.

Instead, they leave the unit for other jobs after a few years, worn down by having to deal with drunks every night and having to sacrifice their nights and weekends.

Some DUI people Arkovich arrests send him thank-you cards, telling him he helped change their lives. Most DUI people don't.

"I would definitely say that most people are not happy when we arrest them," Arkovich said. "It's the minority of people who understand that they got themselves in trouble."

As a young police officer, Arkovich rode along with officers on the DUI task force. He admired the work they did because it produced DUI results.

But Arkovich felt the DUI unit took people who could hurt others off the streets. The officers saved lives.

"It's one of those areas in police work where you really get to help people," Arkovich said.

So when a DUI opening came up in 1998, he applied and got a spot.

"I don't know anyone who has stayed for as long as he has," said Sgt. Keith Peaton, who oversees the DUI unit.

Arkovich's workday begins at 6 p.m. and runs until 4 a.m. He works Wednesdays through Saturdays, a lot of holidays, and has trouble remembering the last time he had a New Year's off.

Usually, he has DUI paperwork waiting for him when he arrives. Sometimes, a DUI arrest is already in progress. The department's unit has a DUI conviction rate in the high 90th percentile.

Arkovich is lean and trim. He talks in crisp, complete sentences and can delve into an explanation of case law in the middle of a DUI arrest. He rarely drinks.

On a recent Thursday night, he headed out with Officer Terri Nagle, who was back from a six-month medical leave.

While Nagle was arresting a DUI drunken driver, the woman had fallen and broken Nagle's leg.

Many DUI drunken drivers make for difficult DUI arrests. Nagle said some act polite and friendly, then explode as soon as the DUI handcuffs come out. They kick and punch, flail and spit. One woman in a cruiser managed to angle her head just so to spit on Nagle after her DUI arrest.

Arkovich's DUI cruiser has suffered, too. A few weeks ago, a young DUI man he arrested became so angry that he managed to kick out a rear window.

The DUI job is conducive to dark humor. A few years ago, the DUI task force began writing down funny quotes on an office board.

This is so unfair. I'm the designed driver, said one DUI woman, who was more than twice the legal limit of 0.08.

I'm a functional Xanax user, said another DUI .

As they headed out for new DUI arrests, and possible additions to the board, Arkovich and Nagle watched for anything that looked suspicious: a car without headlights, a driver swerving wildly, cars stopping in the middle of the intersection or driving slowly.

"Let's go fishing," Arkovich said, as they cruised through the 34th Street corridor, a hot spot on Thursday nights.

This time, the DUI arrest came to them.

An employee at a McDonald's called DUI police after a man in the drive-through reeked so strongly of alcohol that the fumes nearly made her gag.

When Arkovich arrived, a few other DUI officers were there and had taken away a large kitchen knife the man had stuffed in his pants.

Arkovich walked up to the driver, Bert Martin, a bulky 52-year-old.

"How much have you had to drink, sir?" Arkovich asked.

"Not that much ... four cans," Martin replied.

Then, he elaborated, while swaying from side to side: four 32-ounce cans of Miller.

The first DUI field sobriety test Arkovich gave him tested whether Martin could follow a red light with his eyes without jerking too quickly from side to side, a symptom of DUI intoxication. He couldn't.

Then, Martin tried to walk along a yellow line and then turn around and walk back. He wobbled.

Finally, Martin had to stand on one foot. That also didn't go well.

Back at the DUI station, Martin blew a 0.18.


Annual DUI arrests by St. Petersburg police:

2005: 558 DUI arrests

2006: 584 DUI arrests

2007: 468 DUI arrests

California DUI Attorneys could have helped these folks from Stockton

California DUI attorney cases out of Stockton California

Ever wonder why folks should hire a California DUI attorney? To avoid this:

Amador, Raul, 23, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Anderson, Justin, 29, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' California DUI formal probation, $2,323 fine, seven days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Banda, Jorge, 18, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' California DUI formal probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Chavez, Carmen, 36, of Stockton: Second California DUI conviction, five years' California DUI formal probation, $2,323 fine, 10 days in jail, second-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Chuon, Cheun, 26, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Corr, Brian, 23, of Stockton: Second vconviction, five years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, 15 days in jail, second-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Espino, Jorge, 42, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' California DUI formal probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Gallien, Michael, 38, of Stockton: Second California DUI conviction, five years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, 10 days in jail, second-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Guerra, Kenneth, 48, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, 10 days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Hernandez, Jacinto, 35, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Lopez, Joaquin, 20, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' California DUI formal probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Magana, Jorge, 37, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Marquez, Tommy, 26, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, four days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Martinez, Cesar, 27, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Martini, Gina, 29, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Mendoza, Jaime, 20, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' California DUI formal probation, $2,323 fine, 21 days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Mendoza, Martin, 30, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, seven days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Phourn, Phoeuth, 23, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Rivera, Nicholas, 48, of Mariposa: First California DUI conviction, three years' California DUI formal probation, $2,323 fine, seven days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Sandoval, Remedios, 45, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Valencia, Rodolfo, 24, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Valero, Simon, 63, of Linden: Second California DUI conviction, five years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, 120 days in jail, second-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Vang, Phen, 25, of Stockton: Second California DUI conviction, five years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, 10 days in jail, second-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Vega, Benito, 37, of Stockton: Second California DUI conviction, five years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, seven days in jail, second-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

Yen, Paul, 23, of Stockton: First California DUI conviction, three years' formal California DUI probation, $2,323 fine, two days in jail, first-offender California DUI drinking-driver program, driver's license restricted.

California DUI lawyers help folks arrested for California DUI. How many of these folks do you think had California DUI attorneys?

Saturday, February 16, 2008

Murder DUI vs. no Murder DUI in California - 2 cases

California DUI attorney news - issue of murder in California DUI cases:

A Fellows woman is being sought on murder charges in connection with an alleged drunk driving accident that killed a McKittrick man last summer.

A felony warrant charging Donna Brinkman, 43, with second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter, felony drunk driving and driving on a suspended license, was issued on Feb. 6.

Law enforcement officers have been unable to locate her to serve the warrant, Kern County Sheriff's Sgt. Martin Downs said.

Brinkman was arrested at the scene of the July 28 crash on Highway 33 in McKittrick that fatally injured Robert Morrison, 76.

Morrison was struck by Brinkman's vehicle while walking across Highway 33 near D Street, according to the California Highway Patrol.

Kern County Court records show that Brinkman had a prior conviction for drunk driving just one month before the fatal accident.

Brinkman was sentenced on June 26 to two days in jail, fined $15,084 and placed on probation for three years, court records show.


In contrast, California DUI lawyers:

A woman accused of driving drunk and causing a crash that killed her two passengers in Palm Desert last February will not be charged with murder, prosecutors said Friday.

Tiffany Marie Campbell, 23, of Cathedral City, has already been ordered to stand trial for DUI and gross vehicular manslaughter.

The Riverside County District Attorney's Office earlier announced it was considering adding the murder charges, but prosecutors said today there was "insufficient evidence."

"After reviewing all of the evidence and the totality of circumstances surrounding this incident, we determined to have insufficient evidence to warrant murder charges in this case," said D.A. spokesman Michael Jeandron.

If convicted of the other charges, Campbell could be sentenced to up to 12 years in prison.

Campbell, who re-entered not guilty pleas at a pre-trial arraignment Friday, allegedly had a blood-alcohol level of .18, more than twice the legal limit, when her Volkswagen Jetta crashed into the back of a tractor-trailer on Highway 111 at Town Center Way about 2:15 a.m. last Feb. 26.

Her two passengers, Brian Murray, 23, of Palm Desert, and Kelli Luna, 22, of Cathedral City, died at the scene.

Campbell, who suffered moderate injuries in the crash, was being prepped for transport to Desert Regional Medical Center when paramedics smelled a "strong odor of alcohol on her breath," according to the declaration in support of the warrant.

Riverside County Superior Court Judge Randall D. White scheduled a trial-readiness conference for March 14, but her public defender, David Prendergast, said he did not expect the to begin until early summer.

Friday, February 15, 2008

Newport Beach police will set up a sobriety DUI checkpoint

California dui lawyer news

Newport Beach DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI police will set up a DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI sobriety checkpoint Friday night near where drivers leave the peninsula, DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI police officials said.

From 9 p.m. to 3 a.m. on northbound Newport Boulevard and Finley Avenue, DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI officers will screen select drivers for DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI sobriety and pass out brochures on the dangers of DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI - driving under the influence.

DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI Police said they chose the base of the peninsula because of its close proximity to bars and restaurants. DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI Checkpoints tend to reduce the number of DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI inebriated drivers on the road but do not necessarily increase DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI arrests, DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI officials said. DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI Checkpoints are deterrents and ensure public safety by reducing the amount of DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI drunk drivers on the road, DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI police said.

DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI Police also conduct DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI saturation patrols, where DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI officers target drivers appearing to be DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI - driving under the influence.

Jail time if consume alcohol when on DUI probation?

California DUI attorney case

Filed 2/15/08 P. v. Jenkins CA3

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

----

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TRACY ANN JENKINS,

Defendant and Appellant.
C056329
(Super. Ct. No. 03F7585)


Driving at 64 miles per hour around a curve posted at 35 miles per hour, defendant Tracy Ann Jenkins lost control of a dune buggy and crashed. Her passenger, a hitchhiker, sustained a broken arm, a concussion and a bruised chest. Defendant, who had a blood-alcohol content of .32 percent, sustained a broken arm, a concussion and a punctured lung. Defendant pleaded no contest to DUI - driving under the influence causing injury to her passenger, a felony (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining count and the prosecutor’s agreement not to oppose reduction to a misdemeanor upon defendant’s successful completion of probation.

The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation subject to certain terms and conditions, including serving 120 days in county jail and refraining from the consumption of alcohol.

Defendant admitted she had violated probation by consuming alcohol. The court reinstated defendant on probation subject to an additional 30 days in jail.

Defendant again violated probation by consuming alcohol and once again the court reinstated defendant on probation with an additional 60 days in jail.

Defendant violated probation for a third time by consuming alcohol as well as failing to report her arrest to probation.

The court sentenced defendant to state prison for the midterm of two years with presentence custody credit of 266 days (178 actual and 88 conduct days).

Defendant appeals.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.

Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

US Navy sailors simulate DUI in order to avoid a California DUI

California DUI lawyer military clients

The Navy is working to keep sailors safe, not only on the job, but also off-duty.

They’ve brought a high-tech DUI- drunk driving simulator to Oceana this week as part of the Save A Life Tour. The idea is to give participants the experience of driving drunk or DUI, without actually being inebriated.

The ride took sailors from stone cold sober up to a .34 DUI blood alcohol content level. Peripheral vision becomes impaired, reflexes slow down and anticipation disappears.

“We are taking you to levels that you may never experience in your lifetime, but we wanted to show you how bad it can actually get,” explained Brian Beldyga of the Save A Life Tour anti-DUI team.

Click to watch DUI video “It’s really not that easy,” said AO1 Jesse Burnett. “It’s basically just playing tricks on your mind, just simulates if you’d been drinking a lot.”

ASAN Latoya Tolar hopes sailors learn not to drink and drive at all so no DUI. “You think that you have it, ‘Oh, I can control the car. If I don’t swerve, I won’t get caught,’ but don’t drink and drive.”

The Save A Life Tour also works with colleges through Naional Campus Safety Awareness Month.

Speeding & Running Stop Sign BMW in California DUI crash causing death

California DUI attorney news

California DUI Police said a suspected California DUI - drunk driver killed a woman in east Bakersfield Thursday night then tried to run off, but was detained by citizens.

According to the California Highway Patrol, a 34-year-old man crashed his BMW into a pickup truck carrying four people on Casa Loma Drive, sending all of them to the hospital and killing 45-year-old Lilia Aranda.

CHP officials said the man was speeding when he ran the stop sign and hit a dip in the road at Madison Street while heading east on Casa Loma Drive. The driver then lost control of his vehicle and hit the pickup head-on, California DUI police said.

The force of the California DUI impact folded the dashboard on top of the four adults who were seated in the front of the single cab pickup.

As fire crews began the difficult task of trying to cut the victims out of the truck, California DUI police said the man tried to run from the scene. They said bystanders chased after him and held him until California DUI police arrived.

Sgt. Travis Mitchell of the CHP said two citizens detained the man until the Bakersfield California DUI police arrived.

Aranda died at an area hospital. She was the only person who was not wearing a seat belt.

Other passengers from the pickup sustained major injuries.

The driver of the BMW was also taken to an area hospital for medical treatment.

Police said the man now faces charges of California Drunk Driving / felony DUI hit-and-run.

Thursday, February 14, 2008

California DUI Specialist Attorneys

California DUI specialist attorneys

California DUI specialist attorneys work hard defending their clients arrested for drunk driving. After many years of experience defending DUI/DWI cases, California DUI Attorney Specialists have an in-depth knowledge of California DUI Laws, the California DUI court process, CaliforniaDepartment of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") licensing hearings, and all aspects of California DUI defense and related matters.

California DUI specialist attorneys represent many clients from outside of California who get arrested while visiting California.

Some California DUI attorney specialists' cases include the following:

California Drunk Driving
California DUI - Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs
California Driving While Intoxicated
California Field Sobriety Tests
California Breath Testing
California Alcohol Evaluations
California Driver's License Suspension
California Underage Drinking and Driving
California Vehicular Assault
California Vehicular Homicide

California DUI attorney specialists aggressively protect your rights, your freedom, your driving privileges, and your reputation.

Some of the things for a California DUI Attorney Specialist to do include:

Immediately contacting California DMV to Protect Your Driving Privilege by Requesting a Hearing with the DMV
Obtaining a "Stay" on the California Suspension
Obtaining a Restricted California Driver's License
Advising After a California DUI Arrest
Preparing California DUI Documents
Appearing before California Department of Motor Vehicles Driver Safety Officers
California DUI Plea Bargaining
Drafting California DUI Attorney Motions
California DUI Trial Preparation, including Evidence Gathering
Appearing Before All California State Courts of Law
Presenting California DUI Cases at Trial before Jury

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Limited Jury Instruction re: questionable California DUI PAS test

California DUI attorney case

Filed 2/14/08 P. v. Vargas CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERNESTO LUIS VARGAS,

Defendant and Appellant.
A111248
(Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. 050414-2)


A jury found Ernesto Luis Vargas guilty of driving under the influence (count one–Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more (count two–Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and the court, in bifurcated trial on allegations of three prior such convictions (Veh. Code, § 23550), found them true for both counts. Granted probation with execution of a prison term suspended, Vargas claims jury-selection error under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler), plus several errors relating to results of a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test. We affirm the judgment.

Background

We detail the pertinent trial evidence in the issue discussions that follow. We need only state here that both counts arise from a February 22, 2005 traffic stop where officers saw Vargas driving a Honda unsafely, succeeded in pulling him over after some resistance, noticed from his demeanor that he seemed to have been drinking, and used a PAS breath test that confirmed a blood alcohol level of 0.186. The PAS test was used in lieu of a balancing test because it seemed, from blood on Vargas’s face and hands and an earlier report of a fight, that he may have been involved in an assault. Vargas was arrested, and intoxilyzer breath tests administered with a “Draeger machine” at the Pittsburg Police Department showed blood alcohol levels of 0.16 and 0.17.

Discussion

I. Batson/Wheeler

Vargas claims abuse of discretion in a ruling on a Batson/Wheeler objection he raised when the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against a man who was the only Black potential juror on the first panel. The court found no prima facie case and, having so ruled, allowed the prosecutor to state reasons for the challenge.

Circumstances. The juror was L.H., and he had checked the “yes” box on his questionnaire where it asked: “Do you have moral, religious, or other principles which would make it difficult to determine whether someone is guilty or not guilty of a crime?” Prosecutor William Davis asked L.H. about this in detail during general voir dire before anyone was seated in the jury box. After first asking L.H. about his work for Federal Express and service in the United States Army, Davis initiated this exchange:

“And you checked yes regarding moral, religious or other principles which might make it difficult to determine someone’s guilt or innocence. What were you thinking regarding that answer?

“[L.H.]: I was thinking that each individual needs to have wisdom in the things that they do each day. You know, it doesn’t hinder anyone’s opinion of what someone else has done that they have to answer.

“Mr. Davis: Okay. The question I have for you, I guess, answer to?

“[L.H.]: Answer to God at the time of judgment. You going to stand before the throne and He going to ask you do you take accountability for your life and the things that you have done in your life and the things you didn’t do in your life.

“Mr. Davis: Absolutely. Question though is, is that for later, the ultimate judgment, or do you feel like you’re capable of being a judge now, a fact-finder?

“[L.H.]: No, because I don’t go around judging people for what they do. It’s not my job to judge each individual. My job is to judge myself and take accountability for myself.

“Mr. Davis: Okay. The issue, though, if you’re chosen to be a juror, you‘re going to be asked to judge several things, the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to evidence, and, ultimately, whether or not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been proven regarding Mr. Vargas.

“Would your personal philosophies or—more or less interfere with your ability to do that?

“[L.H.]: What you’re asking me, I’ll be presented the facts and make a moral or wisdom judgment of the facts that gonna be presented, yes, I can do that.

“Mr. Davis: Okay. You’re willing to do that?

“[L.H.]: But not to say—well, to judge him straight out, no.

“Mr. Davis: I’m not asking you to judge him now. He’s presumed innocent until proven guilty.

“[L.H.]: Right.

“Mr. Davis: But when you hear the evidence and you’ve discussed it with the other jurors, are you willing to come to a decision?

“[L.H.]: Yes.

“Mr. Davis: All right. Thank you.”

The prosecutor exercised his sixth peremptory strike against L.H., at the first opportunity after L.H. entered the jury box.

Hearing and ruling. A hearing outside the jury’s presence established that L.H. was the only Black on a 42-person panel,1 that Vargas was Hispanic (described by his counsel as “Latina” [sic]), and that the court had no information that any witness would be Black (African-American). The court found no prima facie case in the circumstances, noting additionally that Davis’s other challenges were against those of “different ethnic backgrounds”) and that his questioning of L.H. was not perfunctory. The court stressed that it was not finding a prima facie case but added, “I will allow Mr. Davis to put on the record what excuse or statement he would like to make in the event that a prima facie had been found.”

Davis elaborated: “Yes, Your Honor, the primary concern that I have regarding [L.H.] was his questionnaire. He checked yes regarding the question do you have moral, religious, or other principles which would make it difficult to determine whether someone is guilty or not guilty. And when questioned about that, he went into some detail about the ultimate judgment being in the Almighty’s hands, and while at the end of the day, he seemed to indicate that he could weigh the evidence and be a juror, I was left with reservations myself. [¶] And it wasn’t just his answers. There was also something about the way he was answering it, may just be his style of talking, very low, almost barely with opening his mouth. And I took that as somewhat tense—indications of tension in his responses, and that also weighed on my mind as having reservations about his ability to be impartial.”

The court adhered to its initial ruling of no prima facie case, making no comment on the reasons and closing, “I think I’ve said as much as I’m going to say.”

Analysis. Race-based use of peremptory strikes violates the federal constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the law, as held in Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, and California’s constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, as held in Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258. (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66.) “Blacks . . . are a cognizable group for purposes of both Wheeler [citation] and Batson [citation]” (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 652), and the procedure for objection is this: First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, once that burden is met, the “ ‘ “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 66-67, quoting Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168.)

Here, the court found no prima facie case to shift the burden to the prosecutor to state reasons, and the fact that the court afterward allowed the prosecutor to state reasons nevertheless (see, e.g., People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 421) “did not moot the question of whether defendant had established a prima facie showing. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 422.) We review a no-prima-facie-showing determination deferentially (id. at p. 423), and find it supported.

Vargas stresses that the prosecutor struck “all” members of a cognizable group, and of course, that circumstance, while not conclusive, may establish a prima facie case, “especially if the defendant belongs to the same group” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 901). Here, however, there was only one group member in the entire panel, and nothing further fuels an inference of discrimination.2 “Although circumstances may be imagined in which a prima facie case could be shown on the basis of a single excusal, in the ordinary case, . . . to make a prima facie case after the excusal of only one or two members of a group is very difficult.” (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598, fn. 3.) “ ‘Even the exclusion of a single prospective juror may be the product of an improper group bias. As a practical matter, however, the challenge of one or two jurors can rarely suggest a pattern of impermissible exclusion.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 598.) “To be sure, the ultimate issue to be addressed on a Wheeler-Batson motion ‘is not whether there is a pattern of systematic exclusion; rather, the issue is whether a particular prospective juror has been challenged because of group bias.’ [Citation.] But in drawing an inference of discrimination from the fact one party has excused ‘most or all’ members of a cognizable group [citation], a court finding a prima facie case is necessarily relying on an apparent pattern in the party’s challenges.” (Id. at p. 598, fn. 3.)

The trial court also saw that Vargas was not a member of the same group as L.H., and this further supported the ruling. “ ‘[T]he defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 597.) Vargas was not a member of the cognizable group, and there was no “victim” in this DUI case whose group membership might bear on discriminatory intent. The court even stated, without dispute, that it knew of no witnesses who shared L.H.’s group membership.

Next, the prosecutor’s questioning of L.H. was not “unusually desultory” so as to fuel suspicion of race-based discrimination (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 599); in fact, the questioning was unusually thorough.

We affirm a no-prima-facie-case ruling where the record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged a juror (People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 900; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 116), and L.H.’s responses about his moral, religious or other compunctions suggest ample grounds for doubt about his ability to serve as a fair arbiter of guilt or innocence. In the end, L.H. did differentiate between hearing evidence to decide factual questions on charged crimes, and religious convictions against “judging” persons based on their acts—a task that he saw as God’s, not his own. It took numerous tries to draw that distinction, however, and a party could reasonably wonder why L.H. traveled that path in the first place, when the questionnaire asked nothing about judging people, only about “principles which would make it difficult to determine whether someone is guilty or not guilty of a crime[.]” L.H.’s responses reasonably raised doubts whether he could keep those ideas separate during deliberations. Even in assuring the prosecutor that he could decide the facts, he referred confusingly to making “a moral or wisdom judgment of the facts . . . .”

Vargas invokes the federal high court decision in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 (Miller-El), where a majority undertook a comparative juror analysis, at odds with our state high court’s rule against using such an analysis for the first time on appeal (People v. Johnson (2005) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1306, 1318-1325). Vargas argues that even where a trial court has found no prima facie case, we must undertake a comparative juror analysis, but he ignores binding state Supreme Court precedent (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455) that limits such an inquiry, even under Miller-El, to cases where a trial court has reached a third-stage Batson/Wheeler inquiry, evaluating a prosecutor’s stated reasons after finding a prima facie case. (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 600-601; People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 189.) The court never reached that stage here.

Even if we were free to disregard that precedent, however, it would gain Vargas nothing. He points to only one juror, a Ms. C.T., who was not excused after answering “yes” to the same questionnaire item as L.H. Under questioning by the prosecutor, C.T. explained that she “wouldn’t want to even be in a jury room with a child molester” and was also anxious about spending time away from her job. She said, “No,” when asked if her questionnaire answer had anything to do with sitting “in judgment of someone else.” Thus L.H.’s and C.T.’s responses were not at all similar.

Vargas criticizes the prosecutor’s stated reasons, placed on the record after the court had found no prima facie case, calling those reasons “gratuitous” and “pretextual.” We reject his criticisms on five grounds. First, those reasons were never passed upon or evaluated for good faith by the trial court, leaving us no third-step ruling to review. Second, we have not ourselves found that the record compelled reaching that step. Third, it would be unfair to call the prosecutor’s remarks gratuitous when they were invited by the court, to protect the record. Fourth, the remarks essentially reinforce the same primary concern we identified objectively—concern about the questionnaire answer. Fifth, in the end, there is no basis in this record for Vargas’s alarmist conclusion that the prosecutor “categorized [J.H.] as a shiftless religious zealot, which rings of an antebellum stereotype relating to slaves.”

The ruling is supported, and we reject Vargas’s several intimations that the court misconstrued seriously, or at all, its proper role in ruling on a Batson/Wheeler challenge. No abuse of discretion is shown.

II. PAS Test Results

Vargas’s three final contentions concern evidentiary use of the numeric result of the PAS test administered at the stop scene. He unsuccessfully opposed this use at trial and claims on appeal that the results (1) were inadmissible because unreliable, in part for noncompliance with regulatory mandates contained in title 17 of the California Code of Regulations (hereafter title 17), (2) were inadmissible for failure to comply fully with admonition standards in Vehicle Code section 23612,3 and (3) were misused by the jury because a written version of an instruction on them was incomplete.

The matter first arose in a pretrial defense motion to exclude the PAS results as unreliable. The court deferred ruling then but ordered that the results not be mentioned until there was a “402 hearing” (Evid. Code, § 402) on their admissibility. That hearing later took place outside the jury’s presence and featured testimony by Officer Charles Blazer, whose duties included calibrating, instruction on and maintenance of two PAS devices used by the Pittsburg Police Department, and Officer David Cranston, who administered the PAS test to Vargas in this case. The court found deficiencies in compliance with title 17 and the statutory admonition, but ruled the results admissible as sufficiently reliable despite those shortcomings. Further discussion and testimony refined the ruling but without a change in admissibility.

Cranston was allowed to testify that he felt that the full circumstances, including Vargas’s driving, demeanor and appearance, and the PAS test result of 0.186, gave him probable cause to arrest. The jury also heard testimony about various shortcomings in the regulatory regime and admonition. The admonition, for example, had advised Vargas of his right to refuse to take the PAS test but, rather than telling him that it would not substitute for his obligation to take a blood, breath or urine test (fn. 3, ante), told him he would have to take another test at the station if he refused. For the Pittsburg Police Department’s PAS devices, as another example, the devices had been calibrated just three weeks before one of them was used here, but the calibration beforehand had not been as frequent as title 17 required, and the Pittsburg Police Department generally did not follow the manufacturer’s manual. Finally, for the test given in this case, deficiencies included taking just one reading rather than two, Vargas not having been watched continuously for 15 minutes beforehand (to guard against false results from mouth versus alveolar alcohol), Officer Cranston lacking optimum training on using the device or its theoretical underpinnings, and his failure to use a precautionary checklist or notate which of the department’s two devices he used.

After discussions with counsel, the court fashioned an instruction, consistent with case law holding that deficiencies in the admonition or title 17 requisites do not render PAS test results inadmissible as such (People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408; People v. Wilson (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 953; People v. Bury (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1194), that instructed jurors to consider any such deficiencies in deciding how much weight to give the results. Vargas does not challenge the instruction as orally delivered, but claims prejudice from the inadvertent omission of an introductory portion in a written version the jury was provided for deliberations.4

In jury argument, defense counsel urged reasonable doubt whether Vargas was intoxicated by attributing his odd driving and demeanor to head trauma and relying on deficiencies in the administration of the PAS test and the device’s maintenance. The jury sent two notes during deliberations. The first asked for all evidence, and the physical evidence was furnished to them. The second note, delivered shortly before the verdicts, inquired: “Was the defendant legally arrested based on the ‘PAS’ test (only one given) and the observations of the police officers without any other tests conducted?” With the consent of counsel, the court wrote in response, “There is no issue for you to resolve regarding the legality of the arrest.”

A. Admissibility

Vargas’s admissibility arguments, once again, are that the PAS results should have been excluded because (1) they were unreliable, apart from noncompliance with title 17, and (2) admonition deficiencies independently demanded their exclusion. Case law since the trial reinforces then extant authority that title 17 noncompliance goes to the weight, not admissibility, of the results, that they are admissible on showings of a reliable device, proper administration and competent operator, and that a trial court’s admissibility ruling is reviewed deferentially, for abuse of discretion. (Roze v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1186-1190 (Roze); People v. Hallquist (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 291, 297.) The law also continues to provide Vargas with no direct support for his notion that a “proper remedy” for an improper admonition under Vehicle Code section 23612, subdivision (i) (fn. 3, ante) is exclusion. The predecessor statute was held not to require exclusion of the results. (People v. Bury, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1205-1206; [former Veh. Code, § 23157, subd. (h)].) Moreover, the admonition is legislatively designed to allow an in-field collection of evanescent breath evidence while ensuring lack of confusion about a suspect’s further duty to submit to a more accurate and reliable test, under more controlled circumstances. (Roze, at p. 1189.) Here, where Vargas was cooperative in taking a later test at the station, it is difficult to see what legislative policy would be furthered by exclusion, and while a court-crafted instruction did invite jurors here to use any admonition deficiency as a factor in weighing the test result (fn. 4, ante), we frankly see no logical connection between a defective admonition and the test’s reliability.

Nevertheless, the short answer is that Vargas has not demonstrated reversible error, even by the most stringent standard of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, even if we assume for sake of argument that the PAS results should have been excluded from evidence. The remaining evidence showed, from Vargas’s demeanor and the Draeger machine intoxilyzer test results subsequently obtained, that he was significantly alcohol impaired. Vargas points to the PAS result of 0.186 as harming him by corroborating the intoxilyzer test results of 0.17 and 0.16 and weakening a “reliability defense,” but just the opposite appears. Defense counsel was able to focus on deficiencies in the PAS test to urge doubt about the overall intoxication conclusion. Without the PAS results, we see nothing by which the defense could have impeached the reliability of the intoxilyzer (Draeger machine) results. The evidence shows that the Draeger machine results were obtained in compliance with title 17, including the double tests, observation period, calibration, administration, use of a checklist, and training. Indeed, trial counsel made no argument that the intoxilyzer tests were obtained or administered deficiently, and appellate counsel points to no such evidence now.

Also, expert testimony extrapolating Vargas’s intoxication level from his height and weight used the unimpeached intoxilyzer results, and the police testimony about his driving, unsteady gait, demeanor, strongly alcohol-tinged breath, sweaty face, and slurred speech was never directly contradicted, and would have been completely uncontradicted without the PAS-test evidence and related controversies. Argument about his demeanor being attributable to physical trauma would have been the same without the PAS test results.

Any error in admitting the PAS test results was harmless.

B. Instruction

The misinstruction claim requires a slightly different analysis, for prejudice in this context necessarily assumes properly admitted evidence. The problem, to reiterate, is that the written instruction sent into the jury room had an omitted first page, so that the written version was incomplete (fn. 4, ante). We cannot tell whether jurors discovered this. On one hand, lack of inquiry about an obviously incomplete instruction that began midsentence suggests that they did not use the writing, in which case there was absolutely no prejudice. On the other hand, we may infer resort to it from the jury note asking, “Was the defendant legally arrested based on the ‘PAS’ test (only one given) and the observations of the police officers without any other tests conducted?”

Assuming some resort to the written instruction, however, we see no prejudice, and Vargas’s briefing is murky, at best, on how he was harmed by the omitted first few lines. They were largely introductory, reminding jurors that they had heard evidence of the PAS test and explaining that officers may use the results as a field sobriety test to investigate reasonable cause to arrest for driving under the influence. This was already evident from the uncontradicted testimony from Cranston about having advised Vargas about wanting to use the PAS to “confirm what his sobriety was” and whether “he was impaired or not impaired.” Thus, that part of the omission was clearly harmless. The jury’s note asking whether Vargas was “legally arrested based on the ‘PAS’ test,” without other field tests, shows curiosity whether they had to decide that question, but the court advised them, without dispute on this appeal, that “the legality of the arrest” was not something for them “to resolve.”

The only other omission, then, was this italicized portion of one sentence: “If the officer decides to use the PAS test, he shall advise the person that he is requesting him to take a PAS test to assist the officer in determining if he is under the influence of alcohol. The person’s obligation to submit to a blood, breath or urine test as required by law for the purpose of detecting the alcoholic content of the person’s blood, is not satisfied by the person submitting to a PAS test. The officer shall advise the person of that fact and of the person’s right to refuse to take the PAS test. [¶] In evaluating the weight you choose to give to the PAS test, you may consider whether or not the evidence shows that the officer gave the admonitions so stated above and also whether or not: [¶] The PAS testing device was in proper working order; [¶] The PAS test was properly administered; and [¶] The operator was competent and qualified.” Nothing in the omitted portion spoke to jurors’ task of assessing the weight of the results by considering title 17 deficiencies (fn. 4, ante). The chopped first sentence explicitly stated a duty to advise, but the rest of the paragraph conveyed the duty implicitly. Also, the duty was implicitly conveyed in Cranston’s trial testimony, without any dispute about his duty.

Perhaps the root problem for Vargas in demonstrating prejudice here, where he does not dispute the correctness of the court’s instruction, is the question: What was the jury supposed to do with the fact that the advisement may have been deficient? This is a conundrum under the instruction, which says that lack of proper advisement may affect the “weight” jurors give to the PAS test results, but provides no guidance on how this is so. Reliability, the instruction goes on to explain, depends on whether: (1) the device was in proper working order; (2) the test was administered properly; and (3) the operator was qualified and competent. Those factors logically bear on the reliability of results (People v. Williams, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 414), but a flawed advisement does not. The advice, after all, had nothing to do with how Vargas was to take the test or promote its accuracy. This conundrum, we suspect, triggered the jury’s note about “the legality of the arrest,” for if a flawed advisement did not render the test or arrest illegal, how else was the jury to weigh the flaw as affecting the reliability of results? Vargas’s briefing does not assist us in this, for he argues that improper advice is a defect requiring a remedy of exclusion, as a matter of law and policy. We have rejected that notion (above) as unsupported by the statute or case law. Even if we could accept his notion, whether to exclude evidence would be a legal question for the court (perhaps premised on a preliminary jury finding of improper advisement; Evid. Code, § 400), not a question for the jury. Jurors, of course, decide questions of fact (id., § 312), not questions of admissibility (see id., § 402).

For all of the reasons stated above, Vargas does not show, and the record does not reflect, how omission of parts of the written instruction prejudiced him.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.





_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Lambden, J.

_________________________

Richman, J.

A111248, People v. Vargas



1 The record shows that voir dire later extended to a second panel, comprised of 30 prospective jurors, but does not show whether any Blacks were included on that panel.



2 Vargas offers census figures, not discussed below, suggesting that the venire in this Contra Costa County case underrepresented Blacks, but his objection below was to a strike violating Batson/Wheeler, not to the venire’s composition (e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 855-863). We agree with the People that the census figures are thus of doubtful relevance and, to the extent they might in another case be considered as part of the totality of relevant facts a court considers on a Batson/Wheeler ruling, they are beyond consideration here because the information was neither presented, nor necessarily apparent, below.



3 Vehicle Code section 23612 provides in pertinent part: “(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153. . . .

“. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“(h) A preliminary alcohol screening [(PAS)] test that indicates the presence or concentration of alcohol based on a breath sample in order to establish reasonable cause to believe the person was driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 is a field sobriety test and may be used by an officer as a further investigative tool.

“(i) If the officer decides to use a [PAS] test, the officer shall advise the person that he or she is requesting that person to take a [PAS] test to assist the officer in determining if that person is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs. The person’s obligation to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test, as required by this section, for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of that person’s blood, is not satisfied by the person submitting to a [PAS] test. The officer shall advise the person of that fact and of the person’s right to refuse to take the [PAS] test.”



4 The oral instruction was as follows, italicized portion omitted in the written version: “You have heard evidence that a preliminary alcohol screening test, which I will call PAS, P-A-S, was administered in this case.

“A PAS test that indicates the presence or concentration of alcohol based on a breath sample in order to establish reasonable cause to believe a person was driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code Section 23152 is a field sobriety test and may be used by an officer as a further investigative tool.

“If the officer decides to use the PAS test, he shall advise the person that he is requesting him to take a PAS test to assist the officer in determining if he is under the influence of alcohol. The person’s obligation to submit to a blood, breath or urine test as required by law for the purpose of detecting the alcoholic content of the person’s blood, is not satisfied by the person submitting to a PAS test. The officer shall advise the person of that fact and of the person’s right to refuse to take the PAS test.

“In evaluating the weight you choose to give to the PAS test, you may consider whether or not the evidence shows that the officer gave the admonitions so stated above and also whether or not:

“The PAS testing device was in proper working order;

“The PAS test was properly administered; and

“The operator was competent and qualified.

“The failure, if any, to follow the regulations adopted in Title 17 by the California Department of Health for procedures to be used in administering tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in a person’s blood may be considered by you in determining the accuracy of the test or test results made in this case.”

Mel Gibson successfully completes California DUI probation terms

California DUI attorney news

Mel Gibson Completes California DUI / Drunk Driving Probation

Mel Gibson's days of checking in with the California DUI court are over, as the actor received good reviews from a Malibu judge, at his final California Drunk Driving / DUI-related progress hearing on Tuesday.

Mel was famously arrested for a California DUI, taking to the Pacific Coast Highway, and spewing anti-Semitic remarks to the officer who pulled over his drunk behind.

The actor pleaded no contest to the California DUI , was given three years of probation, paid California DUI fines and has attended AA and court-mandated California DUI program. He'll remain on California DUI probation for 18 more months but is no longer required to check in with the California DUI court for progress reports.

California DUI lawyers watched this one closely.

Wednesday, February 13, 2008

Tougher California DUI laws?

California dui attorney news

State Sen. Jenny Oropeza, D-Long Beach, today introduced legislation to strengthen California´s DUI / drunk-driving law.

As recommended by the National Highway Safety Administration, Oropeza´s bill will amend the law to reduce the threshold for "excessive" DUI drunk driving for first-time offenders from .20 to .15 blood-alcohol content, making it consistent with many other states. At present, the BAC level for standard DUI is .08 percent, with excessive DUI drunk driving set at .20.

"Too many Californians die needlessly every year because of drunk drivers," Oropeza said. "By reducing the blood-alcohol content standard for the worst of DUI offenders this bill could prevent some of these deaths."

At present, California´s excessive DUI drunk driver law calls on judges to consider imposing enhanced sanctions on first-time DUI offenders with a high BAC. This includes requiring offenders to install an ignition interlock device on their vehicles for up to three years. An IID is a cell phone-sized monitor installed on a driver´s car which will not allow the vehicle to start if the driver has been drinking.


According to Mothers Against Drunk Driving, 58 percent of alcohol-related fatalities in vehicles involve drivers with a .15 BAC or greater. A National Conference of State Legislatures report from 2005 indicated that 26 states have a lower BAC threshold for excessive DUI drunk driving than California, included in that figure are 15 states with a BAC of .15.

SB 1190 is currently in Senate Rules Committee awaiting policy committee assignment.

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Attorney Guide To California's DUI Laws

California DUI lawyer news

Guide To California's DUI Laws

California has some of the nation's strictest laws for driving under the influence (DUI). The DUI laws punish offenders for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, other drugs or a combination of alcohol and other drugs. Implementing California's laws has contributed significantly to the state's sharp declines in drinking and driving crashes.

An outgrowth of the continued toughening of California's DUI laws is that they have become increasingly complex. This online brochure explains and condenses state laws:


Section I describes the DUI offense.
Section II details the types of court-imposed (criminal) penalties meted out to offenders.
Section III discusses the administrative license suspension (ALS) system and the civil penalties the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) employs as part of this system. (The ALS system is designed to impose quick license suspensions, restrictions and revocations on offenders.)
Section IV details criminal DUI penalties for first and repeat offenses.
I. The DUI Offense

A DUI offense is both a criminal and civil matter.

Drivers caught with illegally high alcohol levels in their blood or breath or who refuse to take (and complete) a chemical test are dealt with in two ways. They are:

prosecuted in court for the criminal offense of DUI or refusal. Criminal penalties imposed include jail and prison, fines, treatment, probation and license suspension.
subject to licensing action by the DMV (as part of the state's ALS system) for the civil offenses of driving in excess of the fixed "per se" (see below) alcohol limit or refusing a chemical test.
DUI drivers can be prosecuted for violating either the state's "per se" or "presumptive" alcohol limit or both limits.


Drivers who exceed the per se breath or blood alcohol content (BAC) limit are prosecuted solely for having an amount of alcohol in their system greater than that permitted by law. The driver's level of impairment is not at issue. Drivers are guilty of DUI simply for having violated the per se ("in and of itself") BAC limit. California's per se BAC limits (see Table 1) vary depending on the driver's age, whether he or she is a commercial driver, and whether the case is adjudicated in a court (criminally) or by the DMV (civilly).

Table 1: California's Per Se BAC Limits

Characteristic Criminal Offenses Civil Offenses
Driver's Age
Under 21 .05% .01%
21 and Over .08% .08%
Commercial
Driver .04% .08%


Drivers who exceed the presumptive BAC limit are presumed to have been under the influence of alcohol when driving, that is, it is assumed their faculties for driving were impaired. California's presumptive BAC limit is .08% (about four drinks in an hour for a 160-pound male). BAC levels are established from results of law enforcement officers' chemical tests. Drivers exceeding this presumptive limit are presumed to have been under the influence. Still, they can attempt to prove in court that - despite having had an incriminating BAC - they were not physically impaired when driving.


Drivers whose BAC does not exceed the presumptive BAC limits can still be convicted of DUI if other evidence shows their abilities were impaired.


Courts frequently prosecute arrestees for violating both the per se and presumptive statutes. If evidence from the BAC test is strong, it promotes conviction on the less complex per se charge; if BAC test evidence is not strong, prosecutors will still attempt to use sobriety test evidence to prove that the defendant was physically impaired, and guilty of the presumptive DUI charge.


Defendants convicted of both a presumptive and per se charge are punished for only one of these charges.

Drivers who refuse to take (and complete) a chemical test for DUI still receive severe punishment.

According to California's Implied Consent law, drivers are required to submit to and complete a chemical test when requested to by a law enforcement officer. Consequences of refusing the chemical test are severe, including:

receiving license sanctions more harsh than for those convicted of DUI. Even those found not guilty of DUI in court receive a license suspension through the state's ALS system
facing the likelihood of convictions for both DUI and the test refusal. Those who refuse a chemical test and are later convicted of DUI are further punished by:
receiving all standard DUI penalties
losing the possibility of a judge ordering probation as a substitute for jail
receiving longer jail sentences (see Section IV for length of enhanced sentences)
II. Court-Imposed Penalties

Court-imposed DUI penalties vary in some important ways:

Misdemeanor offenses are punished less severely than felonies.
Misdemeanor DUI offenses (California Vehicle Code [CVC] section 23152) typically do not involve injuries; felony DUI offenses (CVC 23153) typically do. In a felony DUI, someone other than the driver was injured or killed as a result of the offense. Offenders convicted of a misdemeanor can be sentenced to jail (but not prison) and fined up to $1,000; offenders convicted of a felony can be sentenced to prison and fined more than $1,000.


Subsequent offenses are punished more severely than previous offenses.

A second, third or subsequent offense is one that occurs within seven years of a prior DUI offense - or ten years if the prior was a felony. A prior alcohol-involved reckless driving guilty plea is counted as a prior DUI conviction when the court determines punishments.

Mandated Penalties and Judicial Discretion

The chart in Section IV lists state-mandated criminal penalties. State law mandates most minimum DUI offender sanctions. Judges have discretion, however, over whether to apply sanctions other than those mandated in the chart or increase offenders sanctions to the maximum allowed in each category.

For example, for first offense misdemeanor DUI, judges have the discretion to sentence offenders to jail or grant probation. As the chart shows, if the judge decides to impose a 48-hour jail sentence, probation must also be used. Additionally, the judge must impose at least the minimum listed offense fine, penalty assessment, restitution, license suspension period and treatment program duration. Vehicle impoundment and ignition interlock installation are not mandated, although they can be imposed by judicial order.

Criminal Sanctions

Drivers convicted of misdemeanor or felony DUI can receive:

County jail or state prison
Fine, penalty assessment and restitution
Drinking and driving treatment
Vehicle impoundment or forfeiture
License restriction, suspension or revocation
Ignition interlock device requirement
Probation
Jail and Prison

A DUI conviction typically results in a mandatory sentence ranging from 48 hours in jail to four years in prison. The sole exception is for a misdemeanor first offense, where a judge can substitute a fine, require a treatment program and levy a 90-day license restriction.

Jail and prison sentences are extended for certain "enhancing" circumstances. (See Section IV for length of enhanced sentences.) Enhancing circumstances are:

JAIL

driving at "excessive speed" (30 mph above the lawful freeway speed or 20 mph above the lawful speed on other roadways)
refusing to take a chemical test
driving with a minor passenger (under age 14) in the vehicle. (Applies to misdemeanor DUI offenses only.)
PRISON


multiple victims (other than the driver). Sentences are enhanced by one year for each victim (up to three)
hit and run, if fleeing the scene after vehicular manslaughter.

Fine, Penalty Assessment and Restitution

Offenders are commonly ordered to pay three types of fines: an offense fine, a penalty assessment, and restitution. (See Section IV for specific amounts.)

Misdemeanor offense fines range from $390 to $1,000; felony offense fines from $390 to $5000.
Penalty Assessments are 170% of the offense fine, that is, $17 extra for each $10 of offense fine imposed
Restitution fines compensate the injuries and losses of victims. Fines range from $100 to $10,000.
Treatment

Convicted DUI offenders may be ordered to attend and complete an alcohol and/or drug treatment program. Drivers suspended for a DUI conviction must complete a drinking driving treatment program prior to license reinstatement.

Repeat offenders granted probation must complete a program for the number of months specified in the chart in Section IV.

Offenders receive no credit for program activities prior to the current violation.

Vehicle Impoundment and Forfeiture

The court can order that the vehicle of a convicted DUI offender be impounded if the offender is its registered owner. A judge can order that an impounded vehicle be forfeited - declared a "nuisance" and sold. Impounds can also be imposed on vehicle owners under 21 (even if not in the vehicle) if a driver or passenger of his or her vehicle is under 21 and illegally possesses alcohol.

License Restriction, Suspension and Revocation

A driver license can be:

Restricted - limiting when and under what circumstances drivers can use a vehicle. Restrictions typically include: driving only to and from work or treatment, and as required by work; maintaining financial responsibility (insurance)
Suspended - withdrawn for a specified period or until some required condition (such as financial responsibility) is met
Revoked - terminated, requiring drivers to reapply for a license after their revocation period.

Commercial vehicle operators convicted of DUI have their license "disqualified," that is, they are prohibited from operating commercial vehicles. A suspension or revocation of a commercial license also applies to the driver's non-commercial license.

Courts can postpone the start of a DUI offender's license suspension or revocation period until after imprisonment. Postponement is typically applied to repeat DUI offenses, DUI offenses involving multiple victims, and hit and run convictions.

Drivers under 21 convicted of DUI (or alcohol-related reckless driving) have their licenses suspended for an additional one-year period, over and above the license suspension they receive for DUI. Drivers under 18 convicted of adult-level DUI (.08% BAC or greater) have their licenses revoked for: one year; until they reach 18; or the period prescribed for the offense-whichever of these three is longest. License reinstatement costs $100 and requires proof of financial responsibility. Youths aged 13-20 convicted of any alcohol-related offense (even those not involving driving) have their first license delayed for a year.

Ignition Interlock Device

For first-time offenders, courts may choose to impose the installation and maintenance of a certified ignition interlock device (which prevents a vehicle from being started if the driver has alcohol in his or her system). For second and other repeat offenders, the device is mandatory. Courts require the device from one to three years once the driver license is restored.

Probation

Court-ordered probation for DUI offenders lasts three to five years. During probation, offenders must not:

commit any criminal offense
drive with any measurable alcohol in their blood
refuse to submit to a chemical test upon request
fail to pay a fine, assessment or restitution
III. Administrative License Suspension (ALS) System

ALS Sanctions

In addition to sanctions imposed as a result of a court conviction, DUI offenders face administrative license actions (suspensions and revocations) by the DMV. These actions are mandatory (the DMV must apply them on violators) and independent of any criminal penalties imposed by a court. Table 2 summarizes license suspensions and revocations imposed on DUI drivers.

Table 2: DMV License Suspensions and Revocations

Nature of Offense First Second Third (or more)
Driver Under 21,
BAC .01% or more 1 year or more 1 year or more 1 year or more
Driver 21 and Over
BAC .08% or more 1 year or more 1 year or more 1 year or more
Chemical Test
Refusal 1 year 2 years*
(Revocation) 3 years*
(Revocation)
*This punishment for a second "test refusal" also applies
if prior offenses were for DUI or were DUI-related.
ALS Process

The administrative license suspension process begins when a driver is cited for DUI. The driver license is taken on the spot by the arresting law enforcement officer if the driver:

violates the civil per se laws (as shown in Table 1: .01% for drivers under 21; .08% for drivers 21 or over)
refuses a chemical test requested by an officer
Licensed offenders are then served with a DMV order of suspension or revocation which serves as a 30-day license. The suspension or revocation takes effect in 30 days. Within 10 days from the citation date, drivers can request a DMV hearing. At the DMV hearing, only a limited number of issues may be considered. These are whether:


the officer had reasonable cause to believe the driver was driving a vehicle with an illegally high BAC
the driver was arrested (or "lawfully detained" if age 21 or less)
the driver refused a chemical test or a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test
the driver was informed that a refusal would result in suspension or revocation


ALS hearings are independent of criminal prosecutions. That is, proceedings and findings in one venue do not affect proceedings and findings in the other. For example, if a defendant's charges are dropped in court, this decision has no effect on the determination made at an ALS hearing. An important exception exists, however: a not guilty verdict in a criminal case overturns an ALS determination and its sanctions.

Continuance for blood retesting allowed in California DUI death case

california dui attorney news

A judge in the california dui case against 19-year-old Katie McKewon granted a request to continue the case to April 11.


In the california dui hearing this morning at the Pleasanton courthouse, Kirk Elliot, who is representing the teen, said he wanted to re-test california dui blood samples that McKewon gave to authorities after a california dui car accident that killed her passenger, 19-year-old Laurel Williams.


The Oct. 20 california dui accident occurred in the morning along Foothill Road, just north of Highland Oaks Drive. McKewon, at the wheel, allegedly crossed over the center divide, crashing head-on into a Mercedes SUV, killing Williams and seriously injuring the driver of the Mercedes.


She was arrested in November on a charge of gross vehicular manslaughter and four counts of felony drunk driving causing great bodily injury / california dui . Police said tests showed McKewon had a blood alcohol level of .23, more than three times the legal limit for persons over the age of 21. Those younger than 21 cannot have any measurable amount of alcohol in their system, according toc alifornia dui state law.




When McKewon was arrested for california dui , she had been staying in an alcohol rehabilitation facility. Elliot told the judge this morning that his client has been attending alcohol classes since she's been in custody.




This is the third time the case against McKewon has been continued. The california dui defendant was expected to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. Also continued was a prior incident that occurred last June, where McKewon was arrested for allegedly assaulting a police officer. Both hearings have been scheduled by Judge Christine Moruza for April 11.


In a related matter, charges against Brentwood resident Paul Stonebarger, 21, who was arrested in connection with providing alcohol for the party that McKewon and Williams attended the night before the accident, will be heard Wednesday when Stonebarger is expected to enter a plea.

6 years for running over doctor in California DUI

California DUI lawyer news

A Montecito woman who ran over a local doctor in a California DUI drunk driving incident learns her fate today.

A judge sentenced 21-year-old Heather Hulsey to six years and four months in prison for vehicular manslaughter, California DUI drunk driving, and hit-and-run charges.

Hulsey pleaded guilty in December to running over Dr. Ronald Shlensky in 2006.

Shlensky's son says the sentence sends an important message to the community.

"Drunken driving will not be tolerated, the culture of drunkenness will not be tolerated, and people must take responsibility for their actions," said Shlensky's son, Lincoln Shlensky.

While awaiting California DUI trial, Hulsey was arrested again for public intoxication at a UC Santa Barbara function.

Snowplow Operator gets Tahoe California DUI

California DUI lawyer news

A city snowplow operator, arrested on suspicion of California DUI driving under the influence while on the job, has resigned.

Anthony Ortiz, 43, submitted his resignation Friday, according to Janet Emmett, human-resources manager for the city of South Lake Tahoe.

The resignation comes before the completion of an internal investigation by the city. "We will not be pursuing any further employment actions," Emmett said.

Ortiz still may face a California DUI driving under the influence charge stemming from an incident in the early-morning hours of Feb. 3, during which Ortiz allegedly was found asleep inside a city snowplow, the smell of alcohol coming from the cab.

"We're treating this as a DUI and handling like we would any DUI case," Police Chief Terry Daniels said last week.

Ortiz's California DUI arraignment had not been scheduled as of Friday.

Another Hilton arrested for California DUI

California DUI attorney news

Paris Hilton's younger brother Barron has been arrested for California DUI driving under the influence in Malibu, Calif.

The 18-year-old was pulled over by cops as he cruised down the Pacific Coast Highway in a black Mercedes-Benz at 8:30 a.m. on Tuesday.

Hilton, who was traveling with a passenger at the time, is currently being booked at the Lost Hills Sheriff's station, reports California DUI police.

Barron's arrest comes just eight months after his sibling spent a brief spell behind bars in relation to a charge of California DUI dating back to September 2006.

No. California DUI nets 7 drunk driving arrests

California DUI lawyer news

A California driving under the influence (DUI) checkpoint in Clearlake on Highway 53 south of 18th Avenue netted 14 California arrests, seven of which were California DUI arrests. The seven California arrests that were not DUI-related included vehicle code violations and health and safety violations, or what deputies refer to as "h and s" violations.

One California DUI police officer from Lakeport police department, two officers from Clearlake police department, six sheriff's deputies, four California Highway Patrol officers and two Lake County jail correctional officers participated in the California DUI checkpoint.

The California DUI checkpoint began at 8 p.m., and California DUI officers tried to keep warm in the 45 degree temperature by writing reports on the hoods of patrol vehicles, according to volunteer firefighter Bob Minenna, who was on-site to photograph the scene. Four arrests were made in the first two hours of the checkpoint. Between 8 p.m. and 12 a.m., seven California DUI arrests were made.

On top of the checkpoint, the CHP conducted a California DUI mobilization, netting four California DUIs, one vehicle impound and numerous citations, according to CHP officer Adam Garcia.

Those arrested were transported to California DUI jail.

Monday, February 11, 2008

Prior DUI used to prove malice in murder DUI conviction

California DUI / drunk driving attorney case

Filed 2/11/08 P. v. Davalos CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SERGIO J. DAVALOS,

Defendant and Appellant.
D050184
(Super. Ct. No. JCF15544)


APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, William D. Lehman, Judge. Affirmed.

Sergio J. Davalos was found guilty of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, leaving the scene of an accident, driving under the influence of alcohol with a prior conviction for driving under the influence, and driving while his driver's license was suspended. Davalos was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life. He appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict of second degree murder and the trial court erred in allowing his prior conviction for driving under the influence to be offered as evidence of malice.

FACTS

A. Prosecution Case

On February 4, 2005, while on probation from an earlier driving under the influence conviction, appellant was arrested for driving under the influence. It was determined appellant's blood alcohol level was .12.

From December 2004 to March 2005 appellant attended and completed a program concerning the dangers of driving under the influence, the law related to drinking and driving and the effects of alcohol consumption on the ability to drive safely.

On the evening of April 4, 2005, appellant, whose driver's license was suspended, drove Esmeralda Rodriguez and Elaine Castillon in his pickup truck to an orchard in Imperial County. Rodriguez estimated that between 10:00 p.m. on April 4 and 1:30 a.m. on April 5 appellant consumed at least 12 cans of beer. At approximately 1:30 a.m. on April 5, 2005, the three left the area on a dirt road. Appellant, still drinking beer, and driving too fast, was unable to negotiate a turn. The truck rolled over, Castillon was ejected from the vehicle and died at the scene.

After the crash, appellant made a cell call to his friend Joseph Flores. Flores drove to the scene. Appellant, appearing "wasted" and smelling of alcohol, got into Flores's truck and the two men drove off. Appellant repeatedly told Flores, "I fucked up." As they drove, appellant called the police to report the rollover. When Flores and appellant neared the Calipatria police station, appellant got out of the truck and fled. Flores contacted the police and led rescue personnel to where Castillon was dying.

A criminalist concluded that based on appellant's reported consumption of beer at the time he lost control of his truck, his blood alcohol level was .19.

C. Defense Case

Appellant testified in his own defense. While admitting the truth of most of the prosecution's evidence, he testified that the night Castillon died he consumed only two beers.

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree murder. He argues that while he might have been drunk, was on probation from a prior conviction for driving under the influence and might have been driving unsafely, he was not driving recklessly, had tried to stop and after Castillon was injured tried to assist her. He argues the evidence might have been sufficient to convict him of vehicular manslaughter but not murder.

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, we review the entire record viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and presuming in support of the verdict the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence. The issue is whether the record so viewed discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value such that a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1156.)

"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought." (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a).) Malice is implied when the circumstances of the killing show "an abandoned and malignant heart." (§ 188.) Implied malice may be found in a vehicular homicide when the defendant's conduct demonstrates both a wanton disregard for life and a subjective awareness of the risk created by his or her behavior. Implied malice murder involves a degree of risk and an element of wantonness that is absent in vehicular manslaughter. The mental elements also differ. Vehicular manslaughter requires only a showing of gross negligence, i.e., would a reasonable person in the defendant's position have been aware of the risk involved? Murder based on implied malice requires the defendant actually appreciate the risk. (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296-298.) It is this conscious disregard for human life that distinguishes implied malice from gross negligence. (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 109.)

In a vehicular homicide case, the actual appreciation of risk and conscious disregard for human life may be shown by the circumstances of the particular homicide. It may also be shown by the defendant's history of drunk driving convictions and participation in educational programs, both of which can support a finding that a defendant actually appreciated the risk of drinking and driving. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 359.)

The jury could reasonably conclude appellant acted wantonly and with an actual appreciation of the risk his behavior created. Appellant was not new to driving or to drinking and driving. He was convicted of driving under the influence in the past, and he drove drunk while on probation from that conviction. As part of his probation, he attended and completed a lengthy education program that emphasized the dangers and consequences of drunk driving. Appellant clearly appreciated the risks of driving under the influence. Nonetheless, appellant purchased beer, consumed a large quantity of it in a relatively short period, and then, while still drinking, and with a blood alcohol level twice the legal limit, drove in an unsafe manner on a dirt road. The evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of second degree murder.

B. Prior Conviction

Appellant notes his prior conviction for driving under the influence was introduced as evidence of his appreciation of the risk of driving under the influence of alcohol. That conviction was based on appellant's plea of guilty. He argues, for the first time on appeal, and without supporting authority, that because at the time he entered his plea he was not advised his conviction could be used in the future to prove him guilty of second degree murder, his plea was defective and should not have been used as evidence in this case.

Before entering a plea of guilty, a defendant, among other things, must be advised of the direct but not the collateral consequences of the plea. In People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 633-634, the defendant argued his prior second degree murder conviction could not be used as a basis for a prior murder special circumstance because at the time of his plea to the prior murder, he was not advised his conviction could be used in the future to support a special circumstances allegation. The court in Gurule concluded such use of the defendant's prior conviction was a collateral and not direct consequence of his plea. That being the case, it is inescapable that the use of appellant's prior drinking and driving conviction in this case was not a direct consequence of his plea. The trial court at the time of his plea was not required to advise him his conviction might be used later to prove malice. The fact of appellant's prior conviction was properly admitted in this case.

The judgment is affirmed.

BENKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.



1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

California Congressional Candidate faces DUI charges

California DUI lawyer news

GRASS VALLEY, California — Theodore Terbolizard, a GOP congressional candidate, is facing possible charges of California DUI - driving under the influence after Grass Valley police pulled him over for speeding.

California DUI lawyers will soon find out Terbolizard was stopped at 1:43 a.m. Sunday for what California DUI officers described as alleged excessive speed as he was on his way home from a bar in Nevada City, according to California DUI police records.

California DUI officers arrested Terbolizard on suspicion of a California DUI / Drunk Driving after administering a California DUI breathalyzer test. California DUI police are waiting for results of a California DUI blood-alcohol test.

Terbolizard, from Cedar Ridge, is running for the seat being vacated by Republican Rep. John Doolittle, who has announced he will not seek another term.

The candidate reports this California DUI will not affect his campaign—other than to give him publicity. California DUI attorneys will discover from public records he has been arrested for California DUI .

Drunk Driving Cop Suspended With Pay

California DUI lawyer news

A Red Springs police officer charged with DUI / drunk driving has been place on administrative leave with pay, according to DUI / drunk driving authorities.

Officer Raul Maisonet, 55, was arrested for DUI / drunk driving Wednesday night in Spring Lake. Red Springs Police Chief Troy McDuffie said he will conduct an internal investigation of the incident. Any further action will be determined after the case makes it way through DUI / drunk driving court, he said.

Maisonet, a patrolman, has worked with the department for two months, McDuffie said.

According to Spring Lake police, Maisonet was driving westbound on Green Street when he lost control of the car, swerved off the road and struck a tree. The vehicle he was driving was not a Red Springs vehicle, DUI / drunk driving authorities said.

Sunday, February 10, 2008

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Saturday, February 9, 2008

Rockers Velvet Revolver Weiland goes to rehab after California DUI charge

San Diego California DUI attorney news

California DUI arrestee / Rockers Velvet Revolver have been forced to pull out of a concert in California after frontman Scott Weiland checked into rehab.

The band had been due to play at the House of Blues in San Diego, California, on Thursday night but the gig had to be scrapped after Weiland voluntarily entered a rehabilitation center.

A statement from the group has apologized to fans and promised to reschedule the canceled show.

It reads, "Following Velvet Revolver's performance last night in Los Angeles, lead singer Scott Weiland voluntarily entered a rehab facility. Tonight's San Diego show at the House of Blues has been postponed; the rescheduled date for San Diego is (to be announced). Velvet Revolver deeply apologize to their fans and thank them for sticking by the group."

Weiland has a long history of alcohol and drug problems that have culminated in convictions for driving under the influence and buying crack cocaine. The singer also faces fresh DUI charges after he was arrested in November following an accident on a California highway.

Weiland's erratic behavior was also called into question last month when he failed to show up for a Velvet Revolver gig at the Sundance Film Festival in Utah, leaving his bandmates to carry on without him.

San Diego California DUI driver hit power pole

San Diego California DUI lawyer

A San Diego California DUI drunk driver plowed his pickup truck into a power pole in Winter Gardens Friday morning, triggering what San Diego California DUI authorities said would be a daylong closure.

The accident on Woodside Avenue, just east of Riverford Road, was reported at 6:05 a.m., according to San Diego California DUI California Highway Patrol in San Diego California.

The driver, who suffered no injuries, was in custody on suspicion of San Diego California DUI driving under the influence, Pennings said. His identity was not immediately released.

Pennings said westbound Woodside Avenue would be closed for the rest of the day. One-way traffic control will allow traffic to pass through in both directions on the eastbound lane. In addition to the pole, the truck broke a small gas line connected to a roadside meter. But unlike the pole, the line was quickly fixed by San Diego Gas & Electric, San Diego California DUI police claim.

Friday, February 8, 2008

California DUI attorney updates around the state

California DUI lawyer news

Sonora, CA -- 44 year old Victoria Etiz of Sonora was booked into the County Jail during the Wednesday noon hour on multiple charges including California DUI "driving under the influence."

Witnesses told Sonora California DUI Police officers that Etiz, driving a 2007 Toyota Corolla, had intitiated her bizarre driving by literally parking for a moment at the Hess Ave.-Mono Way intersection. She then attempted to drive up an off-ramp of Hwy 108 only to make a U-turn on the bypass and return to Mono Way.

Etiz then failed to stop for a traffic light and turned westbound onto Mono Way traveling at a very high rate of speed.

The driver of a second vehicle attempted to avoid Etiz but failed to do so. An ensuing collision east of Greenley Rd. caused back and neck pain for the driver of the second vehicle. Etiz was contacted by officers and blew a preliminary .315, close to four times the California DUI legal limit.

Etiz was immediately placed under arrest and booked into the County Jail on charges of felony California DUI drunk driving-causing an injury and felony child endangerment. Etiz's five year old son was in the back seat at the time of the accident. He was turned over to Child Welfare Services.

Lt. Mark Stinson commented that if witness had notified the California DUI Police Department at the outset of Etiz's bizarre vdriving, the California DUI accident probably could have been avoided.

California DUI lawyer news

NapaValleyRegister.com publishes monthly statistics on California DUI arrests and California DUI convictions for California DUI driving under the influence — and so-called “wet reckless” convictions — in Napa County.

California DUI Arrest information is from the Napa County Sheriff’s Department. Convictions, names and blood-alcohol levels are from Napa County Superior Court.
California DUI Convictions include California DUI cases in which the person pleaded guilty or no contest to one or more drunk driving charges, or where one or more such charges resulted in a guilty verdict at California DUI trial.

California DUI Vehicle code violations considered are: driving under the influence (Vehicle Code section 23152), reckless driving while under the influence (23103.5) and causing injury to another while driving while under the influence (23153).

The California DUI blood-alcohol levels provided by the court are based on a variety of tests — some taken at the scene of the arrest or county jail, others through a later blood test — and have not necessarily been proven or admitted in court. It is unlawful for any person to operate a vehicle if that person has a blood-alcohol level of .08 or more, according to the California Vehicle Code.

California DUI Arrests: 54

California DUI Convictions/pleas: 98

California DUI Reported blood-alcohol below .10 or unavailable: 23

California DUI Reported blood-alcohol between .10 and .19: 53

California DUI Reported blood-alcohol between .20 and .29: 17

California DUI Reported blood-alcohol between .30 and .39: 5

http://www.napavalleyregister.com/articles/2008/02/08/news/local/doc47a229007d396380608230.txt


SANTA MARIA California DUI attorney news

The man accused of driving drunk, resulting in a California DUI crash that killed a woman's unborn child, appears in a Santa Maria courtroom.

Brandon Parker's California DUI arraignment has been postponed at least four times.

The District Attorney says he has not yet entered a California DUI plea.

Today, Parker's attorney asked for a pre-plea California DUI report for the Probation Department.

Police say he crashed into 20-year-old Adrianne Dazo from Santa Maria in late December. She was more than five months pregnant at the time. Adrianne is now recovering at home.

Parker remains in California DUI custody.


California DUI lawyers may respond.

Thursday, February 7, 2008

California DUI probationer Lindsay Lohan needs daddy

California DUI criminal defense / counseling help

California DUI probationer Lindsay Lohan has blamed her bad behaviour on not having a father figure.

The 21-year-old star - checked into rehab for the third time last August following two driving under the influence (California DUI drunk driving) arrests and a brief stint in jail - says seeing her father sent to jail caused her a lot of emotional pain.

Lindsay, who did not speak to her dad Michael - a recovering alcoholic - for three years, said: "When I look back on this last year, it's like, what was I thinking? Not seeing my father was really hard for me, and not being with my family enough.

"I wasn't taking any time to just sit and live and breathe. I was going, going, going, and that ran me down. It was a stressor. It upset me. I didn't have a father to call, and that was a lot of the pain."

Lindsay - who was ordered to work in a mortuary after pleading no contest to misdemeanour California DUI and cocaine possession last August - now believes she has a better outlook on life following her spell at Utah's Cirque Lodge rehab.

She added to Harper's Bazaar magazine: "I've learned so much, like learning to love my life a different way. And I wasn't taking the time to feel my feelings. Being away and going to a place where I could learn about that and take the time with a clear mind to get back on the right track was nice."

Michael served two years in prison from 2005 for various probation violations following an arrest for California DUI .

Third California DUI / Drunk Driving charge

California DUI / Drunk Driving DUI lawyer news

§ 23546. Third California DUI / Drunk Driving offense

(a) If a person is convicted of a violation of Section 23152 and the offense occurred within 10 years of two separate violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, 23152, or 23153, or any combination thereof, that resulted in convictions, that person shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 120 days nor more than one year and by a fine of not less than three hundred ninety dollars ($390) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). The person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be revoked by the Department of Motor Vehicles as required in paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352. The court shall require the person to surrender his or her driver's license to the court in accordance with Section 13550.

The California DUI / Drunk Driving charge must be 3 offenses within 10 years, not 3 convictions within 10 years.

This is only for setting minimums and maximums, and they can still argue this is 3rd California DUI / Drunk Driving charge or 4th California DUI / Drunk Driving charge in lifetime so minimums for this "2nd" California DUI / Drunk Driving charge or "3rd" California DUI / Drunk Driving charge is not appropriate, respectively.

Contact a California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyer for help.

6 years for Felony DUI in California, had prior DUI vehicular manslaughter

California DUI attorney case update

Filed 2/6/08 P. v. Trautloff CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHN HENRY TRAUTLOFF,

Defendant and Appellant.
A116204
(Mendocino County Super. Ct.

No. SCWLCRC06-69915)


Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant John Henry Trautloff pled guilty to count 2, driving with .08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood, with a prior felony manslaughter conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5, subd. (a)(3)), and admitted a prior strike allegation. This offense was committed on February 21, 2006. In exchange, count 1, driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol with a prior felony manslaughter conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5, subd. (a)(3)), and three special allegations charged under count 2 were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to six years in state prison. His sole contention on appeal is that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The People contend the appeal should be dismissed because it challenges matters admitted by his guilty plea and defendant failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. We conclude that defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim goes to the issue of his guilt of the offense to which he pled guilty; therefore, his claim would not be cognizable on appeal even if he had obtained a certificate of probable cause. We shall therefore dismiss the appeal.

Background

At the April 6, 2006 preliminary hearing, the prosecutor presented evidence of the February 2006 incident, as well as an abstract of judgment stating that in March 2002 defendant was convicted of DUI vehicular manslaughter pursuant to Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(3)) (hereafter section 192(c)(3)).1 (Italics added.) The magistrate found the evidence sufficient to believe the prior DUI vehicular manslaughter conviction true.

The Information

The April 19, 2006 information charged defendant with two counts of DUI with a felony manslaughter prior. Count 1 charged the offense under Vehicle Code sections 23152, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 23152(a)) and 23550.5, subdivision (a)(3) (hereafter 23550.5(a)(3)), and alleged that, in April 2002, defendant was convicted of Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(1) (hereafter section 192(c)(1)).2 (Italics added.) Count 2 charged the offense under Vehicle Code sections 23152, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 23152(b)) and 23550.5(a)(3), and again alleged that in April 2002 defendant was convicted of Penal Code section 192(c)(1). (Italics added.) The information also contained four special allegations: (1) a 60-day enhancement for speeding (Veh. Code, § 23582, subd. (a)); (2) a one-year prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)); (3) a prior strike allegation based on a 1987 burglary conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and (4) a prior strike allegation based on the 2002 Penal Code section 192(c)(3) conviction. (Italics added.)

Entry of Plea

Through defense counsel, defendant waived a reading of the information at his April 20, 2006 arraignment; and, on April 27, entered pleas of not guilty to both counts and denied all the special allegations. Thereafter, defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the burglary prior strike allegation pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

On October 13, 2006, defense counsel stated that after conferring with defendant, defendant would be willing to plead guilty to count 2 and admit the burglary prior strike allegation in exchange for dismissal of the remaining count and special allegations. The court stated that count 2 alleged a violation of Vehicle Code sections 23152(b) and 23550.5(a)(3). Defendant acknowledged that was his understanding of count 2, and acknowledged his understanding of the burglary prior strike allegation. Defendant was advised of the rights he would give up by virtue of his plea, and he acknowledged he had sufficient time to discuss the case and its resolution with counsel. Defense counsel opined that defendant understood his rights, the consequences of their waiver and the elements of the offense, and stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript supplied a factual basis for defendant’s plea. The court accepted defendant’s plea and granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the remaining count and special allegations.

At the December 8, 2006 judgment and sentencing hearing, the court denied defendant’s request to reconsider his Romero motion, and sentenced defendant to the upper three-year term on the Vehicle Code sections 23152(b), and 23550.5(a)(3) offense, doubled under the “three strikes” law. Defendant filed a timely appeal from the “judgment and sentence.” The appellate record does not contain a certificate of probable cause. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5.)

Discussion

Defendant notes that Vehicle Code section 23550.5(a)(3) specifies that its predicate violation must be Penal Code section 192(c)(1), and that Penal Code section 192(c)(3) is the predicate violation for Vehicle Code section 23550.5, subdivision (b). He argues that since the evidence established, and the magistrate found, he previously committed vehicular manslaughter under Penal Code section 192(c)(3), there was no factual basis for his guilty plea to violating Vehicle Code sections 23152(b) and 23550.5(a)(3). Thus, he contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) argue at the preliminary hearing that Penal Code section 192(c)(3), could not be the predicate for Vehicle Code section 23550.5(a)(3) under counts 1 and 2; (2) move to dismiss the information; (3) withdraw defendant’s plea due to the absence of a factual predicate therefor; and, (4) request a certificate of probable cause. He also asserts that his counsel undermined his Romero motion by erroneously stating that the prior vehicular manslaughter was pursuant to Penal Code section 192(c)(1).

The People contend the appeal is barred and should be dismissed both because it challenges matters admitted by his guilty plea and he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. In response, defendant contends his ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not challenge his plea or assert error in the plea proceedings. Instead, he argues, since his conviction on its face lacks the statutorily required predicate, his defense counsel was ineffective in permitting him to plead guilty, waive his constitutional rights, and stipulate to the factual basis of a crime that could not have been committed as a matter of law.

“Issues cognizable on an appeal following a guilty plea are limited to issues based on ‘reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings’ resulting in the plea. [Citations.]” (People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896.) Moreover, an appeal from a guilty plea will not lie unless the defendant files a written statement of the issues in the trial court and obtains a certificate of probable cause. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5) Two types of issues may be raised on appeal from a guilty plea without obtaining a certificate of probable cause: issues relating to the validity of a search and seizure and issues arising after entry of the plea that do not affect its validity. (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 30(b)(4) (now rule 8.304); People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 780.

In essence, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an assertion that there was no factual basis for his plea to violating Vehicle Code sections 23152(b) and 23550.5(a)(3), and his counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize that below. The People are correct that defendant is estopped by his guilty plea from asserting this issue on appeal.

In People v. Pinon (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 904, the defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by an ex-felon (Pen. Code, § 12021). On appeal the defendant contended the plea was invalid because the record did not reflect a factual basis for his plea, in that his prior conviction was a misdemeanor, not a felony. (Id. at pp. 907, 909.) The defendant also asserted his counsel was incompetent for failing to recognize that fact. (Id. at p. 909.) In rejecting the defendant’s contention, the court stated, the “defendant’s contention that the prior conviction was a misdemeanor rather than a felony, and the related contention that counsel was incompetent, go solely and directly to the question whether he was in fact guilty of the charged offense. However, his plea of guilty ‘operated to remove such issues from consideration as a plea of guilty admits all matters essential to the conviction.’ [Citations.] Consequently, these issues are simply not cognizable on the present appeal, whether or not [the] defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause.” (Id. at p. 910.)

Defendant argues that Pinon should be reconsidered because it is “contrary to well-established decisional and constitutional law both as to the waiver and reviewability of fundamental constitutional rights and effective assistance of counsel claims under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” However, as noted by the People, in In re Troy Z. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1170, 1180-1182, our Supreme Court discussed Pinon and affirmed its principles in holding that parents who pled no contest to a juvenile dependency petition’s jurisdictional allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (e) (hereafter section 300(e)) were barred from asserting on appeal that their conduct did not fall within that section. Citing Pinon, the Troy Z. court expressly rejected the parents’ argument that the alleged legal inapplicability of section 300(e) to their conduct rendered their claims cognizable on appeal. (In re Troy Z., at p. 1181, fn. 11.) “Any other conclusion—i.e., allowing a parent to challenge jurisdiction findings on appeal after entering a valid no contest plea to those findings, and after the parties proceeded under the assumption that reunification services would not be offered—would not only violate the principles articulated in [Pinon and DeVaughn], but also frustrate the clear purpose of the [juvenile dependency] statutory scheme . . . .” (In re Troy Z., at pp. 1181-1182.) We see no reason to question Pinon’s reasoning or result.

Because defendant is estopped by his guilty plea from raising his counsel’s failure to challenge the lack of a factual basis for his plea, the issue is not cognizable on appeal whether or not he obtained a certificate of probable cause. (See People v. Pinon, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at pp. 909-910.) In any event, defendant’s assertion that his counsel was deficient in failing to obtain a certificate of probable cause lacks merit. “There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that defendant sought to procure a certificate of probable cause or that he informed counsel that he wished to attack on appeal the validity of his guilty plea. In these circumstances, we are precluded by [Penal Code] section 1237.5 from reviewing that issue on the present appeal.” (Pinon, at p. 909.)




Disposition

The appeal is dismissed.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.

JONES, P.J.

STEVENS, J.*



1 As of March 2002, Penal Code section 192(c)(3) defined vehicular manslaughter as: “Driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, but without gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.” (Italics added.) (Stats. 1998, ch. 278, § 1.) Penal Code section 192(c)(3) was amended effective January 1, 2007. (Stats. 2006, ch. 91, § 2.)



2 In defining vehicular manslaughter, the 2002 version of Penal Code section 192(c)(1) provided, in relevant part: “Except as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 191.5, driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, and with gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.” (Italics added.) (Stats. 1998, ch. 278, § 1.)



* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

DUI for firearm felony results in 3 year upper term California drunk driving

California DUI lawyer case update

Filed 2/7/08 P. v. Randall CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSHUA DEVIN RANDALL,

Defendant and Appellant.
A117607
(Mendocino County Super. Ct.

No. SCUK-CRCR-06-73204)


Appellant Joshua Devin Randall was stopped for speeding by a California Highway Patrol officer on August 30, 2006. The officer detained appellant after appellant exited his vehicle. Appellant had a beer can in his hand and attempted to walk away from the officer, who grabbed him by the arm and brought him back. The officer detected a “strong” odor of alcohol, and placed appellant in the back seat of his patrol car. The officer then returned to the truck to “make sure no one else was inside,” and saw a pistol on the floorboard, which he later determined was loaded. The officer checked appellant’s driving record, which revealed appellant’s license had been revoked and he was a convicted felon.

Appellant was charged by an information filed September 25, 2006, with felony possession of a firearm by an ex-felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1), misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) (count 2), misdemeanor driving with .08 percent or more blood alcohol level (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b) (count 3), and misdemeanor driving with suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)) (count 4). The May 26, 1999 prior felony conviction charged in count 1 was a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2.

On November 22, 2006, appellant entered a guilty plea to count 1. On April 17, 2007, appellant was sentenced to the aggravated term of three years. On appeal, appellant challenges imposition of the upper term.

Discussion

The trial court relied upon three factors in aggravation to impose the upper term: (1) appellant’s prior convictions as an adult are numerous, including at least two prior felony convictions (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2));1 (2) appellant served prior prison terms (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and appellant’s prior performance on probation or parole has been poor (rule 4.421(b)(5)). Other than appellant entering a plea at a “fairly early stage” of the proceeding (rule 4.423(b)(3)), the court found no factors in mitigation.

I. Did the Trial Court Apply Cunningham to Its
Sentencing Decision?

Citing Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.___; [127 S.Ct. 856], the trial court began its sentencing discussion by stating, “And I am looking at objective factors now that are not factors that the Cunningham case would prevent me from considering assuming that Cunningham applies now. But even if it did, [considering] the factors in aggravation” (italics added), “the aggravated term is required under the law.” Appellant argues it is not clear the “trial court understood Cunningham was binding upon it.” We, of course assume the trial court properly understood the range of its discretion. (Evid. Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.”].) More significantly, it is clear that the trial court resolved any uncertainty in its mind by assuming that Cunningham governed its decision. Thus, we conclude that the trial court applied Cunningham in exercising its sentencing discretion.

II. Did the Trial Court Properly Apply Cunningham?

Appellant contends the upper term sentences must be reversed because they were based on facts not admitted by him or found true by the jury.

In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490, the United States Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment and held that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be tried to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In Cunningham v. California, supra, 127 S.Ct. at page 871, the high court held that California’s determinate sentencing law violated a defendant’s federal right to trial because it assigned to the trial judge, not the jury, the authority to make factual findings that subject the defendant to the possibility of an upper term.

“The United States Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on an aggravating fact that renders him or her eligible for a sentence above the statutory maximum. First, a fact admitted by the defendant may be used to increase his or her sentence beyond the [statutory] maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict. [Citation.] Second, the right to jury trial and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt do not apply to the aggravating fact of a prior conviction. [Citations.]” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 835, 836-837.) Moreover, “as long as a single aggravating circumstance that renders a defendant eligible for the upper term sentence has been established in accordance with the requirements of Apprendi and its progeny, any additional [factfinding] engaged in by the trial court in selecting the appropriate sentence among the three available options does not violate the defendant’s right to a jury trial.” (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 813.)

Here, the trial court properly relied on at least one aggravating circumstance that entitled the court to impose the upper term sentence: the existence of a felony conviction in addition to the one alleged as an element of count 1. The probation report reflects that appellant was convicted of a felony violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.1 in 1995.

Because at least one aggravating circumstance was established by means that independently satisfied the requirements of the Sixth Amendment and rendered appellant eligible for the upper term, we conclude the court properly sentenced him to the upper term.

Disposition

The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur.

NEEDHAM, J.

STEVENS, J.*



1 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.



* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Wednesday, February 6, 2008

San Diego California DUI - DMV Decision Perez v. Borucki lawful arrest for hit & run

California DUI attorney news

Filed 2/4/08 Perez v. Borucki CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY GARCIA PEREZ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JOAN BORUCKI, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

Defendant/Respondent.
D049162
(Super. Ct. No. GIC862184)


APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Christine V. Pate, Judge. Affirmed.

Larry Garcia Perez appeals the judgment after the superior court denied his petition for writ of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Perez contends the court erred by denying relief from a driver's license suspension order issued by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, because the administrative record contains insufficient evidence to support the court's finding police lawfully stopped his car. Because we conclude the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court's determination the traffic stop was lawful, we affirm the judgment.

I

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Perez filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the superior court in March 2006 to overturn an order of the DMV suspending his driving privileges for one year because he refused to submit to a chemical test of his blood alcohol content. The court denied the writ petition, finding the record supported the DMV's determination suspending Perez's driving privileges. Perez appealed the denial of his writ petition, and filed a petition for writ of supersedeas to stay the judgment and the DMV's license suspension order, pending resolution of his appeal. Perez contended issuance of the writ of supersedeas was necessary to avoid irreparable harm because driving a car was essential to his livelihood and to the support of his family.

This court granted in part the writ of supersedeas, and stayed the license suspension to allow Perez to drive only for work and only during daylight hours. We deemed the exhibits in the petition to be the record on appeal (subject to a request to augment).

II

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

The Hit and Run Accident

On January 2, 2006, at about 11:30 p.m., San Diego police officer Triplett responded to a call regarding a hit-and-run accident in the area of Park Boulevard and Adams Avenue in San Diego. Three eyewitnesses to the accident reported seeing a red car run a stop sign at the intersection of Adams and Park and strike a parked sports utility vehicle (SUV), before fleeing the accident scene. One of the eyewitnesses unsuccessfully tried to run after the car involved in the accident to obtain its license plate number. Triplett stopped Perez's car just two blocks away from the crash site, within minutes of the accident.1 Perez's car matched the description of the car given to police by the reporting party,2 and it appeared Perez's car "had been in a collision as the front end had moderate damage . . . ."

San Diego police officer Armstrong also responded to the report of the hit-and-run accident. Armstrong parked immediately behind Triplett, and the two officers approached Perez's car. The accident report prepared by Armstrong states Perez smelled strongly of alcohol, struggled to get his identification out of his wallet when asked for it by the officers, and used his car for support after he got out of it. Armstrong observed Perez's eyes were glazed and glassy, and his speech was heavily slurred and slow.

Armstrong attempted to administer a field coordination test to Perez. As he was doing so, it became clear to him Perez was in fact intoxicated. Armstrong noted in his arrest report if Perez had been a pedestrian, he would have taken him to "detox." Armstrong put Perez in his patrol car to transport him to headquarters. Within two minutes of getting into the patrol car, Perez fell asleep.

A blood sample from Perez established he had driven with a blood alcohol content of .19 percent.3 Perez was booked into county jail for driving under the influence of alcohol and for the hit-and-run accident.

The Administrative Hearing

At Perez's request, an administrative hearing was held to address, among other issues, Perez's contention he was unlawfully stopped and detained by Triplett on the night of his arrest. Perez contended the probable cause statement prepared by Armstrong was insufficient and lacked facts showing Triplett had reasonable cause to stop Perez's car.

The hearing officer issued a "Notification of Finding and Decision," upholding Perez's one-year license suspension. Based on the arrest, traffic collision, laboratory and DMV reports, the hearing officer found (1) Triplett had reasonable cause to stop Perez's car, and (2) Perez's arrest was lawful.

III

DISCUSSION

Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

When an administrative order or decision appealed substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the superior court is required to exercise an independent judgment standard of review and find an abuse of discretion if the findings of the administrative agency are not supported by the evidence. (Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 (Kazensky); Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.4) In exercising its independent judgment, the superior court must afford a strong presumption of correctness to the administrative findings, and the burden rests on the party challenging the administrative decision to convince the court that decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817 ("Fukuda").)

After the court reviews "an administrative decision under the independent judgment standard of review, the standard of review on appeal of the trial court's determination is the substantial evidence test." (Fukuda v. City of Angels, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824.) The "appellate court must sustain the superior court's findings if substantial evidence supports them"; it "must resolve all conflicts in favor of the party prevailing in the superior court and must give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference in support of the judgment." (Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) When more than one inference can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute its deductions for those of the superior court. (Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (1977) 20 Cal.3d 309, 314.) " 'Evidence is substantial if any reasonable trier of fact could have considered it reasonable, credible and of solid value.' " (Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 52; Kearl v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1052.)

Sufficient Evidence Supports the Court's Decision Triplett

Lawfully Stopped Perez

Perez contends the judgment following denial of his writ petition should be reversed, and the order of the DMV suspending his driving privileges for one year revoked, because the administrative record lacks sufficient evidence showing Triplett lawfully stopped Perez's car. However, the arrest report prepared by Armstrong indicates police received a description of the car involved in the hit-and-run accident from a reporting party. The traffic collision report provides three eyewitness accounts of the hit-and-run accident. Each of the witnesses told police a red car entered the intersection of Adams Avenue and Park Boulevard without stopping at a stop sign, and struck a parked SUV before fleeing the scene of the accident. One of the eyewitnesses even ran after the car in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the car's license plate number.

Although the record does not disclose who reported the hit-and-run accident, it is clear a report was in fact made to the police by one or more witnesses. Significantly, the record shows the witness or witnesses who reported the accident to police included a description of the suspect's car. Triplett and Armstrong responded to the crash scene to investigate, and it was then Triplett located a car matching the description given by the reporting party. This evidence, and all reasonable inferences properly drawn from it, (Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 52), shows the stop of Perez was lawful.

In addition to evidence in the record showing Perez's car matched the description of the suspect's car given to police by the reporting party, the evidence shows Triplett stopped Perez's car about two blocks from the accident scene within minutes of the accident. The timing and proximity of the stop to the hit-and-run accident provides additional evidence to support the judgment. This evidence helps to explain in part why Triplett and Armstrong were patrolling in the area and why Triplett stopped Perez's car. This evidence, and the reasonable inferences deduced from it, supports the finding the traffic stop was not random or arbitrary, but rather was based on information given to police by one or more witnesses just a few minutes before Triplett pulled over Perez's car. We therefore conclude sufficient evidence supports the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment denying Perez's writ of mandate is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

IRION, J.



1 The record does not include the exact time of the stop of Perez's car by Triplett, although the arrest report shows Perez had been stopped, detained, and arrested by 11:38 p.m., just 18 minutes after the accident.



2 The record does not identify the name or names of the witnesses who reported the hit-and-run accident to police.



3 The record shows a disagreement between the parties regarding whether Perez refused to take a breathalyzer test to measure his blood alcohol content after he was transported to police headquarters. However, this dispute is not relevant in this appeal.



4 Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, states in part:

"(b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.

(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence."

California DUI checkpoint in Northern California this weekend

California DUI lawyer checkpoint news

The Napa police are doing their part to get California DUI drunk drivers off the road this Friday, February 8, 2008.

A California DUI Drunk Driving checkpoint is set for 6 p.m., Friday.
Although police are mum about the specific location of the California DUI checkpoint, they said it will be within the Napa City limits and in an area where there has been a high number of alcohol-related crashes.

Officers will look for unlicensed drivers and those driving with a suspended or revoked license.

Motorists approaching the California DUI checkpoint will see an informational sign stating there is a California DUI sobriety checkpoint ahead. Those who have not been drinking and have a valid driver’s license will only be detained for a few minutes.

That won’t be the case for those who have gotten behind the wheel drunk. They will be arrested and could be booked into the county jail.

“An important goal of the DUI checkpoints is to educate the public on the dangers of driving while intoxicated and convince them to not drink and drive in the first place,” Napa Police Sgt. Tom Pieper said.

Funding for the California DUI Drunk Driving checkpoint comes from a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

California DUI attorneys follow these roadblocks closely.

Sheriff pleads guilty, more California DUI injury cases

California DUI lawyer news

Former sheriff pleads no contest, sentenced in California DUI case
02/06/2008

Former San Joaquin County Sheriff Baxter Dunn pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor charge of California DUI driving under the influence and was sentenced to 15 days in jail, according to court documents.
Dunn, who did not appear in court at the Monday California DUI hearing, also was ordered to pay more than $2,300 in fines, spend the next three years on California DUI probation and submit to drug and alcohol testing, according to the California DUI documents.

California DUI Court records indicated Dunn -- who was given credit for two days in jail for his arrest -- could serve his time on a work furlough, home detention or in an alternative work program.

Additional time could be possible because the former sheriff was already on probation after pleading guilty in a corruption probe in 2005 that landed him in federal prison for six months and confined him to his Manteca home for another six months.

Albert Ellis, Dunn's California DUI / defense attorney, represents him.

On Nov. 29, Dunn, 60, of Manteca was traveling between 65 and 70 mph in his Chrysler 300 when he made a lane change and couldn't slow down fast enough to avoid colliding with a 1979 International truck driven by Jorge Albert Becerra, 33, of Ceres California Highway Patrol officials said.

When emergency crews arrived on the scene of the California DUI accident, both parties were outside their vehicles and on the side of the road, CHP officials said.

Dunn provided a California DUI breath sample and had a blood-alcohol content level of .12, according to the California DUI court records.

Dunn failed other California DUI field sobriety tests before being arrested and charged with California DUI felony driving under the influence and injuring someone other than himself in the accident, according to the CHP.
The charges were reduced to California DUI misdemeanors after Becerra's injuries were determined to be minor

Dunn, who served as San Joaquin County sheriff from 2001 to 2005, was booked into San Joaquin County Jail on suspicion of California DUI felony driving under the influence and was quickly released after posting $50,000 bail.


In other news, California DUI Hearing in fatal crash scheduled

NORWALK - A Pico Rivera woman who was allegedly California DUI driving drunk when her car struck a 15-year-old pedestrian will return to court in a month.

A preliminary California DUI hearing date was set for March 18 in the case of Melissa Serrato.

Serrato, 28, had pleaded not guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. CHP officers said she was driving the Toyota Matrix that struck Martin Granado Jr. as the California High student walked north on Lambert Road, outside a crosswalk July 25. Granado later died of his injuries.

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

Hot Actress De Mornay Pleads No Contest To California DUI Charge

California DUI attorney / California Drunk Driving Lawyer news

De Mornay Pleads No Contest To DUI Charge

BEVERLY HILLS, California -

Goddess Rebecca De Mornay pleaded no contest Tuesday to a California DUI misdemeanor drunk driving charge stemming from a traffic stop last October in Beverly Hills, according to California DUI attorney sources.

Superior Court Judge H. Chester Horn ordered De Mornay to complete a three-month program for DUI offenders, serve three years California DUI summary probation and pay $350 plus penalties according to California DUI lawyer sources.

De Mornay was not in Beverly Hills Superior Court for the brief California DUI hearing. California DUI Defense attorney Blair Berk entered the no contest plea on her client's behalf to one count of driving while having a 0.08 percent or higher blood-alcohol level.

A second DUI charge was dismissed as a result of the California DUI plea. De Mornay, 48, was driving alone when she was pulled over for a traffic violation around 10:30 p.m. Oct. 30 near Sunset Boulevard and Foothill Road, according to California DUI Beverly Hills police Lt. Tony Lee.

Officers "immediately detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage" and gave the actress a series of California DUI field sobriety tests, according to Lee.

Police determined she was California DUI driving under the influence and arrested her, according to the California DUI lieutenant, who said her blood-alcohol level was 0.09 percent.

The actress was cited for California DUI and released from the Beverly Hills police station early the next morning.

DeMornay, who rose to fame opposite Tom Cruise in the movie "Risky Business," has also appeared in such titles as "The Hand That Rocks The Cradle," "Backdraft," "Lords of Dogtown" and "Wedding Crashers." She most recently starred in the now-canceled HBO series "John From Cincinnati."

Lawful DUI Hit & Run Stop in DMV Refusal case

California DUI attorney case law update

Filed 2/4/08 Perez v. Borucki CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY GARCIA PEREZ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JOAN BORUCKI, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

Defendant/Respondent.
D049162
(Super. Ct. No. GIC862184)


APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Christine V. Pate, Judge. Affirmed.

Larry Garcia Perez appeals the judgment after the superior court denied his petition for writ of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Perez contends the court erred by denying relief from a driver's license suspension order issued by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, because the administrative record contains insufficient evidence to support the court's finding police lawfully stopped his car. Because we conclude the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court's determination the traffic stop was lawful, we affirm the judgment.

I

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Perez filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the superior court in March 2006 to overturn an order of the DMV suspending his driving privileges for one year because he refused to submit to a chemical test of his blood alcohol content. The court denied the writ petition, finding the record supported the DMV's determination suspending Perez's driving privileges. Perez appealed the denial of his writ petition, and filed a petition for writ of supersedeas to stay the judgment and the DMV's license suspension order, pending resolution of his appeal. Perez contended issuance of the writ of supersedeas was necessary to avoid irreparable harm because driving a car was essential to his livelihood and to the support of his family.

This court granted in part the writ of supersedeas, and stayed the license suspension to allow Perez to drive only for work and only during daylight hours. We deemed the exhibits in the petition to be the record on appeal (subject to a request to augment).

II

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

The Hit and Run Accident

On January 2, 2006, at about 11:30 p.m., San Diego police officer Triplett responded to a call regarding a hit-and-run accident in the area of Park Boulevard and Adams Avenue in San Diego. Three eyewitnesses to the accident reported seeing a red car run a stop sign at the intersection of Adams and Park and strike a parked sports utility vehicle (SUV), before fleeing the accident scene. One of the eyewitnesses unsuccessfully tried to run after the car involved in the accident to obtain its license plate number. Triplett stopped Perez's car just two blocks away from the crash site, within minutes of the accident.1 Perez's car matched the description of the car given to police by the reporting party,2 and it appeared Perez's car "had been in a collision as the front end had moderate damage . . . ."

San Diego police officer Armstrong also responded to the report of the hit-and-run accident. Armstrong parked immediately behind Triplett, and the two officers approached Perez's car. The accident report prepared by Armstrong states Perez smelled strongly of alcohol, struggled to get his identification out of his wallet when asked for it by the officers, and used his car for support after he got out of it. Armstrong observed Perez's eyes were glazed and glassy, and his speech was heavily slurred and slow.

Armstrong attempted to administer a field coordination test to Perez. As he was doing so, it became clear to him Perez was in fact intoxicated. Armstrong noted in his arrest report if Perez had been a pedestrian, he would have taken him to "detox." Armstrong put Perez in his patrol car to transport him to headquarters. Within two minutes of getting into the patrol car, Perez fell asleep.

A blood sample from Perez established he had driven with a blood alcohol content of .19 percent.3 Perez was booked into county jail for driving under the influence of alcohol and for the hit-and-run accident.

The Administrative Hearing

At Perez's request, an administrative hearing was held to address, among other issues, Perez's contention he was unlawfully stopped and detained by Triplett on the night of his arrest. Perez contended the probable cause statement prepared by Armstrong was insufficient and lacked facts showing Triplett had reasonable cause to stop Perez's car.

The hearing officer issued a "Notification of Finding and Decision," upholding Perez's one-year license suspension. Based on the arrest, traffic collision, laboratory and DMV reports, the hearing officer found (1) Triplett had reasonable cause to stop Perez's car, and (2) Perez's arrest was lawful.

III

DISCUSSION

Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

When an administrative order or decision appealed substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the superior court is required to exercise an independent judgment standard of review and find an abuse of discretion if the findings of the administrative agency are not supported by the evidence. (Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 (Kazensky); Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.4) In exercising its independent judgment, the superior court must afford a strong presumption of correctness to the administrative findings, and the burden rests on the party challenging the administrative decision to convince the court that decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817 ("Fukuda").)

After the court reviews "an administrative decision under the independent judgment standard of review, the standard of review on appeal of the trial court's determination is the substantial evidence test." (Fukuda v. City of Angels, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824.) The "appellate court must sustain the superior court's findings if substantial evidence supports them"; it "must resolve all conflicts in favor of the party prevailing in the superior court and must give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference in support of the judgment." (Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) When more than one inference can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute its deductions for those of the superior court. (Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (1977) 20 Cal.3d 309, 314.) " 'Evidence is substantial if any reasonable trier of fact could have considered it reasonable, credible and of solid value.' " (Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 52; Kearl v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1052.)

Sufficient Evidence Supports the Court's Decision Triplett

Lawfully Stopped Perez

Perez contends the judgment following denial of his writ petition should be reversed, and the order of the DMV suspending his driving privileges for one year revoked, because the administrative record lacks sufficient evidence showing Triplett lawfully stopped Perez's car. However, the arrest report prepared by Armstrong indicates police received a description of the car involved in the hit-and-run accident from a reporting party. The traffic collision report provides three eyewitness accounts of the hit-and-run accident. Each of the witnesses told police a red car entered the intersection of Adams Avenue and Park Boulevard without stopping at a stop sign, and struck a parked SUV before fleeing the scene of the accident. One of the eyewitnesses even ran after the car in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the car's license plate number.

Although the record does not disclose who reported the hit-and-run accident, it is clear a report was in fact made to the police by one or more witnesses. Significantly, the record shows the witness or witnesses who reported the accident to police included a description of the suspect's car. Triplett and Armstrong responded to the crash scene to investigate, and it was then Triplett located a car matching the description given by the reporting party. This evidence, and all reasonable inferences properly drawn from it, (Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 52), shows the stop of Perez was lawful.

In addition to evidence in the record showing Perez's car matched the description of the suspect's car given to police by the reporting party, the evidence shows Triplett stopped Perez's car about two blocks from the accident scene within minutes of the accident. The timing and proximity of the stop to the hit-and-run accident provides additional evidence to support the judgment. This evidence helps to explain in part why Triplett and Armstrong were patrolling in the area and why Triplett stopped Perez's car. This evidence, and the reasonable inferences deduced from it, supports the finding the traffic stop was not random or arbitrary, but rather was based on information given to police by one or more witnesses just a few minutes before Triplett pulled over Perez's car. We therefore conclude sufficient evidence supports the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment denying Perez's writ of mandate is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

IRION, J.



1 The record does not include the exact time of the stop of Perez's car by Triplett, although the arrest report shows Perez had been stopped, detained, and arrested by 11:38 p.m., just 18 minutes after the accident.



2 The record does not identify the name or names of the witnesses who reported the hit-and-run accident to police.



3 The record shows a disagreement between the parties regarding whether Perez refused to take a breathalyzer test to measure his blood alcohol content after he was transported to police headquarters. However, this dispute is not relevant in this appeal.



4 Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, states in part:

"(b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.

(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence."

Diagnostic study for DUI with Great Bodily Injury?

California DUI lawyer case update

People v. Harrison (Unpub., DCA4 – 2-5-08) (Note: Another Wende Brief from appointed counsel)



Def. pled guilty to DUI of alcohol, causing injury (VC §23153(a)) and driving with a blood-alcohol level exceeding .08%, causing injury. (VC §23153(b).) She also admitted inflicting GBI injury on the victim (PC §12022.7(a)) and injuring a person in addition to the victim. (VC §23558.) She was sentenced to prison and appealed. In People v. Harrison, case No. E038120, we affirmed her convictions, but vacated her sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court so it could order a diagnostic study, pursuant to PC §1203.03. Subsequently, a diagnostic study was performed and a report generated. Additionally, def.’s original probation officer submitted an updated report, as did her current probation officer. Both recommended prison. The trial court sentenced def. to prison for 6 years. Def. appealed, and upon her request this court appointed counsel to represent her. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of P. v. Wende (1979) 25 C3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and requesting this court to undertake a review of the entire record. We offered def. an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which she has not done. We have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues. The judgment was affirmed.

Motorcyle Probable Cause Issue

California DUI attorney news

Filed 2/4/08 P. v. Berry CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DWIGHT CHRISTOPHER BERRY,

Defendant and Appellant.
B198081
(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. NA068808)


THE COURT:*

Dwight Christopher Berry, also known as Dwight C. Berry, appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest plea to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)2 and driving while having a 0.08 percent or higher blood alcohol (§ 23152, subd. (b)). The guilty plea followed the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. Appellant also admitted the special allegations that he had suffered four prior offenses of driving under the influence within the meaning of sections 23550 and 23550.5 and refused to take or complete the chemical test. The trial court sentenced appellant to the upper term of three years on Count 1, suspending execution of sentence and placing appellant on five years formal probation. Sentence on Count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654. A certificate of probable cause was not applied for nor obtained in connection with this appeal.

Appellant’s convictions were based upon the following facts:3 On January 7, 2006, at 7:41 p.m., Officer Ricardo Ramirez testified that he stopped appellant riding a motorcycle, because the taillight was not on. He then observed that appellant appeared intoxicated.

Appellant introduced evidence of his wife, who owned the motorcycle, and a motorcycle mechanic that the lights on the motorcycle automatically come on when the ignition is switched on and that the motorcycle cannot be driven with the ignition on and the front and rear lights off. But appellant’s wife conceded that if the lights were not working, “the motorcycle would still run. . . .” The motorcycle mechanic had inspected the motorcycle some months after appellant was stopped. He was familiar with the type of motorcycle driven by appellant, and testified that it could not run with the lights off but the ignition on, unless it was rewired. The motorcycle driven by appellant did not appear to be rewired. If the front light was on and the rear light was not, the motorcycle would still turn on.

We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no issues were raised. On October 31, 2007, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider. No response has been received.

We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant’s attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)

The order under review is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT.



* BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.



2 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.



3 The facts are taken from the hearing on appellant’s suppression motion.

California DUI stats on DUI convictions

California dui attorney news

NapaValleyRegister.com publishes monthly statistics on arrests and convictions for driving under the influence — and so-called “wet reckless” convictions — in Napa County.

Arrest information is from the Napa County Sheriff’s Department. Convictions, names and blood-alcohol levels are from Napa County Superior Court.
Convictions include cases in which the person pleaded guilty or no contest to one or more drunk driving charges, or where one or more such charges resulted in a guilty verdict at trial.

Vehicle code violations considered are: driving under the influence (Vehicle Code section 23152), reckless driving while under the influence (23103.5) and causing injury to another while driving while under the influence (23153).

The blood-alcohol levels provided by the court are based on a variety of tests — some taken at the scene of the arrest or county jail, others through a later blood test — and have not necessarily been proven or admitted in court. It is unlawful for any person to operate a vehicle if that person has a blood-alcohol level of .08 or more, according to the California Vehicle Code.

Arrests: 54

Convictions/pleas: 98

Reported blood-alcohol below .10 or unavailable: 23

Reported blood-alcohol between .10 and .19: 53

Reported blood-alcohol between .20 and .29: 17

Reported blood-alcohol between .30 and .39: 5

http://www.napavalleyregister.com/articles/2008/02/05/news/local/doc47a229007d396380608230.txt


In other news, California DUI Police Department officers conducted a California DUI drunk-driving saturation detail Saturday and made five DUI arrests, police reported.

In a California DUI saturation detail, which differs from a California DUI Drunk Driving checkpoint in that extra California DUI officers fan out throughout the city instead of setting up at a fixed location, the intent is to discourage vehicle drivers from drinking, California DUI police said.

In addition to the California DUI arrests, six vehicles were towed, nine citations were issued, two narcotics-related arrests were made, three additional misdemeanor arrests were made and six additional California DUI field sobriety tests given, California DUI police reported.

Monday, February 4, 2008

San Diego California Double DUI Crash

San Diego California DUI attorney news

Suspected San Diego California DUI / drunk driver crashes twice

A suspected San Diego California DUI driver was arrested Sunday night after being involved in two San Diego California DUI accidents including a hit-and-run San Diego California DUI crash that injured a woman.

The 29-year-old driver first ran a red light at University Avenue at Sixth Avenue in Hillcrest just before 10 p.m. where he hit another vehicle and drove off, San Diego California DUI police said. A 24-year-old passenger in the vehicle that was struck suffered a broken rib and cuts to her face, San Diego California DUI police said.

The driver was then involved in another San Diego California DUI crash at Washington and Albatross streets where he ran a stop sign and hit another motorist. San Diego California DUI police said. No one was injured in that San Diego California DUI accident, San Diego California DUI police said.

The driver was arrested and booked on felony San Diego California DUI driving under the influence and hit-and-run charges. He has yet to retain a San Diego California DUI defense lawyer.

Saturday, February 2, 2008

California DUI Prosecuting Attorneys have a book to train how to deal with DUI Defenses

California DUI lawyers should know there is a California DUI Prosecuting Attorneys' book out there on how to anticipate California DUI attorneys' defenses. Here it is:

Targeting Hardcore Impaired Drivers
American Prosecutors Research Institute
99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510
Alexandria,VA 22314
www.ndaa-apri.org

This document was produced thanks to a charitable contribution from the Anheuser-
Busch Foundation in St. Louis, Missouri. Its support in assisting local prosecutors’ fight
against impaired driving is greatly acknowledged. This information is offered for educational
purposes only and is not legal advice. Points of view or opinions expressed in this
document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position
of the Anheuser-Busch Foundation, the National District Attorneys Association, or the
American Prosecutors Research Institute.
TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S
iii
1 Introduction:The Art of Anticipating Defenses
3 Defenses in Impaired Driving Cases4 Pre-trial Tactics
4 Invalid Stop Defenses
8 Invalid Arrest Defenses
11 5th Amendment—Miranda Defenses
13 Common Trial Tactics
13 Attacking the Investigation
13 Attacking Observations of Driving
14 Attacking Observations During Personal
Contact
17 Attacking the Field Sobriety Tests
18 Attacking Breath Testing Instruments &
Their Results
21 Attacking Officer’s Finding of Impairment
22 Other Resources Available
23 Conclusions
Illustrations on pages 1, 3, 7 & 16.
Bruce Plante, nationally syndicated editorial cartoonist & Past
President of the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists
I N T R O D U C T I O N: TH E A R T O F
A N T I C I PAT I N G D E F E N S E S
1
“The criminal trial today is…a kind of show-jumping contest in which the rider
for the prosecution must clear every obstacle to succeed.”
—Robert Mark, Commissioner, London Metropolitan Police.
The Washington Post, November 1971
Many prosecutors
may bristle at an
analogy which
reduces the criminal
justice system to a
steeplechase, but this
analogy speaks an
obvious truth.To successfully
prosecute
hard core impaired
drivers, prosecutors
must clear statutory
and constitutional
hurdles. Prosecutors
must demonstrate
that every element of
the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt and that none
of the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated.
Impaired driving is a crime that cuts across all socio-economic lines, and
a conviction for a multiple offense DUI has severe consequences. Many
impaired driving defendants have resources to support a vigorous
defense. Across the country, defense attorneys have risen to meet the
challenge and serve their clients. For a prosecutor, nothing is better than
encountering the best attorneys from the defense bar. But, anticipating
defenses is generally an art form learned through experience—often
painfully.Yet, there is a similarity of facts and constitutional issues in
impaired driving cases that makes the job less painful.
This publication serves as a guide to the most common defenses in
impaired driving cases, drawing on the expertise and experience of Herb
Tanner, the 2003 Prosecutor Fellow with the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA). Currently working for the Prosecuting
Attorneys Association of Michigan, Herb was formerly the Chief Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Montcalm County, Michigan, and before that
he worked as a criminal defense attorney. As the NHTSA Prosecutor
Fellow, Herb has traveled the country teaching and speaking on impaired
driving issues. He also teaches regularly at the Ernest F. Hollings National
Advocacy Center in Columbia, South Carolina.
For their thoughtful review, insight and comments, APRI is grateful to
Kimberly A. Fogarty of the Massachusetts District Attorneys Association,
Jeff Kwiatkowski, Chief Assistant Solicitor General of Gwinnett County,
Georgia and Tom Kimball of the Tennessee District Attorney Generals
Conference. APRI also thanks Bruce Plante, nationally syndicated cartoonist
and out-going president of the Association of American Editorial
Cartoonists for his illustrations.
For other impaired driving defenses, be sure to check our other APRI
Special Topics publications, including Crash Reconstruction Basics for
Prosecutors,The Admissibility of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Evidence and
Alcohol Toxicology for Prosecutors. These and other publications are available
online at www.ndaa-apri.org click on NTLC—Traffic Law.
Suppose you’ve been diagnosed with a life-threatening illness that
requires complex surgery. Now suppose that you have your choice of
surgeons: one who has years of experience and a high success rate, and
the other who is fresh out of medical school.
Add to that the urgency of the situation
–the surgeon you choose will have little
or no time to study and prepare for
your surgery. It’s a no brainer, right?
But in many prosecutors’ offices a similar
decision is made for impaired driving
cases, and the new guy is chosen
every time.
The facts of life are that many offices assign the newest prosecutors to
the impaired driving cases, even though these cases can be among the
most complex and challenging cases on the docket. Few other cases
present the prosecutor with a more complex and wordy statute, a greater
likelihood of technical, scientific evidence, or the very real likelihood of
expert defense testimony.
Even so, some defense attorneys will occasionally use variations of a
number of traditional defense tactics when trying DUI cases. Knowing
these tactics, and being able to quickly respond to them, gives the prosecutor
the advantage.
Rule of Thumb: If you only have five minutes to prepare, go over
the police report with the arresting officer. Is it reasonable to
believe people will mislead to avoid jail time? Of course it is, so
take time to spot untruths. Figure out what the defendant will say.
Preparation is key.
Pre-Trial Tactics
Invalid Stop Defenses
As the great Japanese swordsman Musashi said:“Pressing Down the
Pillow means not letting your opponent’s head up. In the Way of Martial
Arts combat, it is wrong to let your opponent lead you around or push
you into a defensive position. Above all you want to move him around
freely.” While the defense attorney may not be a student of Musashi, he
may follow this advice and strike quickly and decisively. For the defense
attorney, the plan is simple: no stop, no case.
CLAIM:The stop is invalid because there is no reasonable and articulable
suspicion.
RESPONSE:Your response is fact-driven and relatively simple. All that
is needed to make a valid stop is a reasonable suspicion. If, looking at the
totality of the circumstances, an officer can establish that a fair-minded
person in similar circumstances would suspect some violation was afoot,
the stop is valid.
Remember: In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59
L. Ed.2d 660 (1979), the Supreme Court held that an officer
must have reasonable and articulable suspicion of a violation of
the law or that a driver is otherwise subject to seizure (as a fugitive,
for example) before the officer can stop and detain a driver.
CLAIM:The stop was pretextual.The officer was on a fishing expedition
and merely stopped someone at random in hopes of catching an
impaired driver.
RESPONSE:The real challenge here is whether there was reasonable
and articulable suspicion of a traffic violation to justify the stop.The officer
must be able to articulate what caused him to stop the driver in the
first place.
O V E R C O M I N G I M PA I R E D D R I V I N G D E F E N S E S
4 AM E R I CAN P ROSECUTORS RE S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
CLAIM:The stop is invalid because the officer’s detention of the driver
exceeded the reasonable amount of time for the purpose of the stop. For
example, was it reasonable to keep the defendant at roadside for 30 minutes
and subject him to field sobriety tests, all for a burned-out tail light?
RESPONSE: Officers often stop a driver for a minor traffic violation
and then develop a suspicion that the driver is impaired during that initial,
brief detention. Keep in mind that the officer’s detention can only
last as long as is reasonably necessary to resolve the purpose of the stop. If
the detention continues for more than a brief period of time, the officer
must establish reasonable suspicion for continued detention. Here again,
the observations that led the officer to believe the driver is impaired must
be reasonable and articulable. During encounters with suspects, reasonable
and articulable suspicion is not a static property, but something that
may continually rise to higher levels based on the totality of the facts.
Prosecutors must skillfully conduct direct examination of the officers,
building upon the events to demonstrate the rising level of proof that the
officer encountered during the stop.
PRACTICE TIP: When the defendant challenges an officer’s continued
detention of a driver stopped for a minor traffic violation,
stress the following types of observations:
• Responding inappropriately to the emergency equipment, such as
failing to pull over immediately;
• Parking incorrectly;
• Physical observations (odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred
speech, etc.);
• Open containers or drug paraphernalia;
• Evidence that the driver vomited, urinated or defecated on himself;
• Inability to produce a license and registration although in the
defendant’s wallet;
• Inappropriate responses to questions;
• Admission of drinking or drug use;
• Inappropriate demeanor, e.g., excessively belligerent or abusive to
the officer.
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All of these behaviors and observations contribute to the rising
levels of reasonable suspicion, allowing officers to continue their
investigations.
CLAIM:The officer’s stop of the driver for suspicion of impairment is
based on all the wrong observations.
RESPONSE:When the officer stops a driver because he suspects the
driver is impaired, the officer should be prepared for challenges to those
observations.What the defendant is really challenging is whether the
officer had reason to suspect that the driving he witnessed was due to
alcohol impairment.This argument gets to the crux of DUI prosecutions.
The challenges are behaviorally based because the driving behaviors
known to be indicators of impairment are sometimes quite nuanced.
When the motion to suppress is denied, many of these same arguments
will be repeated for the jury (see section on Common Trial Tactics).
Practice Tips: NHTSA has published more than 20 specific driving
behaviors that indicate possible impairment. Officers are trained
to look for them, and you should be trained to spot them in the
report.These are the clues that give the officer reasonable suspicion,
together with all the other facts, to stop and investigate.
Some of the more common indicators of impairment are:
• Weaving within one’s own lane;
• Driving significantly slower than the posted speed limit;
• Stopping for an excessive time at a stop sign without an apparent
reason;
• Failing to continue to drive when a light turns green;
• Following too closely;
• Making wide turns or cutting a turn too sharply.
While any of these behaviors might not be a traffic violation, in combination
with other facts it can justify a stop.The response remains the
same, however.The stop is justified if, based on the totality of the circumstances,
the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
driving behaviors he saw were due to alcohol impairment.
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CLAIM:The officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant
because the officer relied on a citizen’s tip.The prosecutor has made
no showing of the reliability of the citizen’s tip or the caller’s basis of
knowledge.
RESPONSE: How you respond to this challenge depends on what kind
of citizen tip it was. A citizen’s tip that is truly anonymous may require
the officer to corroborate the caller’s information. A tip that describes the
driver’s location, the make and model of the car, the license plate number,
and the specific driving behaviors may require less corroboration
from the officer. Also, urge officers to call dispatch and determine the
name of the caller. An anonymous tipster may later become a powerful
prosecution witness.
Practice Tip:Widespread
use of mobile phones
makes it easy for citizens
to alert law enforcement
officers to suspected
impaired drivers. A true
citizen’s tip can be
defined as an identifiable
caller who is not of the
criminal element, e.g., a
mailman who reports an impaired driver while delivering mail, a
fast-food, drive-thru server who suspects a customer at the window
is driving drunk, or a metro bus driver calling in someone
who appears to be intoxicated, etc.
Remember that police have relied on true citizen tips for centuries,
and keep in mind that the law makes a distinction between
true citizen information and information that comes from people
of the criminal element. Many defense attorneys argue that true
citizen tips should be held to the higher level of scrutiny required
of informants from the criminal milieu in determining probable
cause in issuing search warrants, e.g., basis of knowledge, reliability,
corroboration, etc. First, they are arguing for a level of scrutiny
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used in a probable cause analysis—not a reasonable and articulable
suspicion analysis. And secondly, courts have held that “when an
average citizen tenders information to the police, the police
should be permitted to assume they are dealing with a credible
person in the absence of special circumstances suggesting that
such may not be the case.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
Section 3.4(a), at 209-11 (3d ed. 1996).“[T]he skepticism and
careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants, sometimes
anonymous, from the criminal milieu, is appropriately
relaxed if the informant is an identified victim or ordinary citizen
witness.”U.S. v. Patane, 304 F. 3d 1013 (U.S. 2003).
Invalid Arrest Defenses
CLAIM:The officer did not have probable cause to make an arrest.
RESPONSE:The major difference between challenges to the arrest and
challenges to the stop is where on the continuum of proof the justification
lies.Whereas a stop is justified by a reasonable suspicion, officers
must have greater proof to arrest; they must have probable cause.This
doesn’t mean that all the evidence used to justify the stop now becomes
irrelevant. On the contrary, that evidence, along with everything else that
the officer developed during the course of his contact with the defendant,
is relevant to the court’s determination of probable cause.
Skillful defense attorneys often concede the officer had a basis for the
stop, but then they mount a full attack on probable cause for arrest.Their
strategy is based on the fact that at a motion hearing the judge would
not hear any proof after the decision to make an arrest was made –i.e.,
the judge would never hear the results of the blood, breath or urine tests.
Blood Alcohol Content tests are typically administered after the decision
to make an arrest.Therefore, no arrest, no test.
PROBABLE CAUSE: The courts have defined probable cause as the
point when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information
are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in
believing that a crime has been or is being committed.
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8 AM E R I CAN P ROSECUTORS RE S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Like reasonable suspicion, probable cause is based on the totality of circumstances:
all the facts known and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them.
CLAIM:The officer’s observations were wrong; there are alternative
explanations for what the officer saw. For example, the defendant may
claim that his eyes where red and watery because he worked a double
shift and was tired (see section on Common Trial Tactics).
RESPONSE:At this stage, whether there are alternative explanations for
the officers observation doesn’t matter, as long as the officer’s observations
can fairly be characterized as signs of impairment. Also, police are
not required to eliminate all other possible explanations for the behavior.
CLAIM:The officer did not have probable cause to make the arrest
based on his administration of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests
(SFSTs), and the results of the blood alcohol tests should be suppressed.
RESPONSE:The attack will be on how the officers developed probable
cause and, in particular, on the SFSTs.The officer is typically cross examined
from an SFST manual published by NHTSA. NHTSA has produced
a CD-ROM of all SFSTs, their validation studies and digital video clips
suitable for demonstrative purposes. Copies are available from APRI’s
National Traffic Law Center or from NHTSA at www.nhtsa.dot.gov.
CLAIM:The officer administered non-standardized field sobriety tests.
Variations on the theme include:
• These tests are inadmissible because they are not scientifically validated.
• The standard battery of tests were administered but not in strict
accordance with NHTSA guidelines and is therefore inadmissible.
• The officer never received formal SFST training on how to administer
the tests in accordance to NHTSA guidelines.The officer testified
that he learned them from other patrolmen; therefore, all the tests
given are inadmissible.
RESPONSE: Courts have long held that even lay people can detect and
express an opinion about impairment.The effects of alcohol on a per-
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son’s physical appearance and behavior are common knowledge and easily
observable. Some of these familiar signs include lack of balance, poor
coordination, exaggerated movements, poor motor skills, slurred speech
and inability to follow directions.
Field sobriety tests merely allow the officer to make observations about
these signs of impairment.There are a number of field sobriety tests that
officers administer other than the SFSTs. Although these tests have not
been subject to the same rigorous examination as the SFSTs, they are still
useful in assisting the officer in determining impairment.This is where
an officer’s life experience and field experience become crucial.The fact
that the tests are non-standardized or administered differently than
NHTSA prescribes goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.
(See Attacking Field Sobriety Tests on page 17).
CLAIM:The officer did not have probable cause for arrest because the
defendant refused all SFSTs and chemical tests.
RESPONSE: Hard core impaired drivers often will refuse blood tests
when the consequences of refusal are not as harsh as the penalties for
another DUI conviction. In those cases, developing probable cause is
more difficult, and the officer’s observations of other indicators of
impairment gain in importance.
PRACTICE TIP: In jurisdictions where a preliminary breath test can
be used to establish probable cause, there are likely to be administrative
rules governing how the test is given. A challenge to the test
based on the officer’s failure to follow the rules in the field, e.g.,
the officer did not observe the driver for the required time before
giving the test, could mean the results are suppressed, and probable
cause will be judged solely on the officer’s remaining observations.
CLAIM:After investigating the wreck, the officer arrested the defendant
for a DUI that occurred outside his presence.
RESPONSE:A number of states have statutes that prohibit officers from
making arrests for misdemeanors that did not occur in their presence.
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Generally, there are exceptions to the statute for crimes such as domestic
violence and shoplifting. Some states have exceptions for DUIs, allowing
arrests to be made within a certain time limit. Know your state’s statute, the
exceptions and case law surrounding the arrests. Experienced officers will
often make a felony arrest of a defendant who left the scene and fill out an
arrest warrant for the misdemeanor when booking the defendant into jail.
5th Amendment—Miranda Defenses
CLAIM:The SFSTs are not admissible because the defendant was not
free to leave the scene during the investigation.Therefore, under Miranda
guidelines, the defendant was in custody.
RESPONSE: In most states, the typical DUI traffic stop is considered
non-custodial, even if the driver is briefly detained. If the SFSTs are
given during that brief, non-custodial detention, Miranda does not apply.
Remember that for Miranda to apply, the defendant must be i) in custody,
ii) under interrogation, iii) by a police officer. Obviously in traffic stops, drivers
are not free to leave, but the U.S. Supreme Court passed a bright line
rule in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed.2d
317 (1984).The Court held that suspects on the roadside were not considered
in custody for Miranda purposes until arrested by the officer or
when the handcuffs go on the suspect.
Perhaps your jurisdiction doesn’t follow Berkemer or hasn’t ruled on the
specific issue based on how your courts interpret your state’s constitutional
protections. If so, the defendant will try to push back the point of
custody to the earliest time in the stop, subjecting everything that follows
to Miranda. Remember that even if your court rules the defendant
was in custody early in the stop, Miranda covers only verbal expression
and is a protection designed to ensure voluntary and knowing confessions
by suspects.
Practice Tip: For a small minority of judges, Miranda is often scrutinized
under the “focus of the investigation” standard, and the
facts are often reviewed on a standard of when the officer knew
he was going to make an arrest. Bring the law to court and be
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ready to demonstrate the correct legal analysis, and if that fails,
build your record for appeal.
CLAIM:The SFSTs are not admissible because they are testimonial in
nature.The defendant incriminated himself with the SFSTs without the
benefit of a Miranda warning.
RESPONSE:This argument applies only to non-standardized tests like
reciting the alphabet or counting backwards, which are not part of the
SFSTs. Most jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue have found that
the physical portions of the SFSTs are non-testimonial. Remember that
for Miranda purposes the suspect is still not in custody, so even the verbal
portions should be allowed.Two states, Oregon and Florida, have found
that the verbal portion of field sobriety tests are testimonial and cannot
be given absent Miranda.
CLAIM:The defendant’s response to the invitation to take a blood,
breath or urine test occurred after arrest and violates Miranda.Those
statements should be suppressed.
RESPONSE:Typically, officers will place defendants under arrest and
read them the implied consent form for a blood alcohol test in the cruiser
or in the booking area of the jail. Often, defendants’ statements are
extremely incriminating.Yes, the defendant is in custody, but Miranda
does not apply because the defendant was not subject to interrogation by
the officer.
In most states, officers are required by law to read the implied consent
statute to suspects and note their response.This is not interrogation;
rather, the officer is fulfilling a statutory duty.Anything a defendant
chooses to say in response to the request to take a breath test is admissible.
(Be sure to check the law in your jurisdiction; a minority of states
interpret their constitutions to have heightened protections.)
Spontaneous admissions and statements against interest are usually admissible.
But, if the officer asks questions after reading the implied consent
statute without a Miranda waiver from the suspect, those statements will
be suppressed.
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12 AM E R I CAN P ROSECUTORS RE S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Common Trial Tactics
How any case is defended is unique to each case and each defense
lawyer.To say that there are “common” tactics only means that there are
certain recurring themes, and you should be prepared for them.
Attacking the Investigation
In many DUI cases, the best defense is to attack the investigation in
some way.These defenses tend to fall into a few broad and often overlapping
variations:
1. Alternative explanations for the officer’s observations;
2. Attacks on the officer’s observations;
3. Alternative explanations for the blood alcohol concentration
(BAC);
4. Attacks on the BAC.
Many of the arguments try to exploit the difference between what the
jurors think they know and what really goes on in the field. For example,
many people believe that the SFSTs are extraordinarily hard to do
and designed to generate a failure. How many in the general public
believe that one standard field sobriety test is to say the alphabet backwards?
Practice Tip: Defendants profit from the empathy that jurors may
have for them. Many people have driven after a few drinks and
truly believe that they were not impaired. If the prosecutor
doesn’t do it for them, jurors will define what it means
to be impaired. And, their definition may be favorable to the
defendant, if only because jurors are reluctant to admit that they
may have driven while impaired and broken the law.
Attacking Observations of Driving
It makes sense that the defense will attack the officer’s observations.
Many acquittals have been achieved by the defense convincing a juror
that his client’s driving was not that bad or attributable to something
other than the drinks he had on the way home.
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CLAIMS:
WEAVING INSIDE THE LANE, SHARP OR WIDE TURNS: It is not illegal to stay
within the painted lines, is it? There are many reasons for corrections of
steering, like poor alignment? Lighting a cigarette? Putting in a CD? The
crown of the road? It is not illegal to turn wide when there is no opposing
traffic or hazard, is it?
SPEEDING OR GOING SLOWLY: Many people speed, don’t they? Did you
suspect each of them of drunk driving? Have you ever been lost?
BLACK ANDWHITE FEVER: You testified to “bad driving,” but you were in
a marked patrol car, correct? No reason why the defendant couldn’t have
seen you in the rearview mirror? And if he did, he probably kept his
attention on you a great deal? If he glances up to the mirror, he could
swerve within his lane or even out of it, couldn’t he? His speed could
drift a little? And if you followed him for a mile, you would see every
swerve? But, you never saw him drive once without your patrol car in
his mirror, did you?
THE NHTSA CLUES: There are more than 20 different clues you are
taught to look for, aren’t there? That’s virtually every possible driving
behavior, isn’t it? One of the clues is wide turns? And one is sharp or
abrupt turns? Those are opposites, so no matter what the driver does he’s
looking like he’s drunk?
RESPONSE:Watching an officer struggle to answer these questions on
the stand is difficult; however, keep in mind that the defense attorney is
not trying to raise doubt about what the officer saw in the field. Indeed,
the tacit assertion of these questions is that the client really did weave.
The defense wants the jury to believe that there might be another explanation
for what the officer saw and that any driving behavior short of
staying absolutely straight in one’s lane is a DUI clue.
Attacking Observations During Personal Contact
CLAIMS:
Odor of Alcohol: Alcohol really doesn’t smell, does it? The flavoring does?
It’s impossible to tell how much of any drink someone had by the smell,
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14 AM E R I CAN P ROSECUTORS RE S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
isn’t it? Some drinks with a low alcohol content, like red wine, can leave
the breath smelling strong with just a few sips? Other very high proof
liquors smell hardly at all, don’t they? You can’t tell when they drank
from the smell, can you?
Disheveled clothing: Officer, you dressed appropriately for court today, didn’t
you? You wanted to show the court and jury the appropriate respect?
And my client, he dressed appropriately, too. But he looked different the
night you arrested him, didn’t he? Before that night, you had never seen
my client? You have no idea if he’s usually a sloppy dresser, do you?
Being a slob is not a crime, is it?
Blood-shot, watery eyes: There are many causes for blood-shot watery eyes,
aren’t there? Fatigue? Lack of sleep? Using the window defroster or
blower while wearing contacts? Seasonal allergies and other medical conditions?
You didn’t ask about those, did you?
Fumbled with wallet and documents: Have you ever been scared? Your body
reacted to that adrenaline dump, didn’t it? Your heart beat faster? Maybe
your hands shook?
RESPONSE:The first response to this line of attack is the officer still
on the scene. Did he ask about mechanical problems? If the driving
clues he saw could have been caused by bad alignment, he should ask
about it to exclude it.This is anticipating the lie! By asking the question
at roadside, the officer takes away from the defendant’s testimony that
the weaving was caused by poor alignment or some cause other than
impairment.
The next response is to remind the jury that the clues are just that
–clues.The driver’s behavior should be analyzed in the context of all the
other clues or evidence of impairment.The fact that weaving within
one’s lane is not illegal is completely irrelevant. It becomes relevant when
considered together with all the other observations and evidence of
impairment. Similarly, while the odor of alcohol, standing alone, may not
prove impairment, taken with all the other evidence, it makes sense that
we hear that the defendant smelled of alcohol.
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Finally, don’t forget at closing what the defense lawyer said and asked
during trial. Chances are there was no evidence that the observable driving
clues resulted from some other cause and the defense lawyer will not
argue the point.That allows you to point out to the jury that there is no
evidence of any of the alternative explanations.
SEVEN BLIND MICEA
CHINESE
PARABLE. One day
seven blind mice
were surprised to
find a strange Thing
by their pond.
“What is it?” they
cried. Red Mouse
said,“It’s a pillar.”
“No, it’s a snake!”
said Green Mouse.
“Can’t be,” said
Yellow Mouse. “It’s a spear.” “No, no,” said Purple Mouse. “It’s a
great cliff.”“Oooo, it’s a fan,” Orange Mouse cried. “What’s the big
deal,” said Blue Mouse. “It’s nothing but a rope.”Then, they all began
to argue.
Until White Mouse, the seventh mouse, went to the Thing. She
ran up one side and down the other. She ran across the top and
from end to end. “Ah,” said white mouse.“Now, I see.The Thing is
as sturdy as a pillar, supple as a snake, wide as a cliff, sharp as a spear,
breezy as a fan, stringy as a rope, but altogether the Thing is…an elephant!”
The other mice ran up one side and down the other,
across the Thing from end to end, and they agreed, too.
The Mouse Moral: Knowing in part may make a fine tale, but wisdom
comes from seeing the whole.
The same can be said about messy clothing or other personal contact
clues, like using the car for balance or stumbling when getting out of the
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16 AM E R I CAN P ROSECUTORS RE S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
car.Taken alone, they can be relatively innocuous and innocent, but it’s
unlikely that all of the clues observed by the officer can be explained by
anything other than the defendant was impaired.
PRACTICE TIP: Take great care in assessing cases in which the
police stop a female driver at night.These situations can be particularly
scary to women because they may be vulnerable.A
clever defense attorney may cite this fear to explain the officer’s
observations of suspected impaired driving
Attacking the Field Sobriety Tests
CLAIM: The officer failed to use approved SFSTs –i.e., he used non-standardized
tests. You’re aware that NHTSA has approved only three field sobriety
tests, aren’t you? The alphabet test you gave is not among them?
Having people guess the time is not one of the approved tests, is it?
RESPONSE: NHTSA has not “approved” any field sobriety tests.
NHTSA has sponsored validation studies and created curricula to train
officers in a standard procedure to make sure the three tests are conducted
the same way every time. In other words, NHTSA has certified
curriculum. NHTSA does not certify tests and officers.
Furthermore, the defense has not claimed that other field sobriety tests
are invalid. The other tests, such as reciting the alphabet, are still evidence
of impairment.The simple argument is that a sober person can
say the alphabet.
CLAIM: How can a person fail a test when he doesn’t know what’s tested? You
didn’t tell him that if he used his arms for balance he would fail the test,
did you? Is that fair? Isn’t that what the arms are for? Is it fair to judge
him on things you didn’t tell him about?
RESPONSE:The word “fail” in relation to a driver’s performance on
SFSTs carries more baggage than some airlines.The tests are not graded
and provide only clues of impairment.The officer is simply making
observations and noting those observations. A driver does not “fail” the
test when he uses his arms for balance. However, considered with the
totality of the evidence, using his arms is evidence of impairment, the
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same as failing to follow directions in the Walk & Turn, or putting a foot
down during the One-Leg Stand.
CLAIM: SFSTs are subjective and insensitive. You are the only one who
decides when someone passes or fails, aren’t you? What is the definition
of “swaying?” How far does someone have to move?
RESPONSE: It is true that SFSTs don’t discriminate well between levels
of impairment, but they are designed to be insensitive so that the tests
identify only the most impaired. In fact, the insensitivity favors those
who are stopped.
It is also true that some of the SFSTs have subjective elements.That is
why the tests are standardized, systematic and fairly easy to score, so that
subjectivity is reduced. Also, to counter this argument, highlight the officer’s
experience and training.
CLAIM: SFSTs don’t test impairment. My client did well on some tasks,
didn’t he? So what does the test really test if he can do some and not the
others but still fail?
RESPONSE: Remind the jury at every opportunity that driving is the
complex integration of many different skills and faculties: the eyes, the
feet, the hands, the brain.We do most of that integration without ever
thinking about it. SFSTs mirror the divided attention skills necessary to
operate a car and examine whether the divided attention skills of the
defendant were impaired to a point to affect his driving ability.
These defense questions also open the door for questions during redirect
to the officer about why he does the SFSTs. He can explain SFSTs and
the concept of divided attention tasks, which test whether a person can
do two things at the same time—two tasks much simpler than driving. If
not, how can that person engage safely in the much more complex task
of driving?
Attacking Breath Test Instruments and Their Results
CLAIM: The officer didn’t follow the rules for administering the test. Officer,
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you’re supposed to watch my client for 15 minutes before giving him the
test? But you had to type his name and other information into the
machine before giving the test? You didn’t look at him while you typed,
did you? So you looked away and violated the rule, didn’t you?
RESPONSE:Virtually every state that uses some breath-testing instrument
has made administrative rules governing how to give the test and
maintain the machine.The first response to these attacks is to simply
know your state’s rules.
Second, remember that the rules exist to ensure the accuracy, and therefore,
the relevancy and admissibility of the test.When the defendant
makes challenges like this, the appropriate response is to ask how the
alleged violation affects the accuracy of the test.
For example, officers are often required to observe defendants for a prescribed
time period before a breath test.The defendant will argue that if
the officer looks away for even the briefest time, the test must be thrown
out because the officer violated the rules. Does that mean the test is inaccurate?
If so, is it because the defendant had something to eat or drink, or
he threw up while the officer looked away? Many of the new breath testing
machines have technology sophisticated enough to detect mouth alcohol,
including a quick shot of mouthwash. Of course, most breath tests are
given in the jail, where there isn’t anything to eat or drink on hand.The
waiting period ensures that nothing gets tested other than the defendant’s
BAC. Unless the defendant can show that there’s a reasonable chance that
he ate or drank something or regurgitated during the officer’s brief glance
away this momentary lapse is a violation in only the most technical sense.
CLAIM: Other substances can cause a positive result for alcohol: You’re aware,
aren’t you, that other things, like having diabetes, can cause the machine
to show that people are drunk when they’re not? Even white bread will
show that a person’s been drinking?
RESPONSE: It is often heard that everyday foods like white bread and
M&Ms will give a false reading, and officers must be able to testify that
nothing was in the defendant’s mouth before he took the test.
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CLAIM:The test is not accurate because the results can be affected by
Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease (GERD), in which stomach acid contains
alcohol and is brought into the mouth through the esophagus.This creates
an artificially high BAC reading.
RESPONSE: Studies have shown this is a myth.The epiglottis actually
closes when a person blows into the instrument, blocking stomach acid
from being released. Also, unless the defendant has GERD, these questions
are not even relevant. For more information, see www.gerd.com.
CLAIM: The test is inherently inaccurate. Someone tests the machine with a
solution that has a known alcohol content and keeps records of that? That
solution is supposed to be at .10, but the records show that solution sometimes
reads more or less than that? Therefore, the machine is inaccurate.
RESPONSE:There is no evidence that the instrument’s tests are inaccurate
when administered properly. In every state, the breath test instrument (or
any other testing instrument, for that matter) must be periodically tested for
accuracy and calibrated to return accurate results. Records of those tests will
often reveal that the instrument’s reading of known sample varies from that
known value. Usually that variance is quite small; for instance, a test sample
known to have a concentration of .10 may result in a reading of .101 or
.098.The defense argues that the results cannot be trusted because the
machine cannot even give an accurate reading on a known sample.
This can be a persuasive argument. It may be fruitless to argue to a jury
the concept of measurements within a scientific tolerance. It’s equally
challenging to talk in terms of statistically significant differences. Some
jurors may ignore the test results entirely once they learn about the variance
in known sample tests. It may be difficult to persuade them with
scientific chatter.
Now is the time to pose logical questions to the jury. Let’s say the instrument
did give an inaccurate reading. How inaccurate does the defendant
say the reading is? Does he really say he had no alcohol, and the reading
is entirely false? The only evidence is that the reading varied from the
known sample by what, .001?
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Let’s subtract .001 from his test results. Is that what the reading is? So,
he’s still over the legal limit.
Let’s be real fair and subtract twice that amount (or more if your case
will bear it). Is that the reading?
CLAIM: The test is gender biased. Is it not true that the machine will read
higher for a woman than a man if they both drink the same amount? If a
man and a woman are given the same amount of alcohol to drink, and
then given a breath test after the same period of time, the woman’s BAC
results will be higher, right? Therefore, the machine is biased against
women, isn’t it?
RESPONSE:This is an example of a fallacious conclusion built upon an
accurate premise. It is true in some cases, that a woman’s BAC will be higher
than a man’s after drinking the same amount of alcohol.The instrument
is accurately measuring that difference. On average,women have a higher
percentage of body fat than men. Fat cells do not contain a great deal of
water, and alcohol is completely water soluble.Therefore,women will not
metabolize alcohol like men, who have a higher percentage of body water.
(See APRI Special Topic Series, Alcohol Toxicology for Prosecutors.) The obvious
question is: just how inaccurate is the test? How much higher is its
reading for women? And, does that matter if the test provides an accurate
reading of her blood alcohol concentration? Use the same argument that
refutes the “inaccurate test of a known sample” defense.
More to the point, refocus the case on the real issue—impairment. If the
BAC is .08, the driver is legally deemed impaired. It doesn’t matter if the
BAC belongs to a man or a woman, the impairment is still there.The bias
is not in the instrument, but in the physiological differences between men
and women.
Attacking Officer’s Finding of Impairment
CLAIM:As a [friend / girlfriend / boyfriend / family member / family
minister, etc. ], I can testify that I did not think the defendant was impaired,
and if I thought he was, I would never have let my loved one leave the
[barbecue, reception, reunion, swimming pool, restaurant, bar, etc.].
D E F E N S E S I N I M PA I R E D D R I V I N G C A S E S
21
RESPONSE: Bringing in another person to dispute the officer’s ultimate
finding that the defendant was impaired is a popular tactic for defense
attorneys who wish to present the defendant’s version of the case to the
jury without having the defendant actually testify.
If the witness testifies that he did not think the defendant was impaired, he
opens the door to a line of questioning about what the defendant looks like
when he is impaired.Ask the witness how much it takes to get the defendant
impaired.Ask how the witness knows when the defendant is impaired.
This is a line of questioning where the answers can help you. If the witness
says he can tell by looking, so can the police or the citizens who saw
the defendant. If he says that the defendant slurs his speech or staggers or
has trouble driving, then that may confirm previous testimony by your
witnesses. If the witness testifies that the defendant was not impaired
because he was not passed out, then you can argue that the witness
defines impairment differently than the law does. Rather than discredit
this witness, you get farther by making him an unwitting witness for you.
Other Resources Available
For more help with common impaired driving defenses, be sure to check
out other publications in the APRI Special Topic Series, such as Crash
Reconstruction Basics for Prosecutors,The Admissibility of Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus Evidence and Alcohol Toxicology for Prosecutors. These publications
and more are available online at www.ndaa-apri.org. Click on NTLC—
Traffic Law.
APRI’s National Traffic Law Center also provides research, training and
technical assistance on a wide range of topics related to the prosecution
of impaired driving cases. Brief banks and expert witness databanks are
available on both prosecution and defense witnesses. Contact NTLC at
703.549.4253 or trafficlaw@ndaa-apri.org.
O V E R C O M I N G I M PA I R E D D R I V I N G D E F E N S E S
22 AM E R I CAN P ROSECUTORS RE S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Conclusion
DUI prosecutions are among the most difficult criminal cases a prosecutor
can handle.They almost always involve technical testimony, scientific
testimony and juror empathy. Sometimes, too, they involve a dedicated,
experienced, skilled and knowledgeable defense counsel who has done
his or her homework on this and many other cases.The people we represent
deserve nothing less from us. Hopefully, this guidance will enable
you to present your case more skillfully and professionally.
D E F E N S E S I N I M PA I R E D D R I V I N G C A S E S
23
American Prosecutors Research Institute
99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510
Alexandria,Virginia 22314
Phone: (703) 549-4253
Fax: (703) 836-3195
http://www.ndaa-apri.org

Here's another example of how California DUI attorneys are usually out-resourced on every case. Do the DUI Prosecutors typically respect folks' space, liberty, dignity? Abdication is apparently not the same as professional. This is a war started by new prohibitionists, and each side must gird his or her loins aggressively to fight it, or must get out of the way of those willing, able, and fiercely dedicated to do so. The Marquise of Queensbury rules do not limit the Hun in their depredations. The comprehensive training and financial resources that California DUI Prosecuting lawyers have available to win is remarkable.

California DUI Prosecuting Lawyers information

California DUI defense lawyers are protecting the constitutional
rights of those charged with a California DUI.

California DUI Prosecuting Attorneys try their best to convict people
charged with a California DUI. Here's more of their powerful influence:

California DUI Prosecuting Attorneys' Association newsletter

Vol. 12, Nos. 3 & 4 (June 30, 2007) 1
C A L I F O R N I A D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y S A S S O C I A T I O N


California’s Traffic Safety Resource
Prosecutor (TSRP) Program
The New Arsenal for DUI Prosecution

Audrey crashed her car into a Jack in the Box fast-food
restaurant. It was not her first time driving under the
influence, but it was her first time getting caught.
Thankfully, no one was injured. The price tag on her DUI
conviction, including property damage, was several thousand
dollars. She also spent four memorable days in jail.
According to Audrey, now an example to her friends, the
conviction changed her mindset permanently. “I don’t
recommend it. I definitely won’t risk it again,” she says.
REDUCE, RESPOND, RESOURCE
In a nationwide Gallup poll, over 90 percent of
respondents cited a jail sentence as one of the best methods to
reduce DUIs.1 This is not surprising. Like Audrey, most
people respond to consequences. A greater likelihood of
conviction is particularly effective, since it not only deters
offenders but also serves as an example to an offender’s peer
group. Prosecutors and investigators are thus in a crucial
battle in the war against DUI crimes. And the new California
Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor (TSRP) program will
provide them with the support they need to prevail.
Similar statewide TSRP programs are springing up
across the nation. In 2000, fewer than five states had a TSRP
program; now there are 28 states with plans for more.2 There
is a clear nationwide agenda to reduce traffic deaths by
combating DUI crimes, and California is building the most
comprehensive program to date.
Funding for the program was provided by a grant from
the California Office of Traffic Safety through the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The grant was
awarded to the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office
with the California District Attorneys Association
implementing the program. Now that funding has arrived,
California’s TSRP program is unveiling the new arsenal for
combating DUI crimes—extensive training, expanded
resources, and expert mentoring.
BASIC TRAINING & BEYOND
The new training schedule is impressive. One-day
seminars on toxicology, collision reconstruction, search and
seizure, and other DUI-related topics will be offered. Trial
advocacy and expert testimony seminars will also be
conducted emphasizing the latest in standardized field
sobriety tests, breath testing devices, defense attorney tactics,
Murder in the Second Degree for
Multitasking Drunk Driver
W hile on duty the early morning of October 9,
2005, 29-year-old Rocklin Police Officer Matthew
Redding lost his life. Officer Redding had set up
cones to divert traffic off of a highway to assist other officers
making a felony stop. As he stood near his fully illuminated
patrol car diverting traffic with his flashlight, a truck moved
through the cone pattern, struck him, throwing him 75 feet
away, and continued on passing 12 other police vehicles.
California Highway Patrol Officers, not knowing Officer
Redding had been hit, spotted the truck driven by Eric
Dungan. Based on the extensive damage to the truck, CHP
officers believed the driver had just been involved in a hitand-
run collision. The CHP officers attempted to pull Dungan
over. Despite the officers’ attempts, Dungan did not stop until
he was 1.2 miles from the collision scene. At the time of the
traffic stop, the CHP officers learned that Officer Redding had
been struck, and immediately arrested Dungan. He was taken
to the Roseville Police Department where the officers
conducted a DUI investigation. Dungan was advised of his
Miranda rights and initially invoked those rights. During the
booking process, however, Dungan waived his rights.
Dungan was then questioned regarding his consumption
of alcohol and his evening leading up to the collision.
Members of the CHP Valley Division Multidisciplinary
Accident Investigation Team were dispatched to the collision
scene, the location of Dungan’s car, and the Roseville Police
Department. MAIT investigators processed the collision
scene, documenting and collecting more than 300 items of
physical evidence. MAIT investigators also interviewed
Dungan for 3.5 hours, the group that was with Dungan, the
employees of the establishments Dungan visited that night,
the officers present at the felony stop, and additional
witnesses.
“I WAS OK TO DRIVE”
Through their investigation, they learned that earlier that
night, Dungan began his evening with a group at a local
restaurant. He and the group then went to a local bar where
they drank some more. When the bar closed, the group went
to a private home for drinks, stopping at a gas station to
purchase additional alcohol. Dungan took a taxi back to his
truck, and although the taxi driver warned him not to, he
drove his truck. Dungan testified, “I felt like I was under the
influence, but I felt like I was OK to drive home. I hadn’t had
a drink for a while. It wasn’t very far.”1 Initially, Dungan
claimed he thought he had hit a dog, a bird, or a sign. He
continued on page 4 continued on page 5
2 CDAA Behind the Wheel
CDAA Officers
President
John R. Poyner
Colusa County
First Vice President
Bonnie Dumanis
San Diego County
Second Vice President
Gary Lieberstein
Napa County
Secretary/Treasurer
Michael A. Ramos
San Bernardino County
Sergeant-at-Arms
Robert Kochly
Contra Costa County
Past President
Gerald T. Shea
San Luis Obispo County
Board of Directors
Carl Adams
Sutter County
Phillip Cline
Tulare County
Elizabeth Egan
Fresno County
Suzanne Gazzaniga
Placer County
Karen Guidotti
San Mateo County
Kamala Harris
San Francisco County
Thomas A. Johnson
Sacramento County
William Mitchell
Riverside County
Nancy O’Malley
Alameda County
Laura Tanney
San Diego County
Glenn Yabuno
San Bernardino County
CDAA Chief Executive Officer
W. Scott Thorpe
Publications Director
Thomas P. Toller
Editor
Lauren Horwood
Research Attorney/Editor
Ann Carroll
Production Artist
Gina Kelly
CDAA’s Mission
To promote justice by enhancing
prosecutorial excellence.
continued on next page
Case Law Update
PEOPLE V. CRANE (2006) 142 CAL.APP.4TH 425 (2DCA, DIV. 6)
FACTS: Defendant admitted a prior driving-while-ability-impaired conviction in Colorado.
As a result, defendant’s sentence for a California DUI conviction was enhanced. Defendant
argued that the wrongful act in Colorado, if committed in California, would not have been a
violation and thus should not be used for sentence enhancement purposes.
HOLDING: While conviction for a DUI in California requires a person to be unable to drive
a vehicle with the same caution as a sober person, Colorado’s charge of driving while ability
impaired requires that a person’s ability to drive be slightly impaired. Since the standard for
the California statute is so much higher than the Colorado statute, defendant would not have
been convicted in California had he committed the same acts. The trial court erred in
allowing defendant’s Colorado conviction to enhance his California punishment.
GLATMAN V. VALVERDE (2006) 146 CAL.APP.4TH 700 (4DCA, DIV. 3)
FACTS: Defendant failed multiple field sobriety tests during a traffic stop for speeding. The
Sheriff-Coroner’s office conducted two tests on a blood sample taken from defendant one
hour after his arrest, resulting in BACs of 0.137 and 0.135. At an administrative hearing,
defendant objected to the DMV’s use of the forensic report. He argued that since the report
was certified by the analysts an entire week after tests, it was not “made at or near the time of
the act, condition or event” and therefore constituted hearsay. The trial court ruled that the
forensic report was inadmissible as hearsay. The DMV appealed.
HOLDING: The test for determining whether or not certifying test results after an
examination becomes hearsay is whether the time span between those two events creates a
danger of inaccuracy by lapse of memory. As the DMV offered no evidence that the bloodalcohol
content of defendant on the night of his arrest was recorded at any time prior to the
certification of the forensic report, the evidence on record suggests that the analysts had to
retain knowledge of defendant’s blood-alcohol content for a week, creating a danger of
inaccuracy by lapse of memory. Therefore, the forensic report is inadmissible as hearsay.
RITSCHEL V. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY (2006)137 CAL.APP.4TH 107 (4DCA, DIV. 3)
REVIEW DEN. MAY 17, 2006
FACTS: Defendant claimed his civil rights under federal and state law were violated when
several police officers used force to obtain a blood sample after he was arrested for driving
under the influence. An officer stopped defendant after observing him violate several traffic
laws. Defendant failed several field sobriety tests and repeatedly used his tongue to block the
breathalyzer while pretending to breathe into it. The officer finally got two readings on
defendant’s BAC—both above the legal limit. Defendant was arrested and taken to the police
station where he was not offered a choice between the blood and breath tests. After several
unsuccessful attempts to get defendant to voluntarily take a blood test, officers handcuffed
him to a chair while a technician took a blood sample.
HOLDING: The officers’ failure to comply with requirements of the state’s implied consent
law by failing to advise defendant of his testing choices did not amount to a violation of
defendant’s federal constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
evidence shows that police had probable cause to arrest defendant for violating traffic stops
and having a BAC well above the legal limit. Although a Fourteenth Amendment violation
might exist in cases where a state-created right is arbitrarily abrogated, this is not one of
those cases. Defendant’s rights were not violated by a suspension of driving privileges
because he failed to prove he was subjected to that statutory penalty, and at the time of the
arrest, his driving privileges were already suspended.
PEOPLE V. BELLACOSA (2007) 147 CAL.APP.4TH 868 (3DCA)
REVIEW DEN. MAY 9, 2007 (CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION)
FACTS: Defendant, who had eluded pursuing officers in California by crossing into Nevada,
was apprehended and convicted in Nevada of misdemeanor DUI and attempting to elude
officers in Nevada. Defendant was also charged in California with felony DUI and eluding a
peace officer while driving with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons and
June 30, 2007 3
CASE UPDATE from previous page
property. At his arraignment, defendant entered a plea of once
in jeopardy, and the magistrate dismissed the complaint
holding that the California charges were precluded by Penal
Code section 656.
HOLDING: Defendant’s convictions in Nevada for his
conduct in Nevada did not preclude his prosecution in
California for his conduct in California. California
prosecutions are barred by a prior conviction or acquittal in
another jurisdiction if the same physical acts are necessary for
conviction in each jurisdiction. If the offense charged in
another jurisdiction requires proof of physical acts different
from the physical acts that constitute the offense charged in
California, then the California prosecution is not barred.
Defendant’s conduct in California stopped at the border. In
California, defendant drove under the influence of alcohol
while evading a California peace officer, while in Nevada, he
drove while intoxicated and tried to elude Nevada peace
officers. The conduct at issue in California was not at issue in
Nevada, and thus precluded the application of the prior
conviction or acquittal defense.
PEOPLE V. PERDOMO (2006) 147 CAL.APP.4TH 605
(2DCA, DIV. 7) REVIEW DEN. MAY 9, 2007
FACTS: Defendant crashed his car into a concrete divider on
the freeway after a night of drinking. Defendant and one
passenger were seriously injured; the other was killed in the
collision. Four days after the accident, officers interviewed
defendant in the hospital. During a 20-minute recorded
interview, defendant initially lied to the police, telling them
he had not been driving, and then later admitted he was the
driver. Defendant moved to exclude the inculpatory
statements made during the interview. The court found that
defendant’s statements were voluntary, and the jury went on
to convict defendant of felony vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated, driving under the influence of alcohol resulting in
bodily injury to a person other than the driver, and driving
with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater resulting
in bodily injury to a person other than the driver.
HOLDING: Statements made to the officers while defendant
was sedated and recovering in the hospital were voluntary. In
order to determine whether a statement is voluntary, the court
must examine the “uncontradicted facts surrounding the
making of the statements to determine … whether the
prosecution met its burden and proved that the statements
were … given without previous inducement, intimidation or
threat.” (Citations omitted.) Defendant never asked for the
20-minute interview to end, the audiotape suggests that the
police officers were quiet and calm in their questioning, and
defendant was alert enough to attempt to deceive the officers
and provide the name of his employer and his work phone
number. Nothing in the record suggests the police officers
overcame or subdued defendant’s will in any way.
Defendant’s statements to the police, although from a hospital
bed, were completely voluntary.
Legislative Update
Set forth below are summaries reflecting the current
language and status of selected legislation from the
2007 legislative session that is relevant to investigating
and prosecuting individuals who drive under the influence. To
access any of the bills in full-text format, log on to
California’s official Web site for legislative information
(www.leginfo.ca.gov).
ACTIVE BILLS
AB 808 (Parra) – Signed Declaration
Adds Vehicle Code section 13385, which would require all
driver’s license application and renewal forms to include a
requirement that the applicant sign a declaration regarding the
potential dangers of driving under the influence and the
potential charges that could result from killing a person as a
result of driving under the influence. Status: Hearing in the
Senate Transportation and Housing Committee on July 3,
2007.
AB 1165 (Maze) – DUI Probation
Adds Vehicle Code section 23154, which would make it
unlawful for a person who is on probation for a violation of
section 23152 or 23153 to operate a motor vehicle at any time
with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.01 percent or greater.
Status: Hearing in the Senate Public Safety Committee on
July 10, 2007.
TWO-YEAR BILLS
AB 247 (Gaines) – Vehicular Manslaughter Committed by a
Minor While Intoxicated
Amends Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 to add
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated to the list of
enumerated crimes for which a minor 14 years of age or older
can be tried as an adult. Status: Failed passage in the
committee. Reconsideration granted.
AB 1198 (Benoit) – Local Government Response Costs
Adds Penal Code section 53150.5, which would authorize
local government entities to recover the reasonable costs of
responding to a person operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
Status: Held on submission in committee.
AB 1416 (Runner) – Child Endangerment
Amends Penal Code section 237a to expand the crime of
child endangerment to a situation where an operator of a
motor vehicle violates Vehicle Code section 23152 or 23153,
and a child is a passenger in that vehicle at the time of the
violation. The punishment for such a violation would be
imprisonment in a county jail for not less than 90 days nor
more than one year or by imprisonment in state prison for
two, four, or six years. Status: Failed passage in committee.
Reconsideration granted.
4 CDAA Behind the Wheel
and newly developed prosecutorial courtroom strategies.
Each training seminar will cover a single DUI-related topic
and host a DUI prosecutors’ roundtable. These seminars will
be held in each of the five TSRP geographic areas and will
emphasize strategies that have had a high record of success in
California. In addition to the seminar training schedule, there
will be a two and one-half day DUI intensive training course
offered annually and a one-time special training event to
enable prosecutors to become familiar with the California
Highway Patrol’s members and resources.
WEAPONS OF MASS INSTRUCTION
Greater resource accessibility will complement the
trainings. All TSRP training materials will be distributed as a
CD-ROM and as a podcast for those who want to review the
materials or who could not make it to
the seminar. Resource databanks will
also be available throughout the
state, with one large, central resource
bank at CDAA’s Sacramento office.
These resource banks will contain
relevant pleadings, case law digests,
legal writings, and scientific data.
Additionally, there will soon be an
interactive Web site exclusively for
DUI prosecutors. This site will
include the latest in case law developments, technical and
issue-based developments, and notices of upcoming seminars
and other training opportunities. It will also contain lists of
forensic DUI experts, collision reconstruction experts, mentor
prosecutors, physicians, and toxicologists. Finally, the site
will be interactive, providing DUI prosecutors an online
forum to communicate with one another. In addition to the
Web site’s myriad resources, a quarterly newsletter related to
DUI enforcement and prosecution will be published for
prosecutors and court personnel.
BOOTS ON THE GROUND
Perhaps most importantly, one specially trained and
experienced DUI prosecutor will be assigned to each of the
five regions: Northern California, the Central Valley, the
Inland Empire, Southern California, and the Coastal Region.
Each regional TSRP will be dedicated solely to the TSRP
program and the task of guiding and mentoring local
prosecutors. The TSRPs will personally contact every DUI
prosecutor within their region to discuss the program, and
will work with those prosecutors to implement a vertical
prosecution program involving DUI cases where the
defendant did not have a driver’s license or the defendant’s
driver’s license was suspended or revoked. Finally, TSRP
mentors will be available to field urgent questions on DUI
issues and, under certain circumstances, provide courtroom
support.
CDAA is currently seeking highly qualified individuals
to staff the program, including the expert TSRPs. In the
meantime, DUI prosecutors should contact TSRP Director
Creg Datig or, for those in the Central Valley—that region’s
TSRP—Stewart Hicks, for those in San Diego and the Inland
Empire TSRP Dan Hicks (see the end of this article for
contact info).
The three-faceted arsenal of the TSRP Program—
extensive training, expanded resources, and expert
mentoring—will both decrease DUI crimes in the long run
and support the administration of justice in general.
Increasing conviction rates translates into arresting more
guilty offenders and administering the just consequences. The
value of such consequences is evident—motorists like Audrey
will no longer crash into fast-food
joints as a result of drinking and
driving. But more importantly,
heightened enforcement and
consequences will foster a culture
where people think twice before
getting behind the wheel under the
influence in the first place. More
convictions result in fewer future
DUI offenders. That is why TSRP
programs are springing up across
United States. And with the most comprehensive program in
the nation, California is prepared to lead the way.
Creg Datig: (951) 342-3322, cdatig2@cdaa.org
Stewart Hicks: (559) 488-3046, stewart.hicks@ca-tsrp.org
Daniel Fox: (619) 531-4042, dan.fox@ca-tsrp.org
Mason Winters is a graduating senior at San Diego State
University and an intern for CDAA’s Publications Department. Mr.
Winters will embark on his law school career this fall at the
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law.
Endnotes:
1. The Gallup Organization, Drinking and Driving in
America (2005) MADDNationwideGallupSurvey_DrunkDriving_2005.pdf>
[as of May 7, 2007].
2. Thomas Robertson, NAPC and NDAA—A Growing
Partnership, The Prosecutor 40, no. 5 (2006) www.ndaa.org/publications/ndaa/
napc_ndaa_sept_oct_2006.html> [as of May 7, 2007].
TSRP continued from page 1
TSRP mentors will be
available to field urgent
questions on DUI issues.
June 30, 2007 5
ultimately admitted that he saw Officer Redding in the
roadway with his hands outstretched and thought, “What is he
doing here?” He continued to drive from the collision scene
because “he just wanted to go home.” Forensics experts
estimated Dungan’s BAC of 0.18 would result after about 15
drinks during the evening. At the time of the collision,
Dungan was wearing iPod headphones, sending a text
message to a friend, and “looking up occasionally,” according
to his testimony.
Before the night of the collision, Dungan had been
stopped once on suspicion of drunken driving. While in the
Air Force, Dungan attended hundreds of weekly safety
sessions where he and the other attendees were cautioned
about the dangers of drinking and driving.
WHAT TO CHARGE?
After receiving the MAIT investigation report, the Placer
County District Attorney’s Office had to decide what charges
to file. If they were to file under Penal Code § 187, they
would have to prove implied malice. The evaluation led to
some disturbing facts:
• Dungan was a multitasking drunk driver with a
BAC of 0.18
• he was educated regarding DUIs while in the military
• he had personal experiences with DUI
• his BAC indicated he had consumed at least 15 drinks
• he disregarded the cab driver’s warnings
• at the timing of the warnings, Dungan had a cab
• he left the victim for dead and was stopped more than
one mile away after driving past 12 other police
vehicles.
After taking these facts into consideration, the DA’s
Office concluded that Dungan had intentionally acted, the
natural consequence of the act was dangerous to life, he knew
his act was dangerous to life, and he deliberately acted with
conscious disregard for human life.
Dungan was charged with second-degree murder, gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and an allegation
of fleeing the scene. The defense argued that the case was
about the degree being charged. They claimed Dungan was
guilty of vehicular manslaughter—not second-degree murder.
NEUTRALIZING THE DEFENSE
In preparation for the trial, the DA investigator assigned
to the case interviewed and re-interviewed more than 60
witnesses with the prosecutors. Through their investigation,
they were able to neutralize key defense witnesses, including
the defense expert toxicologist. These witnesses never took
the stand. As a result, the only witness the defense called was
the defendant. It was also discovered that Dungan had been
drinking to intoxication while out on bail. His bail was
revoked as a result.
At trial, Placer County Deputy District Attorneys Dan
Gong and Joe Hoffmann were able to admit evidence of the
extensive training the defendant received in the Air Force
about the dangers of driving under the influence, defendant’s
prior incidents of driving under the influence (People v.
Garcia (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 1832), three warnings—only
seconds before Dungan turned the key—to not drive due to
his intoxication, and his prior experiences with other vehicle
injury accidents involving alcohol. They were able to show
how the defendant’s behavior changed as he consumed more
alcohol through the evening. A taped interview of Dungan
after the collision was shown.
Dungan’s untruthful statement to the news media was
admissible (Consciousness of Guilt, CALCRIM 362) as was
evidence of Dungan fleeing the scene because it was relevant
and admissible to prove implied malice (Evid. Code
§ 1101(b); People v. Ward (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 241). Even
though the defense was willing to stipulate, a photograph of
Officer Redding was admitted to prove the identity of the
victim (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381). Hoffmann
also contacted CDAA TSRP Director Creg Datig for input.
Gong and Hoffmann used visual presentations, including
many MAIT diagrams.
WANTON DISREGARD FOR LIFE
Deputy District Attorneys Dan Gong and Joe Hoffmann
pointed out the wanton disregard for life Dungan displayed
that night and the many lies he had told since. Dungan had
repeatedly been told of the effects of drinking and driving; a
cab driver warned him that night that the condition he was in
would impair his ability to drive; and he was wearing
headphones and sending text messages while driving. After
six hours of deliberations, the jury agreed and convicted
Dungan of second-degree murder on March 14, 2007. On
April 26, 2007, Dungan was sentenced to 15 years to life in
prison.
Information for this article was taken from presentations by CHP
Officer David Dowty of the Valley Division MAIT Team and Placer
County Deputy District Attorney Joe Hoffmann at CDAA’s Vehicular
Homicide Seminar in May 2007. Thank you Dave and Joe.
Endnotes:
1. “Fatal Cop Crash Defendant Testifies,” News 10, www.news10.net/
printfullstory.aspx?storyid=25223, 3/12/2007.
Additional tidbits:
• In the last ten years: 146 law enforcement officers
nationwide have died after being struck by a vehicle
while outside their own vehicle; 471 law enforcement
officers died in vehicle accidents; and 71 law
enforcement officers died in motorcycle accidents.
• Approximately 220 officers nationwide have been killed
in automobile or motorcycle accidents caused by drunk
drivers. An additional 210 officers were killed by drunk
drivers while standing outside their vehicles. Within the
CHP, 36 officers have been fatally struck by vehicles
while on roadsides since 1938. In the last two years
alone, three of the seven fallen officers died in that
manner and two died after their vehicle was struck.
Sacramento Bee 3/14/07 (A risky routine for officers: Traffic stops, by Kim
Minugh)
SECOND DEGREE continued from page 1
California District Attorneys Association
731 K Street, Third Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814-3402
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SACRAMENTO, CA
PERMIT NO. 1826
Behind the Wheel is published quarterly, and made possible by Grant
Number LT 0407-1059 the California Governor’s Office of
Emergency Services, Criminal Justice Programs Division and
supported by Grant Number 2003–DB–BX–0013, awarded by the
Edward Byrne Fund, U.S. Department of Justice. Funding for this
publication was also provided by a grant from the California Office of
Traffic Safety through the Business, Transportation & Housing
Agency. The opinions, findings, and conclusions herein are those of
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of CDAA, OES, OTS
and/or the U.S. Department of Justice. CDAA, OES, OTS, and the
U.S. Department of Justice reserve a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and
irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, and use the materials
contained in this publication and to authorize others to do so.
T he California District Attorneys Association presented
its Vehicular Homicide Seminar on May 15–18, 2007
in San Diego.
We are fortunate to have stellar core instructors who
never cease to amaze the attendees and are eager to hang
around and answer any questions.
The course began with CDAA’s own TSRP Director
Creg Datig giving an overview of Vehicular Homicide. Here,
Creg provided information on charging considerations,
common defenses, and gross vs. simple negligence. Just
watching Creg instruct, it is clear why he was given CDAA’s
2003 Instructor of the Year Award. And with 20 vehicular
murder convictions under his belt, there is no doubt that he
knows what he’s talking about.
After Creg left the audience speechless with his vast
knowledge of the subject area, we brought in nationally
recognized collision reconstructionist expert John
Kwasnoski. John has a unique way of answering the
questions, “Why do I need to know this?” and “What do
those equations mean?” that leaves his audience wanting to
get the next defense collision report in order to debunk it.
We began the second day with Drug Recognition Expert
Consultant Tom Page. Tom is retired from the Los Angeles
Police Department and was instrumental in the development
of the DRE program that was made into a statewide program
through the California Highway Patrol. Tom showed the
attendees how to prove impairment in drug vehicular
homicides, which can be difficult.
Creg followed with a section on Trial Tactics, which
included cross-examination of experts. This year, we
included a section on Dealing with the Media. Public
Information Officers Lana Wyatt (Riverside County) and
Susan Mickey (San Bernardino County) provided great
pointers for handling the media in these and other types of
cases.
For the first time, we included a case scenario group
workshop. With Creg giving a direct examination of a defense
expert, played by John, each group was tasked with crossexamining
him on a different issue. The groups were so
excited to try and trip John up that many worked through
their break. The exercise was great and the attendees were
able to learn a lot from John, who played the part very well.
The final day, we heard from Sergeant Dean
Reichenberg, of the California Highway Patrol. Dean gave an
update of the Traffic Accident Reconstruction Specialist
Program and some exciting new technology the CHP will be
using in their Multidisciplinary Accident Investigation Team
(MAIT) offices.
Wrapping up the seminar, we brought in San Diego
County Deputy District Attorney Blaine Bowman who gave a
case profile of a vehicular manslaughter case he handled and
the difficulties that arose during that trial. Placer County
Deputy District Attorney and CHP MAIT Officer David
Dowty profiled a vehicular homicide case (see article on
page 1). This section of case studies allowed the attendees to
see the different ways what they have learned throughout the
seminar can practically be applied.
If we missed you at the seminar this year, we’ll be
bringing it back next year. In fact, we will be holding a oneday
Driving Under the Influence Prosecutions Seminar in
April 2008 in San Diego and a one-day DUI Toxicology
Seminar, which will preceed the Vehicular Homicide Seminar
in June 2008 in South Lake Tahoe, California. Check the
Training Schedule due for release in late August for details
and additionally scheduled programs. Also check the TSRP
Web site for topics and dates of the regional trainings
(www.cdaa.org/tsrp/index.asp).

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Friday, February 1, 2008

DUI lawyers go after source code in Kentucky

Premier California DUI attorney update

A Kentucky man charged with DUI drunk driving asks manufacturer of Breathalyzer-like test for the DUI machine source code, a request that both the company and the state attorney general claim is unreasonable. The appeals court reverses ruling of two lower courts, saying the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN must be turned over.

For many years, DUI police and prosecutors have told judges that breath tests are able to provide incontrovertible proof that a defendant violated laws against DUI drunk driving.

But now some DUI defendants are fighting back. In Minnesota last year the state supreme court ordered that the source code be revealed. That follows a 2005 DUI prosecution in Florida in which the defense also won the right to inspect the source. In some cases, prosecutors have dropped DUI charges rather than turn over the source code.

The most recent DUI case involves a Kentucky man named Lennie G. House, who was charged with DUI operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, with additional penalties for allegedly having an alcohol concentration of 0.18 or higher. House failed a DUI breath test given by the closed-source Intoxilyzer 5000EN, which is manufactured by CMI of Owensboro, Ky., and is one of the most popular alcohol level-testing devices used by DUI police nationwide.

House was charged with DUI on March 8, 2006. Four months later, his DUI attorney requested that prosecutors turn over the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. When the state attorney general did not comply, the DUI defense attorney sent a subpoena for the source code directly to CMI. Computer source code is, of course, a series of human-readable instructions that are eventually compiled into the object code that a computer executes.

Access to the source code is key. Without it, a DUI Breathalyzer-like device is a black box that can determine a defendant's guilt without being subject to independent scrutiny or evaluation. Inspection of the DUI source code can discover programming mistakes or even intentional skewing.

Both CMI and the state attorney general, Jack Conway, opposed the subpoena for the source code--which led the defense counsel to ask the trial judge to suppress the results of the breath test in their entirety. In September 2006, a DUI trial judge sided with prosecutors, and four months later, a circuit court did too.

House appealed once again, this time to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. By a 2-to-1 margin, the court agreed that requesting the source code--as long as confidentiality procedures were followed--was not unreasonable.

Excerpts from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky's opinion:
A subpoena may be quashed only upon a showing that compliance therewith would be unreasonable or oppressive. We do not believe the commonwealth and CMI have made this showing.

The request is not unreasonable because its purpose is to challenge the validity of the breath alcohol readings produced by the Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument, which is anticipated to be used at trial in support of the Commonwealth's DUI charge against House. The reading was also used to support the aggravating factor of driving with a breath alcohol reading of .18 or more.

Relevant DUI evidence is admissible unless excluded by some other rule. Because a flaw in the DUI computer source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000 would be consequential to the accuracy of the reading intended to be relied upon by the commonwealth, such evidence is relevant and admissible. Accordingly, requesting the computer code to test the verity of the DUI readings produced by the instrument is not unreasonable.

Moreover, the burden upon CMI in producing the code is not oppressive. The record discloses that the DUI code could be copied to a CD-ROM computer disc and produced in that form at minimum expense. It appears that the only other requirement would be that the passwords to access the DUI code would need to be supplied. Thus, the burden of providing the information is minimal, and the expense de minimis. DUI lawyers concur.

The commonwealth and CMI argue, however, that the DUI computer code is a protected trade secret and that this should weigh against disclosure. However, House has expressed his willingness for he, his DUI attorney, and his DUI expert witness to enter into a protective order stipulating that the code or its contents are not to be shared with any party outside of the case.

The district court is authorized to enter such DUI orders. We further note that the order may provide that any copies or work product generated as a result of the software engineer's review be returned to CMI upon completion of the review. As civil and/or criminal penalties could result from the disclosure of the code to other parties, such a protective order should obviate any concern CMI may have with respect to protection of its source code.

The commonwealth and CMI also argue to the effect that the DUI Intoxilyzer 5000 has been previously accepted as scientifically reliable in various appellate court cases, and thus the verity of the Intoxilyzer 5000 has already been determined to be established. A review of these DUI cases, however, discloses that the issue herein was not squarely addressed in any of those DUI cases. We find nothing in those DUI cases which provide that the computer source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000 is above challenge. As such, they were unpersuaded by this argument.

DUI attorneys in California watch closely although the 5000 has been phased on locally. More articles can be found at www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net .